docs(plugin-security): correct the managed-write-denies docblock on member_default#14028

New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Merged
os-steve merged 1 commit into from
Sep 1, 2026
Merged

docs(plugin-security): correct the managed-write-denies docblock on member_default #14028

Changes from all commits
Commits
Show all changes
1 commit
Select commit
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension
Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
44 changes: 30 additions & 14 deletions packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/managed-object-write-denies.ts
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -4,10 +4,22 @@
* ADR-0092 / ADR-0103 — registry-driven managed-object write denies for the
* default permission sets.
*
* The default write-granting permission sets (`organization_admin`,
* `member_default`, `viewer_readonly`, and the MCP write set) grant CRUD via a
* `'*'` wildcard, then DENY writes on the better-auth-managed identity tables so
* mutations must flow through the auth pipeline (ADR-0092). That deny-list was a
* The default sets this module targets (`organization_admin`, `member_default`,
* `viewer_readonly`, and the MCP write set) DENY writes on the
* better-auth-managed identity tables so mutations must flow through the auth
* pipeline (ADR-0092). What that entry narrows differs per set, and the
* difference is load-bearing for the rest of this file: `organization_admin` and
* the MCP write set grant CRUD through an `objects['*']` wildcard, so their
* managed-table entries are a narrowing overlay; `viewer_readonly`'s wildcard is
* read-only, so its entries are belt-and-suspenders over a wildcard that already
* denies; and `member_default` carries NO wildcard at all since #5491 (the
* additive `everyone` baseline merges most-permissively, so a wildcard there was
* a floor no app could get under — maintainer ruling 2026-08-07: the baseline
* narrows to explicit-allow, and a wildcard is not to be reintroduced here in
* any form). Its access is exactly the objects it NAMES, so a managed-table
* entry in that set is the read grant itself rather than a narrowing of
* anything — which is what keeps `/auth/me`, the org switcher and the Account
* app working for a member with no application profile. That deny-list was a
* hand-maintained object-name array (`BETTER_AUTH_MANAGED_OBJECTS` in
* `default-permission-sets.ts`) — precisely the drift ADR-0092 forbids, and it
* HAD drifted (the static list missed schemas that later declared
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -36,11 +48,12 @@
*
* ── Deliberately NOT covered: engine-owned system / append-only objects ──
* ADR-0103's engine-owned objects (`sys_audit_log`, `sys_automation_run`, …)
* are also wildcard-granted in these sets, but we do NOT inject deny entries for
* them: a per-object entry FULLY OVERRIDES the wildcard (lookup, not merge — see
* `default-permission-sets.ts`), so injecting `{ allowRead: true, ...writes:false }`
* would silently drop the wildcard's `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords` — a
* read-side narrowing. Their user-context writes are already rejected at the
* are also reached by the wildcard in the target sets that carry one, but we do
* NOT inject deny entries for them: a per-object entry FULLY OVERRIDES the
* wildcard (lookup, not merge — see `default-permission-sets.ts`), so injecting
* `{ allowRead: true, ...writes:false }` would silently drop
* `organization_admin`'s `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords` — a read-side
* narrowing. Their user-context writes are already rejected at the
* engine by `assertEngineOwnedWriteAllowed` (ADR-0103) and reflected in the
* `/me/permissions` clamp, so the permission-set layer needs no change for them.
*/
Expand All@@ -62,11 +75,14 @@ export const MANAGED_DENY_ENTRY = {
};

/**
* The default sets whose `'*'` wildcard grants writes and therefore must carry
* the managed-table denies. Explicit allowlist — `admin_full_access` is
* deliberately excluded (it keeps its unqualified wildcard so an admin can
* rescue data directly; the runtime guards are its boundary), as are the MCP
* read / restricted sets (they grant no writes).
* The default sets that must carry an explicit entry for every managed table.
* Membership is NOT "holds a write-granting `'*'` wildcard" — only
* `organization_admin` and the MCP write set hold one; `viewer_readonly`'s
* wildcard is read-only and `member_default` has held none since #5491 (see the
* module docblock for what the injected entry does in each). Explicit allowlist
* — `admin_full_access` is deliberately excluded (it keeps its unqualified
* wildcard so an admin can rescue data directly; the runtime guards are its
* boundary), as are the MCP read / restricted sets (they grant no writes).
*/
export const MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS: readonly string[] = [
'organization_admin',
Expand Down
Loading
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
 blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

Skip to content
docs(plugin-security): correct the managed-write-denies docblock on member_default#14028

New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

 Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and
privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub?
Sign in
to your account

 Merged

os-steve
merged 1 commit into

from

Sep 1, 2026
 Merged


docs(plugin-security): correct the managed-write-denies docblock on member_default
#14028
 Changes from all commits
Commits

