skills(data): split security into rules/security.md under #14296 item 1 (package net −64 tokens) + DATA-B-06#14673

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Merged
os-zhuang merged 5 commits into from
Sep 2, 2026
+237 −235
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skills(data): split security into rules/security.md under #14296 item 1 (package net −64 tokens) + DATA-B-06 #14673

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1847127
skills(data): split Security & Access Control into rules/security.md
claude Sep 2, 2026
680040c
skills(data): move the rules routing table above Core Concepts
claude Sep 2, 2026
965eafc
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14297-sk…
claude Sep 2, 2026
f7d8eae
chore(gates): ratchet-DOWN the role-word baseline for objectstack-data
claude Sep 2, 2026
b3b3cda
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14297-sk…
claude Sep 2, 2026
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10 changes: 9 additions & 1 deletion scripts/check-skills-token-ratchet.mjs
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -313,7 +313,11 @@ export const CEILINGS = new Map([
// a transition gate written as a `validations[]` invariant bricks rows that
// were legal when stored, and an invariant written as `requiredWhen` never
// enforces itself at all. +110 tokens, 1 absorbed by headroom, ceiling +109.
['skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md', 13892],
// 13892 -> 10009: RE-LOCK at the landed count after the `rules/security.md`
// split (#14296 item 1 = A, condition (b)). The raise recorded above is spent
// and its headroom leaves with it; the moved text is priced in its own row
// below, so the package total is unchanged by the re-lock itself.
['skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md', 10009],
['skills/objectstack-formula/SKILL.md', 6002], // -53 (was 6055)
['skills/objectstack-i18n/SKILL.md', 6338], // -11 (was 6349)
// 12705 -> 12984 (2026-08-31 app-repo-principles raise, see the block above).
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -408,6 +412,10 @@ export const CEILINGS = new Map([
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/lifecycle.md', 1590],
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/naming.md', 773],
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/relationships.md', 3778],
// NEW FILE (#14296 item 1 = A, condition (b)): the entry's Security & Access
// Control block moved here whole. Pinned at its landed count — no headroom,
// because a split that arrives with budget is a raise wearing a new path.
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/security.md', 2480],
// 3024 -> 3109 (2026-08-31 app-repo-principles raise, see the block above).
// Severity Levels listed the three values and left the CHOICE unstated: a
// block rests on a judgement a person made, so a machine-inferred signal — a
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion scripts/role-word-baseline.json
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
"content/docs/ui/forms.mdx": 3,
"skills/objectstack-ai/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-automation/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md": 2,
"skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-data/rules/relationships.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-platform/SKILL.md": 2,
"skills/objectstack-query/rules/filters.md": 8,
Expand Down
250 changes: 17 additions & 233 deletions skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md
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Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -37,6 +37,22 @@ metadata:

---

## Quick Reference — Detailed Rules

For comprehensive documentation with incorrect/correct examples:

- **[Naming Conventions](./rules/naming.md)** — snake_case rules, option values, config properties
- **[Field Types](./rules/field-types.md)** — All 49 field types with decision tree and configs
- **[Relationships](./rules/relationships.md)** — lookup vs master_detail, junction patterns, delete behaviors
- **[Validation Rules](./rules/validation.md)** — All validation types, script inversion, severity levels
- **[Index Strategy](./rules/indexing.md)** — btree/gin/gist/fulltext, composite indexes, partial indexes
- **[Data Lifecycle & Retention](./rules/lifecycle.md)** — `lifecycle` classes (record/audit/telemetry/transient/event), retention/TTL/rotation/archive policies; ❗ append-only objects must declare one (distinct from lifecycle *hooks* below)
- **[Lifecycle Hooks](./references/data-hooks.md)** — the 8 lifecycle events, `handler` vs sandboxed `body` (ctx + capability contract), registration, canonical patterns
- **[Datasources & Federation](./rules/datasources.md)** — `defineDatasource`, external/federated objects (`remoteName`/`columnMap`), auto-connect gating, credentials; ❌ no `field.columnName` on external objects
- **[Security & Access Control](./rules/security.md)** — permission sets, assignment rows, RLS policies, `secret` / `requiredPermissions`, `tenancy`, platform-global posture

---

## Core Concepts

### Object Definition
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -280,21 +296,6 @@ export const Invoice = ObjectSchema.create({

---

## Quick Reference — Detailed Rules

For comprehensive documentation with incorrect/correct examples:

- **[Naming Conventions](./rules/naming.md)** — snake_case rules, option values, config properties
- **[Field Types](./rules/field-types.md)** — All 49 field types with decision tree and configs
- **[Relationships](./rules/relationships.md)** — lookup vs master_detail, junction patterns, delete behaviors
- **[Validation Rules](./rules/validation.md)** — All validation types, script inversion, severity levels
- **[Index Strategy](./rules/indexing.md)** — btree/gin/gist/fulltext, composite indexes, partial indexes
- **[Data Lifecycle & Retention](./rules/lifecycle.md)** — `lifecycle` classes (record/audit/telemetry/transient/event), retention/TTL/rotation/archive policies; ❗ append-only objects must declare one (distinct from lifecycle *hooks* below)
- **[Lifecycle Hooks](./references/data-hooks.md)** — the 8 lifecycle events, `handler` vs sandboxed `body` (ctx + capability contract), registration, canonical patterns
- **[Datasources & Federation](./rules/datasources.md)** — `defineDatasource`, external/federated objects (`remoteName`/`columnMap`), auto-connect gating, credentials; ❌ no `field.columnName` on external objects

---

## Quick-Start Template

<!-- os:check -->
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -544,67 +545,7 @@ Per-object access control is authored in **permission sets**, not on the object
schema. There is no object-level `permissions` key (and no `hooks` key either) —
`ObjectSchema.create()` **rejects** both as unknown keys.

