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Chronomaly

Chronomaly is a kernel exploit for the Android / Linux kernel using CVE-2025-38352. The exploit was written specifically for Linux kernel v5.10.157, but should work against all vulnerable v5.10.x kernels, as it does not require any specific kernel text offsets to work.

I covered the vulnerability in detail in a three-part blog post series, all the way from PoC to exploit:

demo

Build Setup

This exploit has only been tested against an x86_64 Linux kernel v5.10.157 running in QEMU. I asked a friend to send me their Pixel 6a kernel config to base my kernel config off of, and these are the config options important for this exploit (I started from the kernelCTF config as a base):

  • CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK=n
  • CONFIG_PREEMPT=y (Full Preemption, no RT)
  • CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT=n
  • DEBUG_LIST=n
  • BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=n
  • LIST_HARDENED=n

To disable CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK, you can follow the steps laid out in my first blog post here.

Refer to the qemu.sh file for my QEMU run script. I used 4 cores and 3 GB RAM for testing.

Exploit parameters

Since the exploit depends on CPU timers, there are two parameters you may need to change to adapt it to your environment.

First, CPU_USAGE_THRESHOLD. This parameter is used when consuming CPU time to fire the timers inside the race_func(). It must be set such that:

  • The timers don't fire on every retry attempt (this would imply that CPU_USAGE_THRESHOLD is too high, as the timers are firing before the race_func() thread can exit).
  • The timers only fire sometimes (this would imply that sometimes the timers fire before the thread exits, and other times it fires while the thread exits).

To determine whether the timers are firing or not, insert a printf() statement in the SIGUSR1 polling code in free_func(). If you see the message print out, that means the timers fired.

Second, PARENT_SETTIME_DELAY_US. This parameter is used by the parent process to hit the 2nd race window inside send_sigqueue() at the same time as the child process. Run the exploit, observe, and modify it as follows:

  • The message "Parent raced too late, readjusting..." appears too often – reduce this parameter.
  • The message "Parent raced too early, readjusting..." appears too often – increase this parameter.

Ideally, the exploit will work within 1 minute. If it doesn't, you'll have to a figure out which of the two parameters above you need to modify.

Potential Improvements

In my cross-cache implementation, I assumed that the kernel is not too busy, and that there haven't been many struct sigqueue allocations. I added a comment in sigqueue_crosscache_preallocs() that explains what you would need to do improve this.

Questions

If you have any questions, please contact me via X / Twitter!

About

Android kernel exploit for CVE-2025-38352, previously exploited in-the-wild. Targets vulnerable Linux kernels v5.10.x.

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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all
 blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '
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Chronomaly

Chronomaly is a kernel exploit for the Android / Linux kernel using CVE-2025-38352. The exploit was written specifically for Linux kernel v5.10.157, but should work against all vulnerable v5.10.x kernels, as it does not require any specific kernel text offsets to work.

I covered the vulnerability in detail in a three-part blog post series, all the way from PoC to exploit:

demo

Build Setup

This exploit has only been tested against an x86_64 Linux kernel v5.10.157 running in QEMU. I asked a friend to send me their Pixel 6a kernel config to base my kernel config off of, and these are the config options important for this exploit (I started from the kernelCTF config as a base):

  • CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK=n
  • CONFIG_PREEMPT=y (Full Preemption, no RT)
  • CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT=n
  • DEBUG_LIST=n
  • BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=n
  • LIST_HARDENED=n

To disable CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK, you can follow the steps laid out in my first blog post here.

Refer to the qemu.sh file for my QEMU run script. I used 4 cores and 3 GB RAM for testing.

Exploit parameters

Since the exploit depends on CPU timers, there are two parameters you may need to change to adapt it to your environment.

First, CPU_USAGE_THRESHOLD. This parameter is used when consuming CPU time to fire the timers inside the race_func(). It must be set such that:

  • The timers don't fire on every retry attempt (this would imply that CPU_USAGE_THRESHOLD is too high, as the timers are firing before the race_func() thread can exit).
  • The timers only fire sometimes (this would imply that sometimes the timers fire before the thread exits, and other times it fires while the thread exits).

