test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first grant route — allowTransfer#14220

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os-steve merged 3 commits into from
Sep 1, 2026
+141 −22
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test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first grant route — allowTransfer #14220

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test(plugin-security): managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first …
claude Sep 1, 2026
327abe0
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14137-ma…
claude Sep 1, 2026
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14137-ma…
claude Sep 1, 2026
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25 changes: 25 additions & 0 deletions .changeset/managed-deny-floor-allowtransfer.md
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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
---
"@objectstack/plugin-security": patch
---

test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor now sees the evaluator's first grant route — `allowTransfer` (#14137)

The independent-property floor that derives which seeded default permission
sets MUST be managed-deny targets ("a default set whose `'*'` wildcard grants
a write", pinned in `default-permission-sets.test.ts` and diffed against
`MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS`, #14029) read only the three CRUD write flags plus
`modifyAllRecords`. That missed the evaluator's FIRST grant route — the
direct bit read off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION` (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'`),
a real grant ENFORCED today through the insert/update `owner_id` door (#3004).
A future default set shaped `'*': { allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true }`
would have held ownership reassignment on every `managedBy: 'better-auth'`
identity table while tripping neither floor clause, so it was never required
to become a managed-deny target and would have kept its wildcard silently.

The floor now also checks `wc.allowTransfer === true` (a value test, never
key-existence — Zod materialises these bits with `.default(false)`, so they
are present-as-false; #14129 first review), and both exhaustive docblocks
name the first route. Zero behaviour delta today: no existing seeded set
carries a transfer-granting wildcard, every existing set keeps its exact
verdict (pinned), and the runtime deny application is byte-identical — this
hardens a CI-time pin, not the shipped permission surface.
10 changes: 8 additions & 2 deletions packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/managed-object-write-denies.ts
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -82,15 +82,21 @@ export const MANAGED_DENY_ENTRY = {
*
* Holding a write-granting `'*'` wildcard is the FLOOR of membership, not its
* definition: every default set whose wildcard grants any generic write class
* — via the three write flags (`allowCreate`/`allowEdit`/`allowDelete`) OR via
* — via the three write flags (`allowCreate`/`allowEdit`/`allowDelete`), OR
* via `allowTransfer` (#14137), the ownership-reassignment bit the
* evaluator's FIRST route reads directly off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`
* (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'`, `permission-evaluator.ts`; a real grant,
* ENFORCED today through the insert/update `owner_id` door, #3004), OR via
* `modifyAllRecords`, whose super-user bypass grants edit/delete and the
* destructive class by the evaluator's second route (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`,
* `permission-evaluator.ts`) — must be listed here (or carry a documented
* exclusion below), because the wildcard is what would otherwise grant raw
* writes on a newly-declared identity table — that floor is what
* `default-permission-sets.test.ts` derives independently and diffs against
* this list (#14029), so a future write-granting set that is not added here
* fails a pin instead of silently keeping its wildcard.
* fails a pin instead of silently keeping its wildcard. (The clause list is
* exhaustive over the evaluator's two known grant tables; a census of routes
* beyond them has not been done — #14137 "Not established".)
* Membership is WIDER than the floor: `viewer_readonly`'s wildcard is read-only
* and `member_default` has held none since #5491 — their injected entries are
* belt-and-suspenders and the read grant itself, respectively (see the module
Expand Down
128 changes: 108 additions & 20 deletions packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/objects/default-permission-sets.test.ts
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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -384,26 +384,43 @@ describe('admin_full_access imports the kernel capability declaration unchanged
*/
describe('managed-deny targets — independent-property floor + registry union reaches the derived variant (#14029)', () => {
// Derived from `defaultPermissionSets`, never from the list under test.
// "Grants a write" in the evaluator's own terms: the three CRUD flags OR
// `modifyAllRecords` — the super-user bypass grants edit/delete and the
// destructive class by a second route (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`,
// `permission-evaluator.ts`), so `'*': { modifyAllRecords: true }` is
// write-granting even with all three CRUD flags false. Value tests
// (`=== true`), not key-existence: Zod materialises the superuser bits with
// `.default(false)` (`permission.zod.ts`), so they are present-as-false.
const writeGrantingWildcardSets: string[] = defaultPermissionSets
.filter((s: any) => {
const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
return (
!!wc &&
(wc.allowCreate === true ||
wc.allowEdit === true ||
wc.allowDelete === true ||
wc.modifyAllRecords === true)
);
})
.map((s) => s.name)
.sort();
// "Grants a write" in the evaluator's own terms — the bits its grant routes
// read (`permission-evaluator.ts`):
// - FIRST route, a direct bit read off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`: the three
// CRUD write flags, plus `allowTransfer` (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'` —
// reassigning `owner_id`; a real grant, ENFORCED today through the
// insert/update owner_id door, #3004), so
// `'*': { allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true }` is write-granting even
// with all three CRUD flags AND `modifyAllRecords` false (#14137);
// - SECOND route, the `modifyAllRecords` super-user bypass, which grants
// edit/delete and the destructive class (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`), so
// `'*': { modifyAllRecords: true }` is write-granting even with all three
// CRUD flags false.
// (A census of grant routes beyond these two tables has NOT been done —
// #14137 "Not established" — so this clause list is exhaustive over the two
// known routes, not a claim about the whole evaluator.)
// Value tests (`=== true`), not key-existence: Zod materialises these bits
// with `.default(false)` (`permission.zod.ts`), so they are present-as-false
// (#14129 first review; pinned below).
const grantsWildcardWrite = (wc: any): boolean =>
wc.allowCreate === true ||
wc.allowEdit === true ||
wc.allowDelete === true ||
wc.modifyAllRecords === true ||
wc.allowTransfer === true;

// The REAL derivation under pin — also applied to synthetic sets below so
// the floor is testable against shapes no seeded set carries yet.
const deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets = (sets: readonly any[]): string[] =>
sets
.filter((s: any) => {
const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
return !!wc && grantsWildcardWrite(wc);
})
.map((s) => s.name)
.sort();

const writeGrantingWildcardSets: string[] = deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets(defaultPermissionSets);

/**
* The one documented exclusion: `admin_full_access` keeps its unqualified
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -435,6 +452,77 @@ describe('managed-deny targets — independent-property floor + registry union r
expect([...MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS]).not.toContain('admin_full_access');
});

// ── The floor judged against synthetic wildcards (#14137) ──
// `allowTransfer` is the evaluator's FIRST grant route (a direct bit read
// off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`) and is ENFORCED today through the
// insert/update owner_id door (#3004): a transfer-only wildcard holds
// ownership reassignment on every managed identity table while all three
// CRUD write flags and `modifyAllRecords` are false — visible only in the
// evaluator's grant semantics, never in the flags the older clauses read.
// Every shape below goes through `PermissionSetSchema.parse` first so Zod
// materialises the `.default(false)` bits: the parsed wildcard carries the
// unauthored bits present-as-false, exactly what the seeded sets look like
// to the filter.
describe('the floor sees the evaluator first grant route — allowTransfer (#14137)', () => {
const parseProbeSet = (wildcard: Record<string, boolean>): any =>
PermissionSetSchema.parse({
name: 'synthetic_floor_probe',
label: 'Synthetic floor probe',
objects: { '*': wildcard },
});

it('a transfer-only wildcard is required to be a managed-deny target (the card)', () => {
const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true });
const wc: any = probe.objects['*'];
// The shape really is the card's: all three CRUD write flags AND
// `modifyAllRecords` are (present-as-)false after parse.
expect(wc.allowCreate).toBe(false);
expect(wc.allowEdit).toBe(false);
expect(wc.allowDelete).toBe(false);
expect(wc.modifyAllRecords).toBe(false);
expect(wc.allowTransfer).toBe(true);
expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual(['synthetic_floor_probe']);
});

it('reverse control: a read-only wildcard is still NOT required', () => {
const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true });
expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual([]);
});

it('present-as-false: an explicit allowTransfer:false wildcard does not trip the floor (value test, not key-existence)', () => {
const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true, allowTransfer: false });
const wc: any = probe.objects['*'];
// The key IS present after parse — `.default(false)` materialises it —
// so a key-existence rewrite of the floor turns exactly this pin red
// (#14129 first review; not to be re-litigated).
expect('allowTransfer' in wc).toBe(true);
expect(wc.allowTransfer).toBe(false);
expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual([]);
});

it('invariance: the allowTransfer clause changes no existing seeded set verdict (zero delta today)', () => {
// The pre-#14137 four-clause floor, restated ONLY to diff verdicts
// against: if a future seeded set legitimately relies on the
// `allowTransfer` clause, this pin goes red and the zero-delta claim is
// consciously retired — the same review moment the membership diff
// above forces.
let wildcardsSeen = 0;
for (const s of defaultPermissionSets as any[]) {
const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
if (!wc) continue;
wildcardsSeen += 1;
const preFloor =
wc.allowCreate === true ||
wc.allowEdit === true ||
wc.allowDelete === true ||
wc.modifyAllRecords === true;
expect(grantsWildcardWrite(wc), `verdict drifted for ${s.name}`).toBe(preFloor);
}
// Non-vacuousness: the loop really visited the seeded wildcards.
expect(wildcardsSeen).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(3);
});
});