### Object-level permissions (RBAC)

Grant CRUD access per object with boolean bits on a permission set:

<!-- os:check -->
```typescript
import { definePermissionSet } from '@objectstack/spec';

export const salesUser = definePermissionSet({
name: 'sales_user',
objects: {
account: { allowRead: true, allowCreate: true, allowEdit: true },
contact: { allowRead: true },
},
});

// Register it on the stack root under `permissions` — NOT `permissionSets`:
// defineStack({ permissions: [salesUser], ... })
```

- **Stack key: `permissions`.** The collection is named for the metadata kind,
not for the factory, so `definePermissionSet()` output goes into
`defineStack({ permissions: [...] })`. `permissionSets:` is **refused at
load** — the top level is strict, so the stack fails with an
`Unrecognized key(s) on this stack definition` error naming the key, never a
silent drop. `ObjectStackDefinitionSchema`
(`node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/stack.zod.ts`) is the enumeration of
record; `objectstack-platform` lists every top-level key.
- Bits: `allowCreate` / `allowRead` / `allowEdit` / `allowDelete`, plus
`allowTransfer` (ownership change), `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords`
(super-user, bypass sharing).
- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts`
- Combine with `enable.apiMethods` to also restrict the HTTP surface.

### Assigning a permission set to a user

Declaring a set grants nobody anything — an assignment is **data**: one row in
the join object **`sys_user_permission_set`** (`@objectstack/plugin-security`),
carrying `user_id`, `permission_set_id`, and an optional `organization_id`
(`null` = every org context). Optional `valid_from` / `valid_until` bound a
half-open window checked at resolution time; `granted_by` is stamped by the
gate on insert — never author it.

⚠️ **`permission_set_id` takes the `sys_permission_set` RECORD ID, not the set's
`name`.** Grants resolve by loading `sys_permission_set` **by `id`**, so a `name`
in that field matches nothing, raises no error, and silently grants nothing.
Declared sets are upserted by `name` with a **generated** `id` on `kernel:ready`
(ADR-0086 D5) — that id differs per environment, so resolve it first.

Assignment is therefore two calls, both `POST /api/v1/data/{object}`
(`…/query` with a QueryAST body for the read): look up the set's `id` in
`sys_permission_set` by `name`, then insert
`{ user_id, permission_set_id, organization_id }` into
`sys_user_permission_set`. Only a tenant admin — or a delegated `adminScope`
carrying `manageAssignments` for that set and user (ADR-0090 D12) — may write
it; plain CRUD bits on the table are not enough.

**Grant looks inert?** Check in order: a `name` in `permission_set_id`; the set
is `active: false`; the validity window has passed; `organization_id` mismatch.
`GET /api/v1/security/explain?object=&operation=&userId=` answers from the
enforcing code path (explaining another user needs `manage_users`).
Full rules: **[Security & Access Control](./rules/security.md)**.

### Access depth (scope-depth) — the ERP "see my unit / my unit and below" axis

Expand All@@ -618,163 +559,6 @@ paid `@objectstack/security-enterprise` plugin, **fail closed to `own`** without
it, and `defineStack` errors unless the grant declares
`requires: ['hierarchy-security']`. Schema: `PermissionSetSchema.objects.*`.

### Row-Level Security (RLS)

The **enforced** RLS surface is a list of `rowLevelSecurity` policies on a
**permission set / profile** (`PermissionSetSchema.rowLevelSecurity`), *not* a
CEL predicate on the object. Each policy carries a `using` (read filter) and/or
`check` (write filter) **string** predicate. The compiler ANDs `using` into
every read for users carrying that set; `check` gates writes. (`@objectstack/plugin-security`
re-reads the target row through the write filter before single-id `update`/`delete`.)

```typescript
// in a permission set (definePermissionSet)
rowLevelSecurity: [
{
name: 'own_records',
object: 'account', // REQUIRED per policy
operation: 'all', // singular: select|insert|update|delete|all
using: 'owner_id == current_user.id', // read scope
check: 'owner_id == current_user.id', // write scope
},
{
name: 'org_isolation',
object: 'contact',
operation: 'select',
using: 'organization_id == current_user.organization_id',
},
]
```

Predicates are **canonical CEL** (ADR-0058): `field == current_user.<prop>`,
`field == 'literal'`, `field in current_user.<array>`, comparisons (`>`/`<`/`>=`/`<=`),
`&&`/`||`/`!`, and `== null` checks all lower to a pushdown filter. **No** cross-object
traversal or subqueries — those are a compile error (ADR-0055), never silently dropped.
A legacy SQL-style `=` / `IN (...)` predicate still compiles via a **deprecated** bridge
(emits a warning) but should be authored in CEL. The compiler resolves these
`current_user.*` placeholders:

| Placeholder | Resolves to |
|:--|:--|
| `current_user.id` | the caller's user id (ownership) |
| `current_user.email` | the caller's email (ADR-0056) |
| `current_user.organization_id` | the caller's tenant |
| `current_user.org_user_ids` | ids of users in the same org (for `IN`) |
| `current_user.positions` | the caller's positions (for `IN`; ADR-0090 D3) |

- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts` (policy shape),
`node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/rls.zod.ts` (predicate grammar).
- Owner-scoping shortcut: the built-in `member_default` set already owner-scopes
writes via `owner_only_writes` / `owner_only_deletes`, and an object's
`sharingModel` (`private` / `public_read` / `public_read_write` / `controlled_by_parent`, ADR-0056 D1)
is the declarative way to set the org-wide default — prefer those over
hand-written policies for the common cases.

### Sensitive fields — `secret` type + `requiredPermissions`

`maskingRule` is **live** (plugin-security's FieldMasker enforces it). The real
channels are:

**Encrypted-at-rest values — `type: 'secret'` (ADR-0100).** For reversible
machine credentials (DB passwords, API keys, tokens): the engine encrypts the
value on write via the registered `ICryptoProvider`, stores the ciphertext
handle in `sys_secret`, persists only an opaque ref on the row, and masks the
value on read. **Fail-closed:** with no crypto provider registered, writes
throw rather than persist cleartext.

```typescript
fields: {
api_key: { type: 'secret', label: 'API Key' },
}
```

**Per-field access gating — `requiredPermissions` (ADR-0066 D3).** Capabilities
required to READ/EDIT the field. A field declaring `requiredPermissions` is
**masked on read and denied on write** unless the caller holds ALL listed
capabilities — an AND-gate that is strictest-wins over permission-set field
grants. Enforced by plugin-security's FieldMasker.

```typescript
fields: {
ssn: {
type: 'text',
requiredPermissions: ['view_pii'], // mask on read / deny on write without it
},
}
```

- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/data/field.zod.ts`
(`secret` field type, `requiredPermissions`)

### Multi-tenancy

For SaaS, set `tenancy` on the object schema for row-level tenant isolation
(the tenant field is injected on write and enforced on read). The block is
**strict** — exactly two keys:

```typescript
tenancy: {
enabled: true, // enable row-level tenant isolation
// tenantField — NO default; omit it and the driver uses `organization_id`
}
```

- **Database-per-tenant isolation is not object metadata** — it is an
environment/deployment choice (each environment carries its own database URL).
- Platform/env-global objects declare `tenancy: { enabled: false }` to opt out
of org row-scoping (see the visibility-posture recipe below).

