sharing: turning publicSharing off leaves already-minted links serving — and silently drops the object's redactFields #13856

Closed
#14171
Closed
sharing: turning publicSharing off leaves already-minted links serving — and silently drops the object's redactFields#13856
#14171
Assignees
os-steve
Labels
bugSomething isn't workingdomain:servicespriority:p1High: required for production / M2security

Description

@claude
claude
bot
opened on Aug 31, 2026

Found while implementing #13608 (re-evaluating publicSharing.eligibility at redemption). Adjacent, and deliberately not carried by that card's PR — its ruling scopes the change to the eligibility predicate.

What the source says

ShareLinkService.getPolicy() (packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts) returns an EMPTY policy whenever the object's publicSharing block is absent or enabled !== true:

 const raw = schema?.publicSharing;
if (!raw || raw.enabled !== true) {
return { enabled: false, allowedAudiences: [], allowedPermissions: [], redactFields: [] };
}

resolveToken() then computes the served redaction set as policy.redactFields union the per-link redact_fields. Two consequences for links that were minted while the object WAS opted in, and are redeemed after it was opted out:

  1. The links keep resolving. Nothing in the redemption path reads policy.enabled; the opt-in is a mint-time check only (createLink refuses with SHARING_NOT_ENABLED). So revoking the object-level opt-in does not stop anonymous serving of the tokens already handed out.
  2. The object's default redactions stop applying — the fail-OPEN direction. With enabled:false the policy's redactFields is [], so a link that was serving a record with, say, owner_id stripped starts serving owner_id. Turning the feature OFF makes the endpoint serve MORE data than it did while it was on.

Read from source on origin/main; stated as a source reading, not as a behavioural measurement — no test was run for it, because the card that surfaced it is scoped elsewhere.

Why it is a separate card

#13608's ruling is specifically about the eligibility predicate, and its fix re-evaluates that predicate only. What enabled:false should mean for an already-minted token is a policy question that card did not answer, and there are at least two defensible answers: treat de-opt-in as a standing policy the way eligibility now is (links die), or treat it as an authoring-surface switch that stops NEW mints only (links live, but then item 2 above is still a plain bug and the object's redactFields must keep applying). Item 2 looks wrong under either answer.

Suggested shape

Whatever is decided for item 1, item 2 wants the redaction set read from the object's declared block regardless of enabled, so that switching the feature off can never widen what an existing token serves.

Related: #13608 (the eligibility half, already ruled and implemented).

Generated by Claude Code

Generated by Claude Code

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    , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
     blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

    Skip to content
    sharing: turning publicSharing off leaves already-minted links serving — and silently drops the object's redactFields #13856
    Closed
    #14171
    Closed
    sharing: turning publicSharing off leaves already-minted links serving — and silently drops the object's redactFields#13856
    #14171
    Assignees
    os-steve
    Labels
    bugSomething isn't workingdomain:servicespriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
    Description
    @claude
    claude
    bot
    opened on Aug 31, 2026
    Found while implementing #13608 (re-evaluating publicSharing.eligibility at redemption). Adjacent, and deliberately not carried by that card's PR — its ruling scopes the change to the eligibility predicate.
    What the source says
    ShareLinkService.getPolicy() (packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts) returns an EMPTY policy whenever the object's publicSharing block is absent or enabled !== true:
     const raw = schema?.publicSharing;
if (!raw || raw.enabled !== true) {
return { enabled: false, allowedAudiences: [], allowedPermissions: [], redactFields: [] };
}