// ── The behaviour the membership buys, measured on the REAL derived set ──
// (clones so the module-level instances other tests read stay unmutated;
// the kernel path hands the same objects to the same function in place).
Expand Down
Loading
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
 blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

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test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first grant route — allowTransfer#14220

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 Merged

os-steve
merged 3 commits into

from

Sep 1, 2026

+141

−22

 Merged


test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first grant route — allowTransfer
#14220
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3c3e3c6

test(plugin-security): managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first …


claude Sep 1, 2026
327abe0

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14137-ma…


claude Sep 1, 2026
6fec5c3

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14137-ma…


claude Sep 1, 2026

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25 changes: 25 additions & 0 deletions
.changeset/managed-deny-floor-allowtransfer.md

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
---
"@objectstack/plugin-security": patch
---

test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor now sees the evaluator's first grant route — `allowTransfer` (#14137)

The independent-property floor that derives which seeded default permission
sets MUST be managed-deny targets ("a default set whose `'*'` wildcard grants
a write", pinned in `default-permission-sets.test.ts` and diffed against
`MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS`, #14029) read only the three CRUD write flags plus
`modifyAllRecords`. That missed the evaluator's FIRST grant route — the
direct bit read off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION` (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'`),
a real grant ENFORCED today through the insert/update `owner_id` door (#3004).
A future default set shaped `'*': { allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true }`
would have held ownership reassignment on every `managedBy: 'better-auth'`
identity table while tripping neither floor clause, so it was never required
to become a managed-deny target and would have kept its wildcard silently.

The floor now also checks `wc.allowTransfer === true` (a value test, never
key-existence — Zod materialises these bits with `.default(false)`, so they
are present-as-false; #14129 first review), and both exhaustive docblocks
name the first route. Zero behaviour delta today: no existing seeded set
carries a transfer-granting wildcard, every existing set keeps its exact
verdict (pinned), and the runtime deny application is byte-identical — this
hardens a CI-time pin, not the shipped permission surface.

10 changes: 8 additions & 2 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/managed-object-write-denies.ts

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -82,15 +82,21 @@ export const MANAGED_DENY_ENTRY = {
 *
 * Holding a write-granting `'*'` wildcard is the FLOOR of membership, not its
 * definition: every default set whose wildcard grants any generic write class
 * — via the three write flags (`allowCreate`/`allowEdit`/`allowDelete`) OR via
 * — via the three write flags (`allowCreate`/`allowEdit`/`allowDelete`), OR
 * via `allowTransfer` (#14137), the ownership-reassignment bit the
 * evaluator's FIRST route reads directly off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`
 * (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'`, `permission-evaluator.ts`; a real grant,
 * ENFORCED today through the insert/update `owner_id` door, #3004), OR via
 * `modifyAllRecords`, whose super-user bypass grants edit/delete and the
 * destructive class by the evaluator's second route (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`,
 * `permission-evaluator.ts`) — must be listed here (or carry a documented
 * exclusion below), because the wildcard is what would otherwise grant raw
 * writes on a newly-declared identity table — that floor is what
 * `default-permission-sets.test.ts` derives independently and diffs against
 * this list (#14029), so a future write-granting set that is not added here
 * fails a pin instead of silently keeping its wildcard.
 * fails a pin instead of silently keeping its wildcard. (The clause list is
 * exhaustive over the evaluator's two known grant tables; a census of routes
 * beyond them has not been done — #14137 "Not established".)
 * Membership is WIDER than the floor: `viewer_readonly`'s wildcard is read-only
 * and `member_default` has held none since #5491 — their injected entries are
 * belt-and-suspenders and the read grant itself, respectively (see the module
Expand Down

128 changes: 108 additions & 20 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/objects/default-permission-sets.test.ts

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -384,26 +384,43 @@ describe('admin_full_access imports the kernel capability declaration unchanged
 */
describe('managed-deny targets — independent-property floor + registry union reaches the derived variant (#14029)', () => {
 // Derived from `defaultPermissionSets`, never from the list under test.
 // "Grants a write" in the evaluator's own terms: the three CRUD flags OR
 // `modifyAllRecords` — the super-user bypass grants edit/delete and the
 // destructive class by a second route (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`,
 // `permission-evaluator.ts`), so `'*': { modifyAllRecords: true }` is
 // write-granting even with all three CRUD flags false. Value tests
 // (`=== true`), not key-existence: Zod materialises the superuser bits with
 // `.default(false)` (`permission.zod.ts`), so they are present-as-false.
 const writeGrantingWildcardSets: string[] = defaultPermissionSets
 .filter((s: any) => {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 return (
 !!wc &&
 (wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true)
 );
 })
 .map((s) => s.name)
 .sort();
 // "Grants a write" in the evaluator's own terms — the bits its grant routes
 // read (`permission-evaluator.ts`):
 // - FIRST route, a direct bit read off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`: the three
 // CRUD write flags, plus `allowTransfer` (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'` —
 // reassigning `owner_id`; a real grant, ENFORCED today through the
 // insert/update owner_id door, #3004), so
 // `'*': { allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true }` is write-granting even
 // with all three CRUD flags AND `modifyAllRecords` false (#14137);
 // - SECOND route, the `modifyAllRecords` super-user bypass, which grants
 // edit/delete and the destructive class (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`), so
 // `'*': { modifyAllRecords: true }` is write-granting even with all three
 // CRUD flags false.
 // (A census of grant routes beyond these two tables has NOT been done —
 // #14137 "Not established" — so this clause list is exhaustive over the two
 // known routes, not a claim about the whole evaluator.)
 // Value tests (`=== true`), not key-existence: Zod materialises these bits
 // with `.default(false)` (`permission.zod.ts`), so they are present-as-false
 // (#14129 first review; pinned below).
 const grantsWildcardWrite = (wc: any): boolean =>
 wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true ||
 wc.allowTransfer === true;

 // The REAL derivation under pin — also applied to synthetic sets below so
 // the floor is testable against shapes no seeded set carries yet.
 const deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets = (sets: readonly any[]): string[] =>
 sets
 .filter((s: any) => {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 return !!wc && grantsWildcardWrite(wc);
 })
 .map((s) => s.name)
 .sort();

 const writeGrantingWildcardSets: string[] = deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets(defaultPermissionSets);

 /**
 * The one documented exclusion: `admin_full_access` keeps its unqualified
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -435,6 +452,77 @@ describe('managed-deny targets — independent-property floor + registry union r
 expect([...MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS]).not.toContain('admin_full_access');
 });

 // ── The floor judged against synthetic wildcards (#14137) ──
 // `allowTransfer` is the evaluator's FIRST grant route (a direct bit read
 // off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`) and is ENFORCED today through the
 // insert/update owner_id door (#3004): a transfer-only wildcard holds
 // ownership reassignment on every managed identity table while all three
 // CRUD write flags and `modifyAllRecords` are false — visible only in the
 // evaluator's grant semantics, never in the flags the older clauses read.
 // Every shape below goes through `PermissionSetSchema.parse` first so Zod
 // materialises the `.default(false)` bits: the parsed wildcard carries the
 // unauthored bits present-as-false, exactly what the seeded sets look like
 // to the filter.
 describe('the floor sees the evaluator first grant route — allowTransfer (#14137)', () => {
 const parseProbeSet = (wildcard: Record<string, boolean>): any =>
 PermissionSetSchema.parse({
 name: 'synthetic_floor_probe',
 label: 'Synthetic floor probe',
 objects: { '*': wildcard },
 });

 it('a transfer-only wildcard is required to be a managed-deny target (the card)', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true });
 const wc: any = probe.objects['*'];
 // The shape really is the card's: all three CRUD write flags AND
 // `modifyAllRecords` are (present-as-)false after parse.
 expect(wc.allowCreate).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowEdit).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowDelete).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.modifyAllRecords).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowTransfer).toBe(true);
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual(['synthetic_floor_probe']);
 });

 it('reverse control: a read-only wildcard is still NOT required', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true });
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual([]);
 });

 it('present-as-false: an explicit allowTransfer:false wildcard does not trip the floor (value test, not key-existence)', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true, allowTransfer: false });
 const wc: any = probe.objects['*'];
 // The key IS present after parse — `.default(false)` materialises it —
 // so a key-existence rewrite of the floor turns exactly this pin red
 // (#14129 first review; not to be re-litigated).
 expect('allowTransfer' in wc).toBe(true);
 expect(wc.allowTransfer).toBe(false);
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual([]);
 });

 it('invariance: the allowTransfer clause changes no existing seeded set verdict (zero delta today)', () => {
 // The pre-#14137 four-clause floor, restated ONLY to diff verdicts
 // against: if a future seeded set legitimately relies on the
 // `allowTransfer` clause, this pin goes red and the zero-delta claim is
 // consciously retired — the same review moment the membership diff
 // above forces.
 let wildcardsSeen = 0;
 for (const s of defaultPermissionSets as any[]) {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 if (!wc) continue;
 wildcardsSeen += 1;
 const preFloor =
 wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true;
 expect(grantsWildcardWrite(wc), `verdict drifted for ${s.name}`).toBe(preFloor);
 }
 // Non-vacuousness: the loop really visited the seeded wildcards.
 expect(wildcardsSeen).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(3);
 });
 });

