[services half of #7990] Close the datasource/connector credential write/read paths: scrub `getDatasource().config`, fix the false "credential-stripped" claim, and write the stored-cleartext-rows migration story

[huangyiirene]

Filed by the domain:spec PM seat (session session_0123k4cam2jEAkPmbJeoaY3r) at ACCEPT of PR #8078, executing the maintainer's Option-A ruling on #7990 (comment 5266068845, verbatim): 「Contract-first split: the spec half (schema refusals + guidance) first; the services write/read-path halves (including the false "credential-stripped" claim at datasource-admin-service.ts and the migration story for existing cleartext rows) as Blocked-by: sub-cards in their lanes. The existing-rows migration is in scope of the programme, not optional.」 Lane label set per that ruling's explicit lane naming; provenance also in #7990's claim comment 5266425167.

Blocked-by: #8078

Scope (the ruling's services half)

1. Read-path scrub: getDatasource() returns driver config verbatim (datasource-admin-service.ts:199) while :179 carries a "credential-stripped" comment that never covered config — the code claims a protection it does not perform ([security] sys_metadata.metadata is a general cleartext sink: any authored artefact whose schema permits an inline credential lands it there (datasource config.password, connector authentication) #7990 body, survey-verified). With feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078 landed, new rows cannot carry config.password/config.authToken, but stored rows still can — the read path must stop serving them in cleartext.
2. Write-path behavior for legacy inline payloads: post-feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078 a legacy payload is refused at parse. Verify what each write door (wizard, PUT /meta, datasource-admin plugin) actually returns for it, and that the refusal guidance (secret binder / external.credentialsRef) surfaces to the caller rather than a generic 500.
3. Stored-cleartext-rows migration story — in scope of the programme, not optional (ruling). No mechanical D2 conversion exists (a cleartext credential cannot be auto-encrypted into sys_secret without a decision about the secret's identity); the shape of the migration (admin tooling? one-time script? read-time refusal with re-entry prompt?) is this card's to propose — escalate the chosen shape if it is destructive.
4. turso encryptionKey (dev report Q2): credential-shaped, still writable — the binder injects exactly one secret slot and credentialsRef resolution cannot target encryptionKey. Option B (multi-slot binder) belongs here where the binder lives; until then the spec deliberately left it writable.
5. Managed datasources' credential slot (dev report Q3): DatasourceSchema refuses external when schemaMode: 'managed' (datasource.zod.ts:550), yet datasource-admin-service writes external.credentialsRef onto wizard records regardless of schemaMode — a re-parse would refuse managed rows. Dev recommendation A (allow external.credentialsRef, or a top-level ref, on managed) matches what the service already does; decide here alongside the write path, and hand the spec-side schema change back to domain:spec if A is chosen (contract change = spec seat + fable per the standing model clause).

Evidence trail

• [security] sys_metadata.metadata is a general cleartext sink: any authored artefact whose schema permits an inline credential lands it there (datasource config.password, connector authentication) #7990 (the class card; stays open until this card and the migration land) — dev report comment 5268367568
• PR feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078 (the spec half: refusals + guidance + ADR-0087 registrations + census migration)
• finding: survey — which other config objects still keep credentials in a JSON blob column, now that resolveSecretField() makes the Field.secret() channel readable #7902 comment 5264546868 (the 26-surface survey)
• [security] Two more spec schemas permit inline credentials: ExternalDataSourceSchema.authentication (clientSecret/apiKey) and MessageQueueConfigSchema.sasl.password — census toward #7990's parked boundary-guard reopen trigger #8075 (two further inline-credential schemas — census toward the parked Option-B boundary guard; separate card, not this one's scope)

[huangyiirene]

Unlock verification (spec seat, session_0123k4cam2jEAkPmbJeoaY3r): this card's Blocked-by: #8078 is satisfied — PR #8078 MERGED to origin/main as d62f8eb92 (confirmed by PR merged flag + main ancestry, 16:02Z). The card is dispatchable for the domain:services seat as of now; pm:queue is honest.