Show all changes


1 commit


Select commit


File filter

Filter by extension
Filter by extension
Conversations

Failed to load comments. 
Loading
Jump to

Jump to file


Failed to load files. 
Loading
 Diff view

 Diff view


44 changes: 30 additions & 14 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/managed-object-write-denies.ts

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -4,10 +4,22 @@
 * ADR-0092 / ADR-0103 — registry-driven managed-object write denies for the
 * default permission sets.
 *
 * The default write-granting permission sets (`organization_admin`,
 * `member_default`, `viewer_readonly`, and the MCP write set) grant CRUD via a
 * `'*'` wildcard, then DENY writes on the better-auth-managed identity tables so
 * mutations must flow through the auth pipeline (ADR-0092). That deny-list was a
 * The default sets this module targets (`organization_admin`, `member_default`,
 * `viewer_readonly`, and the MCP write set) DENY writes on the
 * better-auth-managed identity tables so mutations must flow through the auth
 * pipeline (ADR-0092). What that entry narrows differs per set, and the
 * difference is load-bearing for the rest of this file: `organization_admin` and
 * the MCP write set grant CRUD through an `objects['*']` wildcard, so their
 * managed-table entries are a narrowing overlay; `viewer_readonly`'s wildcard is
 * read-only, so its entries are belt-and-suspenders over a wildcard that already
 * denies; and `member_default` carries NO wildcard at all since #5491 (the
 * additive `everyone` baseline merges most-permissively, so a wildcard there was
 * a floor no app could get under — maintainer ruling 2026-08-07: the baseline
 * narrows to explicit-allow, and a wildcard is not to be reintroduced here in
 * any form). Its access is exactly the objects it NAMES, so a managed-table
 * entry in that set is the read grant itself rather than a narrowing of
 * anything — which is what keeps `/auth/me`, the org switcher and the Account
 * app working for a member with no application profile. That deny-list was a
 * hand-maintained object-name array (`BETTER_AUTH_MANAGED_OBJECTS` in
 * `default-permission-sets.ts`) — precisely the drift ADR-0092 forbids, and it
 * HAD drifted (the static list missed schemas that later declared
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -36,11 +48,12 @@
 *
 * ── Deliberately NOT covered: engine-owned system / append-only objects ──
 * ADR-0103's engine-owned objects (`sys_audit_log`, `sys_automation_run`, …)
 * are also wildcard-granted in these sets, but we do NOT inject deny entries for
 * them: a per-object entry FULLY OVERRIDES the wildcard (lookup, not merge — see
 * `default-permission-sets.ts`), so injecting `{ allowRead: true, ...writes:false }`
 * would silently drop the wildcard's `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords` — a
 * read-side narrowing. Their user-context writes are already rejected at the
 * are also reached by the wildcard in the target sets that carry one, but we do
 * NOT inject deny entries for them: a per-object entry FULLY OVERRIDES the
 * wildcard (lookup, not merge — see `default-permission-sets.ts`), so injecting
 * `{ allowRead: true, ...writes:false }` would silently drop
 * `organization_admin`'s `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords` — a read-side
 * narrowing. Their user-context writes are already rejected at the
 * engine by `assertEngineOwnedWriteAllowed` (ADR-0103) and reflected in the
 * `/me/permissions` clamp, so the permission-set layer needs no change for them.
 */
Expand All@@ -62,11 +75,14 @@ export const MANAGED_DENY_ENTRY = {
};

/**
 * The default sets whose `'*'` wildcard grants writes and therefore must carry
 * the managed-table denies. Explicit allowlist — `admin_full_access` is
 * deliberately excluded (it keeps its unqualified wildcard so an admin can
 * rescue data directly; the runtime guards are its boundary), as are the MCP
 * read / restricted sets (they grant no writes).
 * The default sets that must carry an explicit entry for every managed table.
 * Membership is NOT "holds a write-granting `'*'` wildcard" — only
 * `organization_admin` and the MCP write set hold one; `viewer_readonly`'s
 * wildcard is read-only and `member_default` has held none since #5491 (see the
 * module docblock for what the injected entry does in each). Explicit allowlist
 * — `admin_full_access` is deliberately excluded (it keeps its unqualified
 * wildcard so an admin can rescue data directly; the runtime guards are its
 * boundary), as are the MCP read / restricted sets (they grant no writes).
 */
export const MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS: readonly string[] = [
 'organization_admin',
Expand Down
Loading

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
docs(plugin-security): correct the managed-write-denies docblock on member_default#14028

New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

 Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and
privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub?
Sign in
to your account

 Merged

os-steve
merged 1 commit into

from

Sep 1, 2026
 Merged


docs(plugin-security): correct the managed-write-denies docblock on member_default
#14028
 Changes from all commits
Commits