 // ── The behaviour the membership buys, measured on the REAL derived set ──
 // (clones so the module-level instances other tests read stay unmutated;
 // the kernel path hands the same objects to the same function in place).
Expand Down
Loading

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first grant route — allowTransfer#14220

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privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

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 Merged

os-steve
merged 3 commits into

from

Sep 1, 2026

+141

−22

 Merged


test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first grant route — allowTransfer
#14220
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3c3e3c6

test(plugin-security): managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first …


claude Sep 1, 2026
327abe0

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14137-ma…


claude Sep 1, 2026
6fec5c3

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14137-ma…


claude Sep 1, 2026

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.changeset/managed-deny-floor-allowtransfer.md

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
---
"@objectstack/plugin-security": patch
---

test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor now sees the evaluator's first grant route — `allowTransfer` (#14137)

The independent-property floor that derives which seeded default permission
sets MUST be managed-deny targets ("a default set whose `'*'` wildcard grants
a write", pinned in `default-permission-sets.test.ts` and diffed against
`MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS`, #14029) read only the three CRUD write flags plus
`modifyAllRecords`. That missed the evaluator's FIRST grant route — the
direct bit read off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION` (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'`),
a real grant ENFORCED today through the insert/update `owner_id` door (#3004).
A future default set shaped `'*': { allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true }`
would have held ownership reassignment on every `managedBy: 'better-auth'`
identity table while tripping neither floor clause, so it was never required
to become a managed-deny target and would have kept its wildcard silently.

The floor now also checks `wc.allowTransfer === true` (a value test, never
key-existence — Zod materialises these bits with `.default(false)`, so they
are present-as-false; #14129 first review), and both exhaustive docblocks
name the first route. Zero behaviour delta today: no existing seeded set
carries a transfer-granting wildcard, every existing set keeps its exact
verdict (pinned), and the runtime deny application is byte-identical — this
hardens a CI-time pin, not the shipped permission surface.

10 changes: 8 additions & 2 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/managed-object-write-denies.ts

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -82,15 +82,21 @@ export const MANAGED_DENY_ENTRY = {
 *
 * Holding a write-granting `'*'` wildcard is the FLOOR of membership, not its
 * definition: every default set whose wildcard grants any generic write class
 * — via the three write flags (`allowCreate`/`allowEdit`/`allowDelete`) OR via
 * — via the three write flags (`allowCreate`/`allowEdit`/`allowDelete`), OR
 * via `allowTransfer` (#14137), the ownership-reassignment bit the
 * evaluator's FIRST route reads directly off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`
 * (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'`, `permission-evaluator.ts`; a real grant,
 * ENFORCED today through the insert/update `owner_id` door, #3004), OR via
 * `modifyAllRecords`, whose super-user bypass grants edit/delete and the
 * destructive class by the evaluator's second route (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`,
 * `permission-evaluator.ts`) — must be listed here (or carry a documented
 * exclusion below), because the wildcard is what would otherwise grant raw
 * writes on a newly-declared identity table — that floor is what
 * `default-permission-sets.test.ts` derives independently and diffs against
 * this list (#14029), so a future write-granting set that is not added here
 * fails a pin instead of silently keeping its wildcard.
 * fails a pin instead of silently keeping its wildcard. (The clause list is
 * exhaustive over the evaluator's two known grant tables; a census of routes
 * beyond them has not been done — #14137 "Not established".)
 * Membership is WIDER than the floor: `viewer_readonly`'s wildcard is read-only
 * and `member_default` has held none since #5491 — their injected entries are
 * belt-and-suspenders and the read grant itself, respectively (see the module
Expand Down

128 changes: 108 additions & 20 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/objects/default-permission-sets.test.ts

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -384,26 +384,43 @@ describe('admin_full_access imports the kernel capability declaration unchanged
 */
describe('managed-deny targets — independent-property floor + registry union reaches the derived variant (#14029)', () => {
 // Derived from `defaultPermissionSets`, never from the list under test.
 // "Grants a write" in the evaluator's own terms: the three CRUD flags OR
 // `modifyAllRecords` — the super-user bypass grants edit/delete and the
 // destructive class by a second route (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`,
 // `permission-evaluator.ts`), so `'*': { modifyAllRecords: true }` is
 // write-granting even with all three CRUD flags false. Value tests
 // (`=== true`), not key-existence: Zod materialises the superuser bits with
 // `.default(false)` (`permission.zod.ts`), so they are present-as-false.
 const writeGrantingWildcardSets: string[] = defaultPermissionSets
 .filter((s: any) => {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 return (
 !!wc &&
 (wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true)
 );
 })
 .map((s) => s.name)
 .sort();
 // "Grants a write" in the evaluator's own terms — the bits its grant routes
 // read (`permission-evaluator.ts`):
 // - FIRST route, a direct bit read off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`: the three
 // CRUD write flags, plus `allowTransfer` (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'` —
 // reassigning `owner_id`; a real grant, ENFORCED today through the
 // insert/update owner_id door, #3004), so
 // `'*': { allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true }` is write-granting even
 // with all three CRUD flags AND `modifyAllRecords` false (#14137);
 // - SECOND route, the `modifyAllRecords` super-user bypass, which grants
 // edit/delete and the destructive class (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`), so
 // `'*': { modifyAllRecords: true }` is write-granting even with all three
 // CRUD flags false.
 // (A census of grant routes beyond these two tables has NOT been done —
 // #14137 "Not established" — so this clause list is exhaustive over the two
 // known routes, not a claim about the whole evaluator.)
 // Value tests (`=== true`), not key-existence: Zod materialises these bits
 // with `.default(false)` (`permission.zod.ts`), so they are present-as-false
 // (#14129 first review; pinned below).
 const grantsWildcardWrite = (wc: any): boolean =>
 wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true ||
 wc.allowTransfer === true;

 // The REAL derivation under pin — also applied to synthetic sets below so
 // the floor is testable against shapes no seeded set carries yet.
 const deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets = (sets: readonly any[]): string[] =>
 sets
 .filter((s: any) => {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 return !!wc && grantsWildcardWrite(wc);
 })
 .map((s) => s.name)
 .sort();

 const writeGrantingWildcardSets: string[] = deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets(defaultPermissionSets);

 /**
 * The one documented exclusion: `admin_full_access` keeps its unqualified
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -435,6 +452,77 @@ describe('managed-deny targets — independent-property floor + registry union r
 expect([...MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS]).not.toContain('admin_full_access');
 });

 // ── The floor judged against synthetic wildcards (#14137) ──
 // `allowTransfer` is the evaluator's FIRST grant route (a direct bit read
 // off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`) and is ENFORCED today through the
 // insert/update owner_id door (#3004): a transfer-only wildcard holds
 // ownership reassignment on every managed identity table while all three
 // CRUD write flags and `modifyAllRecords` are false — visible only in the
 // evaluator's grant semantics, never in the flags the older clauses read.
 // Every shape below goes through `PermissionSetSchema.parse` first so Zod
 // materialises the `.default(false)` bits: the parsed wildcard carries the
 // unauthored bits present-as-false, exactly what the seeded sets look like
 // to the filter.
 describe('the floor sees the evaluator first grant route — allowTransfer (#14137)', () => {
 const parseProbeSet = (wildcard: Record<string, boolean>): any =>
 PermissionSetSchema.parse({
 name: 'synthetic_floor_probe',
 label: 'Synthetic floor probe',
 objects: { '*': wildcard },
 });

 it('a transfer-only wildcard is required to be a managed-deny target (the card)', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true });
 const wc: any = probe.objects['*'];
 // The shape really is the card's: all three CRUD write flags AND
 // `modifyAllRecords` are (present-as-)false after parse.
 expect(wc.allowCreate).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowEdit).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowDelete).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.modifyAllRecords).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowTransfer).toBe(true);
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual(['synthetic_floor_probe']);
 });

 it('reverse control: a read-only wildcard is still NOT required', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true });
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual([]);
 });

 it('present-as-false: an explicit allowTransfer:false wildcard does not trip the floor (value test, not key-existence)', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true, allowTransfer: false });
 const wc: any = probe.objects['*'];
 // The key IS present after parse — `.default(false)` materialises it —
 // so a key-existence rewrite of the floor turns exactly this pin red
 // (#14129 first review; not to be re-litigated).
 expect('allowTransfer' in wc).toBe(true);
 expect(wc.allowTransfer).toBe(false);
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual([]);
 });

 it('invariance: the allowTransfer clause changes no existing seeded set verdict (zero delta today)', () => {
 // The pre-#14137 four-clause floor, restated ONLY to diff verdicts
 // against: if a future seeded set legitimately relies on the
 // `allowTransfer` clause, this pin goes red and the zero-delta claim is
 // consciously retired — the same review moment the membership diff
 // above forces.
 let wildcardsSeen = 0;
 for (const s of defaultPermissionSets as any[]) {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 if (!wc) continue;
 wildcardsSeen += 1;
 const preFloor =
 wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true;
 expect(grantsWildcardWrite(wc), `verdict drifted for ${s.name}`).toBe(preFloor);
 }
 // Non-vacuousness: the loop really visited the seeded wildcards.
 expect(wildcardsSeen).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(3);
 });
 });

 // ── The behaviour the membership buys, measured on the REAL derived set ──
 // (clones so the module-level instances other tests read stay unmutated;
 // the kernel path hands the same objects to the same function in place).
Expand Down
Loading

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

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test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first grant route — allowTransfer#14220

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 Merged

os-steve
merged 3 commits into

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Sep 1, 2026

+141

−22

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test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first grant route — allowTransfer
#14220
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3c3e3c6

test(plugin-security): managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first …


claude Sep 1, 2026
327abe0

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14137-ma…


claude Sep 1, 2026
6fec5c3

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14137-ma…


claude Sep 1, 2026

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25 changes: 25 additions & 0 deletions
.changeset/managed-deny-floor-allowtransfer.md

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
---
"@objectstack/plugin-security": patch
---

test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor now sees the evaluator's first grant route — `allowTransfer` (#14137)

The independent-property floor that derives which seeded default permission
sets MUST be managed-deny targets ("a default set whose `'*'` wildcard grants
a write", pinned in `default-permission-sets.test.ts` and diffed against
`MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS`, #14029) read only the three CRUD write flags plus
`modifyAllRecords`. That missed the evaluator's FIRST grant route — the
direct bit read off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION` (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'`),
a real grant ENFORCED today through the insert/update `owner_id` door (#3004).
A future default set shaped `'*': { allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true }`
would have held ownership reassignment on every `managedBy: 'better-auth'`
identity table while tripping neither floor clause, so it was never required
to become a managed-deny target and would have kept its wildcard silently.