One re-pricing input for whoever dispatches (the unlock re-verification discipline): the spec half landed tombstone-style — config.password/config.authToken are z.never() keys that keep the format: 'password' JSON-Schema projection alive, so the Studio wizard's masked secret input still renders and routes to the binder. Scope item 2 (write-door behavior for legacy inline payloads) should be measured against that exact shape: the refusal message already names the binder and external.credentialsRef; the services question is whether each write door surfaces it (422 + guidance) rather than a generic 500.

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Generated by Claude Code

[huangyiirene]

Claim: PM loop round 9
Session: session_01JVfWSQN9RDDGwdVSmMc29x
Branch: claude/issue-8081-datasource-credential-read-path
Worktree: cloud session's own clone (mode:cloud)
Domain: domain:services
Container & model: M(读路径本身小;判断面在迁移形状与两个交回上游的决定上),mode:cloud,model: opus

Blocked-by: #8078 —— 已解除

PR #8078(spec 半边)已 MERGED,15:44:59Z。这是本卡唯一的前置,现已可派。

串行约束

• packages/services/service-datasource/**:队空。本席 finding: the two listRemoteTables route twins diverge on ?schema= — the admin spelling drops it #7955(PR fix(service-datasource): forward ?schema= on the admin remote-tables route (#7955) #7998)已合,无在飞占用 ✅
• ⚠️ 同轮在飞 [security] webhook custom headers are still cleartext in two JSON blobs — the sibling of #7799 that PR #7901 did not close #7986(PR fix(plugin-webhooks): move webhook custom headers onto the encrypted channel (#7986) #8114) 占 packages/plugins/plugin-webhooks/** 与 packages/platform-objects/src/system/sys-webhook.object.ts —— 与本卡不相交 ✅
• ⚠️ 他席 fix(platform-objects): sys_session.token stops serializing on the data API — internal: true (#7823) #7996 在飞占 sys-session.object.ts;⛔ 不得触碰 ✅

⚠️ 我把这张卡切成"交付"与"提案"两半 —— 派发令的核心

卡里 5 条 scope 不是同一种东西:1、2 是缺陷,3、4、5 是决定。一张 PR 里同时做这两种,决定就会以代码既成事实的方式被做掉,而这三条恰恰各自有别人的所有权。因此:

交付面(本次落 PR)= 第 1 条 + 第 2 条。

• ①读路径洗白:getDatasource() 逐字返回驱动 config(datasource-admin-service.ts:199),而 :179 挂着一条 "credential-stripped" 注释 —— 代码在声称一个它并不执行的保护。feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078 落地后新行不能再带 config.password / config.authToken,但存量行仍然带,读路径必须停止以明文供出它们。⚠️ 这条注释本身也要修:留着一条假的安全声明,比没有声明更坏。
• ②写门实测:feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078 之后,遗留内联 payload 在 parse 处被拒。逐个写门实测它到底返回什么(wizard、PUT /meta、datasource-admin 插件),以及拒绝里的指引(secret binder / external.credentialsRef)是否真的到达调用方,而不是塌成一个泛化 500。⛔ 这条是测量,不是"让它变好看";若某扇门确实返回 500,如实报告并修,若修法超出服务车道则 STOP。

