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eth‑red‑blue - Mobile Ransomware Red/Blue Lab

Elevator pitch
A complete, reproducible red/blue lab that simulates a mobile ransomware campaign against a physical Google Pixel 6a on an isolated Wi‑Fi AP.
The Red Team delivers and sideloads a lab APK (“LockerSim”) that encrypts a scoped photo folder and sends benign JSON beacons.
The Blue Team ingests Suricata EVE and ADB logcat --> Wazuh, engineers detections (D1/N1/W1–W5), and correlates boot --> first beacon in Elastic Security.
Everything you need to re‑run the exercise end‑to‑end, code, rules, KQL/EQL, and helper scripts, is in this repo.


Contents


Introduction

This lab demonstrates a realistic mobile ransomware chain-delivery, sideload/exploitation, installation/persistence, C2, and actions‑on‑objective-against the author’s own Pixel 6a on a dedicated lab SSID. The Blue Team side implements network and handset telemetry, custom detections, and a time‑bound correlation linking BOOT_COMPLETED --> first beacon. All detections are designed to be auditable (JSON/PCAP/Kibana exports) and are scoped to keep the exercise ethical and safe (no exfiltration; file encryption limited to an app‑private directory or a user‑granted tree).


High‑level architecture

flowchart TD
subgraph Host["Ubuntu 22.04 Host"]
direction TB
Suricata["Docker Suricata (IDS)"]
ELK["Docker ELK stack (ES + Kibana)"]
Wazuh["Docker Wazuh-manager (SIEM)"]
Agent["Wazuh Agent (on host)"]
Logger["ADB logcat --> syslog forwarder (script)"]
end
subgraph Phone["Google Pixel 6a (Android 14/16 SDK)"]
direction TB
App["LockerSim.apk<br/>- AES-GCM file ops (sandbox/DCIM)<br/>- WorkManager beacons<br/>- BOOT_COMPLETED receiver"]
end
Host ---|"isolated lab SSID (hosted by USB Wi‑Fi AP)"| Phone
Logger --> Agent --> Wazuh
Suricata --> ELK
Loading

Environment & setup

Host prerequisites

  • Ubuntu 22.04 LTS (or similar Linux host).
  • Docker + Docker Compose.
  • ADB / Android Platform Tools on the host.
  • Python 3.10+ (for tiny utility scripts).
  • A dual‑band USB Wi‑Fi adapter (hosted AP) - lab SSID without Internet.
  • The phone (Pixel 6a) connects to the AP; the host is also on the AP and additionally on Ethernet for admin.

Clone & compose

git clone https://github.com/ryanfoxgithub/eth-red-blue.git
cd eth-red-blue
# Bring up the stack (Suricata, Elastic, Wazuh, etc.)
docker compose up -d
# (Optional) verify ingest wiring with the helper
./scripts/vis_ing.sh

Key configs you may want to glance at:

  • config/suricata/suricata.yaml (EVE types enabled, HOME_NET set to your lab subnet)
  • config/filebeat/filebeat.yml (ships EVE to Elasticsearch)
  • config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml (custom W rules used below)

Suricata tuning

Drop your local signatures here and include them from suricata.yaml:

config/suricata/rules/local.rules

Two rules are used in this project:

# N1 - Locker beacon (POST + UA + path)
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (
msg:"LockerSim HTTP beacon (UA+path)";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"POST"; nocase;
http.uri; content:"/beacon";
http.user_agent; content:"Locker-Beacon/1.0"; nocase;
classtype:trojan-activity;
sid:420001; rev:7;
)
# D1 - APK download to handset (delivery)
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 8000 (
msg:"APK download to handset (lab host)";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"GET"; nocase;
http.uri; content:"/app-debug.apk"; nocase;
classtype:policy-violation;
sid:420010; rev:3;
)

Reload Suricata (or restart the container) after editing local.rules.

Wazuh ingest (ADB logcat --> syslog)

The host streams filtered adb logcat into /var/log/syslog with a stable program name (pixel6a). The Wazuh agent (on the host) tails syslog by default.

# On the host (with the phone connected over USB or wireless ADB):
./scripts/logcat_to_syslog.sh

Custom Wazuh rules are already under:

config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml

They cover:

  • W1/W2 – Sideload/install (PackageInstaller/PackageManager lines)
  • W3 – Persistence (BootReceiver BOOT_COMPLETED)
  • W4 – Beacon worker executed (WorkManager / Beacon logs)
  • W5 – Actions on Objective (Encrypt/Decrypt messages)

Restart Wazuh manager after updates:

docker compose exec wazuh-manager /var/ossec/bin/wazuh-control restart

Android app (LockerSim)

The app code lives under:

apps/locker-sim-android/

Key files to review:

  • AndroidManifest.xml (INTERNET, RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED, cleartext allowed for lab)
  • beacon/BeaconWorker.kt (POST /beacon, UA Locker-Beacon/1.0 (SIMULATION))
  • boot/BootReceiver.kt (schedules a oneshot beacon on boot)
  • crypto/Crypto.kt (AES‑GCM using AndroidKeyStore)
  • data/FileRepo.kt (seed/list/encrypt/decrypt in app‑private dir)
  • ransom/RansomNoteActivity.kt (offline note for a screenshot)
  • MainActivity.kt + activity_main.xml (explicit lab UI)

Build the debug APK from Android Studio or via Gradle; the path typically ends up at:

apps/locker-sim-android/app/build/outputs/apk/debug/app-debug.apk

Lab HTTP service for delivery / beacons

For delivery (D1) and beacon (N1) testing you need an HTTP listener on the lab host:

  • Easiest path (delivery only): python3 -m http.server 8000 from the folder that contains app-debug.apk (serves /app-debug.apk).
  • If you also want to record beacons, run a tiny handler (e.g., any lightweight Flask/Node/go‑http) that accepts POST /beacon. Note: Suricata will still alert on the POST/UA even if /beacon returns 404.

Update MainActivity.kt / BeaconWorker to point to your lab host (e.g., http://10.42.0.1:8000/beacon).


Detection engineering

Suricata rules (network)

See the two rules above (N1, D1). Confirm they load (no errors) and then trigger them with:

# D1 - generate a GET for the APK
curl -s -o /dev/null http://10.42.0.1:8000/app-debug.apk
# N1 - generate a beacon POST (host side)
curl -s -X POST http://10.42.0.1:8000/beacon \
-H 'User-Agent: Locker-Beacon/1.0 (SIMULATION)' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"lab":true,"ts":"'"$(date -Iseconds)"'"}'>/dev/null

Evidence extraction (host side):

# Prefer host bind if present
EVE=./suricata/log/eve.json
[ -r"$EVE" ] || EVE=/var/log/suricata/eve.json # fallback (inside container)# D1
jq -c 'select(.event_type=="alert" and .alert.signature_id==420010) | {ts:.timestamp,src:.src_ip,dst:.dest_ip,method:.http.http_method,uri:.http.url,sid:.alert.signature_id,sig:.alert.signature}' \
"$EVE"| tail -n 3 | tee -a evidence/3.2/delivery/d1_alert.json
# N1
jq -c 'select(.event_type=="alert" and .alert.signature_id==420001) | {ts:.timestamp,src:.src_ip,dst:.dest_ip,method:.http.http_method,uri:.http.url,ua:.http.http_user_agent,sid:.alert.signature_id,sig:.alert.signature}' \
"$EVE"| tail -n 3 | tee -a evidence/3.2/c2/n1_alert.json

If your Suricata container doesn’t have jq, run jq on the host against the bind‑mounted EVE file.

Kibana KQL hunts (saved searches)

H1 – Delivery (APK):

event.module : "suricata" and (
suricata.eve.http.url : "/app-debug.apk" or
url.path : "/app-debug.apk" or
url.original : "*app-debug.apk"
) and ( destination.ip : 10.42.0.1 or host.hostname : "10.42.0.1" )

H3 – Beacon (UA contains):

event.module : "suricata" and user_agent.original : "*Locker-Beacon/1.0*"

Exports live under:

evidence/3.2/delivery/H1.ndjson
evidence/3.2/c2/H3.ndjson

Wazuh rules (handset logs)

config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml defines IDs in the 9101xx range:

<!-- W1/W2: Sideload/Install observed -->
<ruleid="910110"level="8">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>Package(Installer|Manager).*(install|installed|install succeeded|Added package)</match>
<description>Android package install observed (possible sideload) - LockerSim chain</description>
<mitre><id>T1476</id><id>T1404</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W3: BOOT_COMPLETED receiver fired -->
<ruleid="910120"level="7">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>BootReceiver.*BOOT_COMPLETED</match>
<description>Android BOOT_COMPLETED handled by app (persistence)</description>
<mitre><id>T1624.001</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W4: WorkManager/Beacon run -->
<ruleid="910130"level="8">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>BeaconWorker.*(POST|Beacon|200)|WorkManager.*Starting work.*BeaconWorker</match>
<description>Beacon worker executed</description>
<mitre><id>T1603</id><id>T1437.001</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W5: Encryption/Decryption activity -->
<ruleid="910140"level="10">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>(LockerSim|FileRepo).*(ENCRYPT|DECRYPT|Encrypt|Decrypt|encrypted|decrypted)</match>
<description>LockerSim AoO activity (encrypt/decrypt)</description>
<mitre><id>T1471</id><id>T1486</id></mitre>
</rule>

Evidence extraction (manager container):

# Last N alerts for a rule idwazuh_last_by_id() {
local rule_id="$1";local n="${2:-20}"
docker compose exec -T wazuh-manager sh -lc \
"grep -F '\"id\":\"$rule_id\"' /var/ossec/logs/alerts/alerts.json | tail -n $n"
}
mkdir -p evidence/3.2/{sideload,persistence,c2,aoo}
# W1/W2
wazuh_last_by_id 910110 20 | tee -a evidence/3.2/sideload/w1w2_alerts.json
# W3
wazuh_last_by_id 910120 10 | tee -a evidence/3.2/persistence/w3_boot.json
# W4
wazuh_last_by_id 910130 10 | tee -a evidence/3.2/c2/w4_alerts.json
# W5
wazuh_last_by_id 910140 20 | tee -a evidence/3.2/aoo/w5_alerts.json

Elastic Security correlation (EQL)

Saved export: evidence/3.2/correlation/C1.ndjson

sequence with maxspan=10m
[ any where event.module == "wazuh" and event.original : "*BootReceiver*BOOT_COMPLETED*" ]
[ any where event.module == "suricata" and user_agent.original : "*Locker-Beacon/1.0*" ]

Run the full validation flow

  1. Baseline ingest – confirm Filebeat --> ES is live (./scripts/vis_ing.sh shows counts, or check Kibana Discover).
  2. Delivery – browse http://10.42.0.1:8000/app-debug.apk from the phone --> expect D1 alert + H1 hits.
  3. Sideload – install the APK (repeat your filmed flow) --> expect W1/W2 alerts.
  4. C2 – press “Send Beacons (x5 @ 60s)” in the app --> expect N1 alert + H3 hits and W4 on the handset logs.
  5. Persistence – reboot the phone --> expect W3, then the EQL sequence (C1) when the first beacon lands.
  6. AoO – run ENCRYPT then DECRYPT in the app UI --> expect W5 (impact & recovery evidence).

Evidence pack layout

This repo already includes representative exports/receipts (add your fresh run beside them):

evidence/
└── 3.2
├── delivery/ # d1_alert.json , H1.ndjson
├── c2/ # n1_alert.json , w4_alerts.json , H3.ndjson , pcap/
├── sideload/ # w1w2_alerts.json
├── persistence/ # w3_boot.json
├── aoo/ # w5_alerts.json
└── correlation/ # C1.ndjson

Host ingest receipts (counts/docs/sample EVE) are stored under config/evidence/ingest-*/ and are handy for screenshots in the report.


Repo structure (excerpt)

Generated from the project’s tree.txt (top‑level only; see repo for the full view).

.
├── config
│ ├── evidence/ingest-*/{compose_ps.txt,es_count.json,es_docs.json,eve_sample.json}
│ ├── filebeat/filebeat.yml
│ ├── suricata/suricata.yaml
│ └── wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml
├── docker-compose.yml
├── evidence/3.2/{delivery,c2,aoo,correlation,persistence,sideload}/...
├── scripts/{logcat_to_syslog.sh,vis_ing.sh}
└── kibana/exports (optional)

Tools list

Red team

  • Android Studio / Gradle – build the LockerSim app (Kotlin).
  • OkHttp, WorkManager, Coroutines – networking & reliable background work.
  • Android Keystore + AES‑GCM – file encryption in a scoped directory.
  • Python 3 – simple HTTP service for APK hosting (and optional /beacon capture).
  • adb / platform‑tools – install, logcat, dumpsys evidence.

Blue team

  • Suricata – IDS with custom HTTP rules (EVE JSON).
  • Filebeat/Elastic/Kibana – ship and analyse network telemetry (KQL/EQL).
  • Wazuh (manager + agent) – parse handset logs from syslog with local rules.
  • jq – extract alert slices from EVE.
  • tcpdump/Wireshark – optional PCAP for beacon verification.

Safety & ethics

  • My device only, on an isolated SSID with no Internet egress.
  • Encryption is limited to an app‑private folder (or a user‑granted tree via SAF) and is reversible in‑app.
  • APK requests only INTERNET and RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED.
  • After demos: uninstall the APK, stop lab services, and archive only benign evidence (logs/exports).

Acknowledgements

  • MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile (technique mapping).
  • Open‑source ecosystems behind Suricata, Elastic Stack, and Wazuh.
  • Android Open Source Project & Jetpack libraries used by LockerSim.

