tests: add panic symbols for alloc - #2
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Signed-off-by: Janusz Jankowski <janusz.jankowski@linux.intel.com>
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Feb 17, 2019
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@lyakh Please remember to use "Rebase and merge" option to not have additional merge commit |
lyakh pushed a commit
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Feb 29, 2024
As discussed in the alternative approach zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr#68494, k_panic() in POSIX mode has various shortcomings that do not provide a useful trace. Useless pointers to signal handlers or other cleanup routines are printed instead. Leverage our already existing k_sys_fatal_error_handler() and dereference a NULL pointer there when in POSIX mode. This "fails fast" and provides a complete and relevant stack trace in CI when fuzzing or when using some other static analyzer. Example of how fuzzing failure thesofproject#8832 would have looked like in CI results thanks to this commit: ``` ./build-fuzz/zephyr/zephyr.exe: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each. Running: ./rballoc_align_fuzz_crash *** Booting Zephyr OS build zephyr-v3.5.0-3971-ge07de4e0a167 *** [00:00:00.000,000] <inf> main: SOF on native_posix [00:00:00.000,000] <inf> main: SOF initialized @ WEST_TOPDIR/sof/zephyr/lib/alloc.c:391 [00:00:00.000,000] <err> os: >>> ZEPHYR FATAL ERROR 4: Kernel panic [00:00:00.000,000] <err> os: Current thread: 0x891f8a0 (unknown) [00:00:00.000,000] <err> zephyr: Halting emulation AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==1784402==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x00000000 ==1784402==The signal is caused by a WRITE memory access. ==1784402==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x829a77d in k_sys_fatal_error_handler zephyr/wrapper.c:352:19 #1 0x829b8c0 in rballoc_align zephyr/lib/alloc.c:391:3 #2 0x8281438 in buffer_alloc src/audio/buffer.c:58:16 #3 0x826a60a in buffer_new src/ipc/ipc-helper.c:48:11 #4 0x8262107 in ipc_buffer_new src/ipc/ipc3/helper.c:459:11 #5 0x825944d in ipc_glb_tplg_buffer_new src/ipc/ipc3/handler.c:1305:8 thesofproject#6 0x8257036 in ipc_cmd src/ipc/ipc3/handler.c:1651:9 thesofproject#7 0x8272e59 in ipc_platform_do_cmd src/platform/posix/ipc.c:162:2 thesofproject#8 0x826a2ac in ipc_do_cmd src/ipc/ipc-common.c:328:9 thesofproject#9 0x829b0ab in task_run zephyr/include/rtos/task.h:94:9 thesofproject#10 0x829abd8 in edf_work_handler zephyr/edf_schedule.c:32:16 thesofproject#11 0x83560f7 in work_queue_main zephyr/kernel/work.c:688:3 thesofproject#12 0x82244c2 in z_thread_entry zephyr/lib/os/thread_entry.c:48:2 ``` Signed-off-by: Marc Herbert <marc.herbert@intel.com>
lyakh pushed a commit
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Nov 6, 2024
The fuzzer engine has produced crash caused by NULL pointer read that originated from ipc3 ipc_stream_pcm_free(). The crash happens when the pipeline of the found comp_dev does not have a source_comp and pipeline_reset() is called for it. This commit adds check to pipeline_comp_test() for this situation and bails out if it is found. Here is the call stack from the situation: #0 0x81e9317 in dev_comp_pipe_id sof/sof/src/include/sof/audio/component.h:646:25 #1 0x81e8015 in pipeline_comp_reset sof/sof/src/audio/pipeline/pipeline-graph.c:326:22 #2 0x81e7d1d in pipeline_reset sof/sof/src/audio/pipeline/pipeline-graph.c:393:8 #3 0x820d7ea in ipc_stream_pcm_free sof/sof/src/ipc/ipc3/handler.c:398:8 #4 0x8208969 in ipc_cmd sof/sof/src/ipc/ipc3/handler.c:1689:9 #5 0x81cbed8 in ipc_platform_do_cmd sof/sof/src/platform/posix/ipc.c:162:2 thesofproject#6 0x81d10db in ipc_do_cmd sof/sof/src/ipc/ipc-common.c:330:9 thesofproject#7 0x81f87e9 in task_run sof/sof/zephyr/include/rtos/task.h:94:9 thesofproject#8 0x81f8308 in edf_work_handler sof/sof/zephyr/edf_schedule.c:31:16 thesofproject#9 0x82b4b32 in work_queue_main sof/zephyr/kernel/work.c:668:3 thesofproject#10 0x8193ec2 in z_thread_entry sof/zephyr/lib/os/thread_entry.c:36:2 thesofproject#11 0x815f639 in __asan::AsanThread::ThreadStart(unsigned long long) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_thread.cpp:277:25 Signed-off-by: Jyri Sarha <jyri.sarha@linux.intel.com>
lyakh pushed a commit