Show all changes


1 commit


Select commit


File filter

Filter by extension
Filter by extension
Conversations

Failed to load comments. 
Loading
Jump to

Jump to file


Failed to load files. 
Loading
 Diff view

 Diff view


44 changes: 30 additions & 14 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/managed-object-write-denies.ts

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -4,10 +4,22 @@
 * ADR-0092 / ADR-0103 — registry-driven managed-object write denies for the
 * default permission sets.
 *
 * The default write-granting permission sets (`organization_admin`,
 * `member_default`, `viewer_readonly`, and the MCP write set) grant CRUD via a
 * `'*'` wildcard, then DENY writes on the better-auth-managed identity tables so
 * mutations must flow through the auth pipeline (ADR-0092). That deny-list was a
 * The default sets this module targets (`organization_admin`, `member_default`,
 * `viewer_readonly`, and the MCP write set) DENY writes on the
 * better-auth-managed identity tables so mutations must flow through the auth
 * pipeline (ADR-0092). What that entry narrows differs per set, and the
 * difference is load-bearing for the rest of this file: `organization_admin` and
 * the MCP write set grant CRUD through an `objects['*']` wildcard, so their
 * managed-table entries are a narrowing overlay; `viewer_readonly`'s wildcard is
 * read-only, so its entries are belt-and-suspenders over a wildcard that already
 * denies; and `member_default` carries NO wildcard at all since #5491 (the
 * additive `everyone` baseline merges most-permissively, so a wildcard there was
 * a floor no app could get under — maintainer ruling 2026-08-07: the baseline
 * narrows to explicit-allow, and a wildcard is not to be reintroduced here in
 * any form). Its access is exactly the objects it NAMES, so a managed-table
 * entry in that set is the read grant itself rather than a narrowing of
 * anything — which is what keeps `/auth/me`, the org switcher and the Account
 * app working for a member with no application profile. That deny-list was a
 * hand-maintained object-name array (`BETTER_AUTH_MANAGED_OBJECTS` in
 * `default-permission-sets.ts`) — precisely the drift ADR-0092 forbids, and it
 * HAD drifted (the static list missed schemas that later declared
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -36,11 +48,12 @@
 *
 * ── Deliberately NOT covered: engine-owned system / append-only objects ──
 * ADR-0103's engine-owned objects (`sys_audit_log`, `sys_automation_run`, …)
 * are also wildcard-granted in these sets, but we do NOT inject deny entries for
 * them: a per-object entry FULLY OVERRIDES the wildcard (lookup, not merge — see
 * `default-permission-sets.ts`), so injecting `{ allowRead: true, ...writes:false }`
 * would silently drop the wildcard's `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords` — a
 * read-side narrowing. Their user-context writes are already rejected at the
 * are also reached by the wildcard in the target sets that carry one, but we do
 * NOT inject deny entries for them: a per-object entry FULLY OVERRIDES the
 * wildcard (lookup, not merge — see `default-permission-sets.ts`), so injecting
 * `{ allowRead: true, ...writes:false }` would silently drop
 * `organization_admin`'s `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords` — a read-side
 * narrowing. Their user-context writes are already rejected at the
 * engine by `assertEngineOwnedWriteAllowed` (ADR-0103) and reflected in the
 * `/me/permissions` clamp, so the permission-set layer needs no change for them.
 */
Expand All@@ -62,11 +75,14 @@ export const MANAGED_DENY_ENTRY = {
};

/**
 * The default sets whose `'*'` wildcard grants writes and therefore must carry
 * the managed-table denies. Explicit allowlist — `admin_full_access` is
 * deliberately excluded (it keeps its unqualified wildcard so an admin can
 * rescue data directly; the runtime guards are its boundary), as are the MCP
 * read / restricted sets (they grant no writes).
 * The default sets that must carry an explicit entry for every managed table.
 * Membership is NOT "holds a write-granting `'*'` wildcard" — only
 * `organization_admin` and the MCP write set hold one; `viewer_readonly`'s
 * wildcard is read-only and `member_default` has held none since #5491 (see the
 * module docblock for what the injected entry does in each). Explicit allowlist
 * — `admin_full_access` is deliberately excluded (it keeps its unqualified
 * wildcard so an admin can rescue data directly; the runtime guards are its
 * boundary), as are the MCP read / restricted sets (they grant no writes).
 */
export const MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS: readonly string[] = [
 'organization_admin',
Expand Down
Loading

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
docs(plugin-security): correct the managed-write-denies docblock on member_default#14028

New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

 Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and
privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub?
Sign in
to your account