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eth‑red‑blue - Mobile Ransomware Red/Blue Lab

Elevator pitch
A complete, reproducible red/blue lab that simulates a mobile ransomware campaign against a physical Google Pixel 6a on an isolated Wi‑Fi AP.
The Red Team delivers and sideloads a lab APK (“LockerSim”) that encrypts a scoped photo folder and sends benign JSON beacons.
The Blue Team ingests Suricata EVE and ADB logcat --> Wazuh, engineers detections (D1/N1/W1–W5), and correlates boot --> first beacon in Elastic Security.
Everything you need to re‑run the exercise end‑to‑end, code, rules, KQL/EQL, and helper scripts, is in this repo.


Contents


Introduction

This lab demonstrates a realistic mobile ransomware chain-delivery, sideload/exploitation, installation/persistence, C2, and actions‑on‑objective-against the author’s own Pixel 6a on a dedicated lab SSID. The Blue Team side implements network and handset telemetry, custom detections, and a time‑bound correlation linking BOOT_COMPLETED --> first beacon. All detections are designed to be auditable (JSON/PCAP/Kibana exports) and are scoped to keep the exercise ethical and safe (no exfiltration; file encryption limited to an app‑private directory or a user‑granted tree).


High‑level architecture

flowchart TD
subgraph Host["Ubuntu 22.04 Host"]
direction TB
Suricata["Docker Suricata (IDS)"]
ELK["Docker ELK stack (ES + Kibana)"]
Wazuh["Docker Wazuh-manager (SIEM)"]
Agent["Wazuh Agent (on host)"]
Logger["ADB logcat --> syslog forwarder (script)"]
end
subgraph Phone["Google Pixel 6a (Android 14/16 SDK)"]
direction TB
App["LockerSim.apk<br/>- AES-GCM file ops (sandbox/DCIM)<br/>- WorkManager beacons<br/>- BOOT_COMPLETED receiver"]
end
Host ---|"isolated lab SSID (hosted by USB Wi‑Fi AP)"| Phone
Logger --> Agent --> Wazuh
Suricata --> ELK
Loading

Environment & setup

Host prerequisites

  • Ubuntu 22.04 LTS (or similar Linux host).
  • Docker + Docker Compose.
  • ADB / Android Platform Tools on the host.
  • Python 3.10+ (for tiny utility scripts).
  • A dual‑band USB Wi‑Fi adapter (hosted AP) - lab SSID without Internet.
  • The phone (Pixel 6a) connects to the AP; the host is also on the AP and additionally on Ethernet for admin.

Clone & compose

git clone https://github.com/ryanfoxgithub/eth-red-blue.git
cd eth-red-blue
# Bring up the stack (Suricata, Elastic, Wazuh, etc.)
docker compose up -d
# (Optional) verify ingest wiring with the helper
./scripts/vis_ing.sh

Key configs you may want to glance at:

  • config/suricata/suricata.yaml (EVE types enabled, HOME_NET set to your lab subnet)
  • config/filebeat/filebeat.yml (ships EVE to Elasticsearch)
  • config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml (custom W rules used below)

Suricata tuning

Drop your local signatures here and include them from suricata.yaml:

config/suricata/rules/local.rules

Two rules are used in this project:

# N1 - Locker beacon (POST + UA + path)
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (
msg:"LockerSim HTTP beacon (UA+path)";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"POST"; nocase;
http.uri; content:"/beacon";
http.user_agent; content:"Locker-Beacon/1.0"; nocase;
classtype:trojan-activity;
sid:420001; rev:7;
)
# D1 - APK download to handset (delivery)
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 8000 (
msg:"APK download to handset (lab host)";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"GET"; nocase;
http.uri; content:"/app-debug.apk"; nocase;
classtype:policy-violation;
sid:420010; rev:3;
)

Reload Suricata (or restart the container) after editing local.rules.

Wazuh ingest (ADB logcat --> syslog)

The host streams filtered adb logcat into /var/log/syslog with a stable program name (pixel6a). The Wazuh agent (on the host) tails syslog by default.

# On the host (with the phone connected over USB or wireless ADB):
./scripts/logcat_to_syslog.sh

Custom Wazuh rules are already under:

config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml

They cover:

  • W1/W2 – Sideload/install (PackageInstaller/PackageManager lines)
  • W3 – Persistence (BootReceiver BOOT_COMPLETED)
  • W4 – Beacon worker executed (WorkManager / Beacon logs)
  • W5 – Actions on Objective (Encrypt/Decrypt messages)

Restart Wazuh manager after updates:

docker compose exec wazuh-manager /var/ossec/bin/wazuh-control restart

Android app (LockerSim)

The app code lives under:

apps/locker-sim-android/

Key files to review:

  • AndroidManifest.xml (INTERNET, RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED, cleartext allowed for lab)
  • beacon/BeaconWorker.kt (POST /beacon, UA Locker-Beacon/1.0 (SIMULATION))
  • boot/BootReceiver.kt (schedules a oneshot beacon on boot)
  • crypto/Crypto.kt (AES‑GCM using AndroidKeyStore)
  • data/FileRepo.kt (seed/list/encrypt/decrypt in app‑private dir)
  • ransom/RansomNoteActivity.kt (offline note for a screenshot)
  • MainActivity.kt + activity_main.xml (explicit lab UI)

Build the debug APK from Android Studio or via Gradle; the path typically ends up at:

apps/locker-sim-android/app/build/outputs/apk/debug/app-debug.apk

Lab HTTP service for delivery / beacons

For delivery (D1) and beacon (N1) testing you need an HTTP listener on the lab host:

  • Easiest path (delivery only): python3 -m http.server 8000 from the folder that contains app-debug.apk (serves /app-debug.apk).
  • If you also want to record beacons, run a tiny handler (e.g., any lightweight Flask/Node/go‑http) that accepts POST /beacon. Note: Suricata will still alert on the POST/UA even if /beacon returns 404.

Update MainActivity.kt / BeaconWorker to point to your lab host (e.g., http://10.42.0.1:8000/beacon).


Detection engineering

Suricata rules (network)

See the two rules above (N1, D1). Confirm they load (no errors) and then trigger them with:

# D1 - generate a GET for the APK
curl -s -o /dev/null http://10.42.0.1:8000/app-debug.apk
# N1 - generate a beacon POST (host side)
curl -s -X POST http://10.42.0.1:8000/beacon \
-H 'User-Agent: Locker-Beacon/1.0 (SIMULATION)' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"lab":true,"ts":"'"$(date -Iseconds)"'"}'>/dev/null

Evidence extraction (host side):

# Prefer host bind if present
EVE=./suricata/log/eve.json
[ -r"$EVE" ] || EVE=/var/log/suricata/eve.json # fallback (inside container)# D1
jq -c 'select(.event_type=="alert" and .alert.signature_id==420010) | {ts:.timestamp,src:.src_ip,dst:.dest_ip,method:.http.http_method,uri:.http.url,sid:.alert.signature_id,sig:.alert.signature}' \
"$EVE"| tail -n 3 | tee -a evidence/3.2/delivery/d1_alert.json
# N1
jq -c 'select(.event_type=="alert" and .alert.signature_id==420001) | {ts:.timestamp,src:.src_ip,dst:.dest_ip,method:.http.http_method,uri:.http.url,ua:.http.http_user_agent,sid:.alert.signature_id,sig:.alert.signature}' \
"$EVE"| tail -n 3 | tee -a evidence/3.2/c2/n1_alert.json

If your Suricata container doesn’t have jq, run jq on the host against the bind‑mounted EVE file.

Kibana KQL hunts (saved searches)

H1 – Delivery (APK):

event.module : "suricata" and (
suricata.eve.http.url : "/app-debug.apk" or
url.path : "/app-debug.apk" or
url.original : "*app-debug.apk"
) and ( destination.ip : 10.42.0.1 or host.hostname : "10.42.0.1" )

H3 – Beacon (UA contains):

event.module : "suricata" and user_agent.original : "*Locker-Beacon/1.0*"

Exports live under:

evidence/3.2/delivery/H1.ndjson
evidence/3.2/c2/H3.ndjson

Wazuh rules (handset logs)

config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml defines IDs in the 9101xx range:

<!-- W1/W2: Sideload/Install observed -->
<ruleid="910110"level="8">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>Package(Installer|Manager).*(install|installed|install succeeded|Added package)</match>
<description>Android package install observed (possible sideload) - LockerSim chain</description>
<mitre><id>T1476</id><id>T1404</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W3: BOOT_COMPLETED receiver fired -->
<ruleid="910120"level="7">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>BootReceiver.*BOOT_COMPLETED</match>
<description>Android BOOT_COMPLETED handled by app (persistence)</description>
<mitre><id>T1624.001</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W4: WorkManager/Beacon run -->
<ruleid="910130"level="8">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>BeaconWorker.*(POST|Beacon|200)|WorkManager.*Starting work.*BeaconWorker</match>
<description>Beacon worker executed</description>
<mitre><id>T1603</id><id>T1437.001</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W5: Encryption/Decryption activity -->
<ruleid="910140"level="10">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>(LockerSim|FileRepo).*(ENCRYPT|DECRYPT|Encrypt|Decrypt|encrypted|decrypted)</match>
<description>LockerSim AoO activity (encrypt/decrypt)</description>
<mitre><id>T1471</id><id>T1486</id></mitre>
</rule>

Evidence extraction (manager container):

# Last N alerts for a rule idwazuh_last_by_id() {
local rule_id="$1";local n="${2:-20}"
docker compose exec -T wazuh-manager sh -lc \
"grep -F '\"id\":\"$rule_id\"' /var/ossec/logs/alerts/alerts.json | tail -n $n"
}
mkdir -p evidence/3.2/{sideload,persistence,c2,aoo}
# W1/W2
wazuh_last_by_id 910110 20 | tee -a evidence/3.2/sideload/w1w2_alerts.json
# W3
wazuh_last_by_id 910120 10 | tee -a evidence/3.2/persistence/w3_boot.json
# W4
wazuh_last_by_id 910130 10 | tee -a evidence/3.2/c2/w4_alerts.json
# W5
wazuh_last_by_id 910140 20 | tee -a evidence/3.2/aoo/w5_alerts.json

Elastic Security correlation (EQL)

Saved export: evidence/3.2/correlation/C1.ndjson

sequence with maxspan=10m
[ any where event.module == "wazuh" and event.original : "*BootReceiver*BOOT_COMPLETED*" ]
[ any where event.module == "suricata" and user_agent.original : "*Locker-Beacon/1.0*" ]

Run the full validation flow

  1. Baseline ingest – confirm Filebeat --> ES is live (./scripts/vis_ing.sh shows counts, or check Kibana Discover).
  2. Delivery – browse http://10.42.0.1:8000/app-debug.apk from the phone --> expect D1 alert + H1 hits.
  3. Sideload – install the APK (repeat your filmed flow) --> expect W1/W2 alerts.
  4. C2 – press “Send Beacons (x5 @ 60s)” in the app --> expect N1 alert + H3 hits and W4 on the handset logs.
  5. Persistence – reboot the phone --> expect W3, then the EQL sequence (C1) when the first beacon lands.
  6. AoO – run ENCRYPT then DECRYPT in the app UI --> expect W5 (impact & recovery evidence).

Evidence pack layout

This repo already includes representative exports/receipts (add your fresh run beside them):

evidence/
└── 3.2
├── delivery/ # d1_alert.json , H1.ndjson
├── c2/ # n1_alert.json , w4_alerts.json , H3.ndjson , pcap/
├── sideload/ # w1w2_alerts.json
├── persistence/ # w3_boot.json
├── aoo/ # w5_alerts.json
└── correlation/ # C1.ndjson

Host ingest receipts (counts/docs/sample EVE) are stored under config/evidence/ingest-*/ and are handy for screenshots in the report.


Repo structure (excerpt)

Generated from the project’s tree.txt (top‑level only; see repo for the full view).

.
├── config
│ ├── evidence/ingest-*/{compose_ps.txt,es_count.json,es_docs.json,eve_sample.json}
│ ├── filebeat/filebeat.yml
│ ├── suricata/suricata.yaml
│ └── wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml
├── docker-compose.yml
├── evidence/3.2/{delivery,c2,aoo,correlation,persistence,sideload}/...
├── scripts/{logcat_to_syslog.sh,vis_ing.sh}
└── kibana/exports (optional)

Tools list

Red team

  • Android Studio / Gradle – build the LockerSim app (Kotlin).
  • OkHttp, WorkManager, Coroutines – networking & reliable background work.
  • Android Keystore + AES‑GCM – file encryption in a scoped directory.
  • Python 3 – simple HTTP service for APK hosting (and optional /beacon capture).
  • adb / platform‑tools – install, logcat, dumpsys evidence.

Blue team

  • Suricata – IDS with custom HTTP rules (EVE JSON).
  • Filebeat/Elastic/Kibana – ship and analyse network telemetry (KQL/EQL).
  • Wazuh (manager + agent) – parse handset logs from syslog with local rules.
  • jq – extract alert slices from EVE.
  • tcpdump/Wireshark – optional PCAP for beacon verification.

Safety & ethics

  • My device only, on an isolated SSID with no Internet egress.
  • Encryption is limited to an app‑private folder (or a user‑granted tree via SAF) and is reversible in‑app.
  • APK requests only INTERNET and RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED.
  • After demos: uninstall the APK, stop lab services, and archive only benign evidence (logs/exports).

Acknowledgements

  • MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile (technique mapping).
  • Open‑source ecosystems behind Suricata, Elastic Stack, and Wazuh.
  • Android Open Source Project & Jetpack libraries used by LockerSim.