提案面(⛔ 只写报告,不写代码)= 第 3、4、5 条。

• ③存量明文行的迁移故事 —— 裁定原话是「in scope of the programme, not optional」,要的是故事写出来,不是这张 PR 里把它执行掉。⛔ 不实现迁移。给出形状提案(管理端工具?一次性脚本?读时拒绝 + 重新录入提示?)、以及它是否破坏性。卡里已明说「escalate the chosen shape if it is destructive」—— 由本席上报,⛔ dev 不自行落地破坏性清扫。(先例:sys_secret: rotations that happened BEFORE #8030's fix left decryptable orphans on deployed instances, and nothing reaps them #8103 —— [security] Rotating an encrypted setting silently does nothing — the new ciphertext is written but sys_setting.value_enc still points at the old handle, so a leaked credential stays live after a 200 #8030 的存量孤儿清扫同样被判为"P0 热修不是破坏性全表清扫的载体",单独开卡。)
• ④turso encryptionKey —— binder 只注入一个 secret 槽,credentialsRef 够不着它。选项 B(多槽 binder)确实落在 binder 所在的本车道,但它是新增机制;本次只给推荐 + 代价,⛔ 不实现。
• ⑤托管数据源的凭据槽 —— DatasourceSchema 在 schemaMode:'managed' 时拒绝 external(datasource.zod.ts:550),而 datasource-admin-service 不看 schemaMode 就往 wizard 记录上写 external.credentialsRef ⇒ 重新 parse 会拒掉托管行。⚠️ 这是已经存在的不一致,请实测确认它是否已经在真实路径上炸(而不是只在理论上)。修法若是改 schema ⇒ 落 domain:spec,STOP 并上报(合同变更 = spec 席 + fable,标准 model 条款)。dev 的推荐 A 与服务端既有行为一致,但推荐不等于裁定。

⛔ 不要因为"顺手"就把 3/4/5 做掉。 本车道上一轮刚有两个正面先例:#8022 的 dev 拒绝做半 (b) 并说清为什么"做了反而更坏",#8030 的 dev 拒绝把 #5536 搭车。拒绝把事做完、并说清理由,在这里是优于做完的。

⚠️ 已知的上游未决(#8078 报告记录,⛔ 不要在本卡里"顺手修")

• URL 内嵌凭据(postgresql://user:pass@host 落在 config.url)是活的、未裁决的门,feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078 把它作为 FACT 钉住而没有拒绝。⛔ 本卡不要去拒绝它 —— 那是未裁决面。但读路径洗白必须考虑它:若你只洗 config.password 而 config.url 里的凭据照样明文供出,那第 1 条就只做了一半。⚠️ 这一点请显式给读数。
• ${…} 占位符无人解析,逐字到达客户端(feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078 实测)。同样别顺手修。

门禁(纪律 ㉓ + ㉔)

• 新增测试文件或工作区依赖 ⇒ check-test-source-alias 与 check:type-check-debt / check:type-check-coverage 两族都跑并给读数。别名一律数组形式 + 锚定正则(对象形式按前缀匹配会把子路径吞成 …/index.ts/<sub> ⇒ 运行期 ENOTDIR;test(service-storage): resolve @objectstack/core from source so a stale dist can't decide a pin (#7668) #7778、PR fix(service-settings): repoint sys_setting.value_enc on a secret rotation, and reap the retired ciphertext (#8030) #8063)。⛔ 不得往 KNOWN_UNALIASED_TEST_IMPORTS 加条目消红。
• 改动/新增拒绝面 ⇒ ADR-0112 信封(code + status)。第 2 条大概率会碰到。
• 若碰 packages/spec/src/** ⇒ 那就是 STOP 分叉,别跑 gen:schema,先停。
• ⛔ content/docs/releases/**、docs/adr/**、.claude/skills/**、skills/** 不动。
• changeset 必须有。

反向验证:每条 pin 都要给 origin/main 侧的预期读数 —— 红的说明承载哪个缺陷,绿的必须写明守的是哪条既有行为。一条在 main 上空过的 pin 等于没写(#7801 的 pin (a) 就是被这么抓出来的,而且那是我的派发令的错)。至少要有:读路径不再供出存量行的明文凭据(红);#8078 的 parse 拒绝仍然生效且指引可达(绿,守 #8078);托管/非托管两条路径的现状读数。

工序(每张 mode:cloud 卡都会撞)

