crypto: mk-ca-bundle.pl drops Izenpe.com and loses NSS SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER semantics #64752

Closed
#64753
Closed
crypto: mk-ca-bundle.pl drops Izenpe.com and loses NSS SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER semantics#64752
#64753
Labels
cryptoIssues and PRs related to the crypto subsystem.toolsIssues and PRs related to the tools directory.

Description

@Archkon
Archkon
opened on Jul 26, 2026

Version

latest main branch

Platform

Subsystem

crypto

What steps will reproduce the bug?

const{ X509Certificate }=require('node:crypto');consttls=require('node:tls');constizenpeFingerprint='25:30:CC:8E:98:32:15:02:BA:D9:6F:9B:1F:BA:1B:09:'+'9E:2D:29:9E:0F:45:48:BB:91:4F:36:3B:C0:D4:53:1F';constfound=tls.rootCertificates.some((pem)=>{returnnewX509Certificate(pem).fingerprint256===izenpeFingerprint;});console.log(tls.rootCertificates.length);// 120console.log(found);// false

How often does it reproduce? Is there a required condition?

Every

What is the expected behavior? Why is that the expected behavior?

Izenpe.com should remain in the bundled CA store.

Its NSS policy specifies:

CKA_NSS_SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER = 260415235959Z

Therefore, assuming all other certificate validation succeeds:

  • A server certificate with NotBefore <= 2026-04-15 23:59:59Z should remain trusted.
  • A server certificate with NotBefore > 2026-04-15 23:59:59Z should be rejected.

The cutoff applies to the end-entity certificate’s issuance time. It does not mean that the entire root must be removed after that date.

Retained roots with a server distrust-after constraint continue to trust post-cutoff certificates because the metadata is discarded during PEM generation.

What do you see instead?

The generated src/node_root_certs.h contains 120 valid PEM certificates, but Izenpe.com is missing.

As a result, TLS server chains anchored to Izenpe fail when Node uses its bundled CA store, including chains whose end-entity certificate was issued before the NSS distrust after cutoff.

The missing root can be detected with:

All existing PEM entries still parse successfully, so a test that only validates PEM syntax does not detect the missing trust anchor.

Additional information

No response

Metadata

Metadata

Assignees

No one assigned

    Labels

    cryptoIssues and PRs related to the crypto subsystem.toolsIssues and PRs related to the tools directory.

    Type

    No type

    Projects

    No projects

      Milestone

      No milestone

      Relationships

      None yet

      Development

      No branches or pull requests

      Issue actions

      , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
       blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

      Skip to content
      crypto: mk-ca-bundle.pl drops Izenpe.com and loses NSS SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER semantics #64752
      Closed
      #64753
      Closed
      crypto: mk-ca-bundle.pl drops Izenpe.com and loses NSS SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER semantics#64752
      #64753
      Labels
      cryptoIssues and PRs related to the crypto subsystem.toolsIssues and PRs related to the tools directory.
      Description
      @Archkon
      Archkon
      opened on Jul 26, 2026
      Version
      latest main branch
      Platform
      Subsystem
      crypto
      What steps will reproduce the bug?
      const{ X509Certificate }=require('node:crypto');consttls=require('node:tls');constizenpeFingerprint='25:30:CC:8E:98:32:15:02:BA:D9:6F:9B:1F:BA:1B:09:'+'9E:2D:29:9E:0F:45:48:BB:91:4F:36:3B:C0:D4:53:1F';constfound=tls.rootCertificates.some((pem)=>{returnnewX509Certificate(pem).fingerprint256===izenpeFingerprint;});console.log(tls.rootCertificates.length);// 120console.log(found);// false
      How often does it reproduce? Is there a required condition?
      Every
      What is the expected behavior? Why is that the expected behavior?
      Izenpe.com should remain in the bundled CA store.
      Its NSS policy specifies:
      CKA_NSS_SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER = 260415235959Z
      Therefore, assuming all other certificate validation succeeds:
      • A server certificate with NotBefore <= 2026-04-15 23:59:59Z should remain trusted.
      • A server certificate with NotBefore > 2026-04-15 23:59:59Z should be rejected.
      The cutoff applies to the end-entity certificate’s issuance time. It does not mean that the entire root must be removed after that date.
      Retained roots with a server distrust-after constraint continue to trust post-cutoff certificates because the metadata is discarded during PEM generation.
      What do you see instead?
      The generated src/node_root_certs.h contains 120 valid PEM certificates, but Izenpe.com is missing.
      As a result, TLS server chains anchored to Izenpe fail when Node uses its bundled CA store, including chains whose end-entity certificate was issued before the NSS distrust after cutoff.
      The missing root can be detected with:
      All existing PEM entries still parse successfully, so a test that only validates PEM syntax does not detect the missing trust anchor.
      Additional information
      No response
      Metadata
      Metadata
      Assignees
      No one assigned
        Labels
        cryptoIssues and PRs related to the crypto subsystem.toolsIssues and PRs related to the tools directory.
        Type
        No type
        Projects
        No projects
          Milestone
          No milestone
          Relationships
          None yet
          Development
          No branches or pull requests
          Issue actions
          