 Merged

os-steve
merged 1 commit into

from

Sep 1, 2026
 Merged


docs(plugin-security): correct the managed-write-denies docblock on member_default
#14028
 Changes from all commits
Commits

Show all changes


1 commit


Select commit


File filter

Filter by extension
Filter by extension
Conversations

Failed to load comments. 
Loading
Jump to

Jump to file


Failed to load files. 
Loading
 Diff view

 Diff view


44 changes: 30 additions & 14 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/managed-object-write-denies.ts

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -4,10 +4,22 @@
 * ADR-0092 / ADR-0103 — registry-driven managed-object write denies for the
 * default permission sets.
 *
 * The default write-granting permission sets (`organization_admin`,
 * `member_default`, `viewer_readonly`, and the MCP write set) grant CRUD via a
 * `'*'` wildcard, then DENY writes on the better-auth-managed identity tables so
 * mutations must flow through the auth pipeline (ADR-0092). That deny-list was a
 * The default sets this module targets (`organization_admin`, `member_default`,
 * `viewer_readonly`, and the MCP write set) DENY writes on the
 * better-auth-managed identity tables so mutations must flow through the auth
 * pipeline (ADR-0092). What that entry narrows differs per set, and the
 * difference is load-bearing for the rest of this file: `organization_admin` and
 * the MCP write set grant CRUD through an `objects['*']` wildcard, so their
 * managed-table entries are a narrowing overlay; `viewer_readonly`'s wildcard is
 * read-only, so its entries are belt-and-suspenders over a wildcard that already
 * denies; and `member_default` carries NO wildcard at all since #5491 (the
 * additive `everyone` baseline merges most-permissively, so a wildcard there was
 * a floor no app could get under — maintainer ruling 2026-08-07: the baseline
 * narrows to explicit-allow, and a wildcard is not to be reintroduced here in
 * any form). Its access is exactly the objects it NAMES, so a managed-table
 * entry in that set is the read grant itself rather than a narrowing of
 * anything — which is what keeps `/auth/me`, the org switcher and the Account
 * app working for a member with no application profile. That deny-list was a
 * hand-maintained object-name array (`BETTER_AUTH_MANAGED_OBJECTS` in
 * `default-permission-sets.ts`) — precisely the drift ADR-0092 forbids, and it
 * HAD drifted (the static list missed schemas that later declared
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -36,11 +48,12 @@
 *
 * ── Deliberately NOT covered: engine-owned system / append-only objects ──
 * ADR-0103's engine-owned objects (`sys_audit_log`, `sys_automation_run`, …)
 * are also wildcard-granted in these sets, but we do NOT inject deny entries for
 * them: a per-object entry FULLY OVERRIDES the wildcard (lookup, not merge — see
 * `default-permission-sets.ts`), so injecting `{ allowRead: true, ...writes:false }`
 * would silently drop the wildcard's `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords` — a
 * read-side narrowing. Their user-context writes are already rejected at the
 * are also reached by the wildcard in the target sets that carry one, but we do
 * NOT inject deny entries for them: a per-object entry FULLY OVERRIDES the
 * wildcard (lookup, not merge — see `default-permission-sets.ts`), so injecting
 * `{ allowRead: true, ...writes:false }` would silently drop
 * `organization_admin`'s `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords` — a read-side
 * narrowing. Their user-context writes are already rejected at the
 * engine by `assertEngineOwnedWriteAllowed` (ADR-0103) and reflected in the
 * `/me/permissions` clamp, so the permission-set layer needs no change for them.
 */
Expand All@@ -62,11 +75,14 @@ export const MANAGED_DENY_ENTRY = {
};

/**
 * The default sets whose `'*'` wildcard grants writes and therefore must carry
 * the managed-table denies. Explicit allowlist — `admin_full_access` is
 * deliberately excluded (it keeps its unqualified wildcard so an admin can
 * rescue data directly; the runtime guards are its boundary), as are the MCP
 * read / restricted sets (they grant no writes).
 * The default sets that must carry an explicit entry for every managed table.
 * Membership is NOT "holds a write-granting `'*'` wildcard" — only
 * `organization_admin` and the MCP write set hold one; `viewer_readonly`'s
 * wildcard is read-only and `member_default` has held none since #5491 (see the
 * module docblock for what the injected entry does in each). Explicit allowlist
 * — `admin_full_access` is deliberately excluded (it keeps its unqualified
 * wildcard so an admin can rescue data directly; the runtime guards are its
 * boundary), as are the MCP read / restricted sets (they grant no writes).
 */
export const MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS: readonly string[] = [
 'organization_admin',
Expand Down
Loading

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

Skip to content
docs(plugin-security): correct the managed-write-denies docblock on member_default#14028

New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

 Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and
privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub?
Sign in
to your account