### Platform-global / admin-only objects (visibility posture)

Some system/config objects are **env-global** (not partitioned per org) and
should be visible to a **platform admin env-wide** but hidden from members —
e.g. identity tables a plugin writes via its own adapter (`sys_sso_provider`,
OAuth clients). These hit a non-obvious interaction:

- Reads of a tenant object pass the **Layer 0 tenant wall** (ADR-0095 D1): an
`organization_id == <the caller's organization>` filter AND-composed ahead of
every business RLS policy. Any row whose `organization_id` is **null or
absent** (common for adapter-written rows that never get the tenant stamp) is
**denied** — the list renders empty. Single-tenant deployments never hit this;
the wall is inert there.
- The `viewAllRecords` superuser bit is **posture-gated and wall-blind**: it
short-circuits **business RLS only**, and only on objects whose posture allows
it (`access.default: 'private'`, `tenancy: { enabled: false }`, or a
better-auth-managed identity table). It never crosses the Layer 0 wall —
crossing takes a *true platform admin* (the superuser bit **and** a
platform-exclusive capability: `manage_metadata`, `manage_platform_settings`,
`studio.access`, `manage_users`) on one of those same postures. So an org
admin holding the superuser bit stays org-scoped, and on an ordinary tenant
object nobody crosses — the admin sees 0 rows too.

**Recipe — env-global, admin-only object that admins can fully see:**

```typescript
tenancy: { enabled: false }, // not a tenant object → Layer 0 contributes nothing
requiredPermissions: ['manage_platform_settings'], // capability AND-gate → members get 403
```

> ⚠️ **Both keys are load-bearing — neither works alone.**
> `tenancy: { enabled: false }` *by itself* switches the wall off for **every**
> caller, and any permission set carrying a wildcard (`'*'`) read grant then
> reads every row env-wide — the shipped `viewer_readonly` still carries one, as
> may an app-declared default profile or a customer-authored set. (The
> `member_default` baseline is **not** one of them: it is explicit-allow and
> grants only the objects it names.) `requiredPermissions` *by itself* leaves the
> object a tenant object, so the wall keeps denying the untagged rows and even a
> platform admin sees nothing. The pair is the correct combo (admin sees all,
> non-admins 403), and `requiredPermissions` is the half that holds however
> permissive the caller's grants are — it is an AND-gate checked **before** the
> CRUD grant. Posture model: ADR-0066; tenant wall: ADR-0095 D1.

### Cross-skill notes

- **API auth providers** (OIDC, JWT, API key) live in **objectstack-api**.
- **Kernel-level RBAC services** (role inheritance, custom policy engines)
live in **objectstack-platform**.
- **CEL predicate syntax** (`P\`...\``, operators, functions) lives in
**objectstack-formula**.

---

## Metadata Protection (`protection`)
Expand Down
Loading
Loading
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all \u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003e blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "github.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '
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skills(data): split security into rules/security.md under #14296 item 1 (package net −64 tokens) + DATA-B-06#14673

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Merged
os-zhuang merged 5 commits into from
Sep 2, 2026
+237 −235
Merged

skills(data): split security into rules/security.md under #14296 item 1 (package net −64 tokens) + DATA-B-06 #14673

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1847127
skills(data): split Security & Access Control into rules/security.md
claude Sep 2, 2026
680040c
skills(data): move the rules routing table above Core Concepts
claude Sep 2, 2026
965eafc
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14297-sk…
claude Sep 2, 2026
f7d8eae
chore(gates): ratchet-DOWN the role-word baseline for objectstack-data
claude Sep 2, 2026
b3b3cda
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14297-sk…
claude Sep 2, 2026
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10 changes: 9 additions & 1 deletion scripts/check-skills-token-ratchet.mjs
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -313,7 +313,11 @@ export const CEILINGS = new Map([
// a transition gate written as a `validations[]` invariant bricks rows that
// were legal when stored, and an invariant written as `requiredWhen` never
// enforces itself at all. +110 tokens, 1 absorbed by headroom, ceiling +109.
['skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md', 13892],
// 13892 -> 10009: RE-LOCK at the landed count after the `rules/security.md`
// split (#14296 item 1 = A, condition (b)). The raise recorded above is spent
// and its headroom leaves with it; the moved text is priced in its own row
// below, so the package total is unchanged by the re-lock itself.
['skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md', 10009],
['skills/objectstack-formula/SKILL.md', 6002], // -53 (was 6055)
['skills/objectstack-i18n/SKILL.md', 6338], // -11 (was 6349)
// 12705 -> 12984 (2026-08-31 app-repo-principles raise, see the block above).
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -408,6 +412,10 @@ export const CEILINGS = new Map([
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/lifecycle.md', 1590],
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/naming.md', 773],
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/relationships.md', 3778],
// NEW FILE (#14296 item 1 = A, condition (b)): the entry's Security & Access
// Control block moved here whole. Pinned at its landed count — no headroom,
// because a split that arrives with budget is a raise wearing a new path.
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/security.md', 2480],
// 3024 -> 3109 (2026-08-31 app-repo-principles raise, see the block above).
// Severity Levels listed the three values and left the CHOICE unstated: a
// block rests on a judgement a person made, so a machine-inferred signal — a
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion scripts/role-word-baseline.json
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
"content/docs/ui/forms.mdx": 3,
"skills/objectstack-ai/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-automation/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md": 2,
"skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-data/rules/relationships.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-platform/SKILL.md": 2,
"skills/objectstack-query/rules/filters.md": 8,
Expand Down
250 changes: 17 additions & 233 deletions skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -37,6 +37,22 @@ metadata:

---

## Quick Reference — Detailed Rules

For comprehensive documentation with incorrect/correct examples:

- **[Naming Conventions](./rules/naming.md)** — snake_case rules, option values, config properties
- **[Field Types](./rules/field-types.md)** — All 49 field types with decision tree and configs
- **[Relationships](./rules/relationships.md)** — lookup vs master_detail, junction patterns, delete behaviors
- **[Validation Rules](./rules/validation.md)** — All validation types, script inversion, severity levels
- **[Index Strategy](./rules/indexing.md)** — btree/gin/gist/fulltext, composite indexes, partial indexes
- **[Data Lifecycle & Retention](./rules/lifecycle.md)** — `lifecycle` classes (record/audit/telemetry/transient/event), retention/TTL/rotation/archive policies; ❗ append-only objects must declare one (distinct from lifecycle *hooks* below)
- **[Lifecycle Hooks](./references/data-hooks.md)** — the 8 lifecycle events, `handler` vs sandboxed `body` (ctx + capability contract), registration, canonical patterns
- **[Datasources & Federation](./rules/datasources.md)** — `defineDatasource`, external/federated objects (`remoteName`/`columnMap`), auto-connect gating, credentials; ❌ no `field.columnName` on external objects
- **[Security & Access Control](./rules/security.md)** — permission sets, assignment rows, RLS policies, `secret` / `requiredPermissions`, `tenancy`, platform-global posture

---

## Core Concepts

### Object Definition
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -280,21 +296,6 @@ export const Invoice = ObjectSchema.create({

---

## Quick Reference — Detailed Rules

For comprehensive documentation with incorrect/correct examples:

- **[Naming Conventions](./rules/naming.md)** — snake_case rules, option values, config properties
- **[Field Types](./rules/field-types.md)** — All 49 field types with decision tree and configs
- **[Relationships](./rules/relationships.md)** — lookup vs master_detail, junction patterns, delete behaviors
- **[Validation Rules](./rules/validation.md)** — All validation types, script inversion, severity levels
- **[Index Strategy](./rules/indexing.md)** — btree/gin/gist/fulltext, composite indexes, partial indexes
- **[Data Lifecycle & Retention](./rules/lifecycle.md)** — `lifecycle` classes (record/audit/telemetry/transient/event), retention/TTL/rotation/archive policies; ❗ append-only objects must declare one (distinct from lifecycle *hooks* below)
- **[Lifecycle Hooks](./references/data-hooks.md)** — the 8 lifecycle events, `handler` vs sandboxed `body` (ctx + capability contract), registration, canonical patterns
- **[Datasources & Federation](./rules/datasources.md)** — `defineDatasource`, external/federated objects (`remoteName`/`columnMap`), auto-connect gating, credentials; ❌ no `field.columnName` on external objects

---

## Quick-Start Template

<!-- os:check -->
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -544,67 +545,7 @@ Per-object access control is authored in **permission sets**, not on the object
schema. There is no object-level `permissions` key (and no `hooks` key either) —
`ObjectSchema.create()` **rejects** both as unknown keys.

### Object-level permissions (RBAC)

Grant CRUD access per object with boolean bits on a permission set:

<!-- os:check -->
```typescript
import { definePermissionSet } from '@objectstack/spec';

export const salesUser = definePermissionSet({
name: 'sales_user',
objects: {
account: { allowRead: true, allowCreate: true, allowEdit: true },
contact: { allowRead: true },
},
});

// Register it on the stack root under `permissions` — NOT `permissionSets`:
// defineStack({ permissions: [salesUser], ... })
```

- **Stack key: `permissions`.** The collection is named for the metadata kind,
not for the factory, so `definePermissionSet()` output goes into
`defineStack({ permissions: [...] })`. `permissionSets:` is **refused at
load** — the top level is strict, so the stack fails with an
`Unrecognized key(s) on this stack definition` error naming the key, never a
silent drop. `ObjectStackDefinitionSchema`
(`node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/stack.zod.ts`) is the enumeration of
record; `objectstack-platform` lists every top-level key.
- Bits: `allowCreate` / `allowRead` / `allowEdit` / `allowDelete`, plus
`allowTransfer` (ownership change), `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords`
(super-user, bypass sharing).
- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts`
- Combine with `enable.apiMethods` to also restrict the HTTP surface.

### Assigning a permission set to a user

Declaring a set grants nobody anything — an assignment is **data**: one row in
the join object **`sys_user_permission_set`** (`@objectstack/plugin-security`),
carrying `user_id`, `permission_set_id`, and an optional `organization_id`
(`null` = every org context). Optional `valid_from` / `valid_until` bound a
half-open window checked at resolution time; `granted_by` is stamped by the
gate on insert — never author it.

⚠️ **`permission_set_id` takes the `sys_permission_set` RECORD ID, not the set's
`name`.** Grants resolve by loading `sys_permission_set` **by `id`**, so a `name`
in that field matches nothing, raises no error, and silently grants nothing.
Declared sets are upserted by `name` with a **generated** `id` on `kernel:ready`
(ADR-0086 D5) — that id differs per environment, so resolve it first.

Assignment is therefore two calls, both `POST /api/v1/data/{object}`
(`…/query` with a QueryAST body for the read): look up the set's `id` in
`sys_permission_set` by `name`, then insert
`{ user_id, permission_set_id, organization_id }` into
`sys_user_permission_set`. Only a tenant admin — or a delegated `adminScope`
carrying `manageAssignments` for that set and user (ADR-0090 D12) — may write
it; plain CRUD bits on the table are not enough.

**Grant looks inert?** Check in order: a `name` in `permission_set_id`; the set
is `active: false`; the validity window has passed; `organization_id` mismatch.
`GET /api/v1/security/explain?object=&operation=&userId=` answers from the
enforcing code path (explaining another user needs `manage_users`).
Full rules: **[Security & Access Control](./rules/security.md)**.

### Access depth (scope-depth) — the ERP "see my unit / my unit and below" axis

Expand All@@ -618,163 +559,6 @@ paid `@objectstack/security-enterprise` plugin, **fail closed to `own`** without
it, and `defineStack` errors unless the grant declares
`requires: ['hierarchy-security']`. Schema: `PermissionSetSchema.objects.*`.