    resolveToken() then computes the served redaction set as policy.redactFields union the per-link redact_fields. Two consequences for links that were minted while the object WAS opted in, and are redeemed after it was opted out:
    1. The links keep resolving. Nothing in the redemption path reads policy.enabled; the opt-in is a mint-time check only (createLink refuses with SHARING_NOT_ENABLED). So revoking the object-level opt-in does not stop anonymous serving of the tokens already handed out.
    2. The object's default redactions stop applying — the fail-OPEN direction. With enabled:false the policy's redactFields is [], so a link that was serving a record with, say, owner_id stripped starts serving owner_id. Turning the feature OFF makes the endpoint serve MORE data than it did while it was on.
    Read from source on origin/main; stated as a source reading, not as a behavioural measurement — no test was run for it, because the card that surfaced it is scoped elsewhere.
    Why it is a separate card
    #13608's ruling is specifically about the eligibility predicate, and its fix re-evaluates that predicate only. What enabled:false should mean for an already-minted token is a policy question that card did not answer, and there are at least two defensible answers: treat de-opt-in as a standing policy the way eligibility now is (links die), or treat it as an authoring-surface switch that stops NEW mints only (links live, but then item 2 above is still a plain bug and the object's redactFields must keep applying). Item 2 looks wrong under either answer.
    Suggested shape
    Whatever is decided for item 1, item 2 wants the redaction set read from the object's declared block regardless of enabled, so that switching the feature off can never widen what an existing token serves.
    Related: #13608 (the eligibility half, already ruled and implemented).
    Generated by Claude Code
    Generated by Claude Code
    Metadata
    Metadata
    Assignees
    Labels
    bugSomething isn't workingdomain:servicespriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
    Type
    No type
    Projects
    No projects
      Milestone
      No milestone
      Relationships
      None yet
      Development
      No branches or pull requests
      Issue actions
      
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

      Skip to content
      sharing: turning publicSharing off leaves already-minted links serving — and silently drops the object's redactFields #13856
      Closed
      #14171
      Closed
      sharing: turning publicSharing off leaves already-minted links serving — and silently drops the object's redactFields#13856
      #14171
      Assignees
      os-steve
      Labels
      bugSomething isn't workingdomain:servicespriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
      Description
      @claude
      claude
      bot
      opened on Aug 31, 2026
      Found while implementing #13608 (re-evaluating publicSharing.eligibility at redemption). Adjacent, and deliberately not carried by that card's PR — its ruling scopes the change to the eligibility predicate.
      What the source says
      ShareLinkService.getPolicy() (packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts) returns an EMPTY policy whenever the object's publicSharing block is absent or enabled !== true:
       const raw = schema?.publicSharing;
if (!raw || raw.enabled !== true) {
return { enabled: false, allowedAudiences: [], allowedPermissions: [], redactFields: [] };
}

      resolveToken() then computes the served redaction set as policy.redactFields union the per-link redact_fields. Two consequences for links that were minted while the object WAS opted in, and are redeemed after it was opted out:
      1. The links keep resolving. Nothing in the redemption path reads policy.enabled; the opt-in is a mint-time check only (createLink refuses with SHARING_NOT_ENABLED). So revoking the object-level opt-in does not stop anonymous serving of the tokens already handed out.
      2. The object's default redactions stop applying — the fail-OPEN direction. With enabled:false the policy's redactFields is [], so a link that was serving a record with, say, owner_id stripped starts serving owner_id. Turning the feature OFF makes the endpoint serve MORE data than it did while it was on.
      Read from source on origin/main; stated as a source reading, not as a behavioural measurement — no test was run for it, because the card that surfaced it is scoped elsewhere.
      Why it is a separate card
      #13608's ruling is specifically about the eligibility predicate, and its fix re-evaluates that predicate only. What enabled:false should mean for an already-minted token is a policy question that card did not answer, and there are at least two defensible answers: treat de-opt-in as a standing policy the way eligibility now is (links die), or treat it as an authoring-surface switch that stops NEW mints only (links live, but then item 2 above is still a plain bug and the object's redactFields must keep applying). Item 2 looks wrong under either answer.
      Suggested shape
      Whatever is decided for item 1, item 2 wants the redaction set read from the object's declared block regardless of enabled, so that switching the feature off can never widen what an existing token serves.
      Related: #13608 (the eligibility half, already ruled and implemented).
      Generated by Claude Code
      Generated by Claude Code
      Metadata
      Metadata
      Assignees
      Labels
      bugSomething isn't workingdomain:servicespriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
      Type
      No type
      Projects
      No projects
        Milestone
        No milestone
        Relationships
        None yet
        Development
        No branches or pull requests
        Issue actions
        