The floor now also checks `wc.allowTransfer === true` (a value test, never
key-existence — Zod materialises these bits with `.default(false)`, so they
are present-as-false; #14129 first review), and both exhaustive docblocks
name the first route. Zero behaviour delta today: no existing seeded set
carries a transfer-granting wildcard, every existing set keeps its exact
verdict (pinned), and the runtime deny application is byte-identical — this
hardens a CI-time pin, not the shipped permission surface.

10 changes: 8 additions & 2 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/managed-object-write-denies.ts

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -82,15 +82,21 @@ export const MANAGED_DENY_ENTRY = {
 *
 * Holding a write-granting `'*'` wildcard is the FLOOR of membership, not its
 * definition: every default set whose wildcard grants any generic write class
 * — via the three write flags (`allowCreate`/`allowEdit`/`allowDelete`) OR via
 * — via the three write flags (`allowCreate`/`allowEdit`/`allowDelete`), OR
 * via `allowTransfer` (#14137), the ownership-reassignment bit the
 * evaluator's FIRST route reads directly off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`
 * (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'`, `permission-evaluator.ts`; a real grant,
 * ENFORCED today through the insert/update `owner_id` door, #3004), OR via
 * `modifyAllRecords`, whose super-user bypass grants edit/delete and the
 * destructive class by the evaluator's second route (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`,
 * `permission-evaluator.ts`) — must be listed here (or carry a documented
 * exclusion below), because the wildcard is what would otherwise grant raw
 * writes on a newly-declared identity table — that floor is what
 * `default-permission-sets.test.ts` derives independently and diffs against
 * this list (#14029), so a future write-granting set that is not added here
 * fails a pin instead of silently keeping its wildcard.
 * fails a pin instead of silently keeping its wildcard. (The clause list is
 * exhaustive over the evaluator's two known grant tables; a census of routes
 * beyond them has not been done — #14137 "Not established".)
 * Membership is WIDER than the floor: `viewer_readonly`'s wildcard is read-only
 * and `member_default` has held none since #5491 — their injected entries are
 * belt-and-suspenders and the read grant itself, respectively (see the module
Expand Down

128 changes: 108 additions & 20 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/objects/default-permission-sets.test.ts

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -384,26 +384,43 @@ describe('admin_full_access imports the kernel capability declaration unchanged
 */
describe('managed-deny targets — independent-property floor + registry union reaches the derived variant (#14029)', () => {
 // Derived from `defaultPermissionSets`, never from the list under test.
 // "Grants a write" in the evaluator's own terms: the three CRUD flags OR
 // `modifyAllRecords` — the super-user bypass grants edit/delete and the
 // destructive class by a second route (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`,
 // `permission-evaluator.ts`), so `'*': { modifyAllRecords: true }` is
 // write-granting even with all three CRUD flags false. Value tests
 // (`=== true`), not key-existence: Zod materialises the superuser bits with
 // `.default(false)` (`permission.zod.ts`), so they are present-as-false.
 const writeGrantingWildcardSets: string[] = defaultPermissionSets
 .filter((s: any) => {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 return (
 !!wc &&
 (wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true)
 );
 })
 .map((s) => s.name)
 .sort();
 // "Grants a write" in the evaluator's own terms — the bits its grant routes
 // read (`permission-evaluator.ts`):
 // - FIRST route, a direct bit read off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`: the three
 // CRUD write flags, plus `allowTransfer` (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'` —
 // reassigning `owner_id`; a real grant, ENFORCED today through the
 // insert/update owner_id door, #3004), so
 // `'*': { allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true }` is write-granting even
 // with all three CRUD flags AND `modifyAllRecords` false (#14137);
 // - SECOND route, the `modifyAllRecords` super-user bypass, which grants
 // edit/delete and the destructive class (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`), so
 // `'*': { modifyAllRecords: true }` is write-granting even with all three
 // CRUD flags false.
 // (A census of grant routes beyond these two tables has NOT been done —
 // #14137 "Not established" — so this clause list is exhaustive over the two
 // known routes, not a claim about the whole evaluator.)
 // Value tests (`=== true`), not key-existence: Zod materialises these bits
 // with `.default(false)` (`permission.zod.ts`), so they are present-as-false
 // (#14129 first review; pinned below).
 const grantsWildcardWrite = (wc: any): boolean =>
 wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true ||
 wc.allowTransfer === true;

 // The REAL derivation under pin — also applied to synthetic sets below so
 // the floor is testable against shapes no seeded set carries yet.
 const deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets = (sets: readonly any[]): string[] =>
 sets
 .filter((s: any) => {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 return !!wc && grantsWildcardWrite(wc);
 })
 .map((s) => s.name)
 .sort();

 const writeGrantingWildcardSets: string[] = deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets(defaultPermissionSets);

 /**
 * The one documented exclusion: `admin_full_access` keeps its unqualified
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -435,6 +452,77 @@ describe('managed-deny targets — independent-property floor + registry union r
 expect([...MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS]).not.toContain('admin_full_access');
 });

 // ── The floor judged against synthetic wildcards (#14137) ──
 // `allowTransfer` is the evaluator's FIRST grant route (a direct bit read
 // off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`) and is ENFORCED today through the
 // insert/update owner_id door (#3004): a transfer-only wildcard holds
 // ownership reassignment on every managed identity table while all three
 // CRUD write flags and `modifyAllRecords` are false — visible only in the
 // evaluator's grant semantics, never in the flags the older clauses read.
 // Every shape below goes through `PermissionSetSchema.parse` first so Zod
 // materialises the `.default(false)` bits: the parsed wildcard carries the
 // unauthored bits present-as-false, exactly what the seeded sets look like
 // to the filter.
 describe('the floor sees the evaluator first grant route — allowTransfer (#14137)', () => {
 const parseProbeSet = (wildcard: Record<string, boolean>): any =>
 PermissionSetSchema.parse({
 name: 'synthetic_floor_probe',
 label: 'Synthetic floor probe',
 objects: { '*': wildcard },
 });

 it('a transfer-only wildcard is required to be a managed-deny target (the card)', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true });
 const wc: any = probe.objects['*'];
 // The shape really is the card's: all three CRUD write flags AND
 // `modifyAllRecords` are (present-as-)false after parse.
 expect(wc.allowCreate).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowEdit).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowDelete).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.modifyAllRecords).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowTransfer).toBe(true);
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual(['synthetic_floor_probe']);
 });

 it('reverse control: a read-only wildcard is still NOT required', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true });
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual([]);
 });

 it('present-as-false: an explicit allowTransfer:false wildcard does not trip the floor (value test, not key-existence)', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true, allowTransfer: false });
 const wc: any = probe.objects['*'];
 // The key IS present after parse — `.default(false)` materialises it —
 // so a key-existence rewrite of the floor turns exactly this pin red
 // (#14129 first review; not to be re-litigated).
 expect('allowTransfer' in wc).toBe(true);
 expect(wc.allowTransfer).toBe(false);
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual([]);
 });

 it('invariance: the allowTransfer clause changes no existing seeded set verdict (zero delta today)', () => {
 // The pre-#14137 four-clause floor, restated ONLY to diff verdicts
 // against: if a future seeded set legitimately relies on the
 // `allowTransfer` clause, this pin goes red and the zero-delta claim is
 // consciously retired — the same review moment the membership diff
 // above forces.
 let wildcardsSeen = 0;
 for (const s of defaultPermissionSets as any[]) {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 if (!wc) continue;
 wildcardsSeen += 1;
 const preFloor =
 wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true;
 expect(grantsWildcardWrite(wc), `verdict drifted for ${s.name}`).toBe(preFloor);
 }
 // Non-vacuousness: the loop really visited the seeded wildcards.
 expect(wildcardsSeen).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(3);
 });
 });

 // ── The behaviour the membership buys, measured on the REAL derived set ──
 // (clones so the module-level instances other tests read stay unmutated;
 // the kernel path hands the same objects to the same function in place).
Expand Down
Loading

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

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test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first grant route — allowTransfer#14220

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os-steve
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Sep 1, 2026

+141

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test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first grant route — allowTransfer
#14220
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3c3e3c6

test(plugin-security): managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first …


claude Sep 1, 2026
327abe0

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14137-ma…


claude Sep 1, 2026
6fec5c3

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14137-ma…


claude Sep 1, 2026

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25 changes: 25 additions & 0 deletions
.changeset/managed-deny-floor-allowtransfer.md

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
---
"@objectstack/plugin-security": patch
---

test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor now sees the evaluator's first grant route — `allowTransfer` (#14137)

The independent-property floor that derives which seeded default permission
sets MUST be managed-deny targets ("a default set whose `'*'` wildcard grants
a write", pinned in `default-permission-sets.test.ts` and diffed against
`MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS`, #14029) read only the three CRUD write flags plus
`modifyAllRecords`. That missed the evaluator's FIRST grant route — the
direct bit read off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION` (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'`),
a real grant ENFORCED today through the insert/update `owner_id` door (#3004).
A future default set shaped `'*': { allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true }`
would have held ownership reassignment on every `managedBy: 'better-auth'`
identity table while tripping neither floor clause, so it was never required
to become a managed-deny target and would have kept its wildcard silently.

