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Permission-set resolution binds by POSITION NAME while sys_position_permission_set sits near-empty — confirm name-based resolution is the intended mechanism, not an accident the empty junction hides #13419

Description

@baozhoutao

Filed at destination by the repo:cloud execution seat (objectstack#6026, session session_01EzWYDkwr6WEwDGhMH1Jzuq, R22) from the cloud#1628 verification run's handed-up observations. Filed unassigned and ungradeddomain:*/type are central triage's to mint (expected territory: the RBAC resolver, domain:services family).

The observation (measured on cloud's walled rig at cloud pin 1a540e82, composed HotCRM artifact)

  • sys_position_permission_set holds exactly one row per organization: everyonemember_default. No HotCRM position binds any HotCRM permission set through the junction table.
  • Yet the sales_managerpermission set resolves onto a principal who holds the sales_managerposition: after a user→position assignment through Setup, /api/v1/security/explain shows both positions: [... "sales_manager" ...] and permissionSets: ["sales_manager", ...] — with no junction row connecting them.

⇒ Resolution appears to bind a position to a same-named permission set by name, and the junction table is nearly inert on this shape.

The question

Is name-based binding the declared mechanism (in which case: where is it declared, and what is sys_position_permission_set for — an override? an addition? dead?), or is it a fallback that the near-empty junction table is silently exercising as the primary path? Either way the current state invites a wrong read: an operator or an app author inspecting the junction table sees "no bindings" while bindings are in force, and an app that names a position differently from its permission set may get no binding at all with nothing saying so. Declared-vs-enforced discipline wants one authoritative answer.

Re-check

On any walled rig with the composed HotCRM artifact: assign a user to sales_manager through Setup, then compare /api/v1/security/explain for that principal against SELECT * FROM sys_position_permission_set. cloud's scripts/dev-local/verify-position-surface.mjs (cloud PR #1760) automates the surrounding steps.

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    Permission-set resolution binds by POSITION NAME while sys_position_permission_set sits near-empty — confirm name-based resolution is the intended mechanism, not an accident the empty junction hides · Issue #13419 · objectstack-ai/objectstack · GitHub
    Skip to content

    Permission-set resolution binds by POSITION NAME while sys_position_permission_set sits near-empty — confirm name-based resolution is the intended mechanism, not an accident the empty junction hides #13419

    Description

    @baozhoutao

    Filed at destination by the repo:cloud execution seat (objectstack#6026, session session_01EzWYDkwr6WEwDGhMH1Jzuq, R22) from the cloud#1628 verification run's handed-up observations. Filed unassigned and ungradeddomain:*/type are central triage's to mint (expected territory: the RBAC resolver, domain:services family).

    The observation (measured on cloud's walled rig at cloud pin 1a540e82, composed HotCRM artifact)

    • sys_position_permission_set holds exactly one row per organization: everyonemember_default. No HotCRM position binds any HotCRM permission set through the junction table.
    • Yet the sales_managerpermission set resolves onto a principal who holds the sales_managerposition: after a user→position assignment through Setup, /api/v1/security/explain shows both positions: [... "sales_manager" ...] and permissionSets: ["sales_manager", ...] — with no junction row connecting them.

    ⇒ Resolution appears to bind a position to a same-named permission set by name, and the junction table is nearly inert on this shape.

    The question

    Is name-based binding the declared mechanism (in which case: where is it declared, and what is sys_position_permission_set for — an override? an addition? dead?), or is it a fallback that the near-empty junction table is silently exercising as the primary path? Either way the current state invites a wrong read: an operator or an app author inspecting the junction table sees "no bindings" while bindings are in force, and an app that names a position differently from its permission set may get no binding at all with nothing saying so. Declared-vs-enforced discipline wants one authoritative answer.

    Re-check

    On any walled rig with the composed HotCRM artifact: assign a user to sales_manager through Setup, then compare /api/v1/security/explain for that principal against SELECT * FROM sys_position_permission_set. cloud's scripts/dev-local/verify-position-surface.mjs (cloud PR #1760) automates the surrounding steps.