 Merged

os-steve
merged 1 commit into

from

Sep 1, 2026
 Merged


docs(plugin-security): correct the managed-write-denies docblock on member_default
#14028
 Changes from all commits
Commits

Show all changes


1 commit


Select commit


File filter

Filter by extension
Filter by extension
Conversations

Failed to load comments. 
Loading
Jump to

Jump to file


Failed to load files. 
Loading
 Diff view

 Diff view


44 changes: 30 additions & 14 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/managed-object-write-denies.ts

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -4,10 +4,22 @@
 * ADR-0092 / ADR-0103 — registry-driven managed-object write denies for the
 * default permission sets.
 *
 * The default write-granting permission sets (`organization_admin`,
 * `member_default`, `viewer_readonly`, and the MCP write set) grant CRUD via a
 * `'*'` wildcard, then DENY writes on the better-auth-managed identity tables so
 * mutations must flow through the auth pipeline (ADR-0092). That deny-list was a
 * The default sets this module targets (`organization_admin`, `member_default`,
 * `viewer_readonly`, and the MCP write set) DENY writes on the
 * better-auth-managed identity tables so mutations must flow through the auth
 * pipeline (ADR-0092). What that entry narrows differs per set, and the
 * difference is load-bearing for the rest of this file: `organization_admin` and
 * the MCP write set grant CRUD through an `objects['*']` wildcard, so their
 * managed-table entries are a narrowing overlay; `viewer_readonly`'s wildcard is
 * read-only, so its entries are belt-and-suspenders over a wildcard that already
 * denies; and `member_default` carries NO wildcard at all since #5491 (the
 * additive `everyone` baseline merges most-permissively, so a wildcard there was
 * a floor no app could get under — maintainer ruling 2026-08-07: the baseline
 * narrows to explicit-allow, and a wildcard is not to be reintroduced here in
 * any form). Its access is exactly the objects it NAMES, so a managed-table
 * entry in that set is the read grant itself rather than a narrowing of
 * anything — which is what keeps `/auth/me`, the org switcher and the Account
 * app working for a member with no application profile. That deny-list was a
 * hand-maintained object-name array (`BETTER_AUTH_MANAGED_OBJECTS` in
 * `default-permission-sets.ts`) — precisely the drift ADR-0092 forbids, and it
 * HAD drifted (the static list missed schemas that later declared
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -36,11 +48,12 @@
 *
 * ── Deliberately NOT covered: engine-owned system / append-only objects ──
 * ADR-0103's engine-owned objects (`sys_audit_log`, `sys_automation_run`, …)
 * are also wildcard-granted in these sets, but we do NOT inject deny entries for
 * them: a per-object entry FULLY OVERRIDES the wildcard (lookup, not merge — see
 * `default-permission-sets.ts`), so injecting `{ allowRead: true, ...writes:false }`
 * would silently drop the wildcard's `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords` — a
 * read-side narrowing. Their user-context writes are already rejected at the
 * are also reached by the wildcard in the target sets that carry one, but we do
 * NOT inject deny entries for them: a per-object entry FULLY OVERRIDES the
 * wildcard (lookup, not merge — see `default-permission-sets.ts`), so injecting
 * `{ allowRead: true, ...writes:false }` would silently drop
 * `organization_admin`'s `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords` — a read-side
 * narrowing. Their user-context writes are already rejected at the
 * engine by `assertEngineOwnedWriteAllowed` (ADR-0103) and reflected in the
 * `/me/permissions` clamp, so the permission-set layer needs no change for them.
 */
Expand All@@ -62,11 +75,14 @@ export const MANAGED_DENY_ENTRY = {
};

/**
 * The default sets whose `'*'` wildcard grants writes and therefore must carry
 * the managed-table denies. Explicit allowlist — `admin_full_access` is
 * deliberately excluded (it keeps its unqualified wildcard so an admin can
 * rescue data directly; the runtime guards are its boundary), as are the MCP
 * read / restricted sets (they grant no writes).
 * The default sets that must carry an explicit entry for every managed table.
 * Membership is NOT "holds a write-granting `'*'` wildcard" — only
 * `organization_admin` and the MCP write set hold one; `viewer_readonly`'s
 * wildcard is read-only and `member_default` has held none since #5491 (see the
 * module docblock for what the injected entry does in each). Explicit allowlist
 * — `admin_full_access` is deliberately excluded (it keeps its unqualified
 * wildcard so an admin can rescue data directly; the runtime guards are its
 * boundary), as are the MCP read / restricted sets (they grant no writes).
 */
export const MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS: readonly string[] = [
 'organization_admin',
Expand Down
Loading

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
docs(plugin-security): correct the managed-write-denies docblock on member_default#14028

New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

 Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and
privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub?
Sign in
to your account

