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test: increase crypto strength for FIPS standard - #3758
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indutny
commented
Nov 11, 2015
No need to start |
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Is this enough to check /:digest too big for rsa key/ ?
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8fe3e9bComparejasnell
commented
Nov 14, 2015
shigeki
commented
Nov 14, 2015
LGTM |
jasnell
commented
Nov 14, 2015
@stefanmb ... this patch, for some reason, is not applying cleanly on master. Can you take a look and rebase/update if necessary. It appears to be having a problem with the changes to common.js |
Use stronger crypto (larger keys, etc.) for arbitrary tests so they will pass in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode without altering the original intent of the test cases.
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390f571Comparestefanmb
commented
Nov 14, 2015
@jasnell I think it should be fixed now, please confirm. I included the commit for common.js in several PRs, but once it landed in the first one it's no longer needed in the others. Thanks! |
jasnell
commented
Nov 14, 2015
Ok. In the future, when you have one commit that may be need by several others, it would likely be best to separate that out into a separate pull request and referenced from the other PRs that depend on it. Doing so helps keep changes isolated and the dependencies visible. |
Use stronger crypto (larger keys, etc.) for arbitrary tests so they will pass in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode without altering the original intent of the test cases. PR-URL: #3758 Reviewed-By: Shigeki Ohtsu <ohtsu@iij.ad.jp> Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
jasnell
commented
Nov 14, 2015
Landed in 11ad744 |
Use stronger crypto (larger keys, etc.) for arbitrary tests so they will pass in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode without altering the original intent of the test cases. PR-URL: #3758 Reviewed-By: Shigeki Ohtsu <ohtsu@iij.ad.jp> Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Fishrock123
commented
Nov 18, 2015
CI wasn't run for this and seems to be causing #3881, fwiw. |
jasnell
commented
Nov 18, 2015
Hmm... ok. At the time CI itself was flaky at best so landing was done optimistically after testing locally on osx and ubuntu. I've been considering working the new node-stress-single-test into my workflow for every PR that lands a significant test change. Or perhaps a variation that merges node-stress-single-test and node-test-pull-request might be worthwhile. It would certainly help us to identify the flaky tests earlier now that CI is relatively stable again. |
evanlucas
commented
Nov 18, 2015
Ah good point. I forgot about that. I like your idea regarding the node-stress-single-test though. |
stefanmb
commented
Nov 18, 2015
@Fishrock123 This follow up PR should alleviate the rpi perf issues #3902. |
Use stronger crypto (larger keys, etc.) for arbitrary tests so they will pass in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode without altering the original intent of the test cases. PR-URL: #3758 Reviewed-By: Shigeki Ohtsu <ohtsu@iij.ad.jp> Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Use stronger crypto (larger keys, etc.) for arbitrary tests so they will pass in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode without altering the original intent of the test cases. PR-URL: #3758 Reviewed-By: Shigeki Ohtsu <ohtsu@iij.ad.jp> Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Use stronger crypto (larger keys, etc.) for arbitrary tests so they will pass in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode without altering the original intent of the test cases. PR-URL: #3758 Reviewed-By: Shigeki Ohtsu <ohtsu@iij.ad.jp> Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Use stronger crypto (larger keys, etc.) for arbitrary tests so they will pass in both FIPS and non-FIPS mode without altering the original intent of the test cases. PR-URL: #3758 Reviewed-By: Shigeki Ohtsu <ohtsu@iij.ad.jp> Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
In many test cases arbitrary crypto is chosen, for example a key length of 256 bits may be selected, or a prime number of 768 bits length. Some of these choices are not compatible with FIPS, in these cases I’ve opted to boost the cryptography level to a minimum supported level in FIPS. For a discussion on “equivalent” crypto strength across different algorithms see Section 5.6.1 of SP 800-57.