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

          Skip to content
          crypto: mk-ca-bundle.pl drops Izenpe.com and loses NSS SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER semantics #64752
          Closed
          #64753
          Closed
          crypto: mk-ca-bundle.pl drops Izenpe.com and loses NSS SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER semantics#64752
          #64753
          Labels
          cryptoIssues and PRs related to the crypto subsystem.toolsIssues and PRs related to the tools directory.
          Description
          @Archkon
          Archkon
          opened on Jul 26, 2026
          Version
          latest main branch
          Platform
          Subsystem
          crypto
          What steps will reproduce the bug?
          const{ X509Certificate }=require('node:crypto');consttls=require('node:tls');constizenpeFingerprint='25:30:CC:8E:98:32:15:02:BA:D9:6F:9B:1F:BA:1B:09:'+'9E:2D:29:9E:0F:45:48:BB:91:4F:36:3B:C0:D4:53:1F';constfound=tls.rootCertificates.some((pem)=>{returnnewX509Certificate(pem).fingerprint256===izenpeFingerprint;});console.log(tls.rootCertificates.length);// 120console.log(found);// false
          How often does it reproduce? Is there a required condition?
          Every
          What is the expected behavior? Why is that the expected behavior?
          Izenpe.com should remain in the bundled CA store.
          Its NSS policy specifies:
          CKA_NSS_SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER = 260415235959Z
          Therefore, assuming all other certificate validation succeeds:
          • A server certificate with NotBefore <= 2026-04-15 23:59:59Z should remain trusted.
          • A server certificate with NotBefore > 2026-04-15 23:59:59Z should be rejected.
          The cutoff applies to the end-entity certificate’s issuance time. It does not mean that the entire root must be removed after that date.
          Retained roots with a server distrust-after constraint continue to trust post-cutoff certificates because the metadata is discarded during PEM generation.
          What do you see instead?
          The generated src/node_root_certs.h contains 120 valid PEM certificates, but Izenpe.com is missing.
          As a result, TLS server chains anchored to Izenpe fail when Node uses its bundled CA store, including chains whose end-entity certificate was issued before the NSS distrust after cutoff.
          The missing root can be detected with:
          All existing PEM entries still parse successfully, so a test that only validates PEM syntax does not detect the missing trust anchor.
          Additional information
          No response
          Metadata
          Metadata
          Assignees
          No one assigned
            Labels
            cryptoIssues and PRs related to the crypto subsystem.toolsIssues and PRs related to the tools directory.
            Type
            No type
            Projects
            No projects
              Milestone
              No milestone
              Relationships
              None yet
              Development
              No branches or pull requests
              Issue actions
              