 Merged

os-steve
merged 1 commit into

from

Sep 1, 2026
 Merged


docs(plugin-security): correct the managed-write-denies docblock on member_default
#14028
 Changes from all commits
Commits

Show all changes


1 commit


Select commit


File filter

Filter by extension
Filter by extension
Conversations

Failed to load comments. 
Loading
Jump to

Jump to file


Failed to load files. 
Loading
 Diff view

 Diff view


44 changes: 30 additions & 14 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/managed-object-write-denies.ts

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -4,10 +4,22 @@
 * ADR-0092 / ADR-0103 — registry-driven managed-object write denies for the
 * default permission sets.
 *
 * The default write-granting permission sets (`organization_admin`,
 * `member_default`, `viewer_readonly`, and the MCP write set) grant CRUD via a
 * `'*'` wildcard, then DENY writes on the better-auth-managed identity tables so
 * mutations must flow through the auth pipeline (ADR-0092). That deny-list was a
 * The default sets this module targets (`organization_admin`, `member_default`,
 * `viewer_readonly`, and the MCP write set) DENY writes on the
 * better-auth-managed identity tables so mutations must flow through the auth
 * pipeline (ADR-0092). What that entry narrows differs per set, and the
 * difference is load-bearing for the rest of this file: `organization_admin` and
 * the MCP write set grant CRUD through an `objects['*']` wildcard, so their
 * managed-table entries are a narrowing overlay; `viewer_readonly`'s wildcard is
 * read-only, so its entries are belt-and-suspenders over a wildcard that already
 * denies; and `member_default` carries NO wildcard at all since #5491 (the
 * additive `everyone` baseline merges most-permissively, so a wildcard there was
 * a floor no app could get under — maintainer ruling 2026-08-07: the baseline
 * narrows to explicit-allow, and a wildcard is not to be reintroduced here in
 * any form). Its access is exactly the objects it NAMES, so a managed-table
 * entry in that set is the read grant itself rather than a narrowing of
 * anything — which is what keeps `/auth/me`, the org switcher and the Account
 * app working for a member with no application profile. That deny-list was a
 * hand-maintained object-name array (`BETTER_AUTH_MANAGED_OBJECTS` in
 * `default-permission-sets.ts`) — precisely the drift ADR-0092 forbids, and it
 * HAD drifted (the static list missed schemas that later declared
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -36,11 +48,12 @@
 *
 * ── Deliberately NOT covered: engine-owned system / append-only objects ──
 * ADR-0103's engine-owned objects (`sys_audit_log`, `sys_automation_run`, …)
 * are also wildcard-granted in these sets, but we do NOT inject deny entries for
 * them: a per-object entry FULLY OVERRIDES the wildcard (lookup, not merge — see
 * `default-permission-sets.ts`), so injecting `{ allowRead: true, ...writes:false }`
 * would silently drop the wildcard's `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords` — a
 * read-side narrowing. Their user-context writes are already rejected at the
 * are also reached by the wildcard in the target sets that carry one, but we do
 * NOT inject deny entries for them: a per-object entry FULLY OVERRIDES the
 * wildcard (lookup, not merge — see `default-permission-sets.ts`), so injecting
 * `{ allowRead: true, ...writes:false }` would silently drop
 * `organization_admin`'s `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords` — a read-side
 * narrowing. Their user-context writes are already rejected at the
 * engine by `assertEngineOwnedWriteAllowed` (ADR-0103) and reflected in the
 * `/me/permissions` clamp, so the permission-set layer needs no change for them.
 */
Expand All@@ -62,11 +75,14 @@ export const MANAGED_DENY_ENTRY = {
};

/**
 * The default sets whose `'*'` wildcard grants writes and therefore must carry
 * the managed-table denies. Explicit allowlist — `admin_full_access` is
 * deliberately excluded (it keeps its unqualified wildcard so an admin can
 * rescue data directly; the runtime guards are its boundary), as are the MCP
 * read / restricted sets (they grant no writes).
 * The default sets that must carry an explicit entry for every managed table.
 * Membership is NOT "holds a write-granting `'*'` wildcard" — only
 * `organization_admin` and the MCP write set hold one; `viewer_readonly`'s
 * wildcard is read-only and `member_default` has held none since #5491 (see the
 * module docblock for what the injected entry does in each). Explicit allowlist
 * — `admin_full_access` is deliberately excluded (it keeps its unqualified
 * wildcard so an admin can rescue data directly; the runtime guards are its
 * boundary), as are the MCP read / restricted sets (they grant no writes).
 */
export const MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS: readonly string[] = [
 'organization_admin',
Expand Down
Loading

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
docs(plugin-security): correct the managed-write-denies docblock on member_default#14028