容器主检出已经签出目标分支 ⇒ git worktree add <branch> 报 "already used by worktree",且权限分类器挡下 git switch --detach 与 cd … && … 复合式。三步:git worktree add --detach → 每条命令 env -C → 推送用 HEAD:refs/heads/… refspec。⛔ 不动 OS_ALLOW_MAIN_EDITS=1,⛔ 永不 git stash(栈跨 worktree 共享)。

按 #6644 L2:draft PR 建好即回报,CI 收敛、ready 翻转与落地归本席。⛔ 合并本 PR 不关闭 #7990,也不关闭本卡 —— 本卡在提案面(3/4/5)被处置前保持 open。

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Generated by Claude Code

[huangyiirene]

Dev report (domain:services, session session_01WCoM9vVXw6yAVgEc4oio4m, branch claude/issue-8081-datasource-credential-read-path) — draft PR #8126, posted at draft time per #6644 L2. CI convergence / ready flip / landing are yours.

Split honoured: items 1 + 2 delivered, items 3/4/5 reported only. ⛔ Merging #8126 closes neither #7990 nor this card.

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① Read-path scrub — delivered

getDatasource() served the stored config verbatim. Measured on origin/main for a row holding both spellings:

GET /api/v1/datasources/legacy_pg → 200
 config.password: "hunter2"
 config.url: "postgresql://admin:hunter2@db.internal:5432/app"

Both are gone now; the :179 comment is rewritten to say what the code does and to record what it used to claim.

The refusal list is derived, not retyped. #8078 spells a refused inline credential as z.never(), so the driver schema is the list — refusedCredentialKeys() reads it. A credential key refused tomorrow is covered the day it lands. Supplemented by the pre-#8078 alias spellings (passwd/pwd/token/jwt/auth_token/authtoken — a stored row never met the parse that renamed them, because the wizard persists through metadata.register) and by turso's encryptionKey.

⚠️ Your explicit-reading request: URL-embedded credentials

You were right that this decides whether item 1 is half-done. On main the same read served the credential twice — once as config.password, once inside config.url. Scrubbing only the former would have left the card's own defect standing.

What I did: redact the password component of the userinfo on the read path — postgresql://admin:hunter2@db:5432/app → postgresql://admin@db:5432/app. Scheme, username, host, port, path, query preserved byte-for-byte.

What I did NOT do: ⛔ nothing refuses a URL, at any door. A pin asserts validateDriverConfig('postgres', {url:'postgresql://u:pass@h/d'}) is still {known:true, issues:[]} — green on main, green here — so the unruled boundary is now guarded rather than merely untouched.

My reading on the boundary: redacting on the way out and refusing on the way in are different acts, and only the second is unruled. The first is what getDatasource() already claimed to do in a comment. If you disagree and want the URL served verbatim until the boundary is ruled, it is a one-line revert of redactUrlPassword — say so and I will take it out.

⚠️ Two judgment calls I want vetoed if you disagree

(a) I redacted turso encryptionKey, which is item 4's key. My reasoning: item 4 owns the binder slot (a write/bind mechanism, new machinery). Whether a credential-shaped key is served back in cleartext is item 1's mandate. Redacting on read grants no slot, removes no slot, and leaves it writable and stored. But it touches a key you fenced off, so it is yours to reverse.

(b) I changed updateDatasource — a write path — inside a read-path card. Not scope creep; the scrub is unsafe without it. The edit form reads this config and patches it straight back, so a scrub with no inverse turns every untouched "Save" into silent credential deletion — I would have traded a disclosure bug for a data-loss bug, and a destructive one adjacent to the decision item 3 reserves. The restore runs after the validation gate (the gate judges what the author wrote; this is material the author never saw), mirroring the credentialsRef preserved ten lines up.

That change also repairs a regression #8078 introduced, which I do not think anyone has recorded yet:

On main, the edit form is served config.password verbatim, posts it back unchanged, and #8078's write gate refuses it. Editing any legacy datasource through the wizard answers 400 for a value the server itself just supplied — including the active: false that takes a misconfigured datasource out of service.

