stage2: rework /data persistence (XTS, meta_bg) + mkruntime tooling by HarryR · Pull Request #1 · lockboot/stage2

HarryR · 2026-07-12T20:46:52Z

Summary

Reworks stage2 /data persistence and the payload-forging tooling. Net change from main:

/data: dm-crypt aes-xts-plain64 (AES-256-XTS) instead of the planned authenticated dm-integrity + AEAD. Authenticated encryption (no internal hash) makes a never-written sector EIO on read, and ext4 online-resize does read-modify-write of new-group metadata in the region it grows into, so the resize aborts unless the whole grow region is pre-wiped (O(volume), unviable on large volumes). XTS decrypts unwritten sectors to garbage, so resize needs no wipe. Trade: at-rest tamper garbles rather than being detected; media integrity is left to the storage layer, raw-disk adversary out of scope. Key drift still fails closed.
PID 1 owns failure: a fatal boot error logs, waits 60s, then ACPI power-offs, instead of a returning init panicking the kernel and spinning a vCPU.
meta_bg ext4 base for unbounded online growth (no resize= cap / journal bump).
mkruntime.sh built out: env knobs, tar-on-stdin / tar / dir / binary inputs (docker export as an example, not a dependency), <out> as a file or - for stdout, and --bootstrap to emit a ready-to-run packed stage2. Makefile pack uses it.

Verification

make ci green (fmt + clippy -D warnings + tests)
PIVOT_TEST=PASS (config passthrough, attest chain, resize, persist-across-reboot, ephemeral overlay)
GROW_TEST=PASS -- grew /data to ~12 GiB across a meta_bg boundary, no wipe, sparse hole reads zero

Review notes / open threads

meta_bg gives unbounded growth; resize_inode + a resize= cap is the bounded alternative if a hard ceiling is ever wanted.
The dm-verity salt is a single fixed value namespacing the whole tree (not per-node); a Merkle per-node domain-separation review is parked as a separate long-thought.
Backlog (not in this PR): real stage2 TPM quote, docker->erofs make front-end, aarch64, digest-pinned erofs-builder.

Draft for review.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

/data: replace the planned authenticated dm-integrity + dm-crypt AEAD stack with confidentiality-only dm-crypt aes-xts-plain64 (AES-256-XTS). Authenticated encryption has no internal hash, so a never-written sector EIOs on read; ext4 online-resize does read-modify-write of new-group metadata (backup GDT via ext4_setup_new_descs) in the region it grows into, so the resize aborts unless the whole grow region is pre-wiped first -- O(volume), unacceptable on large volumes. XTS decrypts unwritten sectors to garbage instead of erroring, so the resize needs no wipe (the standard LUKS/dm-crypt pattern) and cold-boot cost is independent of volume size. Trade: at-rest tampering garbles plaintext rather than being cryptographically detected -- media integrity is left to the storage layer (EBS et al.), and a raw-disk-write adversary is out of scope. Key drift still fails closed (superblock decrypts to garbage -> no ext4 magic -> reinit). 64-byte TPM-derived key, new key label. loader: as PID 1, own fatal boot errors instead of returning. A returning init panics the kernel ("Attempted to kill init") and spins a vCPU at 100% forever (in prod and the QEMU harness). Now: log, 60s grace for console capture, then a clean ACPI power-off. ext4 /data base: meta_bg (drop resize_inode) for unbounded online growth; no resize= ceiling or journal bump needed. Verified growing to ~12 GiB across a meta_bg boundary with no wipe. mkruntime.sh: env knobs (SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH, DATA_SIZE_MB, ROOTFS_UUID, VERITY_SALT) with reproducible defaults; rootfs input now accepts a tar stream on stdin, a tar file, a directory, or a single binary (docker export documented as an example, not a dependency); <out> is a file path or - for stdout; and --bootstrap prepends the loader ELF to emit a ready-to-run packed stage2. The Makefile pack target uses --bootstrap and forwards the knobs. tests: pivot-init drops the tamper-detection check (property removed with the AEAD stack); add grow-probe (large-volume meta_bg growth + sparse-hole). Prune unused probe examples. make ci green; PIVOT_TEST=PASS and GROW_TEST=PASS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

@epoch

…E restructure Make lockboot:erofs-builder a one-shot CLI: bake tools/mkruntime.sh in as the ENTRYPOINT, so packaging no longer needs a repo bind-mount -- mount just the loader ELF, pipe a rootfs in on stdin, get the stage2 out on stdout. Drop coreutils (busybox covers touch -d @epoch, stat -c, tar, install, awk); output stays byte-identical (same root hash), image 20.3 -> 18.2 MB. Makefile pack passes args straight to the entrypoint. Restructure the README to lead with what it is and how to use it (the mkruntime one-liner with the built bootstrap), and move how-it-boots / security model / testing into a Technical details section. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

## What Bring the stage0 build image and disk layout in line with the Fedora 44 chain bump, plus stable disk identity. ## Changes - **rpm + gnupg** added to `Dockerfile.build` so the UKI build can verify Fedora package GPG signatures (image parity with stage1, kept byte-identical). No effect on compiled artifacts. - **Stable lockboot GPT GUIDs + FAT volume-id.** `DISK_GUID` / `PART_GUID` are now constant across releases (`4c4f434b-424f-4f54-...`, "LOCKBOOT" + a role index), so the initial GPT is byte-stable (stable pre-stage2 PCR5) and the boot disk is identifiable by a fixed GUID rather than by hashing stage0.efi (which changed per release). This is the stable identity stage2's `find_boot_device` can key on. (stage2 still rewrites the GPT at runtime to add p2/p3, which is why it excludes PCR5 from its key binding.) - **Pin `vaportpm-attest` to v0.3.0** (rev + version guard), matching stage1. - **Extract the shared `DOCKER_RUN` harness** into `build.mk` (same refactor as stage1). ## Verification - Reproducible: GUIDs/timestamps fixed; build output byte-stable. - No change to the runtime boot path. Pairs with lockboot/stage1#19 (Fedora 44 kernel/stub) and lockboot/stage2#1. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Clean check-context names (no spaces/parens) so the uniform branch ruleset across the lockboot repos can require the same names everywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