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

        Skip to content
        sharing: turning publicSharing off leaves already-minted links serving — and silently drops the object's redactFields #13856
        Closed
        #14171
        Closed
        sharing: turning publicSharing off leaves already-minted links serving — and silently drops the object's redactFields#13856
        #14171
        Assignees
        os-steve
        Labels
        bugSomething isn't workingdomain:servicespriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
        Description
        @claude
        claude
        bot
        opened on Aug 31, 2026
        Found while implementing #13608 (re-evaluating publicSharing.eligibility at redemption). Adjacent, and deliberately not carried by that card's PR — its ruling scopes the change to the eligibility predicate.
        What the source says
        ShareLinkService.getPolicy() (packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts) returns an EMPTY policy whenever the object's publicSharing block is absent or enabled !== true:
         const raw = schema?.publicSharing;
if (!raw || raw.enabled !== true) {
return { enabled: false, allowedAudiences: [], allowedPermissions: [], redactFields: [] };
}

        resolveToken() then computes the served redaction set as policy.redactFields union the per-link redact_fields. Two consequences for links that were minted while the object WAS opted in, and are redeemed after it was opted out:
        1. The links keep resolving. Nothing in the redemption path reads policy.enabled; the opt-in is a mint-time check only (createLink refuses with SHARING_NOT_ENABLED). So revoking the object-level opt-in does not stop anonymous serving of the tokens already handed out.
        2. The object's default redactions stop applying — the fail-OPEN direction. With enabled:false the policy's redactFields is [], so a link that was serving a record with, say, owner_id stripped starts serving owner_id. Turning the feature OFF makes the endpoint serve MORE data than it did while it was on.
        Read from source on origin/main; stated as a source reading, not as a behavioural measurement — no test was run for it, because the card that surfaced it is scoped elsewhere.
        Why it is a separate card
        #13608's ruling is specifically about the eligibility predicate, and its fix re-evaluates that predicate only. What enabled:false should mean for an already-minted token is a policy question that card did not answer, and there are at least two defensible answers: treat de-opt-in as a standing policy the way eligibility now is (links die), or treat it as an authoring-surface switch that stops NEW mints only (links live, but then item 2 above is still a plain bug and the object's redactFields must keep applying). Item 2 looks wrong under either answer.
        Suggested shape
        Whatever is decided for item 1, item 2 wants the redaction set read from the object's declared block regardless of enabled, so that switching the feature off can never widen what an existing token serves.
        Related: #13608 (the eligibility half, already ruled and implemented).
        Generated by Claude Code
        Generated by Claude Code
        Metadata
        Metadata
        Assignees
        Labels
        bugSomething isn't workingdomain:servicespriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
        Type
        No type
        Projects
        No projects
          Milestone
          No milestone
          Relationships
          None yet
          Development
          No branches or pull requests
          Issue actions
          
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

          Skip to content
          sharing: turning publicSharing off leaves already-minted links serving — and silently drops the object's redactFields #13856
          Closed
          #14171
          Closed
          sharing: turning publicSharing off leaves already-minted links serving — and silently drops the object's redactFields#13856
          #14171
          Assignees
          os-steve
          Labels
          bugSomething isn't workingdomain:servicespriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
          Description
          @claude
          claude
          bot
          opened on Aug 31, 2026
          Found while implementing #13608 (re-evaluating publicSharing.eligibility at redemption). Adjacent, and deliberately not carried by that card's PR — its ruling scopes the change to the eligibility predicate.
          What the source says
          ShareLinkService.getPolicy() (packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts) returns an EMPTY policy whenever the object's publicSharing block is absent or enabled !== true:
           const raw = schema?.publicSharing;
if (!raw || raw.enabled !== true) {
return { enabled: false, allowedAudiences: [], allowedPermissions: [], redactFields: [] };
}

          resolveToken() then computes the served redaction set as policy.redactFields union the per-link redact_fields. Two consequences for links that were minted while the object WAS opted in, and are redeemed after it was opted out:
          1. The links keep resolving. Nothing in the redemption path reads policy.enabled; the opt-in is a mint-time check only (createLink refuses with SHARING_NOT_ENABLED). So revoking the object-level opt-in does not stop anonymous serving of the tokens already handed out.
          2. The object's default redactions stop applying — the fail-OPEN direction. With enabled:false the policy's redactFields is [], so a link that was serving a record with, say, owner_id stripped starts serving owner_id. Turning the feature OFF makes the endpoint serve MORE data than it did while it was on.
          Read from source on origin/main; stated as a source reading, not as a behavioural measurement — no test was run for it, because the card that surfaced it is scoped elsewhere.
          Why it is a separate card
          #13608's ruling is specifically about the eligibility predicate, and its fix re-evaluates that predicate only. What enabled:false should mean for an already-minted token is a policy question that card did not answer, and there are at least two defensible answers: treat de-opt-in as a standing policy the way eligibility now is (links die), or treat it as an authoring-surface switch that stops NEW mints only (links live, but then item 2 above is still a plain bug and the object's redactFields must keep applying). Item 2 looks wrong under either answer.
          Suggested shape
          Whatever is decided for item 1, item 2 wants the redaction set read from the object's declared block regardless of enabled, so that switching the feature off can never widen what an existing token serves.
          Related: #13608 (the eligibility half, already ruled and implemented).
          Generated by Claude Code
          Generated by Claude Code
          Metadata
          Metadata
          Assignees
          Labels
          bugSomething isn't workingdomain:servicespriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
          Type
          No type
          Projects
          No projects
            Milestone
            No milestone
            Relationships
            None yet
            Development
            No branches or pull requests
            Issue actions
            