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

              Skip to content
              crypto: mk-ca-bundle.pl drops Izenpe.com and loses NSS SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER semantics #64752
              Closed
              #64753
              Closed
              crypto: mk-ca-bundle.pl drops Izenpe.com and loses NSS SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER semantics#64752
              #64753
              Labels
              cryptoIssues and PRs related to the crypto subsystem.toolsIssues and PRs related to the tools directory.
              Description
              @Archkon
              Archkon
              opened on Jul 26, 2026
              Version
              latest main branch
              Platform
              Subsystem
              crypto
              What steps will reproduce the bug?
              const{ X509Certificate }=require('node:crypto');consttls=require('node:tls');constizenpeFingerprint='25:30:CC:8E:98:32:15:02:BA:D9:6F:9B:1F:BA:1B:09:'+'9E:2D:29:9E:0F:45:48:BB:91:4F:36:3B:C0:D4:53:1F';constfound=tls.rootCertificates.some((pem)=>{returnnewX509Certificate(pem).fingerprint256===izenpeFingerprint;});console.log(tls.rootCertificates.length);// 120console.log(found);// false
              How often does it reproduce? Is there a required condition?
              Every
              What is the expected behavior? Why is that the expected behavior?
              Izenpe.com should remain in the bundled CA store.
              Its NSS policy specifies:
              CKA_NSS_SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER = 260415235959Z
              Therefore, assuming all other certificate validation succeeds:
              • A server certificate with NotBefore <= 2026-04-15 23:59:59Z should remain trusted.
              • A server certificate with NotBefore > 2026-04-15 23:59:59Z should be rejected.
              The cutoff applies to the end-entity certificate’s issuance time. It does not mean that the entire root must be removed after that date.
              Retained roots with a server distrust-after constraint continue to trust post-cutoff certificates because the metadata is discarded during PEM generation.
              What do you see instead?
              The generated src/node_root_certs.h contains 120 valid PEM certificates, but Izenpe.com is missing.
              As a result, TLS server chains anchored to Izenpe fail when Node uses its bundled CA store, including chains whose end-entity certificate was issued before the NSS distrust after cutoff.
              The missing root can be detected with:
              All existing PEM entries still parse successfully, so a test that only validates PEM syntax does not detect the missing trust anchor.
              Additional information
              No response
              Metadata
              Metadata
              Assignees
              No one assigned
                Labels
                cryptoIssues and PRs related to the crypto subsystem.toolsIssues and PRs related to the tools directory.
                Type
                No type
                Projects
                No projects
                  Milestone
                  No milestone
                  Relationships
                  None yet
                  Development
                  No branches or pull requests
                  Issue actions
                  
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

                  Skip to content
                  crypto: mk-ca-bundle.pl drops Izenpe.com and loses NSS SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER semantics #64752
                  Closed
                  #64753
                  Closed
                  crypto: mk-ca-bundle.pl drops Izenpe.com and loses NSS SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER semantics#64752
                  #64753
                  Labels
                  cryptoIssues and PRs related to the crypto subsystem.toolsIssues and PRs related to the tools directory.
                  Description
                  @Archkon
                  Archkon
                  opened on Jul 26, 2026
                  Version
                  latest main branch
                  Platform
                  Subsystem
                  crypto
                  What steps will reproduce the bug?
                  const{ X509Certificate }=require('node:crypto');consttls=require('node:tls');constizenpeFingerprint='25:30:CC:8E:98:32:15:02:BA:D9:6F:9B:1F:BA:1B:09:'+'9E:2D:29:9E:0F:45:48:BB:91:4F:36:3B:C0:D4:53:1F';constfound=tls.rootCertificates.some((pem)=>{returnnewX509Certificate(pem).fingerprint256===izenpeFingerprint;});console.log(tls.rootCertificates.length);// 120console.log(found);// false
                  How often does it reproduce? Is there a required condition?
                  Every
                  What is the expected behavior? Why is that the expected behavior?
                  Izenpe.com should remain in the bundled CA store.
                  Its NSS policy specifies:
                  CKA_NSS_SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER = 260415235959Z
                  Therefore, assuming all other certificate validation succeeds:
                  • A server certificate with NotBefore <= 2026-04-15 23:59:59Z should remain trusted.
                  • A server certificate with NotBefore > 2026-04-15 23:59:59Z should be rejected.
                  The cutoff applies to the end-entity certificate’s issuance time. It does not mean that the entire root must be removed after that date.
                  Retained roots with a server distrust-after constraint continue to trust post-cutoff certificates because the metadata is discarded during PEM generation.
                  What do you see instead?
                  The generated src/node_root_certs.h contains 120 valid PEM certificates, but Izenpe.com is missing.
                  As a result, TLS server chains anchored to Izenpe fail when Node uses its bundled CA store, including chains whose end-entity certificate was issued before the NSS distrust after cutoff.
                  The missing root can be detected with:
                  All existing PEM entries still parse successfully, so a test that only validates PEM syntax does not detect the missing trust anchor.
                  Additional information
                  No response
                  Metadata
                  Metadata
                  Assignees
                  No one assigned
                    Labels
                    cryptoIssues and PRs related to the crypto subsystem.toolsIssues and PRs related to the tools directory.
                    Type
                    No type
                    Projects
                    No projects
                      Milestone
                      No milestone
                      Relationships
                      None yet
                      Development
                      No branches or pull requests
                      Issue actions
                      