HarryR · 2026-07-12T20:46:52Z

Summary

Reworks stage2 /data persistence and the payload-forging tooling. Net change from main:

/data: dm-crypt aes-xts-plain64 (AES-256-XTS) instead of the planned authenticated dm-integrity + AEAD. Authenticated encryption (no internal hash) makes a never-written sector EIO on read, and ext4 online-resize does read-modify-write of new-group metadata in the region it grows into, so the resize aborts unless the whole grow region is pre-wiped (O(volume), unviable on large volumes). XTS decrypts unwritten sectors to garbage, so resize needs no wipe. Trade: at-rest tamper garbles rather than being detected; media integrity is left to the storage layer, raw-disk adversary out of scope. Key drift still fails closed.
PID 1 owns failure: a fatal boot error logs, waits 60s, then ACPI power-offs, instead of a returning init panicking the kernel and spinning a vCPU.
meta_bg ext4 base for unbounded online growth (no resize= cap / journal bump).
mkruntime.sh built out: env knobs, tar-on-stdin / tar / dir / binary inputs (docker export as an example, not a dependency), <out> as a file or - for stdout, and --bootstrap to emit a ready-to-run packed stage2. Makefile pack uses it.

Verification

make ci green (fmt + clippy -D warnings + tests)
PIVOT_TEST=PASS (config passthrough, attest chain, resize, persist-across-reboot, ephemeral overlay)
GROW_TEST=PASS -- grew /data to ~12 GiB across a meta_bg boundary, no wipe, sparse hole reads zero

Review notes / open threads

meta_bg gives unbounded growth; resize_inode + a resize= cap is the bounded alternative if a hard ceiling is ever wanted.
The dm-verity salt is a single fixed value namespacing the whole tree (not per-node); a Merkle per-node domain-separation review is parked as a separate long-thought.
Backlog (not in this PR): real stage2 TPM quote, docker->erofs make front-end, aarch64, digest-pinned erofs-builder.

Draft for review.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

/data: replace the planned authenticated dm-integrity + dm-crypt AEAD stack with confidentiality-only dm-crypt aes-xts-plain64 (AES-256-XTS). Authenticated encryption has no internal hash, so a never-written sector EIOs on read; ext4 online-resize does read-modify-write of new-group metadata (backup GDT via ext4_setup_new_descs) in the region it grows into, so the resize aborts unless the whole grow region is pre-wiped first -- O(volume), unacceptable on large volumes. XTS decrypts unwritten sectors to garbage instead of erroring, so the resize needs no wipe (the standard LUKS/dm-crypt pattern) and cold-boot cost is independent of volume size. Trade: at-rest tampering garbles plaintext rather than being cryptographically detected -- media integrity is left to the storage layer (EBS et al.), and a raw-disk-write adversary is out of scope. Key drift still fails closed (superblock decrypts to garbage -> no ext4 magic -> reinit). 64-byte TPM-derived key, new key label. loader: as PID 1, own fatal boot errors instead of returning. A returning init panics the kernel ("Attempted to kill init") and spins a vCPU at 100% forever (in prod and the QEMU harness). Now: log, 60s grace for console capture, then a clean ACPI power-off. ext4 /data base: meta_bg (drop resize_inode) for unbounded online growth; no resize= ceiling or journal bump needed. Verified growing to ~12 GiB across a meta_bg boundary with no wipe. mkruntime.sh: env knobs (SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH, DATA_SIZE_MB, ROOTFS_UUID, VERITY_SALT) with reproducible defaults; rootfs input now accepts a tar stream on stdin, a tar file, a directory, or a single binary (docker export documented as an example, not a dependency); <out> is a file path or - for stdout; and --bootstrap prepends the loader ELF to emit a ready-to-run packed stage2. The Makefile pack target uses --bootstrap and forwards the knobs. tests: pivot-init drops the tamper-detection check (property removed with the AEAD stack); add grow-probe (large-volume meta_bg growth + sparse-hole). Prune unused probe examples. make ci green; PIVOT_TEST=PASS and GROW_TEST=PASS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

@epoch

…E restructure Make lockboot:erofs-builder a one-shot CLI: bake tools/mkruntime.sh in as the ENTRYPOINT, so packaging no longer needs a repo bind-mount -- mount just the loader ELF, pipe a rootfs in on stdin, get the stage2 out on stdout. Drop coreutils (busybox covers touch -d @epoch, stat -c, tar, install, awk); output stays byte-identical (same root hash), image 20.3 -> 18.2 MB. Makefile pack passes args straight to the entrypoint. Restructure the README to lead with what it is and how to use it (the mkruntime one-liner with the built bootstrap), and move how-it-boots / security model / testing into a Technical details section. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

## What Bring the stage0 build image and disk layout in line with the Fedora 44 chain bump, plus stable disk identity. ## Changes - **rpm + gnupg** added to `Dockerfile.build` so the UKI build can verify Fedora package GPG signatures (image parity with stage1, kept byte-identical). No effect on compiled artifacts. - **Stable lockboot GPT GUIDs + FAT volume-id.** `DISK_GUID` / `PART_GUID` are now constant across releases (`4c4f434b-424f-4f54-...`, "LOCKBOOT" + a role index), so the initial GPT is byte-stable (stable pre-stage2 PCR5) and the boot disk is identifiable by a fixed GUID rather than by hashing stage0.efi (which changed per release). This is the stable identity stage2's `find_boot_device` can key on. (stage2 still rewrites the GPT at runtime to add p2/p3, which is why it excludes PCR5 from its key binding.) - **Pin `vaportpm-attest` to v0.3.0** (rev + version guard), matching stage1. - **Extract the shared `DOCKER_RUN` harness** into `build.mk` (same refactor as stage1). ## Verification - Reproducible: GUIDs/timestamps fixed; build output byte-stable. - No change to the runtime boot path. Pairs with lockboot/stage1#19 (Fedora 44 kernel/stub) and lockboot/stage2#1. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Clean check-context names (no spaces/parens) so the uniform branch ruleset across the lockboot repos can require the same names everywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