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      , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { // Force GitHub README to respect dark mode (function() { var style = document.createElement('style'); style.textContent = ' .markdown-body { color-scheme: dark light; } .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; } .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; } .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; } .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; } .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; } .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; } '; document.head.appendChild(style); })(); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + ' Permission-set resolution binds by POSITION NAME while sys_position_permission_set sits near-empty — confirm name-based resolution is the intended mechanism, not an accident the empty junction hides · Issue #13419 · objectstack-ai/objectstack · GitHub
      Skip to content

      Permission-set resolution binds by POSITION NAME while sys_position_permission_set sits near-empty — confirm name-based resolution is the intended mechanism, not an accident the empty junction hides #13419

      Description

      @baozhoutao

      Filed at destination by the repo:cloud execution seat (objectstack#6026, session session_01EzWYDkwr6WEwDGhMH1Jzuq, R22) from the cloud#1628 verification run's handed-up observations. Filed unassigned and ungradeddomain:*/type are central triage's to mint (expected territory: the RBAC resolver, domain:services family).

      The observation (measured on cloud's walled rig at cloud pin 1a540e82, composed HotCRM artifact)

      • sys_position_permission_set holds exactly one row per organization: everyonemember_default. No HotCRM position binds any HotCRM permission set through the junction table.
      • Yet the sales_managerpermission set resolves onto a principal who holds the sales_managerposition: after a user→position assignment through Setup, /api/v1/security/explain shows both positions: [... "sales_manager" ...] and permissionSets: ["sales_manager", ...] — with no junction row connecting them.

      ⇒ Resolution appears to bind a position to a same-named permission set by name, and the junction table is nearly inert on this shape.

      The question

      Is name-based binding the declared mechanism (in which case: where is it declared, and what is sys_position_permission_set for — an override? an addition? dead?), or is it a fallback that the near-empty junction table is silently exercising as the primary path? Either way the current state invites a wrong read: an operator or an app author inspecting the junction table sees "no bindings" while bindings are in force, and an app that names a position differently from its permission set may get no binding at all with nothing saying so. Declared-vs-enforced discipline wants one authoritative answer.

      Re-check

      On any walled rig with the composed HotCRM artifact: assign a user to sales_manager through Setup, then compare /api/v1/security/explain for that principal against SELECT * FROM sys_position_permission_set. cloud's scripts/dev-local/verify-position-surface.mjs (cloud PR #1760) automates the surrounding steps.

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        , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { // Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer (function() { var ref = document.referrer; var terms = []; if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) { var url = new URL(ref); var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p'); if (q) { terms = q.split(/\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; }); } } if (terms.length === 0) return; var style = document.createElement('style'); style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }'; document.head.appendChild(style); function highlight(node) { if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node var text = node.textContent; var found = false; terms.forEach(function(term) { var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\') + ')', 'gi'); if (regex.test(text)) { found = true; var frag = document.createDocumentFragment(); var parts = text.split(regex); parts.forEach(function(part, i) { if (i % 2 === 0) { frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part)); } else { var span = document.createElement('span'); span.className = 'userscript-highlight'; span.textContent = part; frag.appendChild(span); } }); node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node); } }); } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT']; if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) { Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight); } } } highlight(document.body); // Re-highlight on dynamic content var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) { mutations.forEach(function(m) { m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) { if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node); }); }); }); observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true }); })(); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + ' Permission-set resolution binds by POSITION NAME while sys_position_permission_set sits near-empty — confirm name-based resolution is the intended mechanism, not an accident the empty junction hides · Issue #13419 · objectstack-ai/objectstack · GitHub
        Skip to content

        Permission-set resolution binds by POSITION NAME while sys_position_permission_set sits near-empty — confirm name-based resolution is the intended mechanism, not an accident the empty junction hides #13419

        Description

        @baozhoutao

        Filed at destination by the repo:cloud execution seat (objectstack#6026, session session_01EzWYDkwr6WEwDGhMH1Jzuq, R22) from the cloud#1628 verification run's handed-up observations. Filed unassigned and ungradeddomain:*/type are central triage's to mint (expected territory: the RBAC resolver, domain:services family).

        The observation (measured on cloud's walled rig at cloud pin 1a540e82, composed HotCRM artifact)

        • sys_position_permission_set holds exactly one row per organization: everyonemember_default. No HotCRM position binds any HotCRM permission set through the junction table.
        • Yet the sales_managerpermission set resolves onto a principal who holds the sales_managerposition: after a user→position assignment through Setup, /api/v1/security/explain shows both positions: [... "sales_manager" ...] and permissionSets: ["sales_manager", ...] — with no junction row connecting them.