### Row-Level Security (RLS)

The **enforced** RLS surface is a list of `rowLevelSecurity` policies on a
**permission set / profile** (`PermissionSetSchema.rowLevelSecurity`), *not* a
CEL predicate on the object. Each policy carries a `using` (read filter) and/or
`check` (write filter) **string** predicate. The compiler ANDs `using` into
every read for users carrying that set; `check` gates writes. (`@objectstack/plugin-security`
re-reads the target row through the write filter before single-id `update`/`delete`.)

```typescript
// in a permission set (definePermissionSet)
rowLevelSecurity: [
{
name: 'own_records',
object: 'account', // REQUIRED per policy
operation: 'all', // singular: select|insert|update|delete|all
using: 'owner_id == current_user.id', // read scope
check: 'owner_id == current_user.id', // write scope
},
{
name: 'org_isolation',
object: 'contact',
operation: 'select',
using: 'organization_id == current_user.organization_id',
},
]
```

Predicates are **canonical CEL** (ADR-0058): `field == current_user.<prop>`,
`field == 'literal'`, `field in current_user.<array>`, comparisons (`>`/`<`/`>=`/`<=`),
`&&`/`||`/`!`, and `== null` checks all lower to a pushdown filter. **No** cross-object
traversal or subqueries — those are a compile error (ADR-0055), never silently dropped.
A legacy SQL-style `=` / `IN (...)` predicate still compiles via a **deprecated** bridge
(emits a warning) but should be authored in CEL. The compiler resolves these
`current_user.*` placeholders:

| Placeholder | Resolves to |
|:--|:--|
| `current_user.id` | the caller's user id (ownership) |
| `current_user.email` | the caller's email (ADR-0056) |
| `current_user.organization_id` | the caller's tenant |
| `current_user.org_user_ids` | ids of users in the same org (for `IN`) |
| `current_user.positions` | the caller's positions (for `IN`; ADR-0090 D3) |

- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts` (policy shape),
`node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/rls.zod.ts` (predicate grammar).
- Owner-scoping shortcut: the built-in `member_default` set already owner-scopes
writes via `owner_only_writes` / `owner_only_deletes`, and an object's
`sharingModel` (`private` / `public_read` / `public_read_write` / `controlled_by_parent`, ADR-0056 D1)
is the declarative way to set the org-wide default — prefer those over
hand-written policies for the common cases.

### Sensitive fields — `secret` type + `requiredPermissions`

`maskingRule` is **live** (plugin-security's FieldMasker enforces it). The real
channels are:

**Encrypted-at-rest values — `type: 'secret'` (ADR-0100).** For reversible
machine credentials (DB passwords, API keys, tokens): the engine encrypts the
value on write via the registered `ICryptoProvider`, stores the ciphertext
handle in `sys_secret`, persists only an opaque ref on the row, and masks the
value on read. **Fail-closed:** with no crypto provider registered, writes
throw rather than persist cleartext.

```typescript
fields: {
api_key: { type: 'secret', label: 'API Key' },
}
```

**Per-field access gating — `requiredPermissions` (ADR-0066 D3).** Capabilities
required to READ/EDIT the field. A field declaring `requiredPermissions` is
**masked on read and denied on write** unless the caller holds ALL listed
capabilities — an AND-gate that is strictest-wins over permission-set field
grants. Enforced by plugin-security's FieldMasker.

```typescript
fields: {
ssn: {
type: 'text',
requiredPermissions: ['view_pii'], // mask on read / deny on write without it
},
}
```

- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/data/field.zod.ts`
(`secret` field type, `requiredPermissions`)

### Multi-tenancy

For SaaS, set `tenancy` on the object schema for row-level tenant isolation
(the tenant field is injected on write and enforced on read). The block is
**strict** — exactly two keys:

```typescript
tenancy: {
enabled: true, // enable row-level tenant isolation
// tenantField — NO default; omit it and the driver uses `organization_id`
}
```

- **Database-per-tenant isolation is not object metadata** — it is an
environment/deployment choice (each environment carries its own database URL).
- Platform/env-global objects declare `tenancy: { enabled: false }` to opt out
of org row-scoping (see the visibility-posture recipe below).

### Platform-global / admin-only objects (visibility posture)

Some system/config objects are **env-global** (not partitioned per org) and
should be visible to a **platform admin env-wide** but hidden from members —
e.g. identity tables a plugin writes via its own adapter (`sys_sso_provider`,
OAuth clients). These hit a non-obvious interaction:

- Reads of a tenant object pass the **Layer 0 tenant wall** (ADR-0095 D1): an
`organization_id == <the caller's organization>` filter AND-composed ahead of
every business RLS policy. Any row whose `organization_id` is **null or
absent** (common for adapter-written rows that never get the tenant stamp) is
**denied** — the list renders empty. Single-tenant deployments never hit this;
the wall is inert there.
- The `viewAllRecords` superuser bit is **posture-gated and wall-blind**: it
short-circuits **business RLS only**, and only on objects whose posture allows
it (`access.default: 'private'`, `tenancy: { enabled: false }`, or a
better-auth-managed identity table). It never crosses the Layer 0 wall —
crossing takes a *true platform admin* (the superuser bit **and** a
platform-exclusive capability: `manage_metadata`, `manage_platform_settings`,
`studio.access`, `manage_users`) on one of those same postures. So an org
admin holding the superuser bit stays org-scoped, and on an ordinary tenant
object nobody crosses — the admin sees 0 rows too.

**Recipe — env-global, admin-only object that admins can fully see:**

```typescript
tenancy: { enabled: false }, // not a tenant object → Layer 0 contributes nothing
requiredPermissions: ['manage_platform_settings'], // capability AND-gate → members get 403
```

> ⚠️ **Both keys are load-bearing — neither works alone.**
> `tenancy: { enabled: false }` *by itself* switches the wall off for **every**
> caller, and any permission set carrying a wildcard (`'*'`) read grant then
> reads every row env-wide — the shipped `viewer_readonly` still carries one, as
> may an app-declared default profile or a customer-authored set. (The
> `member_default` baseline is **not** one of them: it is explicit-allow and
> grants only the objects it names.) `requiredPermissions` *by itself* leaves the
> object a tenant object, so the wall keeps denying the untagged rows and even a
> platform admin sees nothing. The pair is the correct combo (admin sees all,
> non-admins 403), and `requiredPermissions` is the half that holds however
> permissive the caller's grants are — it is an AND-gate checked **before** the
> CRUD grant. Posture model: ADR-0066; tenant wall: ADR-0095 D1.