The floor now also checks `wc.allowTransfer === true` (a value test, never
key-existence — Zod materialises these bits with `.default(false)`, so they
are present-as-false; #14129 first review), and both exhaustive docblocks
name the first route. Zero behaviour delta today: no existing seeded set
carries a transfer-granting wildcard, every existing set keeps its exact
verdict (pinned), and the runtime deny application is byte-identical — this
hardens a CI-time pin, not the shipped permission surface.

10 changes: 8 additions & 2 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/managed-object-write-denies.ts

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -82,15 +82,21 @@ export const MANAGED_DENY_ENTRY = {
 *
 * Holding a write-granting `'*'` wildcard is the FLOOR of membership, not its
 * definition: every default set whose wildcard grants any generic write class
 * — via the three write flags (`allowCreate`/`allowEdit`/`allowDelete`) OR via
 * — via the three write flags (`allowCreate`/`allowEdit`/`allowDelete`), OR
 * via `allowTransfer` (#14137), the ownership-reassignment bit the
 * evaluator's FIRST route reads directly off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`
 * (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'`, `permission-evaluator.ts`; a real grant,
 * ENFORCED today through the insert/update `owner_id` door, #3004), OR via
 * `modifyAllRecords`, whose super-user bypass grants edit/delete and the
 * destructive class by the evaluator's second route (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`,
 * `permission-evaluator.ts`) — must be listed here (or carry a documented
 * exclusion below), because the wildcard is what would otherwise grant raw
 * writes on a newly-declared identity table — that floor is what
 * `default-permission-sets.test.ts` derives independently and diffs against
 * this list (#14029), so a future write-granting set that is not added here
 * fails a pin instead of silently keeping its wildcard.
 * fails a pin instead of silently keeping its wildcard. (The clause list is
 * exhaustive over the evaluator's two known grant tables; a census of routes
 * beyond them has not been done — #14137 "Not established".)
 * Membership is WIDER than the floor: `viewer_readonly`'s wildcard is read-only
 * and `member_default` has held none since #5491 — their injected entries are
 * belt-and-suspenders and the read grant itself, respectively (see the module
Expand Down

128 changes: 108 additions & 20 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/objects/default-permission-sets.test.ts

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -384,26 +384,43 @@ describe('admin_full_access imports the kernel capability declaration unchanged
 */
describe('managed-deny targets — independent-property floor + registry union reaches the derived variant (#14029)', () => {
 // Derived from `defaultPermissionSets`, never from the list under test.
 // "Grants a write" in the evaluator's own terms: the three CRUD flags OR
 // `modifyAllRecords` — the super-user bypass grants edit/delete and the
 // destructive class by a second route (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`,
 // `permission-evaluator.ts`), so `'*': { modifyAllRecords: true }` is
 // write-granting even with all three CRUD flags false. Value tests
 // (`=== true`), not key-existence: Zod materialises the superuser bits with
 // `.default(false)` (`permission.zod.ts`), so they are present-as-false.
 const writeGrantingWildcardSets: string[] = defaultPermissionSets
 .filter((s: any) => {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 return (
 !!wc &&
 (wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true)
 );
 })
 .map((s) => s.name)
 .sort();
 // "Grants a write" in the evaluator's own terms — the bits its grant routes
 // read (`permission-evaluator.ts`):
 // - FIRST route, a direct bit read off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`: the three
 // CRUD write flags, plus `allowTransfer` (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'` —
 // reassigning `owner_id`; a real grant, ENFORCED today through the
 // insert/update owner_id door, #3004), so
 // `'*': { allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true }` is write-granting even
 // with all three CRUD flags AND `modifyAllRecords` false (#14137);
 // - SECOND route, the `modifyAllRecords` super-user bypass, which grants
 // edit/delete and the destructive class (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`), so
 // `'*': { modifyAllRecords: true }` is write-granting even with all three
 // CRUD flags false.
 // (A census of grant routes beyond these two tables has NOT been done —
 // #14137 "Not established" — so this clause list is exhaustive over the two
 // known routes, not a claim about the whole evaluator.)
 // Value tests (`=== true`), not key-existence: Zod materialises these bits
 // with `.default(false)` (`permission.zod.ts`), so they are present-as-false
 // (#14129 first review; pinned below).
 const grantsWildcardWrite = (wc: any): boolean =>
 wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true ||
 wc.allowTransfer === true;

 // The REAL derivation under pin — also applied to synthetic sets below so
 // the floor is testable against shapes no seeded set carries yet.
 const deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets = (sets: readonly any[]): string[] =>
 sets
 .filter((s: any) => {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 return !!wc && grantsWildcardWrite(wc);
 })
 .map((s) => s.name)
 .sort();

 const writeGrantingWildcardSets: string[] = deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets(defaultPermissionSets);

 /**
 * The one documented exclusion: `admin_full_access` keeps its unqualified
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -435,6 +452,77 @@ describe('managed-deny targets — independent-property floor + registry union r
 expect([...MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS]).not.toContain('admin_full_access');
 });

 // ── The floor judged against synthetic wildcards (#14137) ──
 // `allowTransfer` is the evaluator's FIRST grant route (a direct bit read
 // off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`) and is ENFORCED today through the
 // insert/update owner_id door (#3004): a transfer-only wildcard holds
 // ownership reassignment on every managed identity table while all three
 // CRUD write flags and `modifyAllRecords` are false — visible only in the
 // evaluator's grant semantics, never in the flags the older clauses read.
 // Every shape below goes through `PermissionSetSchema.parse` first so Zod
 // materialises the `.default(false)` bits: the parsed wildcard carries the
 // unauthored bits present-as-false, exactly what the seeded sets look like
 // to the filter.
 describe('the floor sees the evaluator first grant route — allowTransfer (#14137)', () => {
 const parseProbeSet = (wildcard: Record<string, boolean>): any =>
 PermissionSetSchema.parse({
 name: 'synthetic_floor_probe',
 label: 'Synthetic floor probe',
 objects: { '*': wildcard },
 });

 it('a transfer-only wildcard is required to be a managed-deny target (the card)', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true });
 const wc: any = probe.objects['*'];
 // The shape really is the card's: all three CRUD write flags AND
 // `modifyAllRecords` are (present-as-)false after parse.
 expect(wc.allowCreate).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowEdit).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowDelete).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.modifyAllRecords).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowTransfer).toBe(true);
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual(['synthetic_floor_probe']);
 });

 it('reverse control: a read-only wildcard is still NOT required', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true });
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual([]);
 });

 it('present-as-false: an explicit allowTransfer:false wildcard does not trip the floor (value test, not key-existence)', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true, allowTransfer: false });
 const wc: any = probe.objects['*'];
 // The key IS present after parse — `.default(false)` materialises it —
 // so a key-existence rewrite of the floor turns exactly this pin red
 // (#14129 first review; not to be re-litigated).
 expect('allowTransfer' in wc).toBe(true);
 expect(wc.allowTransfer).toBe(false);
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual([]);
 });

 it('invariance: the allowTransfer clause changes no existing seeded set verdict (zero delta today)', () => {
 // The pre-#14137 four-clause floor, restated ONLY to diff verdicts
 // against: if a future seeded set legitimately relies on the
 // `allowTransfer` clause, this pin goes red and the zero-delta claim is
 // consciously retired — the same review moment the membership diff
 // above forces.
 let wildcardsSeen = 0;
 for (const s of defaultPermissionSets as any[]) {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 if (!wc) continue;
 wildcardsSeen += 1;
 const preFloor =
 wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true;
 expect(grantsWildcardWrite(wc), `verdict drifted for ${s.name}`).toBe(preFloor);
 }
 // Non-vacuousness: the loop really visited the seeded wildcards.
 expect(wildcardsSeen).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(3);
 });
 });

 // ── The behaviour the membership buys, measured on the REAL derived set ──
 // (clones so the module-level instances other tests read stay unmutated;
 // the kernel path hands the same objects to the same function in place).
Expand Down
Loading

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first grant route — allowTransfer#14220

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 Merged

os-steve
merged 3 commits into

from

Sep 1, 2026

+141

−22

 Merged


test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first grant route — allowTransfer
#14220
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3c3e3c6

test(plugin-security): managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first …


claude Sep 1, 2026
327abe0

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14137-ma…


claude Sep 1, 2026
6fec5c3

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14137-ma…


claude Sep 1, 2026

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25 changes: 25 additions & 0 deletions
.changeset/managed-deny-floor-allowtransfer.md

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Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
---
"@objectstack/plugin-security": patch
---

test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor now sees the evaluator's first grant route — `allowTransfer` (#14137)

The independent-property floor that derives which seeded default permission
sets MUST be managed-deny targets ("a default set whose `'*'` wildcard grants
a write", pinned in `default-permission-sets.test.ts` and diffed against
`MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS`, #14029) read only the three CRUD write flags plus
`modifyAllRecords`. That missed the evaluator's FIRST grant route — the
direct bit read off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION` (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'`),
a real grant ENFORCED today through the insert/update `owner_id` door (#3004).
A future default set shaped `'*': { allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true }`
would have held ownership reassignment on every `managedBy: 'better-auth'`
identity table while tripping neither floor clause, so it was never required
to become a managed-deny target and would have kept its wildcard silently.