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

            Skip to content
            sharing: turning publicSharing off leaves already-minted links serving — and silently drops the object's redactFields #13856
            Closed
            #14171
            Closed
            sharing: turning publicSharing off leaves already-minted links serving — and silently drops the object's redactFields#13856
            #14171
            Assignees
            os-steve
            Labels
            bugSomething isn't workingdomain:servicespriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
            Description
            @claude
            claude
            bot
            opened on Aug 31, 2026
            Found while implementing #13608 (re-evaluating publicSharing.eligibility at redemption). Adjacent, and deliberately not carried by that card's PR — its ruling scopes the change to the eligibility predicate.
            What the source says
            ShareLinkService.getPolicy() (packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts) returns an EMPTY policy whenever the object's publicSharing block is absent or enabled !== true:
             const raw = schema?.publicSharing;
if (!raw || raw.enabled !== true) {
return { enabled: false, allowedAudiences: [], allowedPermissions: [], redactFields: [] };
}

            resolveToken() then computes the served redaction set as policy.redactFields union the per-link redact_fields. Two consequences for links that were minted while the object WAS opted in, and are redeemed after it was opted out:
            1. The links keep resolving. Nothing in the redemption path reads policy.enabled; the opt-in is a mint-time check only (createLink refuses with SHARING_NOT_ENABLED). So revoking the object-level opt-in does not stop anonymous serving of the tokens already handed out.
            2. The object's default redactions stop applying — the fail-OPEN direction. With enabled:false the policy's redactFields is [], so a link that was serving a record with, say, owner_id stripped starts serving owner_id. Turning the feature OFF makes the endpoint serve MORE data than it did while it was on.
            Read from source on origin/main; stated as a source reading, not as a behavioural measurement — no test was run for it, because the card that surfaced it is scoped elsewhere.
            Why it is a separate card
            #13608's ruling is specifically about the eligibility predicate, and its fix re-evaluates that predicate only. What enabled:false should mean for an already-minted token is a policy question that card did not answer, and there are at least two defensible answers: treat de-opt-in as a standing policy the way eligibility now is (links die), or treat it as an authoring-surface switch that stops NEW mints only (links live, but then item 2 above is still a plain bug and the object's redactFields must keep applying). Item 2 looks wrong under either answer.
            Suggested shape
            Whatever is decided for item 1, item 2 wants the redaction set read from the object's declared block regardless of enabled, so that switching the feature off can never widen what an existing token serves.
            Related: #13608 (the eligibility half, already ruled and implemented).
            Generated by Claude Code
            Generated by Claude Code
            Metadata
            Metadata
            Assignees
            Labels
            bugSomething isn't workingdomain:servicespriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
            Type
            No type
            Projects
            No projects
              Milestone
              No milestone
              Relationships
              None yet
              Development
              No branches or pull requests
              Issue actions
              
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

              Skip to content
              sharing: turning publicSharing off leaves already-minted links serving — and silently drops the object's redactFields #13856
              Closed
              #14171
              Closed
              sharing: turning publicSharing off leaves already-minted links serving — and silently drops the object's redactFields#13856
              #14171
              Assignees
              os-steve
              Labels
              bugSomething isn't workingdomain:servicespriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
              Description
              @claude
              claude
              bot
              opened on Aug 31, 2026
              Found while implementing #13608 (re-evaluating publicSharing.eligibility at redemption). Adjacent, and deliberately not carried by that card's PR — its ruling scopes the change to the eligibility predicate.
              What the source says
              ShareLinkService.getPolicy() (packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts) returns an EMPTY policy whenever the object's publicSharing block is absent or enabled !== true:
               const raw = schema?.publicSharing;
if (!raw || raw.enabled !== true) {
return { enabled: false, allowedAudiences: [], allowedPermissions: [], redactFields: [] };
}