### Cross-skill notes

- **API auth providers** (OIDC, JWT, API key) live in **objectstack-api**.
- **Kernel-level RBAC services** (role inheritance, custom policy engines)
live in **objectstack-platform**.
- **CEL predicate syntax** (`P\`...\``, operators, functions) lives in
**objectstack-formula**.

---

## Metadata Protection (`protection`)
Expand Down
Loading
Loading
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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Merged
os-zhuang merged 5 commits into from
Sep 2, 2026
+237 −235
Merged

skills(data): split security into rules/security.md under #14296 item 1 (package net −64 tokens) + DATA-B-06 #14673

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1847127
skills(data): split Security & Access Control into rules/security.md
claude Sep 2, 2026
680040c
skills(data): move the rules routing table above Core Concepts
claude Sep 2, 2026
965eafc
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14297-sk…
claude Sep 2, 2026
f7d8eae
chore(gates): ratchet-DOWN the role-word baseline for objectstack-data
claude Sep 2, 2026
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14297-sk…
claude Sep 2, 2026
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10 changes: 9 additions & 1 deletion scripts/check-skills-token-ratchet.mjs
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -313,7 +313,11 @@ export const CEILINGS = new Map([
// a transition gate written as a `validations[]` invariant bricks rows that
// were legal when stored, and an invariant written as `requiredWhen` never
// enforces itself at all. +110 tokens, 1 absorbed by headroom, ceiling +109.
['skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md', 13892],
// 13892 -> 10009: RE-LOCK at the landed count after the `rules/security.md`
// split (#14296 item 1 = A, condition (b)). The raise recorded above is spent
// and its headroom leaves with it; the moved text is priced in its own row
// below, so the package total is unchanged by the re-lock itself.
['skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md', 10009],
['skills/objectstack-formula/SKILL.md', 6002], // -53 (was 6055)
['skills/objectstack-i18n/SKILL.md', 6338], // -11 (was 6349)
// 12705 -> 12984 (2026-08-31 app-repo-principles raise, see the block above).
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -408,6 +412,10 @@ export const CEILINGS = new Map([
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/lifecycle.md', 1590],
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/naming.md', 773],
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/relationships.md', 3778],
// NEW FILE (#14296 item 1 = A, condition (b)): the entry's Security & Access
// Control block moved here whole. Pinned at its landed count — no headroom,
// because a split that arrives with budget is a raise wearing a new path.
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/security.md', 2480],
// 3024 -> 3109 (2026-08-31 app-repo-principles raise, see the block above).
// Severity Levels listed the three values and left the CHOICE unstated: a
// block rests on a judgement a person made, so a machine-inferred signal — a
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion scripts/role-word-baseline.json
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
"content/docs/ui/forms.mdx": 3,
"skills/objectstack-ai/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-automation/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md": 2,
"skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-data/rules/relationships.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-platform/SKILL.md": 2,
"skills/objectstack-query/rules/filters.md": 8,
Expand Down
250 changes: 17 additions & 233 deletions skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -37,6 +37,22 @@ metadata:

---

## Quick Reference — Detailed Rules

For comprehensive documentation with incorrect/correct examples:

- **[Naming Conventions](./rules/naming.md)** — snake_case rules, option values, config properties
- **[Field Types](./rules/field-types.md)** — All 49 field types with decision tree and configs
- **[Relationships](./rules/relationships.md)** — lookup vs master_detail, junction patterns, delete behaviors
- **[Validation Rules](./rules/validation.md)** — All validation types, script inversion, severity levels
- **[Index Strategy](./rules/indexing.md)** — btree/gin/gist/fulltext, composite indexes, partial indexes
- **[Data Lifecycle & Retention](./rules/lifecycle.md)** — `lifecycle` classes (record/audit/telemetry/transient/event), retention/TTL/rotation/archive policies; ❗ append-only objects must declare one (distinct from lifecycle *hooks* below)
- **[Lifecycle Hooks](./references/data-hooks.md)** — the 8 lifecycle events, `handler` vs sandboxed `body` (ctx + capability contract), registration, canonical patterns
- **[Datasources & Federation](./rules/datasources.md)** — `defineDatasource`, external/federated objects (`remoteName`/`columnMap`), auto-connect gating, credentials; ❌ no `field.columnName` on external objects
- **[Security & Access Control](./rules/security.md)** — permission sets, assignment rows, RLS policies, `secret` / `requiredPermissions`, `tenancy`, platform-global posture

---

## Core Concepts

### Object Definition
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -280,21 +296,6 @@ export const Invoice = ObjectSchema.create({

---

## Quick Reference — Detailed Rules

For comprehensive documentation with incorrect/correct examples:

- **[Naming Conventions](./rules/naming.md)** — snake_case rules, option values, config properties
- **[Field Types](./rules/field-types.md)** — All 49 field types with decision tree and configs
- **[Relationships](./rules/relationships.md)** — lookup vs master_detail, junction patterns, delete behaviors
- **[Validation Rules](./rules/validation.md)** — All validation types, script inversion, severity levels
- **[Index Strategy](./rules/indexing.md)** — btree/gin/gist/fulltext, composite indexes, partial indexes
- **[Data Lifecycle & Retention](./rules/lifecycle.md)** — `lifecycle` classes (record/audit/telemetry/transient/event), retention/TTL/rotation/archive policies; ❗ append-only objects must declare one (distinct from lifecycle *hooks* below)
- **[Lifecycle Hooks](./references/data-hooks.md)** — the 8 lifecycle events, `handler` vs sandboxed `body` (ctx + capability contract), registration, canonical patterns
- **[Datasources & Federation](./rules/datasources.md)** — `defineDatasource`, external/federated objects (`remoteName`/`columnMap`), auto-connect gating, credentials; ❌ no `field.columnName` on external objects

---

## Quick-Start Template

<!-- os:check -->
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -544,67 +545,7 @@ Per-object access control is authored in **permission sets**, not on the object
schema. There is no object-level `permissions` key (and no `hooks` key either) —
`ObjectSchema.create()` **rejects** both as unknown keys.