About

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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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eth‑red‑blue - Mobile Ransomware Red/Blue Lab

Elevator pitch
A complete, reproducible red/blue lab that simulates a mobile ransomware campaign against a physical Google Pixel 6a on an isolated Wi‑Fi AP.
The Red Team delivers and sideloads a lab APK (“LockerSim”) that encrypts a scoped photo folder and sends benign JSON beacons.
The Blue Team ingests Suricata EVE and ADB logcat --> Wazuh, engineers detections (D1/N1/W1–W5), and correlates boot --> first beacon in Elastic Security.
Everything you need to re‑run the exercise end‑to‑end, code, rules, KQL/EQL, and helper scripts, is in this repo.


Contents


Introduction

This lab demonstrates a realistic mobile ransomware chain-delivery, sideload/exploitation, installation/persistence, C2, and actions‑on‑objective-against the author’s own Pixel 6a on a dedicated lab SSID. The Blue Team side implements network and handset telemetry, custom detections, and a time‑bound correlation linking BOOT_COMPLETED --> first beacon. All detections are designed to be auditable (JSON/PCAP/Kibana exports) and are scoped to keep the exercise ethical and safe (no exfiltration; file encryption limited to an app‑private directory or a user‑granted tree).


High‑level architecture

flowchart TD
subgraph Host["Ubuntu 22.04 Host"]
direction TB
Suricata["Docker Suricata (IDS)"]
ELK["Docker ELK stack (ES + Kibana)"]
Wazuh["Docker Wazuh-manager (SIEM)"]
Agent["Wazuh Agent (on host)"]
Logger["ADB logcat --> syslog forwarder (script)"]
end
subgraph Phone["Google Pixel 6a (Android 14/16 SDK)"]
direction TB
App["LockerSim.apk<br/>- AES-GCM file ops (sandbox/DCIM)<br/>- WorkManager beacons<br/>- BOOT_COMPLETED receiver"]
end
Host ---|"isolated lab SSID (hosted by USB Wi‑Fi AP)"| Phone
Logger --> Agent --> Wazuh
Suricata --> ELK
Loading

Environment & setup

Host prerequisites

  • Ubuntu 22.04 LTS (or similar Linux host).
  • Docker + Docker Compose.
  • ADB / Android Platform Tools on the host.
  • Python 3.10+ (for tiny utility scripts).
  • A dual‑band USB Wi‑Fi adapter (hosted AP) - lab SSID without Internet.
  • The phone (Pixel 6a) connects to the AP; the host is also on the AP and additionally on Ethernet for admin.

Clone & compose

git clone https://github.com/ryanfoxgithub/eth-red-blue.git
cd eth-red-blue
# Bring up the stack (Suricata, Elastic, Wazuh, etc.)
docker compose up -d
# (Optional) verify ingest wiring with the helper
./scripts/vis_ing.sh

Key configs you may want to glance at:

  • config/suricata/suricata.yaml (EVE types enabled, HOME_NET set to your lab subnet)
  • config/filebeat/filebeat.yml (ships EVE to Elasticsearch)
  • config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml (custom W rules used below)

Suricata tuning

Drop your local signatures here and include them from suricata.yaml:

config/suricata/rules/local.rules

Two rules are used in this project:

# N1 - Locker beacon (POST + UA + path)
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (
msg:"LockerSim HTTP beacon (UA+path)";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"POST"; nocase;
http.uri; content:"/beacon";
http.user_agent; content:"Locker-Beacon/1.0"; nocase;
classtype:trojan-activity;
sid:420001; rev:7;
)
# D1 - APK download to handset (delivery)
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 8000 (
msg:"APK download to handset (lab host)";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"GET"; nocase;
http.uri; content:"/app-debug.apk"; nocase;
classtype:policy-violation;
sid:420010; rev:3;
)

Reload Suricata (or restart the container) after editing local.rules.

Wazuh ingest (ADB logcat --> syslog)

The host streams filtered adb logcat into /var/log/syslog with a stable program name (pixel6a). The Wazuh agent (on the host) tails syslog by default.

# On the host (with the phone connected over USB or wireless ADB):
./scripts/logcat_to_syslog.sh

Custom Wazuh rules are already under:

config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml

They cover:

  • W1/W2 – Sideload/install (PackageInstaller/PackageManager lines)
  • W3 – Persistence (BootReceiver BOOT_COMPLETED)
  • W4 – Beacon worker executed (WorkManager / Beacon logs)
  • W5 – Actions on Objective (Encrypt/Decrypt messages)

Restart Wazuh manager after updates:

docker compose exec wazuh-manager /var/ossec/bin/wazuh-control restart

Android app (LockerSim)

The app code lives under:

apps/locker-sim-android/

Key files to review:

  • AndroidManifest.xml (INTERNET, RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED, cleartext allowed for lab)
  • beacon/BeaconWorker.kt (POST /beacon, UA Locker-Beacon/1.0 (SIMULATION))
  • boot/BootReceiver.kt (schedules a oneshot beacon on boot)
  • crypto/Crypto.kt (AES‑GCM using AndroidKeyStore)
  • data/FileRepo.kt (seed/list/encrypt/decrypt in app‑private dir)
  • ransom/RansomNoteActivity.kt (offline note for a screenshot)
  • MainActivity.kt + activity_main.xml (explicit lab UI)

Build the debug APK from Android Studio or via Gradle; the path typically ends up at:

apps/locker-sim-android/app/build/outputs/apk/debug/app-debug.apk

Lab HTTP service for delivery / beacons

For delivery (D1) and beacon (N1) testing you need an HTTP listener on the lab host:

  • Easiest path (delivery only): python3 -m http.server 8000 from the folder that contains app-debug.apk (serves /app-debug.apk).
  • If you also want to record beacons, run a tiny handler (e.g., any lightweight Flask/Node/go‑http) that accepts POST /beacon. Note: Suricata will still alert on the POST/UA even if /beacon returns 404.

Update MainActivity.kt / BeaconWorker to point to your lab host (e.g., http://10.42.0.1:8000/beacon).


Detection engineering

Suricata rules (network)

See the two rules above (N1, D1). Confirm they load (no errors) and then trigger them with:

# D1 - generate a GET for the APK
curl -s -o /dev/null http://10.42.0.1:8000/app-debug.apk
# N1 - generate a beacon POST (host side)
curl -s -X POST http://10.42.0.1:8000/beacon \
-H 'User-Agent: Locker-Beacon/1.0 (SIMULATION)' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"lab":true,"ts":"'"$(date -Iseconds)"'"}'>/dev/null

Evidence extraction (host side):

# Prefer host bind if present
EVE=./suricata/log/eve.json
[ -r"$EVE" ] || EVE=/var/log/suricata/eve.json # fallback (inside container)# D1
jq -c 'select(.event_type=="alert" and .alert.signature_id==420010) | {ts:.timestamp,src:.src_ip,dst:.dest_ip,method:.http.http_method,uri:.http.url,sid:.alert.signature_id,sig:.alert.signature}' \
"$EVE"| tail -n 3 | tee -a evidence/3.2/delivery/d1_alert.json
# N1
jq -c 'select(.event_type=="alert" and .alert.signature_id==420001) | {ts:.timestamp,src:.src_ip,dst:.dest_ip,method:.http.http_method,uri:.http.url,ua:.http.http_user_agent,sid:.alert.signature_id,sig:.alert.signature}' \
"$EVE"| tail -n 3 | tee -a evidence/3.2/c2/n1_alert.json

If your Suricata container doesn’t have jq, run jq on the host against the bind‑mounted EVE file.

Kibana KQL hunts (saved searches)

H1 – Delivery (APK):

event.module : "suricata" and (
suricata.eve.http.url : "/app-debug.apk" or
url.path : "/app-debug.apk" or
url.original : "*app-debug.apk"
) and ( destination.ip : 10.42.0.1 or host.hostname : "10.42.0.1" )

H3 – Beacon (UA contains):

event.module : "suricata" and user_agent.original : "*Locker-Beacon/1.0*"

Exports live under:

evidence/3.2/delivery/H1.ndjson
evidence/3.2/c2/H3.ndjson

Wazuh rules (handset logs)

config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml defines IDs in the 9101xx range:

<!-- W1/W2: Sideload/Install observed -->
<ruleid="910110"level="8">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>Package(Installer|Manager).*(install|installed|install succeeded|Added package)</match>
<description>Android package install observed (possible sideload) - LockerSim chain</description>
<mitre><id>T1476</id><id>T1404</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W3: BOOT_COMPLETED receiver fired -->
<ruleid="910120"level="7">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>BootReceiver.*BOOT_COMPLETED</match>
<description>Android BOOT_COMPLETED handled by app (persistence)</description>
<mitre><id>T1624.001</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W4: WorkManager/Beacon run -->
<ruleid="910130"level="8">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>BeaconWorker.*(POST|Beacon|200)|WorkManager.*Starting work.*BeaconWorker</match>
<description>Beacon worker executed</description>
<mitre><id>T1603</id><id>T1437.001</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W5: Encryption/Decryption activity -->
<ruleid="910140"level="10">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>(LockerSim|FileRepo).*(ENCRYPT|DECRYPT|Encrypt|Decrypt|encrypted|decrypted)</match>
<description>LockerSim AoO activity (encrypt/decrypt)</description>
<mitre><id>T1471</id><id>T1486</id></mitre>
</rule>

Evidence extraction (manager container):

# Last N alerts for a rule idwazuh_last_by_id() {
local rule_id="$1";local n="${2:-20}"
docker compose exec -T wazuh-manager sh -lc \
"grep -F '\"id\":\"$rule_id\"' /var/ossec/logs/alerts/alerts.json | tail -n $n"
}
mkdir -p evidence/3.2/{sideload,persistence,c2,aoo}
# W1/W2
wazuh_last_by_id 910110 20 | tee -a evidence/3.2/sideload/w1w2_alerts.json
# W3
wazuh_last_by_id 910120 10 | tee -a evidence/3.2/persistence/w3_boot.json
# W4
wazuh_last_by_id 910130 10 | tee -a evidence/3.2/c2/w4_alerts.json
# W5
wazuh_last_by_id 910140 20 | tee -a evidence/3.2/aoo/w5_alerts.json

Elastic Security correlation (EQL)

Saved export: evidence/3.2/correlation/C1.ndjson

sequence with maxspan=10m
[ any where event.module == "wazuh" and event.original : "*BootReceiver*BOOT_COMPLETED*" ]
[ any where event.module == "suricata" and user_agent.original : "*Locker-Beacon/1.0*" ]

Run the full validation flow

  1. Baseline ingest – confirm Filebeat --> ES is live (./scripts/vis_ing.sh shows counts, or check Kibana Discover).
  2. Delivery – browse http://10.42.0.1:8000/app-debug.apk from the phone --> expect D1 alert + H1 hits.
  3. Sideload – install the APK (repeat your filmed flow) --> expect W1/W2 alerts.
  4. C2 – press “Send Beacons (x5 @ 60s)” in the app --> expect N1 alert + H3 hits and W4 on the handset logs.
  5. Persistence – reboot the phone --> expect W3, then the EQL sequence (C1) when the first beacon lands.
  6. AoO – run ENCRYPT then DECRYPT in the app UI --> expect W5 (impact & recovery evidence).

Evidence pack layout

This repo already includes representative exports/receipts (add your fresh run beside them):

evidence/
└── 3.2
├── delivery/ # d1_alert.json , H1.ndjson
├── c2/ # n1_alert.json , w4_alerts.json , H3.ndjson , pcap/
├── sideload/ # w1w2_alerts.json
├── persistence/ # w3_boot.json
├── aoo/ # w5_alerts.json
└── correlation/ # C1.ndjson

Host ingest receipts (counts/docs/sample EVE) are stored under config/evidence/ingest-*/ and are handy for screenshots in the report.


Repo structure (excerpt)

Generated from the project’s tree.txt (top‑level only; see repo for the full view).

.
├── config
│ ├── evidence/ingest-*/{compose_ps.txt,es_count.json,es_docs.json,eve_sample.json}
│ ├── filebeat/filebeat.yml
│ ├── suricata/suricata.yaml
│ └── wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml
├── docker-compose.yml
├── evidence/3.2/{delivery,c2,aoo,correlation,persistence,sideload}/...
├── scripts/{logcat_to_syslog.sh,vis_ing.sh}
└── kibana/exports (optional)

Tools list

Red team

  • Android Studio / Gradle – build the LockerSim app (Kotlin).
  • OkHttp, WorkManager, Coroutines – networking & reliable background work.
  • Android Keystore + AES‑GCM – file encryption in a scoped directory.
  • Python 3 – simple HTTP service for APK hosting (and optional /beacon capture).
  • adb / platform‑tools – install, logcat, dumpsys evidence.

Blue team

  • Suricata – IDS with custom HTTP rules (EVE JSON).
  • Filebeat/Elastic/Kibana – ship and analyse network telemetry (KQL/EQL).
  • Wazuh (manager + agent) – parse handset logs from syslog with local rules.
  • jq – extract alert slices from EVE.
  • tcpdump/Wireshark – optional PCAP for beacon verification.

Safety & ethics

  • My device only, on an isolated SSID with no Internet egress.
  • Encryption is limited to an app‑private folder (or a user‑granted tree via SAF) and is reversible in‑app.
  • APK requests only INTERNET and RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED.
  • After demos: uninstall the APK, stop lab services, and archive only benign evidence (logs/exports).

Acknowledgements

  • MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile (technique mapping).
  • Open‑source ecosystems behind Suricata, Elastic Stack, and Wazuh.
  • Android Open Source Project & Jetpack libraries used by LockerSim.

About

No description, website, or topics provided.