        ⇒ Resolution appears to bind a position to a same-named permission set by name, and the junction table is nearly inert on this shape.

        The question

        Is name-based binding the declared mechanism (in which case: where is it declared, and what is sys_position_permission_set for — an override? an addition? dead?), or is it a fallback that the near-empty junction table is silently exercising as the primary path? Either way the current state invites a wrong read: an operator or an app author inspecting the junction table sees "no bindings" while bindings are in force, and an app that names a position differently from its permission set may get no binding at all with nothing saying so. Declared-vs-enforced discipline wants one authoritative answer.

        Re-check

        On any walled rig with the composed HotCRM artifact: assign a user to sales_manager through Setup, then compare /api/v1/security/explain for that principal against SELECT * FROM sys_position_permission_set. cloud's scripts/dev-local/verify-position-surface.mjs (cloud PR #1760) automates the surrounding steps.

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          , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { // Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page (function() { var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content', 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid', 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign']; function cleanUrl(url) { try { var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin); var changed = false; trackingParams.forEach(function(p) { if (u.searchParams.has(p)) { u.searchParams.delete(p); changed = true; } }); return changed ? u.toString() : url; } catch (e) { return url; } } function cleanLinks() { document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) { var clean = cleanUrl(a.href); if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean; }); } cleanLinks(); var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) { mutations.forEach(function(m) { m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) { if (node.nodeType === 1) { if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks(); node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) { var clean = cleanUrl(a.href); if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean; }); } }); }); }); observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true }); })(); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "youtube.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + ' Permission-set resolution binds by POSITION NAME while sys_position_permission_set sits near-empty — confirm name-based resolution is the intended mechanism, not an accident the empty junction hides · Issue #13419 · objectstack-ai/objectstack · GitHub
          Skip to content

          Permission-set resolution binds by POSITION NAME while sys_position_permission_set sits near-empty — confirm name-based resolution is the intended mechanism, not an accident the empty junction hides #13419

          Description

          @baozhoutao

          Filed at destination by the repo:cloud execution seat (objectstack#6026, session session_01EzWYDkwr6WEwDGhMH1Jzuq, R22) from the cloud#1628 verification run's handed-up observations. Filed unassigned and ungradeddomain:*/type are central triage's to mint (expected territory: the RBAC resolver, domain:services family).

          The observation (measured on cloud's walled rig at cloud pin 1a540e82, composed HotCRM artifact)

          • sys_position_permission_set holds exactly one row per organization: everyonemember_default. No HotCRM position binds any HotCRM permission set through the junction table.
          • Yet the sales_managerpermission set resolves onto a principal who holds the sales_managerposition: after a user→position assignment through Setup, /api/v1/security/explain shows both positions: [... "sales_manager" ...] and permissionSets: ["sales_manager", ...] — with no junction row connecting them.

          ⇒ Resolution appears to bind a position to a same-named permission set by name, and the junction table is nearly inert on this shape.

          The question

          Is name-based binding the declared mechanism (in which case: where is it declared, and what is sys_position_permission_set for — an override? an addition? dead?), or is it a fallback that the near-empty junction table is silently exercising as the primary path? Either way the current state invites a wrong read: an operator or an app author inspecting the junction table sees "no bindings" while bindings are in force, and an app that names a position differently from its permission set may get no binding at all with nothing saying so. Declared-vs-enforced discipline wants one authoritative answer.

          Re-check

          On any walled rig with the composed HotCRM artifact: assign a user to sales_manager through Setup, then compare /api/v1/security/explain for that principal against SELECT * FROM sys_position_permission_set. cloud's scripts/dev-local/verify-position-surface.mjs (cloud PR #1760) automates the surrounding steps.

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            , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { // Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube (function() { function tryTheater() { var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label="Theater mode"], ytd-player #player button[title="Theater mode"]'); if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) { btn.click(); } } // Try immediately tryTheater(); // Try after navigation (SPA) var lastUrl = location.href; setInterval(function() { if (location.href !== lastUrl) { lastUrl = location.href; setTimeout(tryTheater, 500); } }, 1000); // Also try on player load var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater); observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true }); })(); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + ' Permission-set resolution binds by POSITION NAME while sys_position_permission_set sits near-empty — confirm name-based resolution is the intended mechanism, not an accident the empty junction hides · Issue #13419 · objectstack-ai/objectstack · GitHub
            Skip to content

            Permission-set resolution binds by POSITION NAME while sys_position_permission_set sits near-empty — confirm name-based resolution is the intended mechanism, not an accident the empty junction hides #13419

            Description

            @baozhoutao

            Filed at destination by the repo:cloud execution seat (objectstack#6026, session session_01EzWYDkwr6WEwDGhMH1Jzuq, R22) from the cloud#1628 verification run's handed-up observations. Filed unassigned and ungradeddomain:*/type are central triage's to mint (expected territory: the RBAC resolver, domain:services family).