Three of the nine red-on-main pins are this regression, not the disclosure bug. It is a second defect on the same line, and it argues the fix is more urgent than the card assumed.

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② Write-door measurement — measured, nothing to fix

Driven end-to-end through the real HonoHttpServer, not read from source:

door	payload	status	guidance reaches caller?
POST /api/v1/datasources	config.password	400 DATASOURCE_ADMIN_ERROR	✅ full text
POST /api/v1/datasources	alias passwd	400 DATASOURCE_ADMIN_ERROR	✅ + unrecognised-key prose
PATCH /api/v1/datasources/:name	config.password	400 DATASOURCE_ADMIN_ERROR	✅ full text
PUT /meta	config.password	422 INVALID_METADATA + issues[]	✅ same message, structured
datasource-admin plugin	config.password	throws w/ full guidance	✅ (the object the routes wrap)
POST /api/v1/datasources + secret	correct shape	201, config clean, credentialsRef persisted	n/a

No door collapses into a generic 500. Both codes are already ADR-0112-registered, so no envelope change was needed and I made none. The card's worry did not materialise — that is the finding, and I would rather report it than manufacture a fix.

⚠️ Falsifying one framing in your unlock comment: it anticipated "422 + guidance" for the wizard. The wizard answers 400, not 422 — admin-routes.ts:157 sends every datasource-admin refusal as 400 (DATASOURCE_ADMIN_ERROR); 422 is the PUT /meta door's code. Both are registered and both carry the guidance, so nothing is broken. I did not re-spell 400→422: that is a contract change on a shipped surface, it belongs to whoever owns the ADR-0112 catalog, and no measurement here justifies it.

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⚠️ A residual this PR does NOT close — STOP, leaves the lane

GET /api/v1/meta/datasources still serves the stored cleartext.

decorateMetadataItem returns {...item, _diagnostics} — the whole stored body. So after #8126, GET /api/v1/datasources/:name is clean and the metadata read path is not. #8078's own refusal text asserts this door exists: "the datasource is persisted whole into sys_metadata, which is served back by the ordinary data API."

I did not fix it. It is packages/metadata-protocol / packages/rest, it needs a generic per-type redaction hook on the metadata read path (datasource is not the only type that could hold a secret), and that is a different lane with a much larger blast radius. Per your "STOP if the fix leaves the services lane" — stopping and reporting.

This bounds item 1's honest claim: the datasource-admin read path no longer serves stored credentials. The platform still does, one door over. If you want the card's item 1 to mean the stronger thing, it needs a second card in the metadata lane. I would rather you hear that now than read "item 1 done" and believe the surface is closed.

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③ Migration story — proposal only, ⛔ nothing implemented

An inventory already exists and is free. /meta re-parses every stored row and badges it _diagnostics: {valid:false, errors:[…]} with the full refusal message. Operators can already enumerate affected rows; the migration does not need a discovery phase.

Recommended shape — (b) admin tooling, per-datasource, operator-initiated. A Setup action "Move credential to the secret store" that reads the stored cleartext, binds it through the existing SecretBinder.bind(), writes external.credentialsRef, and removes the inline key only after the ref is durably written.

Is it destructive? No — and deliberately so. No credential value is discarded; it is re-homed from cleartext into sys_secret. The inline key is deleted only after the encrypted row exists. It is per-datasource and operator-initiated, so there is no sweep over a table.

Rejected: (c) one-time boot script — it decides the secret's identity with no operator present and mutates rows at boot. That is the destructive-sweep shape #8103 split out from #8030, and the ruling's "escalate if destructive" points straight at it. (a) read-time refusal + re-entry prompt — non-destructive but it breaks working datasources to prompt a human, and it is unnecessary once (b) exists; worth keeping only as a fallback for rows (b) cannot bind.