Resources

Stars

0 stars

Watchers

0 watching

Forks

Releases

Packages

Contributors

Languages

, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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Repository files navigation

eth‑red‑blue - Mobile Ransomware Red/Blue Lab

Elevator pitch
A complete, reproducible red/blue lab that simulates a mobile ransomware campaign against a physical Google Pixel 6a on an isolated Wi‑Fi AP.
The Red Team delivers and sideloads a lab APK (“LockerSim”) that encrypts a scoped photo folder and sends benign JSON beacons.
The Blue Team ingests Suricata EVE and ADB logcat --> Wazuh, engineers detections (D1/N1/W1–W5), and correlates boot --> first beacon in Elastic Security.
Everything you need to re‑run the exercise end‑to‑end, code, rules, KQL/EQL, and helper scripts, is in this repo.


Contents


Introduction

This lab demonstrates a realistic mobile ransomware chain-delivery, sideload/exploitation, installation/persistence, C2, and actions‑on‑objective-against the author’s own Pixel 6a on a dedicated lab SSID. The Blue Team side implements network and handset telemetry, custom detections, and a time‑bound correlation linking BOOT_COMPLETED --> first beacon. All detections are designed to be auditable (JSON/PCAP/Kibana exports) and are scoped to keep the exercise ethical and safe (no exfiltration; file encryption limited to an app‑private directory or a user‑granted tree).


High‑level architecture

flowchart TD
subgraph Host["Ubuntu 22.04 Host"]
direction TB
Suricata["Docker Suricata (IDS)"]
ELK["Docker ELK stack (ES + Kibana)"]
Wazuh["Docker Wazuh-manager (SIEM)"]
Agent["Wazuh Agent (on host)"]
Logger["ADB logcat --> syslog forwarder (script)"]
end
subgraph Phone["Google Pixel 6a (Android 14/16 SDK)"]
direction TB
App["LockerSim.apk<br/>- AES-GCM file ops (sandbox/DCIM)<br/>- WorkManager beacons<br/>- BOOT_COMPLETED receiver"]
end
Host ---|"isolated lab SSID (hosted by USB Wi‑Fi AP)"| Phone
Logger --> Agent --> Wazuh
Suricata --> ELK
Loading

Environment & setup

Host prerequisites

  • Ubuntu 22.04 LTS (or similar Linux host).
  • Docker + Docker Compose.
  • ADB / Android Platform Tools on the host.
  • Python 3.10+ (for tiny utility scripts).
  • A dual‑band USB Wi‑Fi adapter (hosted AP) - lab SSID without Internet.
  • The phone (Pixel 6a) connects to the AP; the host is also on the AP and additionally on Ethernet for admin.

Clone & compose

git clone https://github.com/ryanfoxgithub/eth-red-blue.git
cd eth-red-blue
# Bring up the stack (Suricata, Elastic, Wazuh, etc.)
docker compose up -d
# (Optional) verify ingest wiring with the helper
./scripts/vis_ing.sh

Key configs you may want to glance at:

  • config/suricata/suricata.yaml (EVE types enabled, HOME_NET set to your lab subnet)
  • config/filebeat/filebeat.yml (ships EVE to Elasticsearch)
  • config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml (custom W rules used below)

Suricata tuning

Drop your local signatures here and include them from suricata.yaml:

config/suricata/rules/local.rules

Two rules are used in this project:

# N1 - Locker beacon (POST + UA + path)
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (
msg:"LockerSim HTTP beacon (UA+path)";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"POST"; nocase;
http.uri; content:"/beacon";
http.user_agent; content:"Locker-Beacon/1.0"; nocase;
classtype:trojan-activity;
sid:420001; rev:7;
)
# D1 - APK download to handset (delivery)
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 8000 (
msg:"APK download to handset (lab host)";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"GET"; nocase;
http.uri; content:"/app-debug.apk"; nocase;
classtype:policy-violation;
sid:420010; rev:3;
)

Reload Suricata (or restart the container) after editing local.rules.

Wazuh ingest (ADB logcat --> syslog)

The host streams filtered adb logcat into /var/log/syslog with a stable program name (pixel6a). The Wazuh agent (on the host) tails syslog by default.

# On the host (with the phone connected over USB or wireless ADB):
./scripts/logcat_to_syslog.sh

Custom Wazuh rules are already under:

config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml

They cover:

  • W1/W2 – Sideload/install (PackageInstaller/PackageManager lines)
  • W3 – Persistence (BootReceiver BOOT_COMPLETED)
  • W4 – Beacon worker executed (WorkManager / Beacon logs)
  • W5 – Actions on Objective (Encrypt/Decrypt messages)

Restart Wazuh manager after updates:

docker compose exec wazuh-manager /var/ossec/bin/wazuh-control restart

Android app (LockerSim)

The app code lives under:

apps/locker-sim-android/

Key files to review:

  • AndroidManifest.xml (INTERNET, RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED, cleartext allowed for lab)
  • beacon/BeaconWorker.kt (POST /beacon, UA Locker-Beacon/1.0 (SIMULATION))
  • boot/BootReceiver.kt (schedules a oneshot beacon on boot)
  • crypto/Crypto.kt (AES‑GCM using AndroidKeyStore)
  • data/FileRepo.kt (seed/list/encrypt/decrypt in app‑private dir)
  • ransom/RansomNoteActivity.kt (offline note for a screenshot)
  • MainActivity.kt + activity_main.xml (explicit lab UI)

Build the debug APK from Android Studio or via Gradle; the path typically ends up at:

apps/locker-sim-android/app/build/outputs/apk/debug/app-debug.apk

Lab HTTP service for delivery / beacons

For delivery (D1) and beacon (N1) testing you need an HTTP listener on the lab host:

  • Easiest path (delivery only): python3 -m http.server 8000 from the folder that contains app-debug.apk (serves /app-debug.apk).
  • If you also want to record beacons, run a tiny handler (e.g., any lightweight Flask/Node/go‑http) that accepts POST /beacon. Note: Suricata will still alert on the POST/UA even if /beacon returns 404.

Update MainActivity.kt / BeaconWorker to point to your lab host (e.g., http://10.42.0.1:8000/beacon).


Detection engineering

Suricata rules (network)

See the two rules above (N1, D1). Confirm they load (no errors) and then trigger them with:

# D1 - generate a GET for the APK
curl -s -o /dev/null http://10.42.0.1:8000/app-debug.apk
# N1 - generate a beacon POST (host side)
curl -s -X POST http://10.42.0.1:8000/beacon \
-H 'User-Agent: Locker-Beacon/1.0 (SIMULATION)' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"lab":true,"ts":"'"$(date -Iseconds)"'"}'>/dev/null

Evidence extraction (host side):

# Prefer host bind if present
EVE=./suricata/log/eve.json
[ -r"$EVE" ] || EVE=/var/log/suricata/eve.json # fallback (inside container)# D1
jq -c 'select(.event_type=="alert" and .alert.signature_id==420010) | {ts:.timestamp,src:.src_ip,dst:.dest_ip,method:.http.http_method,uri:.http.url,sid:.alert.signature_id,sig:.alert.signature}' \
"$EVE"| tail -n 3 | tee -a evidence/3.2/delivery/d1_alert.json
# N1
jq -c 'select(.event_type=="alert" and .alert.signature_id==420001) | {ts:.timestamp,src:.src_ip,dst:.dest_ip,method:.http.http_method,uri:.http.url,ua:.http.http_user_agent,sid:.alert.signature_id,sig:.alert.signature}' \
"$EVE"| tail -n 3 | tee -a evidence/3.2/c2/n1_alert.json

If your Suricata container doesn’t have jq, run jq on the host against the bind‑mounted EVE file.

Kibana KQL hunts (saved searches)

H1 – Delivery (APK):

event.module : "suricata" and (
suricata.eve.http.url : "/app-debug.apk" or
url.path : "/app-debug.apk" or
url.original : "*app-debug.apk"
) and ( destination.ip : 10.42.0.1 or host.hostname : "10.42.0.1" )

H3 – Beacon (UA contains):

event.module : "suricata" and user_agent.original : "*Locker-Beacon/1.0*"

Exports live under:

evidence/3.2/delivery/H1.ndjson
evidence/3.2/c2/H3.ndjson

Wazuh rules (handset logs)

config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml defines IDs in the 9101xx range:

<!-- W1/W2: Sideload/Install observed -->
<ruleid="910110"level="8">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>Package(Installer|Manager).*(install|installed|install succeeded|Added package)</match>
<description>Android package install observed (possible sideload) - LockerSim chain</description>
<mitre><id>T1476</id><id>T1404</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W3: BOOT_COMPLETED receiver fired -->
<ruleid="910120"level="7">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>BootReceiver.*BOOT_COMPLETED</match>
<description>Android BOOT_COMPLETED handled by app (persistence)</description>
<mitre><id>T1624.001</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W4: WorkManager/Beacon run -->
<ruleid="910130"level="8">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>BeaconWorker.*(POST|Beacon|200)|WorkManager.*Starting work.*BeaconWorker</match>
<description>Beacon worker executed</description>
<mitre><id>T1603</id><id>T1437.001</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W5: Encryption/Decryption activity -->
<ruleid="910140"level="10">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>(LockerSim|FileRepo).*(ENCRYPT|DECRYPT|Encrypt|Decrypt|encrypted|decrypted)</match>
<description>LockerSim AoO activity (encrypt/decrypt)</description>
<mitre><id>T1471</id><id>T1486</id></mitre>
</rule>

Evidence extraction (manager container):

# Last N alerts for a rule idwazuh_last_by_id() {
local rule_id="$1";local n="${2:-20}"
docker compose exec -T wazuh-manager sh -lc \
"grep -F '\"id\":\"$rule_id\"' /var/ossec/logs/alerts/alerts.json | tail -n $n"
}
mkdir -p evidence/3.2/{sideload,persistence,c2,aoo}
# W1/W2
wazuh_last_by_id 910110 20 | tee -a evidence/3.2/sideload/w1w2_alerts.json
# W3
wazuh_last_by_id 910120 10 | tee -a evidence/3.2/persistence/w3_boot.json
# W4
wazuh_last_by_id 910130 10 | tee -a evidence/3.2/c2/w4_alerts.json
# W5
wazuh_last_by_id 910140 20 | tee -a evidence/3.2/aoo/w5_alerts.json

Elastic Security correlation (EQL)

Saved export: evidence/3.2/correlation/C1.ndjson

sequence with maxspan=10m
[ any where event.module == "wazuh" and event.original : "*BootReceiver*BOOT_COMPLETED*" ]
[ any where event.module == "suricata" and user_agent.original : "*Locker-Beacon/1.0*" ]

Run the full validation flow

  1. Baseline ingest – confirm Filebeat --> ES is live (./scripts/vis_ing.sh shows counts, or check Kibana Discover).
  2. Delivery – browse http://10.42.0.1:8000/app-debug.apk from the phone --> expect D1 alert + H1 hits.
  3. Sideload – install the APK (repeat your filmed flow) --> expect W1/W2 alerts.
  4. C2 – press “Send Beacons (x5 @ 60s)” in the app --> expect N1 alert + H3 hits and W4 on the handset logs.
  5. Persistence – reboot the phone --> expect W3, then the EQL sequence (C1) when the first beacon lands.
  6. AoO – run ENCRYPT then DECRYPT in the app UI --> expect W5 (impact & recovery evidence).

Evidence pack layout

This repo already includes representative exports/receipts (add your fresh run beside them):

evidence/
└── 3.2
├── delivery/ # d1_alert.json , H1.ndjson
├── c2/ # n1_alert.json , w4_alerts.json , H3.ndjson , pcap/
├── sideload/ # w1w2_alerts.json
├── persistence/ # w3_boot.json
├── aoo/ # w5_alerts.json
└── correlation/ # C1.ndjson

Host ingest receipts (counts/docs/sample EVE) are stored under config/evidence/ingest-*/ and are handy for screenshots in the report.


Repo structure (excerpt)

Generated from the project’s tree.txt (top‑level only; see repo for the full view).

.
├── config
│ ├── evidence/ingest-*/{compose_ps.txt,es_count.json,es_docs.json,eve_sample.json}
│ ├── filebeat/filebeat.yml
│ ├── suricata/suricata.yaml
│ └── wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml
├── docker-compose.yml
├── evidence/3.2/{delivery,c2,aoo,correlation,persistence,sideload}/...
├── scripts/{logcat_to_syslog.sh,vis_ing.sh}
└── kibana/exports (optional)

Tools list

Red team

  • Android Studio / Gradle – build the LockerSim app (Kotlin).
  • OkHttp, WorkManager, Coroutines – networking & reliable background work.
  • Android Keystore + AES‑GCM – file encryption in a scoped directory.
  • Python 3 – simple HTTP service for APK hosting (and optional /beacon capture).
  • adb / platform‑tools – install, logcat, dumpsys evidence.

Blue team

  • Suricata – IDS with custom HTTP rules (EVE JSON).
  • Filebeat/Elastic/Kibana – ship and analyse network telemetry (KQL/EQL).
  • Wazuh (manager + agent) – parse handset logs from syslog with local rules.
  • jq – extract alert slices from EVE.
  • tcpdump/Wireshark – optional PCAP for beacon verification.

Safety & ethics

  • My device only, on an isolated SSID with no Internet egress.
  • Encryption is limited to an app‑private folder (or a user‑granted tree via SAF) and is reversible in‑app.
  • APK requests only INTERNET and RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED.
  • After demos: uninstall the APK, stop lab services, and archive only benign evidence (logs/exports).

Acknowledgements

  • MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile (technique mapping).
  • Open‑source ecosystems behind Suricata, Elastic Stack, and Wazuh.
  • Android Open Source Project & Jetpack libraries used by LockerSim.