To determine whether the timers are firing or not, insert a printf() statement in the SIGUSR1 polling code in free_func(). If you see the message print out, that means the timers fired.

Second, PARENT_SETTIME_DELAY_US. This parameter is used by the parent process to hit the 2nd race window inside send_sigqueue() at the same time as the child process. Run the exploit, observe, and modify it as follows:

  • The message "Parent raced too late, readjusting..." appears too often – reduce this parameter.
  • The message "Parent raced too early, readjusting..." appears too often – increase this parameter.

Ideally, the exploit will work within 1 minute. If it doesn't, you'll have to a figure out which of the two parameters above you need to modify.

Potential Improvements

In my cross-cache implementation, I assumed that the kernel is not too busy, and that there haven't been many struct sigqueue allocations. I added a comment in sigqueue_crosscache_preallocs() that explains what you would need to do improve this.

Questions

If you have any questions, please contact me via X / Twitter!

About

Android kernel exploit for CVE-2025-38352, previously exploited in-the-wild. Targets vulnerable Linux kernels v5.10.x.

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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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Chronomaly

Chronomaly is a kernel exploit for the Android / Linux kernel using CVE-2025-38352. The exploit was written specifically for Linux kernel v5.10.157, but should work against all vulnerable v5.10.x kernels, as it does not require any specific kernel text offsets to work.

I covered the vulnerability in detail in a three-part blog post series, all the way from PoC to exploit:

demo

Build Setup

This exploit has only been tested against an x86_64 Linux kernel v5.10.157 running in QEMU. I asked a friend to send me their Pixel 6a kernel config to base my kernel config off of, and these are the config options important for this exploit (I started from the kernelCTF config as a base):

  • CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK=n
  • CONFIG_PREEMPT=y (Full Preemption, no RT)
  • CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT=n
  • DEBUG_LIST=n
  • BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=n
  • LIST_HARDENED=n

To disable CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK, you can follow the steps laid out in my first blog post here.

Refer to the qemu.sh file for my QEMU run script. I used 4 cores and 3 GB RAM for testing.

Exploit parameters

Since the exploit depends on CPU timers, there are two parameters you may need to change to adapt it to your environment.

First, CPU_USAGE_THRESHOLD. This parameter is used when consuming CPU time to fire the timers inside the race_func(). It must be set such that:

  • The timers don't fire on every retry attempt (this would imply that CPU_USAGE_THRESHOLD is too high, as the timers are firing before the race_func() thread can exit).
  • The timers only fire sometimes (this would imply that sometimes the timers fire before the thread exits, and other times it fires while the thread exits).

To determine whether the timers are firing or not, insert a printf() statement in the SIGUSR1 polling code in free_func(). If you see the message print out, that means the timers fired.

Second, PARENT_SETTIME_DELAY_US. This parameter is used by the parent process to hit the 2nd race window inside send_sigqueue() at the same time as the child process. Run the exploit, observe, and modify it as follows:

  • The message "Parent raced too late, readjusting..." appears too often – reduce this parameter.
  • The message "Parent raced too early, readjusting..." appears too often – increase this parameter.

Ideally, the exploit will work within 1 minute. If it doesn't, you'll have to a figure out which of the two parameters above you need to modify.

Potential Improvements

In my cross-cache implementation, I assumed that the kernel is not too busy, and that there haven't been many struct sigqueue allocations. I added a comment in sigqueue_crosscache_preallocs() that explains what you would need to do improve this.

Questions

If you have any questions, please contact me via X / Twitter!

About

Android kernel exploit for CVE-2025-38352, previously exploited in-the-wild. Targets vulnerable Linux kernels v5.10.x.

Resources

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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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Chronomaly

Chronomaly is a kernel exploit for the Android / Linux kernel using CVE-2025-38352. The exploit was written specifically for Linux kernel v5.10.157, but should work against all vulnerable v5.10.x kernels, as it does not require any specific kernel text offsets to work.