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

                      Skip to content
                      crypto: mk-ca-bundle.pl drops Izenpe.com and loses NSS SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER semantics #64752
                      Closed
                      #64753
                      Closed
                      crypto: mk-ca-bundle.pl drops Izenpe.com and loses NSS SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER semantics#64752
                      #64753
                      Labels
                      cryptoIssues and PRs related to the crypto subsystem.toolsIssues and PRs related to the tools directory.
                      Description
                      @Archkon
                      Archkon
                      opened on Jul 26, 2026
                      Version
                      latest main branch
                      Platform
                      Subsystem
                      crypto
                      What steps will reproduce the bug?
                      const{ X509Certificate }=require('node:crypto');consttls=require('node:tls');constizenpeFingerprint='25:30:CC:8E:98:32:15:02:BA:D9:6F:9B:1F:BA:1B:09:'+'9E:2D:29:9E:0F:45:48:BB:91:4F:36:3B:C0:D4:53:1F';constfound=tls.rootCertificates.some((pem)=>{returnnewX509Certificate(pem).fingerprint256===izenpeFingerprint;});console.log(tls.rootCertificates.length);// 120console.log(found);// false
                      How often does it reproduce? Is there a required condition?
                      Every
                      What is the expected behavior? Why is that the expected behavior?
                      Izenpe.com should remain in the bundled CA store.
                      Its NSS policy specifies:
                      CKA_NSS_SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER = 260415235959Z
                      Therefore, assuming all other certificate validation succeeds:
                      • A server certificate with NotBefore <= 2026-04-15 23:59:59Z should remain trusted.
                      • A server certificate with NotBefore > 2026-04-15 23:59:59Z should be rejected.
                      The cutoff applies to the end-entity certificate’s issuance time. It does not mean that the entire root must be removed after that date.
                      Retained roots with a server distrust-after constraint continue to trust post-cutoff certificates because the metadata is discarded during PEM generation.
                      What do you see instead?
                      The generated src/node_root_certs.h contains 120 valid PEM certificates, but Izenpe.com is missing.
                      As a result, TLS server chains anchored to Izenpe fail when Node uses its bundled CA store, including chains whose end-entity certificate was issued before the NSS distrust after cutoff.
                      The missing root can be detected with:
                      All existing PEM entries still parse successfully, so a test that only validates PEM syntax does not detect the missing trust anchor.
                      Additional information
                      No response
                      Metadata
                      Metadata
                      Assignees
                      No one assigned
                        Labels
                        cryptoIssues and PRs related to the crypto subsystem.toolsIssues and PRs related to the tools directory.
                        Type
                        No type
                        Projects
                        No projects
                          Milestone
                          No milestone
                          Relationships
                          None yet
                          Development
                          No branches or pull requests
                          Issue actions
                          