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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "youtube.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
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eth‑red‑blue - Mobile Ransomware Red/Blue Lab

Elevator pitch
A complete, reproducible red/blue lab that simulates a mobile ransomware campaign against a physical Google Pixel 6a on an isolated Wi‑Fi AP.
The Red Team delivers and sideloads a lab APK (“LockerSim”) that encrypts a scoped photo folder and sends benign JSON beacons.
The Blue Team ingests Suricata EVE and ADB logcat --> Wazuh, engineers detections (D1/N1/W1–W5), and correlates boot --> first beacon in Elastic Security.
Everything you need to re‑run the exercise end‑to‑end, code, rules, KQL/EQL, and helper scripts, is in this repo.


Contents


Introduction

This lab demonstrates a realistic mobile ransomware chain-delivery, sideload/exploitation, installation/persistence, C2, and actions‑on‑objective-against the author’s own Pixel 6a on a dedicated lab SSID. The Blue Team side implements network and handset telemetry, custom detections, and a time‑bound correlation linking BOOT_COMPLETED --> first beacon. All detections are designed to be auditable (JSON/PCAP/Kibana exports) and are scoped to keep the exercise ethical and safe (no exfiltration; file encryption limited to an app‑private directory or a user‑granted tree).


High‑level architecture

flowchart TD
subgraph Host["Ubuntu 22.04 Host"]
direction TB
Suricata["Docker Suricata (IDS)"]
ELK["Docker ELK stack (ES + Kibana)"]
Wazuh["Docker Wazuh-manager (SIEM)"]
Agent["Wazuh Agent (on host)"]
Logger["ADB logcat --> syslog forwarder (script)"]
end
subgraph Phone["Google Pixel 6a (Android 14/16 SDK)"]
direction TB
App["LockerSim.apk<br/>- AES-GCM file ops (sandbox/DCIM)<br/>- WorkManager beacons<br/>- BOOT_COMPLETED receiver"]
end
Host ---|"isolated lab SSID (hosted by USB Wi‑Fi AP)"| Phone
Logger --> Agent --> Wazuh
Suricata --> ELK
Loading

Environment & setup

Host prerequisites

  • Ubuntu 22.04 LTS (or similar Linux host).
  • Docker + Docker Compose.
  • ADB / Android Platform Tools on the host.
  • Python 3.10+ (for tiny utility scripts).
  • A dual‑band USB Wi‑Fi adapter (hosted AP) - lab SSID without Internet.
  • The phone (Pixel 6a) connects to the AP; the host is also on the AP and additionally on Ethernet for admin.

Clone & compose

git clone https://github.com/ryanfoxgithub/eth-red-blue.git
cd eth-red-blue
# Bring up the stack (Suricata, Elastic, Wazuh, etc.)
docker compose up -d
# (Optional) verify ingest wiring with the helper
./scripts/vis_ing.sh

Key configs you may want to glance at:

  • config/suricata/suricata.yaml (EVE types enabled, HOME_NET set to your lab subnet)
  • config/filebeat/filebeat.yml (ships EVE to Elasticsearch)
  • config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml (custom W rules used below)

Suricata tuning

Drop your local signatures here and include them from suricata.yaml:

config/suricata/rules/local.rules

Two rules are used in this project:

# N1 - Locker beacon (POST + UA + path)
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (
msg:"LockerSim HTTP beacon (UA+path)";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"POST"; nocase;
http.uri; content:"/beacon";
http.user_agent; content:"Locker-Beacon/1.0"; nocase;
classtype:trojan-activity;
sid:420001; rev:7;
)
# D1 - APK download to handset (delivery)
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 8000 (
msg:"APK download to handset (lab host)";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"GET"; nocase;
http.uri; content:"/app-debug.apk"; nocase;
classtype:policy-violation;
sid:420010; rev:3;
)

Reload Suricata (or restart the container) after editing local.rules.

Wazuh ingest (ADB logcat --> syslog)

The host streams filtered adb logcat into /var/log/syslog with a stable program name (pixel6a). The Wazuh agent (on the host) tails syslog by default.

# On the host (with the phone connected over USB or wireless ADB):
./scripts/logcat_to_syslog.sh

Custom Wazuh rules are already under:

config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml

They cover:

  • W1/W2 – Sideload/install (PackageInstaller/PackageManager lines)
  • W3 – Persistence (BootReceiver BOOT_COMPLETED)
  • W4 – Beacon worker executed (WorkManager / Beacon logs)
  • W5 – Actions on Objective (Encrypt/Decrypt messages)

Restart Wazuh manager after updates:

docker compose exec wazuh-manager /var/ossec/bin/wazuh-control restart

Android app (LockerSim)

The app code lives under:

apps/locker-sim-android/

Key files to review:

  • AndroidManifest.xml (INTERNET, RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED, cleartext allowed for lab)
  • beacon/BeaconWorker.kt (POST /beacon, UA Locker-Beacon/1.0 (SIMULATION))
  • boot/BootReceiver.kt (schedules a oneshot beacon on boot)
  • crypto/Crypto.kt (AES‑GCM using AndroidKeyStore)
  • data/FileRepo.kt (seed/list/encrypt/decrypt in app‑private dir)
  • ransom/RansomNoteActivity.kt (offline note for a screenshot)
  • MainActivity.kt + activity_main.xml (explicit lab UI)

Build the debug APK from Android Studio or via Gradle; the path typically ends up at:

apps/locker-sim-android/app/build/outputs/apk/debug/app-debug.apk

Lab HTTP service for delivery / beacons

For delivery (D1) and beacon (N1) testing you need an HTTP listener on the lab host:

  • Easiest path (delivery only): python3 -m http.server 8000 from the folder that contains app-debug.apk (serves /app-debug.apk).
  • If you also want to record beacons, run a tiny handler (e.g., any lightweight Flask/Node/go‑http) that accepts POST /beacon. Note: Suricata will still alert on the POST/UA even if /beacon returns 404.

Update MainActivity.kt / BeaconWorker to point to your lab host (e.g., http://10.42.0.1:8000/beacon).


Detection engineering

Suricata rules (network)

See the two rules above (N1, D1). Confirm they load (no errors) and then trigger them with:

# D1 - generate a GET for the APK
curl -s -o /dev/null http://10.42.0.1:8000/app-debug.apk
# N1 - generate a beacon POST (host side)
curl -s -X POST http://10.42.0.1:8000/beacon \
-H 'User-Agent: Locker-Beacon/1.0 (SIMULATION)' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"lab":true,"ts":"'"$(date -Iseconds)"'"}'>/dev/null

Evidence extraction (host side):

# Prefer host bind if present
EVE=./suricata/log/eve.json
[ -r"$EVE" ] || EVE=/var/log/suricata/eve.json # fallback (inside container)# D1
jq -c 'select(.event_type=="alert" and .alert.signature_id==420010) | {ts:.timestamp,src:.src_ip,dst:.dest_ip,method:.http.http_method,uri:.http.url,sid:.alert.signature_id,sig:.alert.signature}' \
"$EVE"| tail -n 3 | tee -a evidence/3.2/delivery/d1_alert.json
# N1
jq -c 'select(.event_type=="alert" and .alert.signature_id==420001) | {ts:.timestamp,src:.src_ip,dst:.dest_ip,method:.http.http_method,uri:.http.url,ua:.http.http_user_agent,sid:.alert.signature_id,sig:.alert.signature}' \
"$EVE"| tail -n 3 | tee -a evidence/3.2/c2/n1_alert.json

If your Suricata container doesn’t have jq, run jq on the host against the bind‑mounted EVE file.

Kibana KQL hunts (saved searches)

H1 – Delivery (APK):

event.module : "suricata" and (
suricata.eve.http.url : "/app-debug.apk" or
url.path : "/app-debug.apk" or
url.original : "*app-debug.apk"
) and ( destination.ip : 10.42.0.1 or host.hostname : "10.42.0.1" )

H3 – Beacon (UA contains):

event.module : "suricata" and user_agent.original : "*Locker-Beacon/1.0*"

Exports live under:

evidence/3.2/delivery/H1.ndjson
evidence/3.2/c2/H3.ndjson

Wazuh rules (handset logs)

config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml defines IDs in the 9101xx range:

<!-- W1/W2: Sideload/Install observed -->
<ruleid="910110"level="8">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>Package(Installer|Manager).*(install|installed|install succeeded|Added package)</match>
<description>Android package install observed (possible sideload) - LockerSim chain</description>
<mitre><id>T1476</id><id>T1404</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W3: BOOT_COMPLETED receiver fired -->
<ruleid="910120"level="7">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>BootReceiver.*BOOT_COMPLETED</match>
<description>Android BOOT_COMPLETED handled by app (persistence)</description>
<mitre><id>T1624.001</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W4: WorkManager/Beacon run -->
<ruleid="910130"level="8">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>BeaconWorker.*(POST|Beacon|200)|WorkManager.*Starting work.*BeaconWorker</match>
<description>Beacon worker executed</description>
<mitre><id>T1603</id><id>T1437.001</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W5: Encryption/Decryption activity -->
<ruleid="910140"level="10">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>(LockerSim|FileRepo).*(ENCRYPT|DECRYPT|Encrypt|Decrypt|encrypted|decrypted)</match>
<description>LockerSim AoO activity (encrypt/decrypt)</description>
<mitre><id>T1471</id><id>T1486</id></mitre>
</rule>

Evidence extraction (manager container):

# Last N alerts for a rule idwazuh_last_by_id() {
local rule_id="$1";local n="${2:-20}"
docker compose exec -T wazuh-manager sh -lc \
"grep -F '\"id\":\"$rule_id\"' /var/ossec/logs/alerts/alerts.json | tail -n $n"
}
mkdir -p evidence/3.2/{sideload,persistence,c2,aoo}
# W1/W2
wazuh_last_by_id 910110 20 | tee -a evidence/3.2/sideload/w1w2_alerts.json
# W3
wazuh_last_by_id 910120 10 | tee -a evidence/3.2/persistence/w3_boot.json
# W4
wazuh_last_by_id 910130 10 | tee -a evidence/3.2/c2/w4_alerts.json
# W5
wazuh_last_by_id 910140 20 | tee -a evidence/3.2/aoo/w5_alerts.json

Elastic Security correlation (EQL)

Saved export: evidence/3.2/correlation/C1.ndjson

sequence with maxspan=10m
[ any where event.module == "wazuh" and event.original : "*BootReceiver*BOOT_COMPLETED*" ]
[ any where event.module == "suricata" and user_agent.original : "*Locker-Beacon/1.0*" ]

Run the full validation flow

  1. Baseline ingest – confirm Filebeat --> ES is live (./scripts/vis_ing.sh shows counts, or check Kibana Discover).
  2. Delivery – browse http://10.42.0.1:8000/app-debug.apk from the phone --> expect D1 alert + H1 hits.
  3. Sideload – install the APK (repeat your filmed flow) --> expect W1/W2 alerts.
  4. C2 – press “Send Beacons (x5 @ 60s)” in the app --> expect N1 alert + H3 hits and W4 on the handset logs.
  5. Persistence – reboot the phone --> expect W3, then the EQL sequence (C1) when the first beacon lands.
  6. AoO – run ENCRYPT then DECRYPT in the app UI --> expect W5 (impact & recovery evidence).

Evidence pack layout

This repo already includes representative exports/receipts (add your fresh run beside them):

evidence/
└── 3.2
├── delivery/ # d1_alert.json , H1.ndjson
├── c2/ # n1_alert.json , w4_alerts.json , H3.ndjson , pcap/
├── sideload/ # w1w2_alerts.json
├── persistence/ # w3_boot.json
├── aoo/ # w5_alerts.json
└── correlation/ # C1.ndjson

Host ingest receipts (counts/docs/sample EVE) are stored under config/evidence/ingest-*/ and are handy for screenshots in the report.


Repo structure (excerpt)

Generated from the project’s tree.txt (top‑level only; see repo for the full view).

.
├── config
│ ├── evidence/ingest-*/{compose_ps.txt,es_count.json,es_docs.json,eve_sample.json}
│ ├── filebeat/filebeat.yml
│ ├── suricata/suricata.yaml
│ └── wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml
├── docker-compose.yml
├── evidence/3.2/{delivery,c2,aoo,correlation,persistence,sideload}/...
├── scripts/{logcat_to_syslog.sh,vis_ing.sh}
└── kibana/exports (optional)

Tools list

Red team

  • Android Studio / Gradle – build the LockerSim app (Kotlin).
  • OkHttp, WorkManager, Coroutines – networking & reliable background work.
  • Android Keystore + AES‑GCM – file encryption in a scoped directory.
  • Python 3 – simple HTTP service for APK hosting (and optional /beacon capture).
  • adb / platform‑tools – install, logcat, dumpsys evidence.

Blue team

  • Suricata – IDS with custom HTTP rules (EVE JSON).
  • Filebeat/Elastic/Kibana – ship and analyse network telemetry (KQL/EQL).
  • Wazuh (manager + agent) – parse handset logs from syslog with local rules.
  • jq – extract alert slices from EVE.
  • tcpdump/Wireshark – optional PCAP for beacon verification.

Safety & ethics

  • My device only, on an isolated SSID with no Internet egress.
  • Encryption is limited to an app‑private folder (or a user‑granted tree via SAF) and is reversible in‑app.
  • APK requests only INTERNET and RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED.
  • After demos: uninstall the APK, stop lab services, and archive only benign evidence (logs/exports).

Acknowledgements

  • MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile (technique mapping).
  • Open‑source ecosystems behind Suricata, Elastic Stack, and Wazuh.
  • Android Open Source Project & Jetpack libraries used by LockerSim.