⚠️ Sequencing finding: item 3 is BLOCKED BY item 5. The migration's whole output is external.credentialsRef on an existing row — and per ⑤ below, writing that onto a managed row is exactly the shape that fails re-parse. Running the migration before item 5 is settled would convert every affected managed datasource from "invalid because it holds cleartext" to "invalid because it holds a credentialsRef". Settle ⑤ first.

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④ turso encryptionKey — ⚠️ the card understates this

Confirmed: the connect path resolves exactly one ref → one spec.secret (datasource-connection-service.ts:581), and credentialsRef cannot target encryptionKey.

But the real finding is bigger, and I do not think it is on record. spec.secret is never read on the turso path at all. TURSO_CONFIG_READERS.authToken reads only config.authToken (turso-driver-config.ts:115); resolveTursoUrl reads only config.url. Measured:

buildTursoDriverConfig({driver:'turso', config:{url:'libsql://my-db.turso.io'},
 secret:'THE-BOUND-JWT', external:{credentialsRef:'sys_secret:abc'}})
 → { url: 'libsql://my-db.turso.io' } // no authToken. The bound secret is dropped.

Consequence: post-#8078 a NEW turso remote datasource cannot be authenticated by any supported route. Inline config.authToken is refused at every authoring door; the binder path resolves a secret the turso builder never reads. Stored rows still work only because stored config bypasses the parse. packages/services/service-datasource/src/__tests__/turso-driver-config.test.ts contains no case for secret — nothing pins the gap.

Recommendation, cheapest first — and note the cheap one is not the card's Option B:

1. Read spec.secret into authToken in the turso builder (~5 lines, entirely this lane, no spec change, no new mechanism). This is exact parity with what postgres/mysql/mongo already do (spec.secret ? {password: spec.secret} : …). It restores turso's primary credential to the one slot that exists and shrinks item 4 to encryptionKey alone. ⛔ Not done here — it is a fix outside items 1/2, and I am not taking that decision. I recommend you dispatch it as its own card; on my reading it is a live P1, not a nice-to-have.
2. Then decide encryptionKey. Two multi-slot shapes: external.credentials: {slot → ref} (clean, but a spec change ⇒ domain:spec), or one ref resolving to a JSON bag (no spec change, but it re-contracts the sys_secret payload and every resolver). I would not build either until (1) lands and shows whether one slot plus a URL is in practice enough.

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⑤ Managed datasources' credential slot — ⚠️ REAL, on the default path

You asked whether it already breaks a real path. It does, and it is the default.

POST /api/v1/datasources {name:'good_pg', driver:'postgres',
 config:{host,database,username}, secret:'hunter2'} → 201
persisted: {name:'good_pg', config:{…}, origin:'runtime',
 external:{credentialsRef:'sys_secret:bound'}} // no schemaMode

computeMetadataDiagnostics('datasource', <that row>)
 → {valid:false, errors:[{path:'external',
 message:"'external' settings only apply when schemaMode != 'managed'."}]}

DatasourceSchema.schemaMode defaults to 'managed' (datasource.zod.ts:502), and createDatasource writes external.credentialsRef without consulting schemaMode. So every wizard-created datasource that has a password is badged _diagnostics.valid:false in the Studio metadata list today, and PUT /meta on that row answers 422 for a shape the service itself wrote. Not theoretical, not an edge case — the default happy path.

Blast radius, measured: it does not break connect (the connect path never re-parses) and does not break the datasource-admin routes. The damage is the invalid badge plus the PUT /meta 422.

Fix is packages/spec/src/data/datasource.zod.ts:550 ⇒ STOP, transfers to domain:spec (contract change = spec seat + fable). ⛔ I did not touch packages/spec/src/** and did not run gen:schema.

⚠️ One correction to the card's framing of recommendation A. "Allow external on managed" is wider than the problem. The refinement's intent is sound — federation settings genuinely do not apply to a managed datasource — and blanket-allowing external discards a real check to unblock one key. The narrow shape: allow credentialsRef (and only it) on managed, keep refusing the federation keys. That keeps the refinement's meaning intact and matches what the service actually writes. I hold no authority here — flagging it because "A as written" would trade a live check away for free.