I covered the vulnerability in detail in a three-part blog post series, all the way from PoC to exploit:

demo

Build Setup

This exploit has only been tested against an x86_64 Linux kernel v5.10.157 running in QEMU. I asked a friend to send me their Pixel 6a kernel config to base my kernel config off of, and these are the config options important for this exploit (I started from the kernelCTF config as a base):

  • CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK=n
  • CONFIG_PREEMPT=y (Full Preemption, no RT)
  • CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT=n
  • DEBUG_LIST=n
  • BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=n
  • LIST_HARDENED=n

To disable CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK, you can follow the steps laid out in my first blog post here.

Refer to the qemu.sh file for my QEMU run script. I used 4 cores and 3 GB RAM for testing.

Exploit parameters

Since the exploit depends on CPU timers, there are two parameters you may need to change to adapt it to your environment.

First, CPU_USAGE_THRESHOLD. This parameter is used when consuming CPU time to fire the timers inside the race_func(). It must be set such that:

  • The timers don't fire on every retry attempt (this would imply that CPU_USAGE_THRESHOLD is too high, as the timers are firing before the race_func() thread can exit).
  • The timers only fire sometimes (this would imply that sometimes the timers fire before the thread exits, and other times it fires while the thread exits).

To determine whether the timers are firing or not, insert a printf() statement in the SIGUSR1 polling code in free_func(). If you see the message print out, that means the timers fired.

Second, PARENT_SETTIME_DELAY_US. This parameter is used by the parent process to hit the 2nd race window inside send_sigqueue() at the same time as the child process. Run the exploit, observe, and modify it as follows:

  • The message "Parent raced too late, readjusting..." appears too often – reduce this parameter.
  • The message "Parent raced too early, readjusting..." appears too often – increase this parameter.

Ideally, the exploit will work within 1 minute. If it doesn't, you'll have to a figure out which of the two parameters above you need to modify.

Potential Improvements

In my cross-cache implementation, I assumed that the kernel is not too busy, and that there haven't been many struct sigqueue allocations. I added a comment in sigqueue_crosscache_preallocs() that explains what you would need to do improve this.

Questions

If you have any questions, please contact me via X / Twitter!

About

Android kernel exploit for CVE-2025-38352, previously exploited in-the-wild. Targets vulnerable Linux kernels v5.10.x.

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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "youtube.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
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Chronomaly

Chronomaly is a kernel exploit for the Android / Linux kernel using CVE-2025-38352. The exploit was written specifically for Linux kernel v5.10.157, but should work against all vulnerable v5.10.x kernels, as it does not require any specific kernel text offsets to work.

I covered the vulnerability in detail in a three-part blog post series, all the way from PoC to exploit:

demo

Build Setup

This exploit has only been tested against an x86_64 Linux kernel v5.10.157 running in QEMU. I asked a friend to send me their Pixel 6a kernel config to base my kernel config off of, and these are the config options important for this exploit (I started from the kernelCTF config as a base):

  • CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK=n
  • CONFIG_PREEMPT=y (Full Preemption, no RT)
  • CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT=n
  • DEBUG_LIST=n
  • BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=n
  • LIST_HARDENED=n

To disable CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK, you can follow the steps laid out in my first blog post here.

Refer to the qemu.sh file for my QEMU run script. I used 4 cores and 3 GB RAM for testing.

Exploit parameters

Since the exploit depends on CPU timers, there are two parameters you may need to change to adapt it to your environment.

First, CPU_USAGE_THRESHOLD. This parameter is used when consuming CPU time to fire the timers inside the race_func(). It must be set such that:

  • The timers don't fire on every retry attempt (this would imply that CPU_USAGE_THRESHOLD is too high, as the timers are firing before the race_func() thread can exit).
  • The timers only fire sometimes (this would imply that sometimes the timers fire before the thread exits, and other times it fires while the thread exits).

To determine whether the timers are firing or not, insert a printf() statement in the SIGUSR1 polling code in free_func(). If you see the message print out, that means the timers fired.

Second, PARENT_SETTIME_DELAY_US. This parameter is used by the parent process to hit the 2nd race window inside send_sigqueue() at the same time as the child process. Run the exploit, observe, and modify it as follows:

  • The message "Parent raced too late, readjusting..." appears too often – reduce this parameter.
  • The message "Parent raced too early, readjusting..." appears too often – increase this parameter.

Ideally, the exploit will work within 1 minute. If it doesn't, you'll have to a figure out which of the two parameters above you need to modify.