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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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eth‑red‑blue - Mobile Ransomware Red/Blue Lab

Elevator pitch
A complete, reproducible red/blue lab that simulates a mobile ransomware campaign against a physical Google Pixel 6a on an isolated Wi‑Fi AP.
The Red Team delivers and sideloads a lab APK (“LockerSim”) that encrypts a scoped photo folder and sends benign JSON beacons.
The Blue Team ingests Suricata EVE and ADB logcat --> Wazuh, engineers detections (D1/N1/W1–W5), and correlates boot --> first beacon in Elastic Security.
Everything you need to re‑run the exercise end‑to‑end, code, rules, KQL/EQL, and helper scripts, is in this repo.


Contents


Introduction

This lab demonstrates a realistic mobile ransomware chain-delivery, sideload/exploitation, installation/persistence, C2, and actions‑on‑objective-against the author’s own Pixel 6a on a dedicated lab SSID. The Blue Team side implements network and handset telemetry, custom detections, and a time‑bound correlation linking BOOT_COMPLETED --> first beacon. All detections are designed to be auditable (JSON/PCAP/Kibana exports) and are scoped to keep the exercise ethical and safe (no exfiltration; file encryption limited to an app‑private directory or a user‑granted tree).


High‑level architecture

flowchart TD
subgraph Host["Ubuntu 22.04 Host"]
direction TB
Suricata["Docker Suricata (IDS)"]
ELK["Docker ELK stack (ES + Kibana)"]
Wazuh["Docker Wazuh-manager (SIEM)"]
Agent["Wazuh Agent (on host)"]
Logger["ADB logcat --> syslog forwarder (script)"]
end
subgraph Phone["Google Pixel 6a (Android 14/16 SDK)"]
direction TB
App["LockerSim.apk<br/>- AES-GCM file ops (sandbox/DCIM)<br/>- WorkManager beacons<br/>- BOOT_COMPLETED receiver"]
end
Host ---|"isolated lab SSID (hosted by USB Wi‑Fi AP)"| Phone
Logger --> Agent --> Wazuh
Suricata --> ELK
Loading

Environment & setup

Host prerequisites

  • Ubuntu 22.04 LTS (or similar Linux host).
  • Docker + Docker Compose.
  • ADB / Android Platform Tools on the host.
  • Python 3.10+ (for tiny utility scripts).
  • A dual‑band USB Wi‑Fi adapter (hosted AP) - lab SSID without Internet.
  • The phone (Pixel 6a) connects to the AP; the host is also on the AP and additionally on Ethernet for admin.

Clone & compose

git clone https://github.com/ryanfoxgithub/eth-red-blue.git
cd eth-red-blue
# Bring up the stack (Suricata, Elastic, Wazuh, etc.)
docker compose up -d
# (Optional) verify ingest wiring with the helper
./scripts/vis_ing.sh

Key configs you may want to glance at:

  • config/suricata/suricata.yaml (EVE types enabled, HOME_NET set to your lab subnet)
  • config/filebeat/filebeat.yml (ships EVE to Elasticsearch)
  • config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml (custom W rules used below)

Suricata tuning

Drop your local signatures here and include them from suricata.yaml:

config/suricata/rules/local.rules

Two rules are used in this project:

# N1 - Locker beacon (POST + UA + path)
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (
msg:"LockerSim HTTP beacon (UA+path)";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"POST"; nocase;
http.uri; content:"/beacon";
http.user_agent; content:"Locker-Beacon/1.0"; nocase;
classtype:trojan-activity;
sid:420001; rev:7;
)
# D1 - APK download to handset (delivery)
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 8000 (
msg:"APK download to handset (lab host)";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"GET"; nocase;
http.uri; content:"/app-debug.apk"; nocase;
classtype:policy-violation;
sid:420010; rev:3;
)

Reload Suricata (or restart the container) after editing local.rules.

Wazuh ingest (ADB logcat --> syslog)

The host streams filtered adb logcat into /var/log/syslog with a stable program name (pixel6a). The Wazuh agent (on the host) tails syslog by default.

# On the host (with the phone connected over USB or wireless ADB):
./scripts/logcat_to_syslog.sh

Custom Wazuh rules are already under:

config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml

They cover:

  • W1/W2 – Sideload/install (PackageInstaller/PackageManager lines)
  • W3 – Persistence (BootReceiver BOOT_COMPLETED)
  • W4 – Beacon worker executed (WorkManager / Beacon logs)
  • W5 – Actions on Objective (Encrypt/Decrypt messages)

Restart Wazuh manager after updates:

docker compose exec wazuh-manager /var/ossec/bin/wazuh-control restart

Android app (LockerSim)

The app code lives under:

apps/locker-sim-android/

Key files to review:

  • AndroidManifest.xml (INTERNET, RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED, cleartext allowed for lab)
  • beacon/BeaconWorker.kt (POST /beacon, UA Locker-Beacon/1.0 (SIMULATION))
  • boot/BootReceiver.kt (schedules a oneshot beacon on boot)
  • crypto/Crypto.kt (AES‑GCM using AndroidKeyStore)
  • data/FileRepo.kt (seed/list/encrypt/decrypt in app‑private dir)
  • ransom/RansomNoteActivity.kt (offline note for a screenshot)
  • MainActivity.kt + activity_main.xml (explicit lab UI)

Build the debug APK from Android Studio or via Gradle; the path typically ends up at:

apps/locker-sim-android/app/build/outputs/apk/debug/app-debug.apk

Lab HTTP service for delivery / beacons

For delivery (D1) and beacon (N1) testing you need an HTTP listener on the lab host:

  • Easiest path (delivery only): python3 -m http.server 8000 from the folder that contains app-debug.apk (serves /app-debug.apk).
  • If you also want to record beacons, run a tiny handler (e.g., any lightweight Flask/Node/go‑http) that accepts POST /beacon. Note: Suricata will still alert on the POST/UA even if /beacon returns 404.

Update MainActivity.kt / BeaconWorker to point to your lab host (e.g., http://10.42.0.1:8000/beacon).


Detection engineering

Suricata rules (network)

See the two rules above (N1, D1). Confirm they load (no errors) and then trigger them with:

# D1 - generate a GET for the APK
curl -s -o /dev/null http://10.42.0.1:8000/app-debug.apk
# N1 - generate a beacon POST (host side)
curl -s -X POST http://10.42.0.1:8000/beacon \
-H 'User-Agent: Locker-Beacon/1.0 (SIMULATION)' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"lab":true,"ts":"'"$(date -Iseconds)"'"}'>/dev/null

Evidence extraction (host side):

# Prefer host bind if present
EVE=./suricata/log/eve.json
[ -r"$EVE" ] || EVE=/var/log/suricata/eve.json # fallback (inside container)# D1
jq -c 'select(.event_type=="alert" and .alert.signature_id==420010) | {ts:.timestamp,src:.src_ip,dst:.dest_ip,method:.http.http_method,uri:.http.url,sid:.alert.signature_id,sig:.alert.signature}' \
"$EVE"| tail -n 3 | tee -a evidence/3.2/delivery/d1_alert.json
# N1
jq -c 'select(.event_type=="alert" and .alert.signature_id==420001) | {ts:.timestamp,src:.src_ip,dst:.dest_ip,method:.http.http_method,uri:.http.url,ua:.http.http_user_agent,sid:.alert.signature_id,sig:.alert.signature}' \
"$EVE"| tail -n 3 | tee -a evidence/3.2/c2/n1_alert.json

If your Suricata container doesn’t have jq, run jq on the host against the bind‑mounted EVE file.

Kibana KQL hunts (saved searches)

H1 – Delivery (APK):

event.module : "suricata" and (
suricata.eve.http.url : "/app-debug.apk" or
url.path : "/app-debug.apk" or
url.original : "*app-debug.apk"
) and ( destination.ip : 10.42.0.1 or host.hostname : "10.42.0.1" )

H3 – Beacon (UA contains):

event.module : "suricata" and user_agent.original : "*Locker-Beacon/1.0*"

Exports live under:

evidence/3.2/delivery/H1.ndjson
evidence/3.2/c2/H3.ndjson

Wazuh rules (handset logs)

config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml defines IDs in the 9101xx range:

<!-- W1/W2: Sideload/Install observed -->
<ruleid="910110"level="8">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>Package(Installer|Manager).*(install|installed|install succeeded|Added package)</match>
<description>Android package install observed (possible sideload) - LockerSim chain</description>
<mitre><id>T1476</id><id>T1404</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W3: BOOT_COMPLETED receiver fired -->
<ruleid="910120"level="7">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>BootReceiver.*BOOT_COMPLETED</match>
<description>Android BOOT_COMPLETED handled by app (persistence)</description>
<mitre><id>T1624.001</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W4: WorkManager/Beacon run -->
<ruleid="910130"level="8">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>BeaconWorker.*(POST|Beacon|200)|WorkManager.*Starting work.*BeaconWorker</match>
<description>Beacon worker executed</description>
<mitre><id>T1603</id><id>T1437.001</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W5: Encryption/Decryption activity -->
<ruleid="910140"level="10">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>(LockerSim|FileRepo).*(ENCRYPT|DECRYPT|Encrypt|Decrypt|encrypted|decrypted)</match>
<description>LockerSim AoO activity (encrypt/decrypt)</description>
<mitre><id>T1471</id><id>T1486</id></mitre>
</rule>

Evidence extraction (manager container):

# Last N alerts for a rule idwazuh_last_by_id() {
local rule_id="$1";local n="${2:-20}"
docker compose exec -T wazuh-manager sh -lc \
"grep -F '\"id\":\"$rule_id\"' /var/ossec/logs/alerts/alerts.json | tail -n $n"
}
mkdir -p evidence/3.2/{sideload,persistence,c2,aoo}
# W1/W2
wazuh_last_by_id 910110 20 | tee -a evidence/3.2/sideload/w1w2_alerts.json
# W3
wazuh_last_by_id 910120 10 | tee -a evidence/3.2/persistence/w3_boot.json
# W4
wazuh_last_by_id 910130 10 | tee -a evidence/3.2/c2/w4_alerts.json
# W5
wazuh_last_by_id 910140 20 | tee -a evidence/3.2/aoo/w5_alerts.json

Elastic Security correlation (EQL)

Saved export: evidence/3.2/correlation/C1.ndjson

sequence with maxspan=10m
[ any where event.module == "wazuh" and event.original : "*BootReceiver*BOOT_COMPLETED*" ]
[ any where event.module == "suricata" and user_agent.original : "*Locker-Beacon/1.0*" ]

Run the full validation flow

  1. Baseline ingest – confirm Filebeat --> ES is live (./scripts/vis_ing.sh shows counts, or check Kibana Discover).
  2. Delivery – browse http://10.42.0.1:8000/app-debug.apk from the phone --> expect D1 alert + H1 hits.
  3. Sideload – install the APK (repeat your filmed flow) --> expect W1/W2 alerts.
  4. C2 – press “Send Beacons (x5 @ 60s)” in the app --> expect N1 alert + H3 hits and W4 on the handset logs.
  5. Persistence – reboot the phone --> expect W3, then the EQL sequence (C1) when the first beacon lands.
  6. AoO – run ENCRYPT then DECRYPT in the app UI --> expect W5 (impact & recovery evidence).

Evidence pack layout

This repo already includes representative exports/receipts (add your fresh run beside them):

evidence/
└── 3.2
├── delivery/ # d1_alert.json , H1.ndjson
├── c2/ # n1_alert.json , w4_alerts.json , H3.ndjson , pcap/
├── sideload/ # w1w2_alerts.json
├── persistence/ # w3_boot.json
├── aoo/ # w5_alerts.json
└── correlation/ # C1.ndjson

Host ingest receipts (counts/docs/sample EVE) are stored under config/evidence/ingest-*/ and are handy for screenshots in the report.


Repo structure (excerpt)

Generated from the project’s tree.txt (top‑level only; see repo for the full view).

.
├── config
│ ├── evidence/ingest-*/{compose_ps.txt,es_count.json,es_docs.json,eve_sample.json}
│ ├── filebeat/filebeat.yml
│ ├── suricata/suricata.yaml
│ └── wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml
├── docker-compose.yml
├── evidence/3.2/{delivery,c2,aoo,correlation,persistence,sideload}/...
├── scripts/{logcat_to_syslog.sh,vis_ing.sh}
└── kibana/exports (optional)

Tools list

Red team

  • Android Studio / Gradle – build the LockerSim app (Kotlin).
  • OkHttp, WorkManager, Coroutines – networking & reliable background work.
  • Android Keystore + AES‑GCM – file encryption in a scoped directory.
  • Python 3 – simple HTTP service for APK hosting (and optional /beacon capture).
  • adb / platform‑tools – install, logcat, dumpsys evidence.

Blue team

  • Suricata – IDS with custom HTTP rules (EVE JSON).
  • Filebeat/Elastic/Kibana – ship and analyse network telemetry (KQL/EQL).
  • Wazuh (manager + agent) – parse handset logs from syslog with local rules.
  • jq – extract alert slices from EVE.
  • tcpdump/Wireshark – optional PCAP for beacon verification.

Safety & ethics

  • My device only, on an isolated SSID with no Internet egress.
  • Encryption is limited to an app‑private folder (or a user‑granted tree via SAF) and is reversible in‑app.
  • APK requests only INTERNET and RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED.
  • After demos: uninstall the APK, stop lab services, and archive only benign evidence (logs/exports).

Acknowledgements

  • MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile (technique mapping).
  • Open‑source ecosystems behind Suricata, Elastic Stack, and Wazuh.
  • Android Open Source Project & Jetpack libraries used by LockerSim.

About

No description, website, or topics provided.