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Jul 20, 2026
Fix a heap out-of-bounds access found by the IPC4 libFuzzer harness (native_sim/x86, ASAN-enabled build with CONFIG_SYS_HEAP_SANITIZER_ASAN). A single 173-byte crash input triggers a use-after-poison READ of size 4 in copier_dai_create(): ==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: use-after-poison on address 0x088cf1c4 READ of size 4 ... in copier_dai_create copier_dai.c:284 #1 copier_init copier.c:220 #2 module_init generic.c:123 #3 module_adapter_new_ext module_adapter.c:307 #4 comp_new_ipc4 ipc4/helper.c:198 #5 ipc4_init_module_instance handler-user.c:763 copier_dai.c:284 reads cd->config.gtw_cfg.config_length, which lands 8 bytes past the end of the under-allocated cd block. Fuzzer payload -------------- The harness frames the raw input as a 2-byte little-endian length prefix followed by an 8-byte IPC4 compact header (primary + extension word) and a payload that is mirrored into MAILBOX_HOSTBOX. The decoded message is an INIT_MODULE_INSTANCE (MODULE_MSG / INIT_INSTANCE) whose module_id resolves to the copier driver, so comp_new_ipc4() -> module_adapter_new() -> copier_init() runs on host-controlled config bytes. The copier's ipc4_copier_module_cfg carried (values from gdb): gtw_cfg.node_id.dw = 0x050012f5 dma_type = 18 (ipc4_alh_uaol_stream_link_ output_class, a non-host ALH/UAOL link gateway), v_index = 245 gtw_cfg.dma_buffer_size = 0xffffffff gtw_cfg.config_length = 0xffffffff <-- the trigger md->cfg.size (payload) = 888 bytes node_id != IPC4_INVALID_NODE_ID selects the gateway-copier path, and the UAOL link class routes into copier_dai_create(). The long run of 0xff bytes at the tail of the input is what supplies config_length = 0xffffffff. libFuzzer discovered the message by mutating the corpus; the crucial field is the all-ones config_length. Root cause ---------- copier_init() sizes the variable-length gateway blob that trails the config struct: if (copier->gtw_cfg.config_length > 1) { gtw_cfg_var_size += (copier->gtw_cfg.config_length - 1) << 2; cfg_total_size += gtw_cfg_var_size; } if (cfg_total_size > md->cfg.size) /* payload guard */ return -EINVAL; cd = mod_zalloc(mod, sizeof(*cd) + gtw_cfg_var_size); config_length is a uint32_t from the untrusted payload. The expression (config_length - 1) << 2 is evaluated in 32-bit arithmetic and wraps: with 0xffffffff it yields 0xfffffff8, i.e. -8 as a size_t. That poisons both dependent computations: * cfg_total_size wraps down to 76 (below even sizeof(*copier) = 84), so the "cfg_total_size > md->cfg.size" guard added earlier does not fire (76 < 888). * mod_zalloc() is called with sizeof(*cd) + (size_t)-8 = 452 - 8 = 444 bytes, while struct copier_data needs 452. gtw_cfg.config_length sits at offset 444, exactly past the truncated allocation. copier_dai_create() then reads that field (and the config_data pointer right after it) out of bounds. size_t is 32-bit on native_sim and on the real Xtensa DSP targets, so this is a genuine firmware bug, not just a host-fuzzer artifact. Fix --- Validate config_length before any size arithmetic is performed on it. The blob is expressed in dwords and must fit within the received init payload, so an upper bound of md->cfg.size / sizeof(uint32_t) both is correct and keeps (config_length - 1) << 2 from overflowing (the mailbox payload is bounded by SOF_IPC_MSG_MAX_SIZE): if (copier->gtw_cfg.config_length > md->cfg.size / sizeof(uint32_t)) { comp_err(dev, "copier_init(): invalid gtw_cfg.config_length %u", copier->gtw_cfg.config_length); return -EINVAL; } The existing precise "cfg_total_size > md->cfg.size" check is retained as a secondary guard for the non-overflowing mismatch case. Verification ------------ - The crash input now executes cleanly: config_length is rejected with -EINVAL, exit code 0, no ASAN report. The new bound branch is confirmed hit (config_length 0xffffffff vs bound 222). - Full IPC4 corpus replay: 92,780 inputs, 0 crashes (-runs=0), coverage unchanged (cov 1331 / ft 5270), confirming the check does not over-restrict legitimate copier init payloads. Found-by: IPC4 libFuzzer (ASAN, native_sim) Signed-off-by: Tomasz Leman <tomasz.m.leman@intel.com>
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Signed-off-by: Janusz Jankowski janusz.jankowski@linux.intel.com