The floor now also checks `wc.allowTransfer === true` (a value test, never
key-existence — Zod materialises these bits with `.default(false)`, so they
are present-as-false; #14129 first review), and both exhaustive docblocks
name the first route. Zero behaviour delta today: no existing seeded set
carries a transfer-granting wildcard, every existing set keeps its exact
verdict (pinned), and the runtime deny application is byte-identical — this
hardens a CI-time pin, not the shipped permission surface.

10 changes: 8 additions & 2 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/managed-object-write-denies.ts

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -82,15 +82,21 @@ export const MANAGED_DENY_ENTRY = {
 *
 * Holding a write-granting `'*'` wildcard is the FLOOR of membership, not its
 * definition: every default set whose wildcard grants any generic write class
 * — via the three write flags (`allowCreate`/`allowEdit`/`allowDelete`) OR via
 * — via the three write flags (`allowCreate`/`allowEdit`/`allowDelete`), OR
 * via `allowTransfer` (#14137), the ownership-reassignment bit the
 * evaluator's FIRST route reads directly off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`
 * (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'`, `permission-evaluator.ts`; a real grant,
 * ENFORCED today through the insert/update `owner_id` door, #3004), OR via
 * `modifyAllRecords`, whose super-user bypass grants edit/delete and the
 * destructive class by the evaluator's second route (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`,
 * `permission-evaluator.ts`) — must be listed here (or carry a documented
 * exclusion below), because the wildcard is what would otherwise grant raw
 * writes on a newly-declared identity table — that floor is what
 * `default-permission-sets.test.ts` derives independently and diffs against
 * this list (#14029), so a future write-granting set that is not added here
 * fails a pin instead of silently keeping its wildcard.
 * fails a pin instead of silently keeping its wildcard. (The clause list is
 * exhaustive over the evaluator's two known grant tables; a census of routes
 * beyond them has not been done — #14137 "Not established".)
 * Membership is WIDER than the floor: `viewer_readonly`'s wildcard is read-only
 * and `member_default` has held none since #5491 — their injected entries are
 * belt-and-suspenders and the read grant itself, respectively (see the module
Expand Down

128 changes: 108 additions & 20 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/objects/default-permission-sets.test.ts

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -384,26 +384,43 @@ describe('admin_full_access imports the kernel capability declaration unchanged
 */
describe('managed-deny targets — independent-property floor + registry union reaches the derived variant (#14029)', () => {
 // Derived from `defaultPermissionSets`, never from the list under test.
 // "Grants a write" in the evaluator's own terms: the three CRUD flags OR
 // `modifyAllRecords` — the super-user bypass grants edit/delete and the
 // destructive class by a second route (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`,
 // `permission-evaluator.ts`), so `'*': { modifyAllRecords: true }` is
 // write-granting even with all three CRUD flags false. Value tests
 // (`=== true`), not key-existence: Zod materialises the superuser bits with
 // `.default(false)` (`permission.zod.ts`), so they are present-as-false.
 const writeGrantingWildcardSets: string[] = defaultPermissionSets
 .filter((s: any) => {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 return (
 !!wc &&
 (wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true)
 );
 })
 .map((s) => s.name)
 .sort();
 // "Grants a write" in the evaluator's own terms — the bits its grant routes
 // read (`permission-evaluator.ts`):
 // - FIRST route, a direct bit read off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`: the three
 // CRUD write flags, plus `allowTransfer` (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'` —
 // reassigning `owner_id`; a real grant, ENFORCED today through the
 // insert/update owner_id door, #3004), so
 // `'*': { allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true }` is write-granting even
 // with all three CRUD flags AND `modifyAllRecords` false (#14137);
 // - SECOND route, the `modifyAllRecords` super-user bypass, which grants
 // edit/delete and the destructive class (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`), so
 // `'*': { modifyAllRecords: true }` is write-granting even with all three
 // CRUD flags false.
 // (A census of grant routes beyond these two tables has NOT been done —
 // #14137 "Not established" — so this clause list is exhaustive over the two
 // known routes, not a claim about the whole evaluator.)
 // Value tests (`=== true`), not key-existence: Zod materialises these bits
 // with `.default(false)` (`permission.zod.ts`), so they are present-as-false
 // (#14129 first review; pinned below).
 const grantsWildcardWrite = (wc: any): boolean =>
 wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true ||
 wc.allowTransfer === true;

 // The REAL derivation under pin — also applied to synthetic sets below so
 // the floor is testable against shapes no seeded set carries yet.
 const deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets = (sets: readonly any[]): string[] =>
 sets
 .filter((s: any) => {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 return !!wc && grantsWildcardWrite(wc);
 })
 .map((s) => s.name)
 .sort();

 const writeGrantingWildcardSets: string[] = deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets(defaultPermissionSets);

 /**
 * The one documented exclusion: `admin_full_access` keeps its unqualified
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -435,6 +452,77 @@ describe('managed-deny targets — independent-property floor + registry union r
 expect([...MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS]).not.toContain('admin_full_access');
 });

 // ── The floor judged against synthetic wildcards (#14137) ──
 // `allowTransfer` is the evaluator's FIRST grant route (a direct bit read
 // off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`) and is ENFORCED today through the
 // insert/update owner_id door (#3004): a transfer-only wildcard holds
 // ownership reassignment on every managed identity table while all three
 // CRUD write flags and `modifyAllRecords` are false — visible only in the
 // evaluator's grant semantics, never in the flags the older clauses read.
 // Every shape below goes through `PermissionSetSchema.parse` first so Zod
 // materialises the `.default(false)` bits: the parsed wildcard carries the
 // unauthored bits present-as-false, exactly what the seeded sets look like
 // to the filter.
 describe('the floor sees the evaluator first grant route — allowTransfer (#14137)', () => {
 const parseProbeSet = (wildcard: Record<string, boolean>): any =>
 PermissionSetSchema.parse({
 name: 'synthetic_floor_probe',
 label: 'Synthetic floor probe',
 objects: { '*': wildcard },
 });

 it('a transfer-only wildcard is required to be a managed-deny target (the card)', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true });
 const wc: any = probe.objects['*'];
 // The shape really is the card's: all three CRUD write flags AND
 // `modifyAllRecords` are (present-as-)false after parse.
 expect(wc.allowCreate).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowEdit).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowDelete).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.modifyAllRecords).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowTransfer).toBe(true);
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual(['synthetic_floor_probe']);
 });

 it('reverse control: a read-only wildcard is still NOT required', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true });
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual([]);
 });

 it('present-as-false: an explicit allowTransfer:false wildcard does not trip the floor (value test, not key-existence)', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true, allowTransfer: false });
 const wc: any = probe.objects['*'];
 // The key IS present after parse — `.default(false)` materialises it —
 // so a key-existence rewrite of the floor turns exactly this pin red
 // (#14129 first review; not to be re-litigated).
 expect('allowTransfer' in wc).toBe(true);
 expect(wc.allowTransfer).toBe(false);
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual([]);
 });

 it('invariance: the allowTransfer clause changes no existing seeded set verdict (zero delta today)', () => {
 // The pre-#14137 four-clause floor, restated ONLY to diff verdicts
 // against: if a future seeded set legitimately relies on the
 // `allowTransfer` clause, this pin goes red and the zero-delta claim is
 // consciously retired — the same review moment the membership diff
 // above forces.
 let wildcardsSeen = 0;
 for (const s of defaultPermissionSets as any[]) {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 if (!wc) continue;
 wildcardsSeen += 1;
 const preFloor =
 wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true;
 expect(grantsWildcardWrite(wc), `verdict drifted for ${s.name}`).toBe(preFloor);
 }
 // Non-vacuousness: the loop really visited the seeded wildcards.
 expect(wildcardsSeen).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(3);
 });
 });

 // ── The behaviour the membership buys, measured on the REAL derived set ──
 // (clones so the module-level instances other tests read stay unmutated;
 // the kernel path hands the same objects to the same function in place).
Expand Down
Loading

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first grant route — allowTransfer#14220

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privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

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 Merged

os-steve
merged 3 commits into

from

Sep 1, 2026

+141

−22

 Merged


test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first grant route — allowTransfer
#14220
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3c3e3c6

test(plugin-security): managed-deny floor sees the evaluator's first …


claude Sep 1, 2026
327abe0

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14137-ma…


claude Sep 1, 2026
6fec5c3

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14137-ma…


claude Sep 1, 2026

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.changeset/managed-deny-floor-allowtransfer.md

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@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
---
"@objectstack/plugin-security": patch
---

test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor now sees the evaluator's first grant route — `allowTransfer` (#14137)

The independent-property floor that derives which seeded default permission
sets MUST be managed-deny targets ("a default set whose `'*'` wildcard grants
a write", pinned in `default-permission-sets.test.ts` and diffed against
`MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS`, #14029) read only the three CRUD write flags plus
`modifyAllRecords`. That missed the evaluator's FIRST grant route — the
direct bit read off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION` (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'`),
a real grant ENFORCED today through the insert/update `owner_id` door (#3004).
A future default set shaped `'*': { allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true }`
would have held ownership reassignment on every `managedBy: 'better-auth'`
identity table while tripping neither floor clause, so it was never required
to become a managed-deny target and would have kept its wildcard silently.