### Object-level permissions (RBAC)

Grant CRUD access per object with boolean bits on a permission set:

<!-- os:check -->
```typescript
import { definePermissionSet } from '@objectstack/spec';

export const salesUser = definePermissionSet({
name: 'sales_user',
objects: {
account: { allowRead: true, allowCreate: true, allowEdit: true },
contact: { allowRead: true },
},
});

// Register it on the stack root under `permissions` — NOT `permissionSets`:
// defineStack({ permissions: [salesUser], ... })
```

- **Stack key: `permissions`.** The collection is named for the metadata kind,
not for the factory, so `definePermissionSet()` output goes into
`defineStack({ permissions: [...] })`. `permissionSets:` is **refused at
load** — the top level is strict, so the stack fails with an
`Unrecognized key(s) on this stack definition` error naming the key, never a
silent drop. `ObjectStackDefinitionSchema`
(`node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/stack.zod.ts`) is the enumeration of
record; `objectstack-platform` lists every top-level key.
- Bits: `allowCreate` / `allowRead` / `allowEdit` / `allowDelete`, plus
`allowTransfer` (ownership change), `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords`
(super-user, bypass sharing).
- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts`
- Combine with `enable.apiMethods` to also restrict the HTTP surface.

### Assigning a permission set to a user

Declaring a set grants nobody anything — an assignment is **data**: one row in
the join object **`sys_user_permission_set`** (`@objectstack/plugin-security`),
carrying `user_id`, `permission_set_id`, and an optional `organization_id`
(`null` = every org context). Optional `valid_from` / `valid_until` bound a
half-open window checked at resolution time; `granted_by` is stamped by the
gate on insert — never author it.

⚠️ **`permission_set_id` takes the `sys_permission_set` RECORD ID, not the set's
`name`.** Grants resolve by loading `sys_permission_set` **by `id`**, so a `name`
in that field matches nothing, raises no error, and silently grants nothing.
Declared sets are upserted by `name` with a **generated** `id` on `kernel:ready`
(ADR-0086 D5) — that id differs per environment, so resolve it first.

Assignment is therefore two calls, both `POST /api/v1/data/{object}`
(`…/query` with a QueryAST body for the read): look up the set's `id` in
`sys_permission_set` by `name`, then insert
`{ user_id, permission_set_id, organization_id }` into
`sys_user_permission_set`. Only a tenant admin — or a delegated `adminScope`
carrying `manageAssignments` for that set and user (ADR-0090 D12) — may write
it; plain CRUD bits on the table are not enough.

**Grant looks inert?** Check in order: a `name` in `permission_set_id`; the set
is `active: false`; the validity window has passed; `organization_id` mismatch.
`GET /api/v1/security/explain?object=&operation=&userId=` answers from the
enforcing code path (explaining another user needs `manage_users`).
Full rules: **[Security & Access Control](./rules/security.md)**.

### Access depth (scope-depth) — the ERP "see my unit / my unit and below" axis

Expand All@@ -618,163 +559,6 @@ paid `@objectstack/security-enterprise` plugin, **fail closed to `own`** without
it, and `defineStack` errors unless the grant declares
`requires: ['hierarchy-security']`. Schema: `PermissionSetSchema.objects.*`.

### Row-Level Security (RLS)

The **enforced** RLS surface is a list of `rowLevelSecurity` policies on a
**permission set / profile** (`PermissionSetSchema.rowLevelSecurity`), *not* a
CEL predicate on the object. Each policy carries a `using` (read filter) and/or
`check` (write filter) **string** predicate. The compiler ANDs `using` into
every read for users carrying that set; `check` gates writes. (`@objectstack/plugin-security`
re-reads the target row through the write filter before single-id `update`/`delete`.)

```typescript
// in a permission set (definePermissionSet)
rowLevelSecurity: [
{
name: 'own_records',
object: 'account', // REQUIRED per policy
operation: 'all', // singular: select|insert|update|delete|all
using: 'owner_id == current_user.id', // read scope
check: 'owner_id == current_user.id', // write scope
},
{
name: 'org_isolation',
object: 'contact',
operation: 'select',
using: 'organization_id == current_user.organization_id',
},
]
```

Predicates are **canonical CEL** (ADR-0058): `field == current_user.<prop>`,
`field == 'literal'`, `field in current_user.<array>`, comparisons (`>`/`<`/`>=`/`<=`),
`&&`/`||`/`!`, and `== null` checks all lower to a pushdown filter. **No** cross-object
traversal or subqueries — those are a compile error (ADR-0055), never silently dropped.
A legacy SQL-style `=` / `IN (...)` predicate still compiles via a **deprecated** bridge
(emits a warning) but should be authored in CEL. The compiler resolves these
`current_user.*` placeholders:

| Placeholder | Resolves to |
|:--|:--|
| `current_user.id` | the caller's user id (ownership) |
| `current_user.email` | the caller's email (ADR-0056) |
| `current_user.organization_id` | the caller's tenant |
| `current_user.org_user_ids` | ids of users in the same org (for `IN`) |
| `current_user.positions` | the caller's positions (for `IN`; ADR-0090 D3) |

- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts` (policy shape),
`node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/rls.zod.ts` (predicate grammar).
- Owner-scoping shortcut: the built-in `member_default` set already owner-scopes
writes via `owner_only_writes` / `owner_only_deletes`, and an object's
`sharingModel` (`private` / `public_read` / `public_read_write` / `controlled_by_parent`, ADR-0056 D1)
is the declarative way to set the org-wide default — prefer those over
hand-written policies for the common cases.

### Sensitive fields — `secret` type + `requiredPermissions`

`maskingRule` is **live** (plugin-security's FieldMasker enforces it). The real
channels are:

**Encrypted-at-rest values — `type: 'secret'` (ADR-0100).** For reversible
machine credentials (DB passwords, API keys, tokens): the engine encrypts the
value on write via the registered `ICryptoProvider`, stores the ciphertext
handle in `sys_secret`, persists only an opaque ref on the row, and masks the
value on read. **Fail-closed:** with no crypto provider registered, writes
throw rather than persist cleartext.

```typescript
fields: {
api_key: { type: 'secret', label: 'API Key' },
}
```

**Per-field access gating — `requiredPermissions` (ADR-0066 D3).** Capabilities
required to READ/EDIT the field. A field declaring `requiredPermissions` is
**masked on read and denied on write** unless the caller holds ALL listed
capabilities — an AND-gate that is strictest-wins over permission-set field
grants. Enforced by plugin-security's FieldMasker.

```typescript
fields: {
ssn: {
type: 'text',
requiredPermissions: ['view_pii'], // mask on read / deny on write without it
},
}
```

- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/data/field.zod.ts`
(`secret` field type, `requiredPermissions`)

### Multi-tenancy

For SaaS, set `tenancy` on the object schema for row-level tenant isolation
(the tenant field is injected on write and enforced on read). The block is
**strict** — exactly two keys:

```typescript
tenancy: {
enabled: true, // enable row-level tenant isolation
// tenantField — NO default; omit it and the driver uses `organization_id`
}
```

- **Database-per-tenant isolation is not object metadata** — it is an
environment/deployment choice (each environment carries its own database URL).
- Platform/env-global objects declare `tenancy: { enabled: false }` to opt out
of org row-scoping (see the visibility-posture recipe below).