New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

 Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and
privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub?
Sign in
to your account

 Merged

os-steve
merged 1 commit into

from

Sep 1, 2026
 Merged


docs(plugin-security): correct the managed-write-denies docblock on member_default
#14028
 Changes from all commits
Commits

Show all changes


1 commit


Select commit


File filter

Filter by extension
Filter by extension
Conversations

Failed to load comments. 
Loading
Jump to

Jump to file


Failed to load files. 
Loading
 Diff view

 Diff view


44 changes: 30 additions & 14 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/managed-object-write-denies.ts

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -4,10 +4,22 @@
 * ADR-0092 / ADR-0103 — registry-driven managed-object write denies for the
 * default permission sets.
 *
 * The default write-granting permission sets (`organization_admin`,
 * `member_default`, `viewer_readonly`, and the MCP write set) grant CRUD via a
 * `'*'` wildcard, then DENY writes on the better-auth-managed identity tables so
 * mutations must flow through the auth pipeline (ADR-0092). That deny-list was a
 * The default sets this module targets (`organization_admin`, `member_default`,
 * `viewer_readonly`, and the MCP write set) DENY writes on the
 * better-auth-managed identity tables so mutations must flow through the auth
 * pipeline (ADR-0092). What that entry narrows differs per set, and the
 * difference is load-bearing for the rest of this file: `organization_admin` and
 * the MCP write set grant CRUD through an `objects['*']` wildcard, so their
 * managed-table entries are a narrowing overlay; `viewer_readonly`'s wildcard is
 * read-only, so its entries are belt-and-suspenders over a wildcard that already
 * denies; and `member_default` carries NO wildcard at all since #5491 (the
 * additive `everyone` baseline merges most-permissively, so a wildcard there was
 * a floor no app could get under — maintainer ruling 2026-08-07: the baseline
 * narrows to explicit-allow, and a wildcard is not to be reintroduced here in
 * any form). Its access is exactly the objects it NAMES, so a managed-table
 * entry in that set is the read grant itself rather than a narrowing of
 * anything — which is what keeps `/auth/me`, the org switcher and the Account
 * app working for a member with no application profile. That deny-list was a
 * hand-maintained object-name array (`BETTER_AUTH_MANAGED_OBJECTS` in
 * `default-permission-sets.ts`) — precisely the drift ADR-0092 forbids, and it
 * HAD drifted (the static list missed schemas that later declared
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -36,11 +48,12 @@
 *
 * ── Deliberately NOT covered: engine-owned system / append-only objects ──
 * ADR-0103's engine-owned objects (`sys_audit_log`, `sys_automation_run`, …)
 * are also wildcard-granted in these sets, but we do NOT inject deny entries for
 * them: a per-object entry FULLY OVERRIDES the wildcard (lookup, not merge — see
 * `default-permission-sets.ts`), so injecting `{ allowRead: true, ...writes:false }`
 * would silently drop the wildcard's `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords` — a
 * read-side narrowing. Their user-context writes are already rejected at the
 * are also reached by the wildcard in the target sets that carry one, but we do
 * NOT inject deny entries for them: a per-object entry FULLY OVERRIDES the
 * wildcard (lookup, not merge — see `default-permission-sets.ts`), so injecting
 * `{ allowRead: true, ...writes:false }` would silently drop
 * `organization_admin`'s `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords` — a read-side
 * narrowing. Their user-context writes are already rejected at the
 * engine by `assertEngineOwnedWriteAllowed` (ADR-0103) and reflected in the
 * `/me/permissions` clamp, so the permission-set layer needs no change for them.
 */
Expand All@@ -62,11 +75,14 @@ export const MANAGED_DENY_ENTRY = {
};

/**
 * The default sets whose `'*'` wildcard grants writes and therefore must carry
 * the managed-table denies. Explicit allowlist — `admin_full_access` is
 * deliberately excluded (it keeps its unqualified wildcard so an admin can
 * rescue data directly; the runtime guards are its boundary), as are the MCP
 * read / restricted sets (they grant no writes).
 * The default sets that must carry an explicit entry for every managed table.
 * Membership is NOT "holds a write-granting `'*'` wildcard" — only
 * `organization_admin` and the MCP write set hold one; `viewer_readonly`'s
 * wildcard is read-only and `member_default` has held none since #5491 (see the
 * module docblock for what the injected entry does in each). Explicit allowlist
 * — `admin_full_access` is deliberately excluded (it keeps its unqualified
 * wildcard so an admin can rescue data directly; the runtime guards are its
 * boundary), as are the MCP read / restricted sets (they grant no writes).
 */
export const MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS: readonly string[] = [
 'organization_admin',
Expand Down
Loading

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

Skip to content
docs(plugin-security): correct the managed-write-denies docblock on member_default#14028