The floor now also checks `wc.allowTransfer === true` (a value test, never
key-existence — Zod materialises these bits with `.default(false)`, so they
are present-as-false; #14129 first review), and both exhaustive docblocks
name the first route. Zero behaviour delta today: no existing seeded set
carries a transfer-granting wildcard, every existing set keeps its exact
verdict (pinned), and the runtime deny application is byte-identical — this
hardens a CI-time pin, not the shipped permission surface.

10 changes: 8 additions & 2 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/managed-object-write-denies.ts

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -82,15 +82,21 @@ export const MANAGED_DENY_ENTRY = {
 *
 * Holding a write-granting `'*'` wildcard is the FLOOR of membership, not its
 * definition: every default set whose wildcard grants any generic write class
 * — via the three write flags (`allowCreate`/`allowEdit`/`allowDelete`) OR via
 * — via the three write flags (`allowCreate`/`allowEdit`/`allowDelete`), OR
 * via `allowTransfer` (#14137), the ownership-reassignment bit the
 * evaluator's FIRST route reads directly off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`
 * (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'`, `permission-evaluator.ts`; a real grant,
 * ENFORCED today through the insert/update `owner_id` door, #3004), OR via
 * `modifyAllRecords`, whose super-user bypass grants edit/delete and the
 * destructive class by the evaluator's second route (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`,
 * `permission-evaluator.ts`) — must be listed here (or carry a documented
 * exclusion below), because the wildcard is what would otherwise grant raw
 * writes on a newly-declared identity table — that floor is what
 * `default-permission-sets.test.ts` derives independently and diffs against
 * this list (#14029), so a future write-granting set that is not added here
 * fails a pin instead of silently keeping its wildcard.
 * fails a pin instead of silently keeping its wildcard. (The clause list is
 * exhaustive over the evaluator's two known grant tables; a census of routes
 * beyond them has not been done — #14137 "Not established".)
 * Membership is WIDER than the floor: `viewer_readonly`'s wildcard is read-only
 * and `member_default` has held none since #5491 — their injected entries are
 * belt-and-suspenders and the read grant itself, respectively (see the module
Expand Down

128 changes: 108 additions & 20 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/objects/default-permission-sets.test.ts

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -384,26 +384,43 @@ describe('admin_full_access imports the kernel capability declaration unchanged
 */
describe('managed-deny targets — independent-property floor + registry union reaches the derived variant (#14029)', () => {
 // Derived from `defaultPermissionSets`, never from the list under test.
 // "Grants a write" in the evaluator's own terms: the three CRUD flags OR
 // `modifyAllRecords` — the super-user bypass grants edit/delete and the
 // destructive class by a second route (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`,
 // `permission-evaluator.ts`), so `'*': { modifyAllRecords: true }` is
 // write-granting even with all three CRUD flags false. Value tests
 // (`=== true`), not key-existence: Zod materialises the superuser bits with
 // `.default(false)` (`permission.zod.ts`), so they are present-as-false.
 const writeGrantingWildcardSets: string[] = defaultPermissionSets
 .filter((s: any) => {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 return (
 !!wc &&
 (wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true)
 );
 })
 .map((s) => s.name)
 .sort();
 // "Grants a write" in the evaluator's own terms — the bits its grant routes
 // read (`permission-evaluator.ts`):
 // - FIRST route, a direct bit read off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`: the three
 // CRUD write flags, plus `allowTransfer` (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'` —
 // reassigning `owner_id`; a real grant, ENFORCED today through the
 // insert/update owner_id door, #3004), so
 // `'*': { allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true }` is write-granting even
 // with all three CRUD flags AND `modifyAllRecords` false (#14137);
 // - SECOND route, the `modifyAllRecords` super-user bypass, which grants
 // edit/delete and the destructive class (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`), so
 // `'*': { modifyAllRecords: true }` is write-granting even with all three
 // CRUD flags false.
 // (A census of grant routes beyond these two tables has NOT been done —
 // #14137 "Not established" — so this clause list is exhaustive over the two
 // known routes, not a claim about the whole evaluator.)
 // Value tests (`=== true`), not key-existence: Zod materialises these bits
 // with `.default(false)` (`permission.zod.ts`), so they are present-as-false
 // (#14129 first review; pinned below).
 const grantsWildcardWrite = (wc: any): boolean =>
 wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true ||
 wc.allowTransfer === true;

 // The REAL derivation under pin — also applied to synthetic sets below so
 // the floor is testable against shapes no seeded set carries yet.
 const deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets = (sets: readonly any[]): string[] =>
 sets
 .filter((s: any) => {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 return !!wc && grantsWildcardWrite(wc);
 })
 .map((s) => s.name)
 .sort();

 const writeGrantingWildcardSets: string[] = deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets(defaultPermissionSets);

 /**
 * The one documented exclusion: `admin_full_access` keeps its unqualified
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -435,6 +452,77 @@ describe('managed-deny targets — independent-property floor + registry union r
 expect([...MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS]).not.toContain('admin_full_access');
 });

 // ── The floor judged against synthetic wildcards (#14137) ──
 // `allowTransfer` is the evaluator's FIRST grant route (a direct bit read
 // off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`) and is ENFORCED today through the
 // insert/update owner_id door (#3004): a transfer-only wildcard holds
 // ownership reassignment on every managed identity table while all three
 // CRUD write flags and `modifyAllRecords` are false — visible only in the
 // evaluator's grant semantics, never in the flags the older clauses read.
 // Every shape below goes through `PermissionSetSchema.parse` first so Zod
 // materialises the `.default(false)` bits: the parsed wildcard carries the
 // unauthored bits present-as-false, exactly what the seeded sets look like
 // to the filter.
 describe('the floor sees the evaluator first grant route — allowTransfer (#14137)', () => {
 const parseProbeSet = (wildcard: Record<string, boolean>): any =>
 PermissionSetSchema.parse({
 name: 'synthetic_floor_probe',
 label: 'Synthetic floor probe',
 objects: { '*': wildcard },
 });

 it('a transfer-only wildcard is required to be a managed-deny target (the card)', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true });
 const wc: any = probe.objects['*'];
 // The shape really is the card's: all three CRUD write flags AND
 // `modifyAllRecords` are (present-as-)false after parse.
 expect(wc.allowCreate).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowEdit).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowDelete).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.modifyAllRecords).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowTransfer).toBe(true);
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual(['synthetic_floor_probe']);
 });

 it('reverse control: a read-only wildcard is still NOT required', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true });
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual([]);
 });

 it('present-as-false: an explicit allowTransfer:false wildcard does not trip the floor (value test, not key-existence)', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true, allowTransfer: false });
 const wc: any = probe.objects['*'];
 // The key IS present after parse — `.default(false)` materialises it —
 // so a key-existence rewrite of the floor turns exactly this pin red
 // (#14129 first review; not to be re-litigated).
 expect('allowTransfer' in wc).toBe(true);
 expect(wc.allowTransfer).toBe(false);
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual([]);
 });

 it('invariance: the allowTransfer clause changes no existing seeded set verdict (zero delta today)', () => {
 // The pre-#14137 four-clause floor, restated ONLY to diff verdicts
 // against: if a future seeded set legitimately relies on the
 // `allowTransfer` clause, this pin goes red and the zero-delta claim is
 // consciously retired — the same review moment the membership diff
 // above forces.
 let wildcardsSeen = 0;
 for (const s of defaultPermissionSets as any[]) {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 if (!wc) continue;
 wildcardsSeen += 1;
 const preFloor =
 wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true;
 expect(grantsWildcardWrite(wc), `verdict drifted for ${s.name}`).toBe(preFloor);
 }
 // Non-vacuousness: the loop really visited the seeded wildcards.
 expect(wildcardsSeen).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(3);
 });
 });

 // ── The behaviour the membership buys, measured on the REAL derived set ──
 // (clones so the module-level instances other tests read stay unmutated;
 // the kernel path hands the same objects to the same function in place).
Expand Down
Loading

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

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#14220
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14137-ma…


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25 changes: 25 additions & 0 deletions
.changeset/managed-deny-floor-allowtransfer.md

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
---
"@objectstack/plugin-security": patch
---

test(plugin-security): the managed-deny floor now sees the evaluator's first grant route — `allowTransfer` (#14137)

The independent-property floor that derives which seeded default permission
sets MUST be managed-deny targets ("a default set whose `'*'` wildcard grants
a write", pinned in `default-permission-sets.test.ts` and diffed against
`MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS`, #14029) read only the three CRUD write flags plus
`modifyAllRecords`. That missed the evaluator's FIRST grant route — the
direct bit read off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION` (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'`),
a real grant ENFORCED today through the insert/update `owner_id` door (#3004).
A future default set shaped `'*': { allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true }`
would have held ownership reassignment on every `managedBy: 'better-auth'`
identity table while tripping neither floor clause, so it was never required
to become a managed-deny target and would have kept its wildcard silently.