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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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eth‑red‑blue - Mobile Ransomware Red/Blue Lab

Elevator pitch
A complete, reproducible red/blue lab that simulates a mobile ransomware campaign against a physical Google Pixel 6a on an isolated Wi‑Fi AP.
The Red Team delivers and sideloads a lab APK (“LockerSim”) that encrypts a scoped photo folder and sends benign JSON beacons.
The Blue Team ingests Suricata EVE and ADB logcat --> Wazuh, engineers detections (D1/N1/W1–W5), and correlates boot --> first beacon in Elastic Security.
Everything you need to re‑run the exercise end‑to‑end, code, rules, KQL/EQL, and helper scripts, is in this repo.


Contents


Introduction

This lab demonstrates a realistic mobile ransomware chain-delivery, sideload/exploitation, installation/persistence, C2, and actions‑on‑objective-against the author’s own Pixel 6a on a dedicated lab SSID. The Blue Team side implements network and handset telemetry, custom detections, and a time‑bound correlation linking BOOT_COMPLETED --> first beacon. All detections are designed to be auditable (JSON/PCAP/Kibana exports) and are scoped to keep the exercise ethical and safe (no exfiltration; file encryption limited to an app‑private directory or a user‑granted tree).


High‑level architecture

flowchart TD
subgraph Host["Ubuntu 22.04 Host"]
direction TB
Suricata["Docker Suricata (IDS)"]
ELK["Docker ELK stack (ES + Kibana)"]
Wazuh["Docker Wazuh-manager (SIEM)"]
Agent["Wazuh Agent (on host)"]
Logger["ADB logcat --> syslog forwarder (script)"]
end
subgraph Phone["Google Pixel 6a (Android 14/16 SDK)"]
direction TB
App["LockerSim.apk<br/>- AES-GCM file ops (sandbox/DCIM)<br/>- WorkManager beacons<br/>- BOOT_COMPLETED receiver"]
end
Host ---|"isolated lab SSID (hosted by USB Wi‑Fi AP)"| Phone
Logger --> Agent --> Wazuh
Suricata --> ELK
Loading

Environment & setup

Host prerequisites

  • Ubuntu 22.04 LTS (or similar Linux host).
  • Docker + Docker Compose.
  • ADB / Android Platform Tools on the host.
  • Python 3.10+ (for tiny utility scripts).
  • A dual‑band USB Wi‑Fi adapter (hosted AP) - lab SSID without Internet.
  • The phone (Pixel 6a) connects to the AP; the host is also on the AP and additionally on Ethernet for admin.

Clone & compose

git clone https://github.com/ryanfoxgithub/eth-red-blue.git
cd eth-red-blue
# Bring up the stack (Suricata, Elastic, Wazuh, etc.)
docker compose up -d
# (Optional) verify ingest wiring with the helper
./scripts/vis_ing.sh

Key configs you may want to glance at:

  • config/suricata/suricata.yaml (EVE types enabled, HOME_NET set to your lab subnet)
  • config/filebeat/filebeat.yml (ships EVE to Elasticsearch)
  • config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml (custom W rules used below)

Suricata tuning

Drop your local signatures here and include them from suricata.yaml:

config/suricata/rules/local.rules

Two rules are used in this project:

# N1 - Locker beacon (POST + UA + path)
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (
msg:"LockerSim HTTP beacon (UA+path)";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"POST"; nocase;
http.uri; content:"/beacon";
http.user_agent; content:"Locker-Beacon/1.0"; nocase;
classtype:trojan-activity;
sid:420001; rev:7;
)
# D1 - APK download to handset (delivery)
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 8000 (
msg:"APK download to handset (lab host)";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"GET"; nocase;
http.uri; content:"/app-debug.apk"; nocase;
classtype:policy-violation;
sid:420010; rev:3;
)

Reload Suricata (or restart the container) after editing local.rules.

Wazuh ingest (ADB logcat --> syslog)

The host streams filtered adb logcat into /var/log/syslog with a stable program name (pixel6a). The Wazuh agent (on the host) tails syslog by default.

# On the host (with the phone connected over USB or wireless ADB):
./scripts/logcat_to_syslog.sh

Custom Wazuh rules are already under:

config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml

They cover:

  • W1/W2 – Sideload/install (PackageInstaller/PackageManager lines)
  • W3 – Persistence (BootReceiver BOOT_COMPLETED)
  • W4 – Beacon worker executed (WorkManager / Beacon logs)
  • W5 – Actions on Objective (Encrypt/Decrypt messages)

Restart Wazuh manager after updates:

docker compose exec wazuh-manager /var/ossec/bin/wazuh-control restart

Android app (LockerSim)

The app code lives under:

apps/locker-sim-android/

Key files to review:

  • AndroidManifest.xml (INTERNET, RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED, cleartext allowed for lab)
  • beacon/BeaconWorker.kt (POST /beacon, UA Locker-Beacon/1.0 (SIMULATION))
  • boot/BootReceiver.kt (schedules a oneshot beacon on boot)
  • crypto/Crypto.kt (AES‑GCM using AndroidKeyStore)
  • data/FileRepo.kt (seed/list/encrypt/decrypt in app‑private dir)
  • ransom/RansomNoteActivity.kt (offline note for a screenshot)
  • MainActivity.kt + activity_main.xml (explicit lab UI)

Build the debug APK from Android Studio or via Gradle; the path typically ends up at:

apps/locker-sim-android/app/build/outputs/apk/debug/app-debug.apk

Lab HTTP service for delivery / beacons

For delivery (D1) and beacon (N1) testing you need an HTTP listener on the lab host:

  • Easiest path (delivery only): python3 -m http.server 8000 from the folder that contains app-debug.apk (serves /app-debug.apk).
  • If you also want to record beacons, run a tiny handler (e.g., any lightweight Flask/Node/go‑http) that accepts POST /beacon. Note: Suricata will still alert on the POST/UA even if /beacon returns 404.

Update MainActivity.kt / BeaconWorker to point to your lab host (e.g., http://10.42.0.1:8000/beacon).


Detection engineering

Suricata rules (network)

See the two rules above (N1, D1). Confirm they load (no errors) and then trigger them with:

# D1 - generate a GET for the APK
curl -s -o /dev/null http://10.42.0.1:8000/app-debug.apk
# N1 - generate a beacon POST (host side)
curl -s -X POST http://10.42.0.1:8000/beacon \
-H 'User-Agent: Locker-Beacon/1.0 (SIMULATION)' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"lab":true,"ts":"'"$(date -Iseconds)"'"}'>/dev/null

Evidence extraction (host side):

# Prefer host bind if present
EVE=./suricata/log/eve.json
[ -r"$EVE" ] || EVE=/var/log/suricata/eve.json # fallback (inside container)# D1
jq -c 'select(.event_type=="alert" and .alert.signature_id==420010) | {ts:.timestamp,src:.src_ip,dst:.dest_ip,method:.http.http_method,uri:.http.url,sid:.alert.signature_id,sig:.alert.signature}' \
"$EVE"| tail -n 3 | tee -a evidence/3.2/delivery/d1_alert.json
# N1
jq -c 'select(.event_type=="alert" and .alert.signature_id==420001) | {ts:.timestamp,src:.src_ip,dst:.dest_ip,method:.http.http_method,uri:.http.url,ua:.http.http_user_agent,sid:.alert.signature_id,sig:.alert.signature}' \
"$EVE"| tail -n 3 | tee -a evidence/3.2/c2/n1_alert.json

If your Suricata container doesn’t have jq, run jq on the host against the bind‑mounted EVE file.

Kibana KQL hunts (saved searches)

H1 – Delivery (APK):

event.module : "suricata" and (
suricata.eve.http.url : "/app-debug.apk" or
url.path : "/app-debug.apk" or
url.original : "*app-debug.apk"
) and ( destination.ip : 10.42.0.1 or host.hostname : "10.42.0.1" )

H3 – Beacon (UA contains):

event.module : "suricata" and user_agent.original : "*Locker-Beacon/1.0*"

Exports live under:

evidence/3.2/delivery/H1.ndjson
evidence/3.2/c2/H3.ndjson

Wazuh rules (handset logs)

config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml defines IDs in the 9101xx range:

<!-- W1/W2: Sideload/Install observed -->
<ruleid="910110"level="8">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>Package(Installer|Manager).*(install|installed|install succeeded|Added package)</match>
<description>Android package install observed (possible sideload) - LockerSim chain</description>
<mitre><id>T1476</id><id>T1404</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W3: BOOT_COMPLETED receiver fired -->
<ruleid="910120"level="7">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>BootReceiver.*BOOT_COMPLETED</match>
<description>Android BOOT_COMPLETED handled by app (persistence)</description>
<mitre><id>T1624.001</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W4: WorkManager/Beacon run -->
<ruleid="910130"level="8">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>BeaconWorker.*(POST|Beacon|200)|WorkManager.*Starting work.*BeaconWorker</match>
<description>Beacon worker executed</description>
<mitre><id>T1603</id><id>T1437.001</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W5: Encryption/Decryption activity -->
<ruleid="910140"level="10">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>(LockerSim|FileRepo).*(ENCRYPT|DECRYPT|Encrypt|Decrypt|encrypted|decrypted)</match>
<description>LockerSim AoO activity (encrypt/decrypt)</description>
<mitre><id>T1471</id><id>T1486</id></mitre>
</rule>

Evidence extraction (manager container):

# Last N alerts for a rule idwazuh_last_by_id() {
local rule_id="$1";local n="${2:-20}"
docker compose exec -T wazuh-manager sh -lc \
"grep -F '\"id\":\"$rule_id\"' /var/ossec/logs/alerts/alerts.json | tail -n $n"
}
mkdir -p evidence/3.2/{sideload,persistence,c2,aoo}
# W1/W2
wazuh_last_by_id 910110 20 | tee -a evidence/3.2/sideload/w1w2_alerts.json
# W3
wazuh_last_by_id 910120 10 | tee -a evidence/3.2/persistence/w3_boot.json
# W4
wazuh_last_by_id 910130 10 | tee -a evidence/3.2/c2/w4_alerts.json
# W5
wazuh_last_by_id 910140 20 | tee -a evidence/3.2/aoo/w5_alerts.json

Elastic Security correlation (EQL)

Saved export: evidence/3.2/correlation/C1.ndjson

sequence with maxspan=10m
[ any where event.module == "wazuh" and event.original : "*BootReceiver*BOOT_COMPLETED*" ]
[ any where event.module == "suricata" and user_agent.original : "*Locker-Beacon/1.0*" ]

Run the full validation flow

  1. Baseline ingest – confirm Filebeat --> ES is live (./scripts/vis_ing.sh shows counts, or check Kibana Discover).
  2. Delivery – browse http://10.42.0.1:8000/app-debug.apk from the phone --> expect D1 alert + H1 hits.
  3. Sideload – install the APK (repeat your filmed flow) --> expect W1/W2 alerts.
  4. C2 – press “Send Beacons (x5 @ 60s)” in the app --> expect N1 alert + H3 hits and W4 on the handset logs.
  5. Persistence – reboot the phone --> expect W3, then the EQL sequence (C1) when the first beacon lands.
  6. AoO – run ENCRYPT then DECRYPT in the app UI --> expect W5 (impact & recovery evidence).

Evidence pack layout

This repo already includes representative exports/receipts (add your fresh run beside them):

evidence/
└── 3.2
├── delivery/ # d1_alert.json , H1.ndjson
├── c2/ # n1_alert.json , w4_alerts.json , H3.ndjson , pcap/
├── sideload/ # w1w2_alerts.json
├── persistence/ # w3_boot.json
├── aoo/ # w5_alerts.json
└── correlation/ # C1.ndjson

Host ingest receipts (counts/docs/sample EVE) are stored under config/evidence/ingest-*/ and are handy for screenshots in the report.


Repo structure (excerpt)

Generated from the project’s tree.txt (top‑level only; see repo for the full view).

.
├── config
│ ├── evidence/ingest-*/{compose_ps.txt,es_count.json,es_docs.json,eve_sample.json}
│ ├── filebeat/filebeat.yml
│ ├── suricata/suricata.yaml
│ └── wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml
├── docker-compose.yml
├── evidence/3.2/{delivery,c2,aoo,correlation,persistence,sideload}/...
├── scripts/{logcat_to_syslog.sh,vis_ing.sh}
└── kibana/exports (optional)

Tools list

Red team

  • Android Studio / Gradle – build the LockerSim app (Kotlin).
  • OkHttp, WorkManager, Coroutines – networking & reliable background work.
  • Android Keystore + AES‑GCM – file encryption in a scoped directory.
  • Python 3 – simple HTTP service for APK hosting (and optional /beacon capture).
  • adb / platform‑tools – install, logcat, dumpsys evidence.

Blue team

  • Suricata – IDS with custom HTTP rules (EVE JSON).
  • Filebeat/Elastic/Kibana – ship and analyse network telemetry (KQL/EQL).
  • Wazuh (manager + agent) – parse handset logs from syslog with local rules.
  • jq – extract alert slices from EVE.
  • tcpdump/Wireshark – optional PCAP for beacon verification.

Safety & ethics

  • My device only, on an isolated SSID with no Internet egress.
  • Encryption is limited to an app‑private folder (or a user‑granted tree via SAF) and is reversible in‑app.
  • APK requests only INTERNET and RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED.
  • After demos: uninstall the APK, stop lab services, and archive only benign evidence (logs/exports).

Acknowledgements

  • MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile (technique mapping).
  • Open‑source ecosystems behind Suricata, Elastic Stack, and Wazuh.
  • Android Open Source Project & Jetpack libraries used by LockerSim.