              resolveToken() then computes the served redaction set as policy.redactFields union the per-link redact_fields. Two consequences for links that were minted while the object WAS opted in, and are redeemed after it was opted out:
              1. The links keep resolving. Nothing in the redemption path reads policy.enabled; the opt-in is a mint-time check only (createLink refuses with SHARING_NOT_ENABLED). So revoking the object-level opt-in does not stop anonymous serving of the tokens already handed out.
              2. The object's default redactions stop applying — the fail-OPEN direction. With enabled:false the policy's redactFields is [], so a link that was serving a record with, say, owner_id stripped starts serving owner_id. Turning the feature OFF makes the endpoint serve MORE data than it did while it was on.
              Read from source on origin/main; stated as a source reading, not as a behavioural measurement — no test was run for it, because the card that surfaced it is scoped elsewhere.
              Why it is a separate card
              #13608's ruling is specifically about the eligibility predicate, and its fix re-evaluates that predicate only. What enabled:false should mean for an already-minted token is a policy question that card did not answer, and there are at least two defensible answers: treat de-opt-in as a standing policy the way eligibility now is (links die), or treat it as an authoring-surface switch that stops NEW mints only (links live, but then item 2 above is still a plain bug and the object's redactFields must keep applying). Item 2 looks wrong under either answer.
              Suggested shape
              Whatever is decided for item 1, item 2 wants the redaction set read from the object's declared block regardless of enabled, so that switching the feature off can never widen what an existing token serves.
              Related: #13608 (the eligibility half, already ruled and implemented).
              Generated by Claude Code
              Generated by Claude Code
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

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                sharing: turning publicSharing off leaves already-minted links serving — and silently drops the object's redactFields #13856
                Closed
                #14171
                Closed
                sharing: turning publicSharing off leaves already-minted links serving — and silently drops the object's redactFields#13856
                #14171
                Assignees
                os-steve
                Labels
                bugSomething isn't workingdomain:servicespriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
                Description
                @claude
                claude
                bot
                opened on Aug 31, 2026
                Found while implementing #13608 (re-evaluating publicSharing.eligibility at redemption). Adjacent, and deliberately not carried by that card's PR — its ruling scopes the change to the eligibility predicate.
                What the source says
                ShareLinkService.getPolicy() (packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts) returns an EMPTY policy whenever the object's publicSharing block is absent or enabled !== true:
                 const raw = schema?.publicSharing;
if (!raw || raw.enabled !== true) {
return { enabled: false, allowedAudiences: [], allowedPermissions: [], redactFields: [] };
}

                resolveToken() then computes the served redaction set as policy.redactFields union the per-link redact_fields. Two consequences for links that were minted while the object WAS opted in, and are redeemed after it was opted out:
                1. The links keep resolving. Nothing in the redemption path reads policy.enabled; the opt-in is a mint-time check only (createLink refuses with SHARING_NOT_ENABLED). So revoking the object-level opt-in does not stop anonymous serving of the tokens already handed out.
                2. The object's default redactions stop applying — the fail-OPEN direction. With enabled:false the policy's redactFields is [], so a link that was serving a record with, say, owner_id stripped starts serving owner_id. Turning the feature OFF makes the endpoint serve MORE data than it did while it was on.
                Read from source on origin/main; stated as a source reading, not as a behavioural measurement — no test was run for it, because the card that surfaced it is scoped elsewhere.
                Why it is a separate card
                #13608's ruling is specifically about the eligibility predicate, and its fix re-evaluates that predicate only. What enabled:false should mean for an already-minted token is a policy question that card did not answer, and there are at least two defensible answers: treat de-opt-in as a standing policy the way eligibility now is (links die), or treat it as an authoring-surface switch that stops NEW mints only (links live, but then item 2 above is still a plain bug and the object's redactFields must keep applying). Item 2 looks wrong under either answer.
                Suggested shape
                Whatever is decided for item 1, item 2 wants the redaction set read from the object's declared block regardless of enabled, so that switching the feature off can never widen what an existing token serves.
                Related: #13608 (the eligibility half, already ruled and implemented).
                Generated by Claude Code
                Generated by Claude Code
                Metadata
                Metadata
                Assignees
                Labels
                bugSomething isn't workingdomain:servicespriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
                Type
                No type
                Projects
                No projects
                  Milestone
                  No milestone
                  Relationships
                  None yet
                  Development
                  No branches or pull requests
                  Issue actions