Potential Improvements

In my cross-cache implementation, I assumed that the kernel is not too busy, and that there haven't been many struct sigqueue allocations. I added a comment in sigqueue_crosscache_preallocs() that explains what you would need to do improve this.

Questions

If you have any questions, please contact me via X / Twitter!

About

Android kernel exploit for CVE-2025-38352, previously exploited in-the-wild. Targets vulnerable Linux kernels v5.10.x.

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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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Chronomaly

Chronomaly is a kernel exploit for the Android / Linux kernel using CVE-2025-38352. The exploit was written specifically for Linux kernel v5.10.157, but should work against all vulnerable v5.10.x kernels, as it does not require any specific kernel text offsets to work.

I covered the vulnerability in detail in a three-part blog post series, all the way from PoC to exploit:

demo

Build Setup

This exploit has only been tested against an x86_64 Linux kernel v5.10.157 running in QEMU. I asked a friend to send me their Pixel 6a kernel config to base my kernel config off of, and these are the config options important for this exploit (I started from the kernelCTF config as a base):

  • CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK=n
  • CONFIG_PREEMPT=y (Full Preemption, no RT)
  • CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT=n
  • DEBUG_LIST=n
  • BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=n
  • LIST_HARDENED=n

To disable CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK, you can follow the steps laid out in my first blog post here.

Refer to the qemu.sh file for my QEMU run script. I used 4 cores and 3 GB RAM for testing.

Exploit parameters

Since the exploit depends on CPU timers, there are two parameters you may need to change to adapt it to your environment.

First, CPU_USAGE_THRESHOLD. This parameter is used when consuming CPU time to fire the timers inside the race_func(). It must be set such that:

  • The timers don't fire on every retry attempt (this would imply that CPU_USAGE_THRESHOLD is too high, as the timers are firing before the race_func() thread can exit).
  • The timers only fire sometimes (this would imply that sometimes the timers fire before the thread exits, and other times it fires while the thread exits).

To determine whether the timers are firing or not, insert a printf() statement in the SIGUSR1 polling code in free_func(). If you see the message print out, that means the timers fired.

Second, PARENT_SETTIME_DELAY_US. This parameter is used by the parent process to hit the 2nd race window inside send_sigqueue() at the same time as the child process. Run the exploit, observe, and modify it as follows:

  • The message "Parent raced too late, readjusting..." appears too often – reduce this parameter.
  • The message "Parent raced too early, readjusting..." appears too often – increase this parameter.

Ideally, the exploit will work within 1 minute. If it doesn't, you'll have to a figure out which of the two parameters above you need to modify.

Potential Improvements

In my cross-cache implementation, I assumed that the kernel is not too busy, and that there haven't been many struct sigqueue allocations. I added a comment in sigqueue_crosscache_preallocs() that explains what you would need to do improve this.

Questions

If you have any questions, please contact me via X / Twitter!

About

Android kernel exploit for CVE-2025-38352, previously exploited in-the-wild. Targets vulnerable Linux kernels v5.10.x.

Resources

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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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Chronomaly

Chronomaly is a kernel exploit for the Android / Linux kernel using CVE-2025-38352. The exploit was written specifically for Linux kernel v5.10.157, but should work against all vulnerable v5.10.x kernels, as it does not require any specific kernel text offsets to work.

I covered the vulnerability in detail in a three-part blog post series, all the way from PoC to exploit:

demo

Build Setup

This exploit has only been tested against an x86_64 Linux kernel v5.10.157 running in QEMU. I asked a friend to send me their Pixel 6a kernel config to base my kernel config off of, and these are the config options important for this exploit (I started from the kernelCTF config as a base):

  • CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK=n
  • CONFIG_PREEMPT=y (Full Preemption, no RT)
  • CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT=n
  • DEBUG_LIST=n
  • BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=n
  • LIST_HARDENED=n

To disable CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK, you can follow the steps laid out in my first blog post here.

Refer to the qemu.sh file for my QEMU run script. I used 4 cores and 3 GB RAM for testing.

Exploit parameters

Since the exploit depends on CPU timers, there are two parameters you may need to change to adapt it to your environment.