New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

 Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and
privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub?
Sign in
to your account

 Merged

os-steve
merged 1 commit into

from

Sep 1, 2026
 Merged


docs(plugin-security): correct the managed-write-denies docblock on member_default
#14028
 Changes from all commits
Commits

Show all changes


1 commit


Select commit


File filter

Filter by extension
Filter by extension
Conversations

Failed to load comments. 
Loading
Jump to

Jump to file


Failed to load files. 
Loading
 Diff view

 Diff view


44 changes: 30 additions & 14 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/managed-object-write-denies.ts

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -4,10 +4,22 @@
 * ADR-0092 / ADR-0103 — registry-driven managed-object write denies for the
 * default permission sets.
 *
 * The default write-granting permission sets (`organization_admin`,
 * `member_default`, `viewer_readonly`, and the MCP write set) grant CRUD via a
 * `'*'` wildcard, then DENY writes on the better-auth-managed identity tables so
 * mutations must flow through the auth pipeline (ADR-0092). That deny-list was a
 * The default sets this module targets (`organization_admin`, `member_default`,
 * `viewer_readonly`, and the MCP write set) DENY writes on the
 * better-auth-managed identity tables so mutations must flow through the auth
 * pipeline (ADR-0092). What that entry narrows differs per set, and the
 * difference is load-bearing for the rest of this file: `organization_admin` and
 * the MCP write set grant CRUD through an `objects['*']` wildcard, so their
 * managed-table entries are a narrowing overlay; `viewer_readonly`'s wildcard is
 * read-only, so its entries are belt-and-suspenders over a wildcard that already
 * denies; and `member_default` carries NO wildcard at all since #5491 (the
 * additive `everyone` baseline merges most-permissively, so a wildcard there was
 * a floor no app could get under — maintainer ruling 2026-08-07: the baseline
 * narrows to explicit-allow, and a wildcard is not to be reintroduced here in
 * any form). Its access is exactly the objects it NAMES, so a managed-table
 * entry in that set is the read grant itself rather than a narrowing of
 * anything — which is what keeps `/auth/me`, the org switcher and the Account
 * app working for a member with no application profile. That deny-list was a
 * hand-maintained object-name array (`BETTER_AUTH_MANAGED_OBJECTS` in
 * `default-permission-sets.ts`) — precisely the drift ADR-0092 forbids, and it
 * HAD drifted (the static list missed schemas that later declared
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -36,11 +48,12 @@
 *
 * ── Deliberately NOT covered: engine-owned system / append-only objects ──
 * ADR-0103's engine-owned objects (`sys_audit_log`, `sys_automation_run`, …)
 * are also wildcard-granted in these sets, but we do NOT inject deny entries for
 * them: a per-object entry FULLY OVERRIDES the wildcard (lookup, not merge — see
 * `default-permission-sets.ts`), so injecting `{ allowRead: true, ...writes:false }`
 * would silently drop the wildcard's `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords` — a
 * read-side narrowing. Their user-context writes are already rejected at the
 * are also reached by the wildcard in the target sets that carry one, but we do
 * NOT inject deny entries for them: a per-object entry FULLY OVERRIDES the
 * wildcard (lookup, not merge — see `default-permission-sets.ts`), so injecting
 * `{ allowRead: true, ...writes:false }` would silently drop
 * `organization_admin`'s `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords` — a read-side
 * narrowing. Their user-context writes are already rejected at the
 * engine by `assertEngineOwnedWriteAllowed` (ADR-0103) and reflected in the
 * `/me/permissions` clamp, so the permission-set layer needs no change for them.
 */
Expand All@@ -62,11 +75,14 @@ export const MANAGED_DENY_ENTRY = {
};

/**
 * The default sets whose `'*'` wildcard grants writes and therefore must carry
 * the managed-table denies. Explicit allowlist — `admin_full_access` is
 * deliberately excluded (it keeps its unqualified wildcard so an admin can
 * rescue data directly; the runtime guards are its boundary), as are the MCP
 * read / restricted sets (they grant no writes).
 * The default sets that must carry an explicit entry for every managed table.
 * Membership is NOT "holds a write-granting `'*'` wildcard" — only
 * `organization_admin` and the MCP write set hold one; `viewer_readonly`'s
 * wildcard is read-only and `member_default` has held none since #5491 (see the
 * module docblock for what the injected entry does in each). Explicit allowlist
 * — `admin_full_access` is deliberately excluded (it keeps its unqualified
 * wildcard so an admin can rescue data directly; the runtime guards are its
 * boundary), as are the MCP read / restricted sets (they grant no writes).
 */
export const MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS: readonly string[] = [
 'organization_admin',
Expand Down
Loading