HarryR · 2026-07-12T20:46:52Z

Summary

Reworks stage2 /data persistence and the payload-forging tooling. Net change from main:

/data: dm-crypt aes-xts-plain64 (AES-256-XTS) instead of the planned authenticated dm-integrity + AEAD. Authenticated encryption (no internal hash) makes a never-written sector EIO on read, and ext4 online-resize does read-modify-write of new-group metadata in the region it grows into, so the resize aborts unless the whole grow region is pre-wiped (O(volume), unviable on large volumes). XTS decrypts unwritten sectors to garbage, so resize needs no wipe. Trade: at-rest tamper garbles rather than being detected; media integrity is left to the storage layer, raw-disk adversary out of scope. Key drift still fails closed.
PID 1 owns failure: a fatal boot error logs, waits 60s, then ACPI power-offs, instead of a returning init panicking the kernel and spinning a vCPU.
meta_bg ext4 base for unbounded online growth (no resize= cap / journal bump).
mkruntime.sh built out: env knobs, tar-on-stdin / tar / dir / binary inputs (docker export as an example, not a dependency), <out> as a file or - for stdout, and --bootstrap to emit a ready-to-run packed stage2. Makefile pack uses it.

Verification

make ci green (fmt + clippy -D warnings + tests)
PIVOT_TEST=PASS (config passthrough, attest chain, resize, persist-across-reboot, ephemeral overlay)
GROW_TEST=PASS -- grew /data to ~12 GiB across a meta_bg boundary, no wipe, sparse hole reads zero

Review notes / open threads

meta_bg gives unbounded growth; resize_inode + a resize= cap is the bounded alternative if a hard ceiling is ever wanted.
The dm-verity salt is a single fixed value namespacing the whole tree (not per-node); a Merkle per-node domain-separation review is parked as a separate long-thought.
Backlog (not in this PR): real stage2 TPM quote, docker->erofs make front-end, aarch64, digest-pinned erofs-builder.

Draft for review.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

/data: replace the planned authenticated dm-integrity + dm-crypt AEAD stack with confidentiality-only dm-crypt aes-xts-plain64 (AES-256-XTS). Authenticated encryption has no internal hash, so a never-written sector EIOs on read; ext4 online-resize does read-modify-write of new-group metadata (backup GDT via ext4_setup_new_descs) in the region it grows into, so the resize aborts unless the whole grow region is pre-wiped first -- O(volume), unacceptable on large volumes. XTS decrypts unwritten sectors to garbage instead of erroring, so the resize needs no wipe (the standard LUKS/dm-crypt pattern) and cold-boot cost is independent of volume size. Trade: at-rest tampering garbles plaintext rather than being cryptographically detected -- media integrity is left to the storage layer (EBS et al.), and a raw-disk-write adversary is out of scope. Key drift still fails closed (superblock decrypts to garbage -> no ext4 magic -> reinit). 64-byte TPM-derived key, new key label. loader: as PID 1, own fatal boot errors instead of returning. A returning init panics the kernel ("Attempted to kill init") and spins a vCPU at 100% forever (in prod and the QEMU harness). Now: log, 60s grace for console capture, then a clean ACPI power-off. ext4 /data base: meta_bg (drop resize_inode) for unbounded online growth; no resize= ceiling or journal bump needed. Verified growing to ~12 GiB across a meta_bg boundary with no wipe. mkruntime.sh: env knobs (SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH, DATA_SIZE_MB, ROOTFS_UUID, VERITY_SALT) with reproducible defaults; rootfs input now accepts a tar stream on stdin, a tar file, a directory, or a single binary (docker export documented as an example, not a dependency); <out> is a file path or - for stdout; and --bootstrap prepends the loader ELF to emit a ready-to-run packed stage2. The Makefile pack target uses --bootstrap and forwards the knobs. tests: pivot-init drops the tamper-detection check (property removed with the AEAD stack); add grow-probe (large-volume meta_bg growth + sparse-hole). Prune unused probe examples. make ci green; PIVOT_TEST=PASS and GROW_TEST=PASS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

@epoch

…E restructure Make lockboot:erofs-builder a one-shot CLI: bake tools/mkruntime.sh in as the ENTRYPOINT, so packaging no longer needs a repo bind-mount -- mount just the loader ELF, pipe a rootfs in on stdin, get the stage2 out on stdout. Drop coreutils (busybox covers touch -d @epoch, stat -c, tar, install, awk); output stays byte-identical (same root hash), image 20.3 -> 18.2 MB. Makefile pack passes args straight to the entrypoint. Restructure the README to lead with what it is and how to use it (the mkruntime one-liner with the built bootstrap), and move how-it-boots / security model / testing into a Technical details section. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

## What Bring the stage0 build image and disk layout in line with the Fedora 44 chain bump, plus stable disk identity. ## Changes - **rpm + gnupg** added to `Dockerfile.build` so the UKI build can verify Fedora package GPG signatures (image parity with stage1, kept byte-identical). No effect on compiled artifacts. - **Stable lockboot GPT GUIDs + FAT volume-id.** `DISK_GUID` / `PART_GUID` are now constant across releases (`4c4f434b-424f-4f54-...`, "LOCKBOOT" + a role index), so the initial GPT is byte-stable (stable pre-stage2 PCR5) and the boot disk is identifiable by a fixed GUID rather than by hashing stage0.efi (which changed per release). This is the stable identity stage2's `find_boot_device` can key on. (stage2 still rewrites the GPT at runtime to add p2/p3, which is why it excludes PCR5 from its key binding.) - **Pin `vaportpm-attest` to v0.3.0** (rev + version guard), matching stage1. - **Extract the shared `DOCKER_RUN` harness** into `build.mk` (same refactor as stage1). ## Verification - Reproducible: GUIDs/timestamps fixed; build output byte-stable. - No change to the runtime boot path. Pairs with lockboot/stage1#19 (Fedora 44 kernel/stub) and lockboot/stage2#1. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Clean check-context names (no spaces/parens) so the uniform branch ruleset across the lockboot repos can require the same names everywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

HarryR · 2026-07-12T20:46:52Z

Summary

Reworks stage2 /data persistence and the payload-forging tooling. Net change from main:

/data: dm-crypt aes-xts-plain64 (AES-256-XTS) instead of the planned authenticated dm-integrity + AEAD. Authenticated encryption (no internal hash) makes a never-written sector EIO on read, and ext4 online-resize does read-modify-write of new-group metadata in the region it grows into, so the resize aborts unless the whole grow region is pre-wiped (O(volume), unviable on large volumes). XTS decrypts unwritten sectors to garbage, so resize needs no wipe. Trade: at-rest tamper garbles rather than being detected; media integrity is left to the storage layer, raw-disk adversary out of scope. Key drift still fails closed.
PID 1 owns failure: a fatal boot error logs, waits 60s, then ACPI power-offs, instead of a returning init panicking the kernel and spinning a vCPU.
meta_bg ext4 base for unbounded online growth (no resize= cap / journal bump).
mkruntime.sh built out: env knobs, tar-on-stdin / tar / dir / binary inputs (docker export as an example, not a dependency), <out> as a file or - for stdout, and --bootstrap to emit a ready-to-run packed stage2. Makefile pack uses it.

Verification

make ci green (fmt + clippy -D warnings + tests)
PIVOT_TEST=PASS (config passthrough, attest chain, resize, persist-across-reboot, ephemeral overlay)
GROW_TEST=PASS -- grew /data to ~12 GiB across a meta_bg boundary, no wipe, sparse hole reads zero

Review notes / open threads

meta_bg gives unbounded growth; resize_inode + a resize= cap is the bounded alternative if a hard ceiling is ever wanted.
The dm-verity salt is a single fixed value namespacing the whole tree (not per-node); a Merkle per-node domain-separation review is parked as a separate long-thought.
Backlog (not in this PR): real stage2 TPM quote, docker->erofs make front-end, aarch64, digest-pinned erofs-builder.

Draft for review.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

/data: replace the planned authenticated dm-integrity + dm-crypt AEAD stack with confidentiality-only dm-crypt aes-xts-plain64 (AES-256-XTS). Authenticated encryption has no internal hash, so a never-written sector EIOs on read; ext4 online-resize does read-modify-write of new-group metadata (backup GDT via ext4_setup_new_descs) in the region it grows into, so the resize aborts unless the whole grow region is pre-wiped first -- O(volume), unacceptable on large volumes. XTS decrypts unwritten sectors to garbage instead of erroring, so the resize needs no wipe (the standard LUKS/dm-crypt pattern) and cold-boot cost is independent of volume size. Trade: at-rest tampering garbles plaintext rather than being cryptographically detected -- media integrity is left to the storage layer (EBS et al.), and a raw-disk-write adversary is out of scope. Key drift still fails closed (superblock decrypts to garbage -> no ext4 magic -> reinit). 64-byte TPM-derived key, new key label. loader: as PID 1, own fatal boot errors instead of returning. A returning init panics the kernel ("Attempted to kill init") and spins a vCPU at 100% forever (in prod and the QEMU harness). Now: log, 60s grace for console capture, then a clean ACPI power-off. ext4 /data base: meta_bg (drop resize_inode) for unbounded online growth; no resize= ceiling or journal bump needed. Verified growing to ~12 GiB across a meta_bg boundary with no wipe. mkruntime.sh: env knobs (SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH, DATA_SIZE_MB, ROOTFS_UUID, VERITY_SALT) with reproducible defaults; rootfs input now accepts a tar stream on stdin, a tar file, a directory, or a single binary (docker export documented as an example, not a dependency); <out> is a file path or - for stdout; and --bootstrap prepends the loader ELF to emit a ready-to-run packed stage2. The Makefile pack target uses --bootstrap and forwards the knobs. tests: pivot-init drops the tamper-detection check (property removed with the AEAD stack); add grow-probe (large-volume meta_bg growth + sparse-hole). Prune unused probe examples. make ci green; PIVOT_TEST=PASS and GROW_TEST=PASS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

@epoch

…E restructure Make lockboot:erofs-builder a one-shot CLI: bake tools/mkruntime.sh in as the ENTRYPOINT, so packaging no longer needs a repo bind-mount -- mount just the loader ELF, pipe a rootfs in on stdin, get the stage2 out on stdout. Drop coreutils (busybox covers touch -d @epoch, stat -c, tar, install, awk); output stays byte-identical (same root hash), image 20.3 -> 18.2 MB. Makefile pack passes args straight to the entrypoint. Restructure the README to lead with what it is and how to use it (the mkruntime one-liner with the built bootstrap), and move how-it-boots / security model / testing into a Technical details section. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

## What Bring the stage0 build image and disk layout in line with the Fedora 44 chain bump, plus stable disk identity. ## Changes - **rpm + gnupg** added to `Dockerfile.build` so the UKI build can verify Fedora package GPG signatures (image parity with stage1, kept byte-identical). No effect on compiled artifacts. - **Stable lockboot GPT GUIDs + FAT volume-id.** `DISK_GUID` / `PART_GUID` are now constant across releases (`4c4f434b-424f-4f54-...`, "LOCKBOOT" + a role index), so the initial GPT is byte-stable (stable pre-stage2 PCR5) and the boot disk is identifiable by a fixed GUID rather than by hashing stage0.efi (which changed per release). This is the stable identity stage2's `find_boot_device` can key on. (stage2 still rewrites the GPT at runtime to add p2/p3, which is why it excludes PCR5 from its key binding.) - **Pin `vaportpm-attest` to v0.3.0** (rev + version guard), matching stage1. - **Extract the shared `DOCKER_RUN` harness** into `build.mk` (same refactor as stage1). ## Verification - Reproducible: GUIDs/timestamps fixed; build output byte-stable. - No change to the runtime boot path. Pairs with lockboot/stage1#19 (Fedora 44 kernel/stub) and lockboot/stage2#1. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Clean check-context names (no spaces/parens) so the uniform branch ruleset across the lockboot repos can require the same names everywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

HarryR · 2026-07-12T20:46:52Z

Summary

Reworks stage2 /data persistence and the payload-forging tooling. Net change from main:

/data: dm-crypt aes-xts-plain64 (AES-256-XTS) instead of the planned authenticated dm-integrity + AEAD. Authenticated encryption (no internal hash) makes a never-written sector EIO on read, and ext4 online-resize does read-modify-write of new-group metadata in the region it grows into, so the resize aborts unless the whole grow region is pre-wiped (O(volume), unviable on large volumes). XTS decrypts unwritten sectors to garbage, so resize needs no wipe. Trade: at-rest tamper garbles rather than being detected; media integrity is left to the storage layer, raw-disk adversary out of scope. Key drift still fails closed.
PID 1 owns failure: a fatal boot error logs, waits 60s, then ACPI power-offs, instead of a returning init panicking the kernel and spinning a vCPU.
meta_bg ext4 base for unbounded online growth (no resize= cap / journal bump).
mkruntime.sh built out: env knobs, tar-on-stdin / tar / dir / binary inputs (docker export as an example, not a dependency), <out> as a file or - for stdout, and --bootstrap to emit a ready-to-run packed stage2. Makefile pack uses it.

Verification

make ci green (fmt + clippy -D warnings + tests)
PIVOT_TEST=PASS (config passthrough, attest chain, resize, persist-across-reboot, ephemeral overlay)
GROW_TEST=PASS -- grew /data to ~12 GiB across a meta_bg boundary, no wipe, sparse hole reads zero

Review notes / open threads

meta_bg gives unbounded growth; resize_inode + a resize= cap is the bounded alternative if a hard ceiling is ever wanted.
The dm-verity salt is a single fixed value namespacing the whole tree (not per-node); a Merkle per-node domain-separation review is parked as a separate long-thought.
Backlog (not in this PR): real stage2 TPM quote, docker->erofs make front-end, aarch64, digest-pinned erofs-builder.

Draft for review.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

/data: replace the planned authenticated dm-integrity + dm-crypt AEAD stack with confidentiality-only dm-crypt aes-xts-plain64 (AES-256-XTS). Authenticated encryption has no internal hash, so a never-written sector EIOs on read; ext4 online-resize does read-modify-write of new-group metadata (backup GDT via ext4_setup_new_descs) in the region it grows into, so the resize aborts unless the whole grow region is pre-wiped first -- O(volume), unacceptable on large volumes. XTS decrypts unwritten sectors to garbage instead of erroring, so the resize needs no wipe (the standard LUKS/dm-crypt pattern) and cold-boot cost is independent of volume size. Trade: at-rest tampering garbles plaintext rather than being cryptographically detected -- media integrity is left to the storage layer (EBS et al.), and a raw-disk-write adversary is out of scope. Key drift still fails closed (superblock decrypts to garbage -> no ext4 magic -> reinit). 64-byte TPM-derived key, new key label. loader: as PID 1, own fatal boot errors instead of returning. A returning init panics the kernel ("Attempted to kill init") and spins a vCPU at 100% forever (in prod and the QEMU harness). Now: log, 60s grace for console capture, then a clean ACPI power-off. ext4 /data base: meta_bg (drop resize_inode) for unbounded online growth; no resize= ceiling or journal bump needed. Verified growing to ~12 GiB across a meta_bg boundary with no wipe. mkruntime.sh: env knobs (SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH, DATA_SIZE_MB, ROOTFS_UUID, VERITY_SALT) with reproducible defaults; rootfs input now accepts a tar stream on stdin, a tar file, a directory, or a single binary (docker export documented as an example, not a dependency); <out> is a file path or - for stdout; and --bootstrap prepends the loader ELF to emit a ready-to-run packed stage2. The Makefile pack target uses --bootstrap and forwards the knobs. tests: pivot-init drops the tamper-detection check (property removed with the AEAD stack); add grow-probe (large-volume meta_bg growth + sparse-hole). Prune unused probe examples. make ci green; PIVOT_TEST=PASS and GROW_TEST=PASS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

@epoch

…E restructure Make lockboot:erofs-builder a one-shot CLI: bake tools/mkruntime.sh in as the ENTRYPOINT, so packaging no longer needs a repo bind-mount -- mount just the loader ELF, pipe a rootfs in on stdin, get the stage2 out on stdout. Drop coreutils (busybox covers touch -d @epoch, stat -c, tar, install, awk); output stays byte-identical (same root hash), image 20.3 -> 18.2 MB. Makefile pack passes args straight to the entrypoint. Restructure the README to lead with what it is and how to use it (the mkruntime one-liner with the built bootstrap), and move how-it-boots / security model / testing into a Technical details section. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

## What Bring the stage0 build image and disk layout in line with the Fedora 44 chain bump, plus stable disk identity. ## Changes - **rpm + gnupg** added to `Dockerfile.build` so the UKI build can verify Fedora package GPG signatures (image parity with stage1, kept byte-identical). No effect on compiled artifacts. - **Stable lockboot GPT GUIDs + FAT volume-id.** `DISK_GUID` / `PART_GUID` are now constant across releases (`4c4f434b-424f-4f54-...`, "LOCKBOOT" + a role index), so the initial GPT is byte-stable (stable pre-stage2 PCR5) and the boot disk is identifiable by a fixed GUID rather than by hashing stage0.efi (which changed per release). This is the stable identity stage2's `find_boot_device` can key on. (stage2 still rewrites the GPT at runtime to add p2/p3, which is why it excludes PCR5 from its key binding.) - **Pin `vaportpm-attest` to v0.3.0** (rev + version guard), matching stage1. - **Extract the shared `DOCKER_RUN` harness** into `build.mk` (same refactor as stage1). ## Verification - Reproducible: GUIDs/timestamps fixed; build output byte-stable. - No change to the runtime boot path. Pairs with lockboot/stage1#19 (Fedora 44 kernel/stub) and lockboot/stage2#1. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Clean check-context names (no spaces/parens) so the uniform branch ruleset across the lockboot repos can require the same names everywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

HarryR · 2026-07-12T20:46:52Z

Summary

Reworks stage2 /data persistence and the payload-forging tooling. Net change from main:

/data: dm-crypt aes-xts-plain64 (AES-256-XTS) instead of the planned authenticated dm-integrity + AEAD. Authenticated encryption (no internal hash) makes a never-written sector EIO on read, and ext4 online-resize does read-modify-write of new-group metadata in the region it grows into, so the resize aborts unless the whole grow region is pre-wiped (O(volume), unviable on large volumes). XTS decrypts unwritten sectors to garbage, so resize needs no wipe. Trade: at-rest tamper garbles rather than being detected; media integrity is left to the storage layer, raw-disk adversary out of scope. Key drift still fails closed.
PID 1 owns failure: a fatal boot error logs, waits 60s, then ACPI power-offs, instead of a returning init panicking the kernel and spinning a vCPU.
meta_bg ext4 base for unbounded online growth (no resize= cap / journal bump).
mkruntime.sh built out: env knobs, tar-on-stdin / tar / dir / binary inputs (docker export as an example, not a dependency), <out> as a file or - for stdout, and --bootstrap to emit a ready-to-run packed stage2. Makefile pack uses it.