First, CPU_USAGE_THRESHOLD. This parameter is used when consuming CPU time to fire the timers inside the race_func(). It must be set such that:

  • The timers don't fire on every retry attempt (this would imply that CPU_USAGE_THRESHOLD is too high, as the timers are firing before the race_func() thread can exit).
  • The timers only fire sometimes (this would imply that sometimes the timers fire before the thread exits, and other times it fires while the thread exits).

To determine whether the timers are firing or not, insert a printf() statement in the SIGUSR1 polling code in free_func(). If you see the message print out, that means the timers fired.

Second, PARENT_SETTIME_DELAY_US. This parameter is used by the parent process to hit the 2nd race window inside send_sigqueue() at the same time as the child process. Run the exploit, observe, and modify it as follows:

  • The message "Parent raced too late, readjusting..." appears too often – reduce this parameter.
  • The message "Parent raced too early, readjusting..." appears too often – increase this parameter.

Ideally, the exploit will work within 1 minute. If it doesn't, you'll have to a figure out which of the two parameters above you need to modify.

Potential Improvements

In my cross-cache implementation, I assumed that the kernel is not too busy, and that there haven't been many struct sigqueue allocations. I added a comment in sigqueue_crosscache_preallocs() that explains what you would need to do improve this.

Questions

If you have any questions, please contact me via X / Twitter!

About

Android kernel exploit for CVE-2025-38352, previously exploited in-the-wild. Targets vulnerable Linux kernels v5.10.x.

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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); } })(); })();
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Chronomaly

Chronomaly is a kernel exploit for the Android / Linux kernel using CVE-2025-38352. The exploit was written specifically for Linux kernel v5.10.157, but should work against all vulnerable v5.10.x kernels, as it does not require any specific kernel text offsets to work.

I covered the vulnerability in detail in a three-part blog post series, all the way from PoC to exploit:

demo

Build Setup

This exploit has only been tested against an x86_64 Linux kernel v5.10.157 running in QEMU. I asked a friend to send me their Pixel 6a kernel config to base my kernel config off of, and these are the config options important for this exploit (I started from the kernelCTF config as a base):

  • CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK=n
  • CONFIG_PREEMPT=y (Full Preemption, no RT)
  • CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT=n
  • DEBUG_LIST=n
  • BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=n
  • LIST_HARDENED=n

To disable CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK, you can follow the steps laid out in my first blog post here.

Refer to the qemu.sh file for my QEMU run script. I used 4 cores and 3 GB RAM for testing.

Exploit parameters

Since the exploit depends on CPU timers, there are two parameters you may need to change to adapt it to your environment.

First, CPU_USAGE_THRESHOLD. This parameter is used when consuming CPU time to fire the timers inside the race_func(). It must be set such that:

  • The timers don't fire on every retry attempt (this would imply that CPU_USAGE_THRESHOLD is too high, as the timers are firing before the race_func() thread can exit).
  • The timers only fire sometimes (this would imply that sometimes the timers fire before the thread exits, and other times it fires while the thread exits).

To determine whether the timers are firing or not, insert a printf() statement in the SIGUSR1 polling code in free_func(). If you see the message print out, that means the timers fired.

Second, PARENT_SETTIME_DELAY_US. This parameter is used by the parent process to hit the 2nd race window inside send_sigqueue() at the same time as the child process. Run the exploit, observe, and modify it as follows:

  • The message "Parent raced too late, readjusting..." appears too often – reduce this parameter.
  • The message "Parent raced too early, readjusting..." appears too often – increase this parameter.

Ideally, the exploit will work within 1 minute. If it doesn't, you'll have to a figure out which of the two parameters above you need to modify.

Potential Improvements

In my cross-cache implementation, I assumed that the kernel is not too busy, and that there haven't been many struct sigqueue allocations. I added a comment in sigqueue_crosscache_preallocs() that explains what you would need to do improve this.

Questions

If you have any questions, please contact me via X / Twitter!

About

Android kernel exploit for CVE-2025-38352, previously exploited in-the-wild. Targets vulnerable Linux kernels v5.10.x.

Resources

Stars

1 star

Watchers

0 watching

Forks

Releases

Packages

Contributors

Languages