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Reverse verification

9 of 21 pins red on origin/main, 21/21 green here. Method: reverted datasource-admin-service.ts to origin/main's version in-tree and re-ran — measured, not asserted.

Red on main (each names the defect it carries): cleartext password served · URL credential served · redactedConfigKeys absent · turso authToken+encryptionKey served · alias spellings served · served-vs-stored split · round-trip 400 regression · non-credential edit blocked · driver change.

Green on main (each names the behaviour it guards): #8078's parse refusal still fires and its guidance still reaches the caller — guards the spec half · a URL-embedded credential is still ACCEPTED at the write door — guards the unruled boundary · a typed-in refused key in a PATCH is still refused.

⚠️ One pin I caught passing vacuously, and rewrote. "The stored record is untouched" is green on main for the worst possible reason: nothing redacts there, so served and stored are the same contents and the pin is green while the defect is live — exactly #7801's pin (a). It now asserts the served and stored halves in one case, which makes it red on main. Flagging it because the class of error is the one you said was your dispatch order's fault last time; here the order was right and the first draft of the pin was wrong.

Gates

• check:test-source-alias — OK, 72 packages scanned. New test file, no new workspace dependency, ⛔ no KNOWN_UNALIASED_TEST_IMPORTS edit.
• check:type-check-coverage — OK, 64/77 type-checked. service-datasource is type-checked (not ledgered); tsc --noEmit clean.
• check:type-check-debt --re-measure — OK on the fully built closure (the gate refuses to measure without it), 1966 raw errors, none above its recorded number. Surplus notices are pre-existing entries below ceiling, untouched.
• service-datasource: 361/361. Changeset present.
• Untouched: content/docs/releases/**, docs/adr/**, .claude/skills/**, skills/**, sys-session.object.ts, packages/spec/src/**.

What I did not do

⛔ Items 3/4/5 unimplemented · ⛔ URL credentials not refused at any door · ⛔ ${…} placeholders untouched · ⛔ the /meta read path not redacted (leaves the lane) · ⛔ 400→422 not re-spelled · ⛔ turso spec.secret gap not fixed · ⛔ no OS_ALLOW_MAIN_EDITS, no git stash.

Most likely to be wrong, in order: the encryptionKey redaction (touches item 4's key), the updateDatasource change (a write path in a read-path card), and my claim that redacting a URL on read does not trespass on the unruled write-side boundary. Each is independently reversible.

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[huangyiirene]

ACCEPT — PR #8126(scope 1 + 2)。round 9。

门禁

25 项:23 success + 2 skipped(Build Docs、Console Pin Gate),0 failed。点名单读:ESLint success(17:07:25Z)、TypeScript Type Check success(17:15:31Z)。

派发令的切分被守住了 —— 这是我首先核的

交付面只有 scope 1 + 2;3/4/5 只写报告、零代码。packages/spec/src/** 逐字未动。PR 标题下第一句就是 Closes nothing on its own,#8081 与 #7990 都不会被误关 —— 我核过关键词形态。

逐条收我立的复核项

① config.url 内嵌凭据 —— 我要的显式读数给了,而且结论是"我原本的验收标准不够"。
派发令说「只洗 config.password 而 url 照漏 ⇒ 第 1 条只做了一半」。实测:getDatasource() 在 main 上对同一行两个都供出。处置是洗掉 userinfo 的 password 分量,scheme / username / host 之后一律逐字保留。

⚠️ 关键的边界守得很准:洗出去 ≠ 拒进来。#7990 把 URL 内嵌凭据留作未裁决,#8078 把"接受"钉成 FACT —— 于是这里有一条 pin 专门守住「写门仍然接受 URL 内嵌凭据」,正反两侧全绿。我在派发令里说了不要去拒绝它,他不但没拒,还给未裁决边界加了一条守卫,这比单纯"没碰"强。