Verification

make ci green (fmt + clippy -D warnings + tests)
PIVOT_TEST=PASS (config passthrough, attest chain, resize, persist-across-reboot, ephemeral overlay)
GROW_TEST=PASS -- grew /data to ~12 GiB across a meta_bg boundary, no wipe, sparse hole reads zero

Review notes / open threads

meta_bg gives unbounded growth; resize_inode + a resize= cap is the bounded alternative if a hard ceiling is ever wanted.
The dm-verity salt is a single fixed value namespacing the whole tree (not per-node); a Merkle per-node domain-separation review is parked as a separate long-thought.
Backlog (not in this PR): real stage2 TPM quote, docker->erofs make front-end, aarch64, digest-pinned erofs-builder.

Draft for review.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

/data: replace the planned authenticated dm-integrity + dm-crypt AEAD stack with confidentiality-only dm-crypt aes-xts-plain64 (AES-256-XTS). Authenticated encryption has no internal hash, so a never-written sector EIOs on read; ext4 online-resize does read-modify-write of new-group metadata (backup GDT via ext4_setup_new_descs) in the region it grows into, so the resize aborts unless the whole grow region is pre-wiped first -- O(volume), unacceptable on large volumes. XTS decrypts unwritten sectors to garbage instead of erroring, so the resize needs no wipe (the standard LUKS/dm-crypt pattern) and cold-boot cost is independent of volume size. Trade: at-rest tampering garbles plaintext rather than being cryptographically detected -- media integrity is left to the storage layer (EBS et al.), and a raw-disk-write adversary is out of scope. Key drift still fails closed (superblock decrypts to garbage -> no ext4 magic -> reinit). 64-byte TPM-derived key, new key label. loader: as PID 1, own fatal boot errors instead of returning. A returning init panics the kernel ("Attempted to kill init") and spins a vCPU at 100% forever (in prod and the QEMU harness). Now: log, 60s grace for console capture, then a clean ACPI power-off. ext4 /data base: meta_bg (drop resize_inode) for unbounded online growth; no resize= ceiling or journal bump needed. Verified growing to ~12 GiB across a meta_bg boundary with no wipe. mkruntime.sh: env knobs (SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH, DATA_SIZE_MB, ROOTFS_UUID, VERITY_SALT) with reproducible defaults; rootfs input now accepts a tar stream on stdin, a tar file, a directory, or a single binary (docker export documented as an example, not a dependency); <out> is a file path or - for stdout; and --bootstrap prepends the loader ELF to emit a ready-to-run packed stage2. The Makefile pack target uses --bootstrap and forwards the knobs. tests: pivot-init drops the tamper-detection check (property removed with the AEAD stack); add grow-probe (large-volume meta_bg growth + sparse-hole). Prune unused probe examples. make ci green; PIVOT_TEST=PASS and GROW_TEST=PASS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

@epoch

…E restructure Make lockboot:erofs-builder a one-shot CLI: bake tools/mkruntime.sh in as the ENTRYPOINT, so packaging no longer needs a repo bind-mount -- mount just the loader ELF, pipe a rootfs in on stdin, get the stage2 out on stdout. Drop coreutils (busybox covers touch -d @epoch, stat -c, tar, install, awk); output stays byte-identical (same root hash), image 20.3 -> 18.2 MB. Makefile pack passes args straight to the entrypoint. Restructure the README to lead with what it is and how to use it (the mkruntime one-liner with the built bootstrap), and move how-it-boots / security model / testing into a Technical details section. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

## What Bring the stage0 build image and disk layout in line with the Fedora 44 chain bump, plus stable disk identity. ## Changes - **rpm + gnupg** added to `Dockerfile.build` so the UKI build can verify Fedora package GPG signatures (image parity with stage1, kept byte-identical). No effect on compiled artifacts. - **Stable lockboot GPT GUIDs + FAT volume-id.** `DISK_GUID` / `PART_GUID` are now constant across releases (`4c4f434b-424f-4f54-...`, "LOCKBOOT" + a role index), so the initial GPT is byte-stable (stable pre-stage2 PCR5) and the boot disk is identifiable by a fixed GUID rather than by hashing stage0.efi (which changed per release). This is the stable identity stage2's `find_boot_device` can key on. (stage2 still rewrites the GPT at runtime to add p2/p3, which is why it excludes PCR5 from its key binding.) - **Pin `vaportpm-attest` to v0.3.0** (rev + version guard), matching stage1. - **Extract the shared `DOCKER_RUN` harness** into `build.mk` (same refactor as stage1). ## Verification - Reproducible: GUIDs/timestamps fixed; build output byte-stable. - No change to the runtime boot path. Pairs with lockboot/stage1#19 (Fedora 44 kernel/stub) and lockboot/stage2#1. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Clean check-context names (no spaces/parens) so the uniform branch ruleset across the lockboot repos can require the same names everywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

HarryR · 2026-07-12T20:46:52Z

Summary

Reworks stage2 /data persistence and the payload-forging tooling. Net change from main:

/data: dm-crypt aes-xts-plain64 (AES-256-XTS) instead of the planned authenticated dm-integrity + AEAD. Authenticated encryption (no internal hash) makes a never-written sector EIO on read, and ext4 online-resize does read-modify-write of new-group metadata in the region it grows into, so the resize aborts unless the whole grow region is pre-wiped (O(volume), unviable on large volumes). XTS decrypts unwritten sectors to garbage, so resize needs no wipe. Trade: at-rest tamper garbles rather than being detected; media integrity is left to the storage layer, raw-disk adversary out of scope. Key drift still fails closed.
PID 1 owns failure: a fatal boot error logs, waits 60s, then ACPI power-offs, instead of a returning init panicking the kernel and spinning a vCPU.
meta_bg ext4 base for unbounded online growth (no resize= cap / journal bump).
mkruntime.sh built out: env knobs, tar-on-stdin / tar / dir / binary inputs (docker export as an example, not a dependency), <out> as a file or - for stdout, and --bootstrap to emit a ready-to-run packed stage2. Makefile pack uses it.