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

                          Skip to content
                          crypto: mk-ca-bundle.pl drops Izenpe.com and loses NSS SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER semantics #64752
                          Closed
                          #64753
                          Closed
                          crypto: mk-ca-bundle.pl drops Izenpe.com and loses NSS SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER semantics#64752
                          #64753
                          Labels
                          cryptoIssues and PRs related to the crypto subsystem.toolsIssues and PRs related to the tools directory.
                          Description
                          @Archkon
                          Archkon
                          opened on Jul 26, 2026
                          Version
                          latest main branch
                          Platform
                          Subsystem
                          crypto
                          What steps will reproduce the bug?
                          const{ X509Certificate }=require('node:crypto');consttls=require('node:tls');constizenpeFingerprint='25:30:CC:8E:98:32:15:02:BA:D9:6F:9B:1F:BA:1B:09:'+'9E:2D:29:9E:0F:45:48:BB:91:4F:36:3B:C0:D4:53:1F';constfound=tls.rootCertificates.some((pem)=>{returnnewX509Certificate(pem).fingerprint256===izenpeFingerprint;});console.log(tls.rootCertificates.length);// 120console.log(found);// false
                          How often does it reproduce? Is there a required condition?
                          Every
                          What is the expected behavior? Why is that the expected behavior?
                          Izenpe.com should remain in the bundled CA store.
                          Its NSS policy specifies:
                          CKA_NSS_SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER = 260415235959Z
                          Therefore, assuming all other certificate validation succeeds:
                          • A server certificate with NotBefore <= 2026-04-15 23:59:59Z should remain trusted.
                          • A server certificate with NotBefore > 2026-04-15 23:59:59Z should be rejected.
                          The cutoff applies to the end-entity certificate’s issuance time. It does not mean that the entire root must be removed after that date.
                          Retained roots with a server distrust-after constraint continue to trust post-cutoff certificates because the metadata is discarded during PEM generation.
                          What do you see instead?
                          The generated src/node_root_certs.h contains 120 valid PEM certificates, but Izenpe.com is missing.
                          As a result, TLS server chains anchored to Izenpe fail when Node uses its bundled CA store, including chains whose end-entity certificate was issued before the NSS distrust after cutoff.
                          The missing root can be detected with:
                          All existing PEM entries still parse successfully, so a test that only validates PEM syntax does not detect the missing trust anchor.
                          Additional information
                          No response
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

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                              crypto: mk-ca-bundle.pl drops Izenpe.com and loses NSS SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER semantics #64752
                              Closed
                              #64753
                              Closed
                              crypto: mk-ca-bundle.pl drops Izenpe.com and loses NSS SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER semantics#64752
                              #64753
                              Labels
                              cryptoIssues and PRs related to the crypto subsystem.toolsIssues and PRs related to the tools directory.
                              Description
                              @Archkon
                              Archkon
                              opened on Jul 26, 2026
                              Version
                              latest main branch
                              Platform
                              Subsystem
                              crypto
                              What steps will reproduce the bug?
                              const{ X509Certificate }=require('node:crypto');consttls=require('node:tls');constizenpeFingerprint='25:30:CC:8E:98:32:15:02:BA:D9:6F:9B:1F:BA:1B:09:'+'9E:2D:29:9E:0F:45:48:BB:91:4F:36:3B:C0:D4:53:1F';constfound=tls.rootCertificates.some((pem)=>{returnnewX509Certificate(pem).fingerprint256===izenpeFingerprint;});console.log(tls.rootCertificates.length);// 120console.log(found);// false
                              How often does it reproduce? Is there a required condition?
                              Every
                              What is the expected behavior? Why is that the expected behavior?
                              Izenpe.com should remain in the bundled CA store.
                              Its NSS policy specifies:
                              CKA_NSS_SERVER_DISTRUST_AFTER = 260415235959Z
                              Therefore, assuming all other certificate validation succeeds:
                              • A server certificate with NotBefore <= 2026-04-15 23:59:59Z should remain trusted.
                              • A server certificate with NotBefore > 2026-04-15 23:59:59Z should be rejected.
                              The cutoff applies to the end-entity certificate’s issuance time. It does not mean that the entire root must be removed after that date.
                              Retained roots with a server distrust-after constraint continue to trust post-cutoff certificates because the metadata is discarded during PEM generation.
                              What do you see instead?
                              The generated src/node_root_certs.h contains 120 valid PEM certificates, but Izenpe.com is missing.
                              As a result, TLS server chains anchored to Izenpe fail when Node uses its bundled CA store, including chains whose end-entity certificate was issued before the NSS distrust after cutoff.
                              The missing root can be detected with:
                              All existing PEM entries still parse successfully, so a test that only validates PEM syntax does not detect the missing trust anchor.
                              Additional information
                              No response
                              Metadata
                              Metadata
                              Assignees
                              No one assigned
                                Labels
                                cryptoIssues and PRs related to the crypto subsystem.toolsIssues and PRs related to the tools directory.
                                Type
                                No type
                                Projects
                                No projects
                                  Milestone
                                  No milestone
                                  Relationships
                                  None yet
                                  Development
                                  No branches or pull requests
                                  Issue actions