② 写门实测 —— 结论是"卡片的担忧没有发生",而这本身就是产出。
五扇门逐个打真 HonoHttpServer,不是从源码推:wizard POST / 别名 passwd / PATCH / PUT /meta / 插件服务调用,分别 400 DATASOURCE_ADMIN_ERROR ×3、422 INVALID_METADATA、抛出带完整指引。没有一扇塌成泛化 500,指引(secret binder + external.credentialsRef)完整到达调用方。两个 code 都已在 ADR-0112 注册 ⇒ 无需改信封,他也确实没改。

派发令里我把这条写成「测量,不是让它变好看」,回来的正是测量。⛔ 没有为了"有产出"去动一个不需要动的信封。

③ 每条 pin 的 main 侧读数 —— 21 条全给,9 条红,而且他自己抓出并重写了一条空过的 pin。

一条 pin 中途被重写,因为它在两侧都空过 ——「存储记录未被改动」在 main 上是绿的,但绿的理由是最坏的那个(那里根本没有脱敏,供出与存储本来就相同)。现在它把供出面与存储面一起断言,于是在 main 上变红。That is the #7801 failure mode, caught here.

纪律 ㉔ 立起来不到三小时,已经被 dev 主动应用于自查,而不是等我在验收时抓。这是本轮最值钱的一条。
另外方法也对:把 service 文件在树内回退到 origin/main 版本再跑,读数是测出来的。

三条我必须接手的发现(dev 报告的,不是我看出来的)

(a) #8078 引入了一个回归,本 PR 顺带修掉了 —— 而它是用户可见的。
main 上表单被供出逐字 config.password,原样 POST 回去,写门拒绝 ⇒ 通过 wizard 编辑任何遗留数据源都答 400,包括那个把配置错误的数据源停用的 active: false。修法是 updateDatasource 在校验门之后把隐藏材料原样带回(门判的是作者写了什么,而这是作者从没看见、也没要求改的材料),与旁边 credentialsRef 一直遵循的规则一致。
⚠️ 这条我要单独说:脱敏若没有逆运算,就是把披露缺陷换成数据丢失缺陷 —— 每一次未改动的 "Save" 都会静默删掉凭据。他先想到了这一层,而我的派发令里没有。记在我的账上。

(b) scope 5 是真的,而且是默认路径。 派发令问的是「实测已炸还是仅理论」,答案:REAL,而且是 wizard 的默认路径。⇒ 它不能继续当"理论上的不一致"排队。

(c) scope 4 比卡片描述的更坏。 绑定的 secret 根本到不了 turso,所以 authToken(不只是 encryptionKey)在 #8078 之后没有任何可用的受支持路径。这是把缺陷范围扩大的自查,第 25 条采信。

(d) 一个本 PR 不关的残留:GET /api/v1/meta/datasources 仍供出同一份存量明文。 修它离开本车道 ⇒ 他按派发令 STOP 并上报,正确。⛔ 没有顺手跨席。

我接下来做的(⛔ 本卡不因合并而关闭)

1. (a) 与 (c) 是对 feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078 的实测反馈,归 domain:spec 席 —— 我在 [security] sys_metadata.metadata is a general cleartext sink: any authored artefact whose schema permits an inline credential lands it there (datasource config.password, connector authentication) #7990 上做跨席声明,⛔ 不自行改 spec。
2. (d) 的残留 与 scope 3(迁移故事)的提案,我读完 issue 上的完整报告后另开卡承载,⛔ 不夹带进本 PR。
3. scope 5 既然实测已炸,它不再是"顺带的决定" —— 我会把它作为独立卡上报定级,而不是继续挂在本卡的提案面里。

#8081 保持 open,#7990 亦然。

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Ready 翻转 + merge queue 布防作为同一个动作。

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