Verification

make ci green (fmt + clippy -D warnings + tests)
PIVOT_TEST=PASS (config passthrough, attest chain, resize, persist-across-reboot, ephemeral overlay)
GROW_TEST=PASS -- grew /data to ~12 GiB across a meta_bg boundary, no wipe, sparse hole reads zero

Review notes / open threads

meta_bg gives unbounded growth; resize_inode + a resize= cap is the bounded alternative if a hard ceiling is ever wanted.
The dm-verity salt is a single fixed value namespacing the whole tree (not per-node); a Merkle per-node domain-separation review is parked as a separate long-thought.
Backlog (not in this PR): real stage2 TPM quote, docker->erofs make front-end, aarch64, digest-pinned erofs-builder.

Draft for review.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

/data: replace the planned authenticated dm-integrity + dm-crypt AEAD stack with confidentiality-only dm-crypt aes-xts-plain64 (AES-256-XTS). Authenticated encryption has no internal hash, so a never-written sector EIOs on read; ext4 online-resize does read-modify-write of new-group metadata (backup GDT via ext4_setup_new_descs) in the region it grows into, so the resize aborts unless the whole grow region is pre-wiped first -- O(volume), unacceptable on large volumes. XTS decrypts unwritten sectors to garbage instead of erroring, so the resize needs no wipe (the standard LUKS/dm-crypt pattern) and cold-boot cost is independent of volume size. Trade: at-rest tampering garbles plaintext rather than being cryptographically detected -- media integrity is left to the storage layer (EBS et al.), and a raw-disk-write adversary is out of scope. Key drift still fails closed (superblock decrypts to garbage -> no ext4 magic -> reinit). 64-byte TPM-derived key, new key label. loader: as PID 1, own fatal boot errors instead of returning. A returning init panics the kernel ("Attempted to kill init") and spins a vCPU at 100% forever (in prod and the QEMU harness). Now: log, 60s grace for console capture, then a clean ACPI power-off. ext4 /data base: meta_bg (drop resize_inode) for unbounded online growth; no resize= ceiling or journal bump needed. Verified growing to ~12 GiB across a meta_bg boundary with no wipe. mkruntime.sh: env knobs (SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH, DATA_SIZE_MB, ROOTFS_UUID, VERITY_SALT) with reproducible defaults; rootfs input now accepts a tar stream on stdin, a tar file, a directory, or a single binary (docker export documented as an example, not a dependency); <out> is a file path or - for stdout; and --bootstrap prepends the loader ELF to emit a ready-to-run packed stage2. The Makefile pack target uses --bootstrap and forwards the knobs. tests: pivot-init drops the tamper-detection check (property removed with the AEAD stack); add grow-probe (large-volume meta_bg growth + sparse-hole). Prune unused probe examples. make ci green; PIVOT_TEST=PASS and GROW_TEST=PASS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

@epoch

…E restructure Make lockboot:erofs-builder a one-shot CLI: bake tools/mkruntime.sh in as the ENTRYPOINT, so packaging no longer needs a repo bind-mount -- mount just the loader ELF, pipe a rootfs in on stdin, get the stage2 out on stdout. Drop coreutils (busybox covers touch -d @epoch, stat -c, tar, install, awk); output stays byte-identical (same root hash), image 20.3 -> 18.2 MB. Makefile pack passes args straight to the entrypoint. Restructure the README to lead with what it is and how to use it (the mkruntime one-liner with the built bootstrap), and move how-it-boots / security model / testing into a Technical details section. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

## What Bring the stage0 build image and disk layout in line with the Fedora 44 chain bump, plus stable disk identity. ## Changes - **rpm + gnupg** added to `Dockerfile.build` so the UKI build can verify Fedora package GPG signatures (image parity with stage1, kept byte-identical). No effect on compiled artifacts. - **Stable lockboot GPT GUIDs + FAT volume-id.** `DISK_GUID` / `PART_GUID` are now constant across releases (`4c4f434b-424f-4f54-...`, "LOCKBOOT" + a role index), so the initial GPT is byte-stable (stable pre-stage2 PCR5) and the boot disk is identifiable by a fixed GUID rather than by hashing stage0.efi (which changed per release). This is the stable identity stage2's `find_boot_device` can key on. (stage2 still rewrites the GPT at runtime to add p2/p3, which is why it excludes PCR5 from its key binding.) - **Pin `vaportpm-attest` to v0.3.0** (rev + version guard), matching stage1. - **Extract the shared `DOCKER_RUN` harness** into `build.mk` (same refactor as stage1). ## Verification - Reproducible: GUIDs/timestamps fixed; build output byte-stable. - No change to the runtime boot path. Pairs with lockboot/stage1#19 (Fedora 44 kernel/stub) and lockboot/stage2#1. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Clean check-context names (no spaces/parens) so the uniform branch ruleset across the lockboot repos can require the same names everywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

HarryR · 2026-07-12T20:46:52Z

Summary

Reworks stage2 /data persistence and the payload-forging tooling. Net change from main:

/data: dm-crypt aes-xts-plain64 (AES-256-XTS) instead of the planned authenticated dm-integrity + AEAD. Authenticated encryption (no internal hash) makes a never-written sector EIO on read, and ext4 online-resize does read-modify-write of new-group metadata in the region it grows into, so the resize aborts unless the whole grow region is pre-wiped (O(volume), unviable on large volumes). XTS decrypts unwritten sectors to garbage, so resize needs no wipe. Trade: at-rest tamper garbles rather than being detected; media integrity is left to the storage layer, raw-disk adversary out of scope. Key drift still fails closed.
PID 1 owns failure: a fatal boot error logs, waits 60s, then ACPI power-offs, instead of a returning init panicking the kernel and spinning a vCPU.
meta_bg ext4 base for unbounded online growth (no resize= cap / journal bump).
mkruntime.sh built out: env knobs, tar-on-stdin / tar / dir / binary inputs (docker export as an example, not a dependency), <out> as a file or - for stdout, and --bootstrap to emit a ready-to-run packed stage2. Makefile pack uses it.