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eth‑red‑blue - Mobile Ransomware Red/Blue Lab

Elevator pitch
A complete, reproducible red/blue lab that simulates a mobile ransomware campaign against a physical Google Pixel 6a on an isolated Wi‑Fi AP.
The Red Team delivers and sideloads a lab APK (“LockerSim”) that encrypts a scoped photo folder and sends benign JSON beacons.
The Blue Team ingests Suricata EVE and ADB logcat --> Wazuh, engineers detections (D1/N1/W1–W5), and correlates boot --> first beacon in Elastic Security.
Everything you need to re‑run the exercise end‑to‑end, code, rules, KQL/EQL, and helper scripts, is in this repo.


Contents


Introduction

This lab demonstrates a realistic mobile ransomware chain-delivery, sideload/exploitation, installation/persistence, C2, and actions‑on‑objective-against the author’s own Pixel 6a on a dedicated lab SSID. The Blue Team side implements network and handset telemetry, custom detections, and a time‑bound correlation linking BOOT_COMPLETED --> first beacon. All detections are designed to be auditable (JSON/PCAP/Kibana exports) and are scoped to keep the exercise ethical and safe (no exfiltration; file encryption limited to an app‑private directory or a user‑granted tree).


High‑level architecture

flowchart TD
subgraph Host["Ubuntu 22.04 Host"]
direction TB
Suricata["Docker Suricata (IDS)"]
ELK["Docker ELK stack (ES + Kibana)"]
Wazuh["Docker Wazuh-manager (SIEM)"]
Agent["Wazuh Agent (on host)"]
Logger["ADB logcat --> syslog forwarder (script)"]
end
subgraph Phone["Google Pixel 6a (Android 14/16 SDK)"]
direction TB
App["LockerSim.apk<br/>- AES-GCM file ops (sandbox/DCIM)<br/>- WorkManager beacons<br/>- BOOT_COMPLETED receiver"]
end
Host ---|"isolated lab SSID (hosted by USB Wi‑Fi AP)"| Phone
Logger --> Agent --> Wazuh
Suricata --> ELK
Loading

Environment & setup

Host prerequisites

  • Ubuntu 22.04 LTS (or similar Linux host).
  • Docker + Docker Compose.
  • ADB / Android Platform Tools on the host.
  • Python 3.10+ (for tiny utility scripts).
  • A dual‑band USB Wi‑Fi adapter (hosted AP) - lab SSID without Internet.
  • The phone (Pixel 6a) connects to the AP; the host is also on the AP and additionally on Ethernet for admin.

Clone & compose

git clone https://github.com/ryanfoxgithub/eth-red-blue.git
cd eth-red-blue
# Bring up the stack (Suricata, Elastic, Wazuh, etc.)
docker compose up -d
# (Optional) verify ingest wiring with the helper
./scripts/vis_ing.sh

Key configs you may want to glance at:

  • config/suricata/suricata.yaml (EVE types enabled, HOME_NET set to your lab subnet)
  • config/filebeat/filebeat.yml (ships EVE to Elasticsearch)
  • config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml (custom W rules used below)

Suricata tuning

Drop your local signatures here and include them from suricata.yaml:

config/suricata/rules/local.rules

Two rules are used in this project:

# N1 - Locker beacon (POST + UA + path)
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (
msg:"LockerSim HTTP beacon (UA+path)";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"POST"; nocase;
http.uri; content:"/beacon";
http.user_agent; content:"Locker-Beacon/1.0"; nocase;
classtype:trojan-activity;
sid:420001; rev:7;
)
# D1 - APK download to handset (delivery)
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 8000 (
msg:"APK download to handset (lab host)";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"GET"; nocase;
http.uri; content:"/app-debug.apk"; nocase;
classtype:policy-violation;
sid:420010; rev:3;
)

Reload Suricata (or restart the container) after editing local.rules.

Wazuh ingest (ADB logcat --> syslog)

The host streams filtered adb logcat into /var/log/syslog with a stable program name (pixel6a). The Wazuh agent (on the host) tails syslog by default.

# On the host (with the phone connected over USB or wireless ADB):
./scripts/logcat_to_syslog.sh

Custom Wazuh rules are already under:

config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml

They cover:

  • W1/W2 – Sideload/install (PackageInstaller/PackageManager lines)
  • W3 – Persistence (BootReceiver BOOT_COMPLETED)
  • W4 – Beacon worker executed (WorkManager / Beacon logs)
  • W5 – Actions on Objective (Encrypt/Decrypt messages)

Restart Wazuh manager after updates:

docker compose exec wazuh-manager /var/ossec/bin/wazuh-control restart

Android app (LockerSim)

The app code lives under:

apps/locker-sim-android/

Key files to review:

  • AndroidManifest.xml (INTERNET, RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED, cleartext allowed for lab)
  • beacon/BeaconWorker.kt (POST /beacon, UA Locker-Beacon/1.0 (SIMULATION))
  • boot/BootReceiver.kt (schedules a oneshot beacon on boot)
  • crypto/Crypto.kt (AES‑GCM using AndroidKeyStore)
  • data/FileRepo.kt (seed/list/encrypt/decrypt in app‑private dir)
  • ransom/RansomNoteActivity.kt (offline note for a screenshot)
  • MainActivity.kt + activity_main.xml (explicit lab UI)

Build the debug APK from Android Studio or via Gradle; the path typically ends up at:

apps/locker-sim-android/app/build/outputs/apk/debug/app-debug.apk

Lab HTTP service for delivery / beacons

For delivery (D1) and beacon (N1) testing you need an HTTP listener on the lab host:

  • Easiest path (delivery only): python3 -m http.server 8000 from the folder that contains app-debug.apk (serves /app-debug.apk).
  • If you also want to record beacons, run a tiny handler (e.g., any lightweight Flask/Node/go‑http) that accepts POST /beacon. Note: Suricata will still alert on the POST/UA even if /beacon returns 404.

Update MainActivity.kt / BeaconWorker to point to your lab host (e.g., http://10.42.0.1:8000/beacon).


Detection engineering

Suricata rules (network)

See the two rules above (N1, D1). Confirm they load (no errors) and then trigger them with:

# D1 - generate a GET for the APK
curl -s -o /dev/null http://10.42.0.1:8000/app-debug.apk
# N1 - generate a beacon POST (host side)
curl -s -X POST http://10.42.0.1:8000/beacon \
-H 'User-Agent: Locker-Beacon/1.0 (SIMULATION)' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"lab":true,"ts":"'"$(date -Iseconds)"'"}'>/dev/null

Evidence extraction (host side):

# Prefer host bind if present
EVE=./suricata/log/eve.json
[ -r"$EVE" ] || EVE=/var/log/suricata/eve.json # fallback (inside container)# D1
jq -c 'select(.event_type=="alert" and .alert.signature_id==420010) | {ts:.timestamp,src:.src_ip,dst:.dest_ip,method:.http.http_method,uri:.http.url,sid:.alert.signature_id,sig:.alert.signature}' \
"$EVE"| tail -n 3 | tee -a evidence/3.2/delivery/d1_alert.json
# N1
jq -c 'select(.event_type=="alert" and .alert.signature_id==420001) | {ts:.timestamp,src:.src_ip,dst:.dest_ip,method:.http.http_method,uri:.http.url,ua:.http.http_user_agent,sid:.alert.signature_id,sig:.alert.signature}' \
"$EVE"| tail -n 3 | tee -a evidence/3.2/c2/n1_alert.json

If your Suricata container doesn’t have jq, run jq on the host against the bind‑mounted EVE file.

Kibana KQL hunts (saved searches)

H1 – Delivery (APK):

event.module : "suricata" and (
suricata.eve.http.url : "/app-debug.apk" or
url.path : "/app-debug.apk" or
url.original : "*app-debug.apk"
) and ( destination.ip : 10.42.0.1 or host.hostname : "10.42.0.1" )

H3 – Beacon (UA contains):

event.module : "suricata" and user_agent.original : "*Locker-Beacon/1.0*"

Exports live under:

evidence/3.2/delivery/H1.ndjson
evidence/3.2/c2/H3.ndjson

Wazuh rules (handset logs)

config/wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml defines IDs in the 9101xx range:

<!-- W1/W2: Sideload/Install observed -->
<ruleid="910110"level="8">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>Package(Installer|Manager).*(install|installed|install succeeded|Added package)</match>
<description>Android package install observed (possible sideload) - LockerSim chain</description>
<mitre><id>T1476</id><id>T1404</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W3: BOOT_COMPLETED receiver fired -->
<ruleid="910120"level="7">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>BootReceiver.*BOOT_COMPLETED</match>
<description>Android BOOT_COMPLETED handled by app (persistence)</description>
<mitre><id>T1624.001</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W4: WorkManager/Beacon run -->
<ruleid="910130"level="8">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>BeaconWorker.*(POST|Beacon|200)|WorkManager.*Starting work.*BeaconWorker</match>
<description>Beacon worker executed</description>
<mitre><id>T1603</id><id>T1437.001</id></mitre>
</rule>
<!-- W5: Encryption/Decryption activity -->
<ruleid="910140"level="10">
<if_program_name>pixel6a</if_program_name>
<match>(LockerSim|FileRepo).*(ENCRYPT|DECRYPT|Encrypt|Decrypt|encrypted|decrypted)</match>
<description>LockerSim AoO activity (encrypt/decrypt)</description>
<mitre><id>T1471</id><id>T1486</id></mitre>
</rule>

Evidence extraction (manager container):

# Last N alerts for a rule idwazuh_last_by_id() {
local rule_id="$1";local n="${2:-20}"
docker compose exec -T wazuh-manager sh -lc \
"grep -F '\"id\":\"$rule_id\"' /var/ossec/logs/alerts/alerts.json | tail -n $n"
}
mkdir -p evidence/3.2/{sideload,persistence,c2,aoo}
# W1/W2
wazuh_last_by_id 910110 20 | tee -a evidence/3.2/sideload/w1w2_alerts.json
# W3
wazuh_last_by_id 910120 10 | tee -a evidence/3.2/persistence/w3_boot.json
# W4
wazuh_last_by_id 910130 10 | tee -a evidence/3.2/c2/w4_alerts.json
# W5
wazuh_last_by_id 910140 20 | tee -a evidence/3.2/aoo/w5_alerts.json

Elastic Security correlation (EQL)

Saved export: evidence/3.2/correlation/C1.ndjson

sequence with maxspan=10m
[ any where event.module == "wazuh" and event.original : "*BootReceiver*BOOT_COMPLETED*" ]
[ any where event.module == "suricata" and user_agent.original : "*Locker-Beacon/1.0*" ]

Run the full validation flow

  1. Baseline ingest – confirm Filebeat --> ES is live (./scripts/vis_ing.sh shows counts, or check Kibana Discover).
  2. Delivery – browse http://10.42.0.1:8000/app-debug.apk from the phone --> expect D1 alert + H1 hits.
  3. Sideload – install the APK (repeat your filmed flow) --> expect W1/W2 alerts.
  4. C2 – press “Send Beacons (x5 @ 60s)” in the app --> expect N1 alert + H3 hits and W4 on the handset logs.
  5. Persistence – reboot the phone --> expect W3, then the EQL sequence (C1) when the first beacon lands.
  6. AoO – run ENCRYPT then DECRYPT in the app UI --> expect W5 (impact & recovery evidence).

Evidence pack layout

This repo already includes representative exports/receipts (add your fresh run beside them):

evidence/
└── 3.2
├── delivery/ # d1_alert.json , H1.ndjson
├── c2/ # n1_alert.json , w4_alerts.json , H3.ndjson , pcap/
├── sideload/ # w1w2_alerts.json
├── persistence/ # w3_boot.json
├── aoo/ # w5_alerts.json
└── correlation/ # C1.ndjson

Host ingest receipts (counts/docs/sample EVE) are stored under config/evidence/ingest-*/ and are handy for screenshots in the report.


Repo structure (excerpt)

Generated from the project’s tree.txt (top‑level only; see repo for the full view).

.
├── config
│ ├── evidence/ingest-*/{compose_ps.txt,es_count.json,es_docs.json,eve_sample.json}
│ ├── filebeat/filebeat.yml
│ ├── suricata/suricata.yaml
│ └── wazuh/manager/local_rules.xml
├── docker-compose.yml
├── evidence/3.2/{delivery,c2,aoo,correlation,persistence,sideload}/...
├── scripts/{logcat_to_syslog.sh,vis_ing.sh}
└── kibana/exports (optional)

Tools list

Red team

  • Android Studio / Gradle – build the LockerSim app (Kotlin).
  • OkHttp, WorkManager, Coroutines – networking & reliable background work.
  • Android Keystore + AES‑GCM – file encryption in a scoped directory.
  • Python 3 – simple HTTP service for APK hosting (and optional /beacon capture).
  • adb / platform‑tools – install, logcat, dumpsys evidence.

Blue team

  • Suricata – IDS with custom HTTP rules (EVE JSON).
  • Filebeat/Elastic/Kibana – ship and analyse network telemetry (KQL/EQL).
  • Wazuh (manager + agent) – parse handset logs from syslog with local rules.
  • jq – extract alert slices from EVE.
  • tcpdump/Wireshark – optional PCAP for beacon verification.

Safety & ethics

  • My device only, on an isolated SSID with no Internet egress.
  • Encryption is limited to an app‑private folder (or a user‑granted tree via SAF) and is reversible in‑app.
  • APK requests only INTERNET and RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED.
  • After demos: uninstall the APK, stop lab services, and archive only benign evidence (logs/exports).

Acknowledgements

  • MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile (technique mapping).
  • Open‑source ecosystems behind Suricata, Elastic Stack, and Wazuh.
  • Android Open Source Project & Jetpack libraries used by LockerSim.

About

No description, website, or topics provided.

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0 stars

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