The floor now also checks `wc.allowTransfer === true` (a value test, never
key-existence — Zod materialises these bits with `.default(false)`, so they
are present-as-false; #14129 first review), and both exhaustive docblocks
name the first route. Zero behaviour delta today: no existing seeded set
carries a transfer-granting wildcard, every existing set keeps its exact
verdict (pinned), and the runtime deny application is byte-identical — this
hardens a CI-time pin, not the shipped permission surface.

10 changes: 8 additions & 2 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/managed-object-write-denies.ts

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -82,15 +82,21 @@ export const MANAGED_DENY_ENTRY = {
 *
 * Holding a write-granting `'*'` wildcard is the FLOOR of membership, not its
 * definition: every default set whose wildcard grants any generic write class
 * — via the three write flags (`allowCreate`/`allowEdit`/`allowDelete`) OR via
 * — via the three write flags (`allowCreate`/`allowEdit`/`allowDelete`), OR
 * via `allowTransfer` (#14137), the ownership-reassignment bit the
 * evaluator's FIRST route reads directly off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`
 * (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'`, `permission-evaluator.ts`; a real grant,
 * ENFORCED today through the insert/update `owner_id` door, #3004), OR via
 * `modifyAllRecords`, whose super-user bypass grants edit/delete and the
 * destructive class by the evaluator's second route (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`,
 * `permission-evaluator.ts`) — must be listed here (or carry a documented
 * exclusion below), because the wildcard is what would otherwise grant raw
 * writes on a newly-declared identity table — that floor is what
 * `default-permission-sets.test.ts` derives independently and diffs against
 * this list (#14029), so a future write-granting set that is not added here
 * fails a pin instead of silently keeping its wildcard.
 * fails a pin instead of silently keeping its wildcard. (The clause list is
 * exhaustive over the evaluator's two known grant tables; a census of routes
 * beyond them has not been done — #14137 "Not established".)
 * Membership is WIDER than the floor: `viewer_readonly`'s wildcard is read-only
 * and `member_default` has held none since #5491 — their injected entries are
 * belt-and-suspenders and the read grant itself, respectively (see the module
Expand Down

128 changes: 108 additions & 20 deletions
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/objects/default-permission-sets.test.ts

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -384,26 +384,43 @@ describe('admin_full_access imports the kernel capability declaration unchanged
 */
describe('managed-deny targets — independent-property floor + registry union reaches the derived variant (#14029)', () => {
 // Derived from `defaultPermissionSets`, never from the list under test.
 // "Grants a write" in the evaluator's own terms: the three CRUD flags OR
 // `modifyAllRecords` — the super-user bypass grants edit/delete and the
 // destructive class by a second route (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`,
 // `permission-evaluator.ts`), so `'*': { modifyAllRecords: true }` is
 // write-granting even with all three CRUD flags false. Value tests
 // (`=== true`), not key-existence: Zod materialises the superuser bits with
 // `.default(false)` (`permission.zod.ts`), so they are present-as-false.
 const writeGrantingWildcardSets: string[] = defaultPermissionSets
 .filter((s: any) => {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 return (
 !!wc &&
 (wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true)
 );
 })
 .map((s) => s.name)
 .sort();
 // "Grants a write" in the evaluator's own terms — the bits its grant routes
 // read (`permission-evaluator.ts`):
 // - FIRST route, a direct bit read off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`: the three
 // CRUD write flags, plus `allowTransfer` (`transfer: 'allowTransfer'` —
 // reassigning `owner_id`; a real grant, ENFORCED today through the
 // insert/update owner_id door, #3004), so
 // `'*': { allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true }` is write-granting even
 // with all three CRUD flags AND `modifyAllRecords` false (#14137);
 // - SECOND route, the `modifyAllRecords` super-user bypass, which grants
 // edit/delete and the destructive class (`MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS`), so
 // `'*': { modifyAllRecords: true }` is write-granting even with all three
 // CRUD flags false.
 // (A census of grant routes beyond these two tables has NOT been done —
 // #14137 "Not established" — so this clause list is exhaustive over the two
 // known routes, not a claim about the whole evaluator.)
 // Value tests (`=== true`), not key-existence: Zod materialises these bits
 // with `.default(false)` (`permission.zod.ts`), so they are present-as-false
 // (#14129 first review; pinned below).
 const grantsWildcardWrite = (wc: any): boolean =>
 wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true ||
 wc.allowTransfer === true;

 // The REAL derivation under pin — also applied to synthetic sets below so
 // the floor is testable against shapes no seeded set carries yet.
 const deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets = (sets: readonly any[]): string[] =>
 sets
 .filter((s: any) => {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 return !!wc && grantsWildcardWrite(wc);
 })
 .map((s) => s.name)
 .sort();

 const writeGrantingWildcardSets: string[] = deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets(defaultPermissionSets);

 /**
 * The one documented exclusion: `admin_full_access` keeps its unqualified
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -435,6 +452,77 @@ describe('managed-deny targets — independent-property floor + registry union r
 expect([...MANAGED_DENY_TARGET_SETS]).not.toContain('admin_full_access');
 });

 // ── The floor judged against synthetic wildcards (#14137) ──
 // `allowTransfer` is the evaluator's FIRST grant route (a direct bit read
 // off `OPERATION_TO_PERMISSION`) and is ENFORCED today through the
 // insert/update owner_id door (#3004): a transfer-only wildcard holds
 // ownership reassignment on every managed identity table while all three
 // CRUD write flags and `modifyAllRecords` are false — visible only in the
 // evaluator's grant semantics, never in the flags the older clauses read.
 // Every shape below goes through `PermissionSetSchema.parse` first so Zod
 // materialises the `.default(false)` bits: the parsed wildcard carries the
 // unauthored bits present-as-false, exactly what the seeded sets look like
 // to the filter.
 describe('the floor sees the evaluator first grant route — allowTransfer (#14137)', () => {
 const parseProbeSet = (wildcard: Record<string, boolean>): any =>
 PermissionSetSchema.parse({
 name: 'synthetic_floor_probe',
 label: 'Synthetic floor probe',
 objects: { '*': wildcard },
 });

 it('a transfer-only wildcard is required to be a managed-deny target (the card)', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true, allowTransfer: true });
 const wc: any = probe.objects['*'];
 // The shape really is the card's: all three CRUD write flags AND
 // `modifyAllRecords` are (present-as-)false after parse.
 expect(wc.allowCreate).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowEdit).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowDelete).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.modifyAllRecords).toBe(false);
 expect(wc.allowTransfer).toBe(true);
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual(['synthetic_floor_probe']);
 });

 it('reverse control: a read-only wildcard is still NOT required', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true });
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual([]);
 });

 it('present-as-false: an explicit allowTransfer:false wildcard does not trip the floor (value test, not key-existence)', () => {
 const probe = parseProbeSet({ allowRead: true, allowTransfer: false });
 const wc: any = probe.objects['*'];
 // The key IS present after parse — `.default(false)` materialises it —
 // so a key-existence rewrite of the floor turns exactly this pin red
 // (#14129 first review; not to be re-litigated).
 expect('allowTransfer' in wc).toBe(true);
 expect(wc.allowTransfer).toBe(false);
 expect(deriveWriteGrantingWildcardSets([probe])).toEqual([]);
 });

 it('invariance: the allowTransfer clause changes no existing seeded set verdict (zero delta today)', () => {
 // The pre-#14137 four-clause floor, restated ONLY to diff verdicts
 // against: if a future seeded set legitimately relies on the
 // `allowTransfer` clause, this pin goes red and the zero-delta claim is
 // consciously retired — the same review moment the membership diff
 // above forces.
 let wildcardsSeen = 0;
 for (const s of defaultPermissionSets as any[]) {
 const wc = s.objects?.['*'];
 if (!wc) continue;
 wildcardsSeen += 1;
 const preFloor =
 wc.allowCreate === true ||
 wc.allowEdit === true ||
 wc.allowDelete === true ||
 wc.modifyAllRecords === true;
 expect(grantsWildcardWrite(wc), `verdict drifted for ${s.name}`).toBe(preFloor);
 }
 // Non-vacuousness: the loop really visited the seeded wildcards.
 expect(wildcardsSeen).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(3);
 });
 });

 // ── The behaviour the membership buys, measured on the REAL derived set ──
 // (clones so the module-level instances other tests read stay unmutated;
 // the kernel path hands the same objects to the same function in place).
Expand Down
Loading