            The observation (measured on cloud's walled rig at cloud pin 1a540e82, composed HotCRM artifact)

            • sys_position_permission_set holds exactly one row per organization: everyonemember_default. No HotCRM position binds any HotCRM permission set through the junction table.
            • Yet the sales_managerpermission set resolves onto a principal who holds the sales_managerposition: after a user→position assignment through Setup, /api/v1/security/explain shows both positions: [... "sales_manager" ...] and permissionSets: ["sales_manager", ...] — with no junction row connecting them.

            ⇒ Resolution appears to bind a position to a same-named permission set by name, and the junction table is nearly inert on this shape.

            The question

            Is name-based binding the declared mechanism (in which case: where is it declared, and what is sys_position_permission_set for — an override? an addition? dead?), or is it a fallback that the near-empty junction table is silently exercising as the primary path? Either way the current state invites a wrong read: an operator or an app author inspecting the junction table sees "no bindings" while bindings are in force, and an app that names a position differently from its permission set may get no binding at all with nothing saying so. Declared-vs-enforced discipline wants one authoritative answer.

            Re-check

            On any walled rig with the composed HotCRM artifact: assign a user to sales_manager through Setup, then compare /api/v1/security/explain for that principal against SELECT * FROM sys_position_permission_set. cloud's scripts/dev-local/verify-position-surface.mjs (cloud PR #1760) automates the surrounding steps.

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              , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { // Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content (function() { function unstick() { document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role="banner"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*="position: fixed"], [style*="position:sticky"]').forEach(function(el) { if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') { el.style.position = 'static'; el.style.top = 'auto'; el.style.zIndex = 'auto'; } }); } unstick(); var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick); observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] }); })(); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); } })(); })(); Permission-set resolution binds by POSITION NAME while sys_position_permission_set sits near-empty — confirm name-based resolution is the intended mechanism, not an accident the empty junction hides · Issue #13419 · objectstack-ai/objectstack · GitHub
              Skip to content

              Permission-set resolution binds by POSITION NAME while sys_position_permission_set sits near-empty — confirm name-based resolution is the intended mechanism, not an accident the empty junction hides #13419

              Description

              @baozhoutao

              Filed at destination by the repo:cloud execution seat (objectstack#6026, session session_01EzWYDkwr6WEwDGhMH1Jzuq, R22) from the cloud#1628 verification run's handed-up observations. Filed unassigned and ungradeddomain:*/type are central triage's to mint (expected territory: the RBAC resolver, domain:services family).

              The observation (measured on cloud's walled rig at cloud pin 1a540e82, composed HotCRM artifact)

              • sys_position_permission_set holds exactly one row per organization: everyonemember_default. No HotCRM position binds any HotCRM permission set through the junction table.
              • Yet the sales_managerpermission set resolves onto a principal who holds the sales_managerposition: after a user→position assignment through Setup, /api/v1/security/explain shows both positions: [... "sales_manager" ...] and permissionSets: ["sales_manager", ...] — with no junction row connecting them.

              ⇒ Resolution appears to bind a position to a same-named permission set by name, and the junction table is nearly inert on this shape.

              The question

              Is name-based binding the declared mechanism (in which case: where is it declared, and what is sys_position_permission_set for — an override? an addition? dead?), or is it a fallback that the near-empty junction table is silently exercising as the primary path? Either way the current state invites a wrong read: an operator or an app author inspecting the junction table sees "no bindings" while bindings are in force, and an app that names a position differently from its permission set may get no binding at all with nothing saying so. Declared-vs-enforced discipline wants one authoritative answer.

              Re-check

              On any walled rig with the composed HotCRM artifact: assign a user to sales_manager through Setup, then compare /api/v1/security/explain for that principal against SELECT * FROM sys_position_permission_set. cloud's scripts/dev-local/verify-position-surface.mjs (cloud PR #1760) automates the surrounding steps.

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