Verification

make ci green (fmt + clippy -D warnings + tests)
PIVOT_TEST=PASS (config passthrough, attest chain, resize, persist-across-reboot, ephemeral overlay)
GROW_TEST=PASS -- grew /data to ~12 GiB across a meta_bg boundary, no wipe, sparse hole reads zero

Review notes / open threads

meta_bg gives unbounded growth; resize_inode + a resize= cap is the bounded alternative if a hard ceiling is ever wanted.
The dm-verity salt is a single fixed value namespacing the whole tree (not per-node); a Merkle per-node domain-separation review is parked as a separate long-thought.
Backlog (not in this PR): real stage2 TPM quote, docker->erofs make front-end, aarch64, digest-pinned erofs-builder.

Draft for review.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

/data: replace the planned authenticated dm-integrity + dm-crypt AEAD stack with confidentiality-only dm-crypt aes-xts-plain64 (AES-256-XTS). Authenticated encryption has no internal hash, so a never-written sector EIOs on read; ext4 online-resize does read-modify-write of new-group metadata (backup GDT via ext4_setup_new_descs) in the region it grows into, so the resize aborts unless the whole grow region is pre-wiped first -- O(volume), unacceptable on large volumes. XTS decrypts unwritten sectors to garbage instead of erroring, so the resize needs no wipe (the standard LUKS/dm-crypt pattern) and cold-boot cost is independent of volume size. Trade: at-rest tampering garbles plaintext rather than being cryptographically detected -- media integrity is left to the storage layer (EBS et al.), and a raw-disk-write adversary is out of scope. Key drift still fails closed (superblock decrypts to garbage -> no ext4 magic -> reinit). 64-byte TPM-derived key, new key label. loader: as PID 1, own fatal boot errors instead of returning. A returning init panics the kernel ("Attempted to kill init") and spins a vCPU at 100% forever (in prod and the QEMU harness). Now: log, 60s grace for console capture, then a clean ACPI power-off. ext4 /data base: meta_bg (drop resize_inode) for unbounded online growth; no resize= ceiling or journal bump needed. Verified growing to ~12 GiB across a meta_bg boundary with no wipe. mkruntime.sh: env knobs (SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH, DATA_SIZE_MB, ROOTFS_UUID, VERITY_SALT) with reproducible defaults; rootfs input now accepts a tar stream on stdin, a tar file, a directory, or a single binary (docker export documented as an example, not a dependency); <out> is a file path or - for stdout; and --bootstrap prepends the loader ELF to emit a ready-to-run packed stage2. The Makefile pack target uses --bootstrap and forwards the knobs. tests: pivot-init drops the tamper-detection check (property removed with the AEAD stack); add grow-probe (large-volume meta_bg growth + sparse-hole). Prune unused probe examples. make ci green; PIVOT_TEST=PASS and GROW_TEST=PASS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

@epoch

…E restructure Make lockboot:erofs-builder a one-shot CLI: bake tools/mkruntime.sh in as the ENTRYPOINT, so packaging no longer needs a repo bind-mount -- mount just the loader ELF, pipe a rootfs in on stdin, get the stage2 out on stdout. Drop coreutils (busybox covers touch -d @epoch, stat -c, tar, install, awk); output stays byte-identical (same root hash), image 20.3 -> 18.2 MB. Makefile pack passes args straight to the entrypoint. Restructure the README to lead with what it is and how to use it (the mkruntime one-liner with the built bootstrap), and move how-it-boots / security model / testing into a Technical details section. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

## What Bring the stage0 build image and disk layout in line with the Fedora 44 chain bump, plus stable disk identity. ## Changes - **rpm + gnupg** added to `Dockerfile.build` so the UKI build can verify Fedora package GPG signatures (image parity with stage1, kept byte-identical). No effect on compiled artifacts. - **Stable lockboot GPT GUIDs + FAT volume-id.** `DISK_GUID` / `PART_GUID` are now constant across releases (`4c4f434b-424f-4f54-...`, "LOCKBOOT" + a role index), so the initial GPT is byte-stable (stable pre-stage2 PCR5) and the boot disk is identifiable by a fixed GUID rather than by hashing stage0.efi (which changed per release). This is the stable identity stage2's `find_boot_device` can key on. (stage2 still rewrites the GPT at runtime to add p2/p3, which is why it excludes PCR5 from its key binding.) - **Pin `vaportpm-attest` to v0.3.0** (rev + version guard), matching stage1. - **Extract the shared `DOCKER_RUN` harness** into `build.mk` (same refactor as stage1). ## Verification - Reproducible: GUIDs/timestamps fixed; build output byte-stable. - No change to the runtime boot path. Pairs with lockboot/stage1#19 (Fedora 44 kernel/stub) and lockboot/stage2#1. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Clean check-context names (no spaces/parens) so the uniform branch ruleset across the lockboot repos can require the same names everywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

HarryR marked this pull request as ready for review July 13, 2026 18:03

HarryR mentioned this pull request Jul 13, 2026
build: add rpm + gnupg (Fedora RPM GPG verification) lockboot/stage0#10
Merged

HarryR mentioned this pull request Jul 13, 2026
profile: drop boot-chain diagram; fix stale /data crypto claim lockboot/.github#1
Merged

ci: rename build job -> build-x86_64 / build-aarch64
6669086
Clean check-context names (no spaces/parens) so the uniform branch ruleset across the lockboot repos can require the same names everywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>