### Platform-global / admin-only objects (visibility posture)

Some system/config objects are **env-global** (not partitioned per org) and
should be visible to a **platform admin env-wide** but hidden from members —
e.g. identity tables a plugin writes via its own adapter (`sys_sso_provider`,
OAuth clients). These hit a non-obvious interaction:

- Reads of a tenant object pass the **Layer 0 tenant wall** (ADR-0095 D1): an
`organization_id == <the caller's organization>` filter AND-composed ahead of
every business RLS policy. Any row whose `organization_id` is **null or
absent** (common for adapter-written rows that never get the tenant stamp) is
**denied** — the list renders empty. Single-tenant deployments never hit this;
the wall is inert there.
- The `viewAllRecords` superuser bit is **posture-gated and wall-blind**: it
short-circuits **business RLS only**, and only on objects whose posture allows
it (`access.default: 'private'`, `tenancy: { enabled: false }`, or a
better-auth-managed identity table). It never crosses the Layer 0 wall —
crossing takes a *true platform admin* (the superuser bit **and** a
platform-exclusive capability: `manage_metadata`, `manage_platform_settings`,
`studio.access`, `manage_users`) on one of those same postures. So an org
admin holding the superuser bit stays org-scoped, and on an ordinary tenant
object nobody crosses — the admin sees 0 rows too.

**Recipe — env-global, admin-only object that admins can fully see:**

```typescript
tenancy: { enabled: false }, // not a tenant object → Layer 0 contributes nothing
requiredPermissions: ['manage_platform_settings'], // capability AND-gate → members get 403
```

> ⚠️ **Both keys are load-bearing — neither works alone.**
> `tenancy: { enabled: false }` *by itself* switches the wall off for **every**
> caller, and any permission set carrying a wildcard (`'*'`) read grant then
> reads every row env-wide — the shipped `viewer_readonly` still carries one, as
> may an app-declared default profile or a customer-authored set. (The
> `member_default` baseline is **not** one of them: it is explicit-allow and
> grants only the objects it names.) `requiredPermissions` *by itself* leaves the
> object a tenant object, so the wall keeps denying the untagged rows and even a
> platform admin sees nothing. The pair is the correct combo (admin sees all,
> non-admins 403), and `requiredPermissions` is the half that holds however
> permissive the caller's grants are — it is an AND-gate checked **before** the
> CRUD grant. Posture model: ADR-0066; tenant wall: ADR-0095 D1.

### Cross-skill notes

- **API auth providers** (OIDC, JWT, API key) live in **objectstack-api**.
- **Kernel-level RBAC services** (role inheritance, custom policy engines)
live in **objectstack-platform**.
- **CEL predicate syntax** (`P\`...\``, operators, functions) lives in
**objectstack-formula**.

---

## Metadata Protection (`protection`)
Expand Down
Loading
Loading
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length \u003e 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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skills(data): split security into rules/security.md under #14296 item 1 (package net −64 tokens) + DATA-B-06#14673

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Merged
os-zhuang merged 5 commits into from
Sep 2, 2026
+237 −235
Merged

skills(data): split security into rules/security.md under #14296 item 1 (package net −64 tokens) + DATA-B-06 #14673

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1847127
skills(data): split Security & Access Control into rules/security.md
claude Sep 2, 2026
680040c
skills(data): move the rules routing table above Core Concepts
claude Sep 2, 2026
965eafc
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14297-sk…
claude Sep 2, 2026
f7d8eae
chore(gates): ratchet-DOWN the role-word baseline for objectstack-data
claude Sep 2, 2026
b3b3cda
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14297-sk…
claude Sep 2, 2026
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10 changes: 9 additions & 1 deletion scripts/check-skills-token-ratchet.mjs
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -313,7 +313,11 @@ export const CEILINGS = new Map([
// a transition gate written as a `validations[]` invariant bricks rows that
// were legal when stored, and an invariant written as `requiredWhen` never
// enforces itself at all. +110 tokens, 1 absorbed by headroom, ceiling +109.
['skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md', 13892],
// 13892 -> 10009: RE-LOCK at the landed count after the `rules/security.md`
// split (#14296 item 1 = A, condition (b)). The raise recorded above is spent
// and its headroom leaves with it; the moved text is priced in its own row
// below, so the package total is unchanged by the re-lock itself.
['skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md', 10009],
['skills/objectstack-formula/SKILL.md', 6002], // -53 (was 6055)
['skills/objectstack-i18n/SKILL.md', 6338], // -11 (was 6349)
// 12705 -> 12984 (2026-08-31 app-repo-principles raise, see the block above).
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -408,6 +412,10 @@ export const CEILINGS = new Map([
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/lifecycle.md', 1590],
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/naming.md', 773],
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/relationships.md', 3778],
// NEW FILE (#14296 item 1 = A, condition (b)): the entry's Security & Access
// Control block moved here whole. Pinned at its landed count — no headroom,
// because a split that arrives with budget is a raise wearing a new path.
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/security.md', 2480],
// 3024 -> 3109 (2026-08-31 app-repo-principles raise, see the block above).
// Severity Levels listed the three values and left the CHOICE unstated: a
// block rests on a judgement a person made, so a machine-inferred signal — a
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion scripts/role-word-baseline.json
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
"content/docs/ui/forms.mdx": 3,
"skills/objectstack-ai/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-automation/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md": 2,
"skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-data/rules/relationships.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-platform/SKILL.md": 2,
"skills/objectstack-query/rules/filters.md": 8,
Expand Down
250 changes: 17 additions & 233 deletions skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md
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Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -37,6 +37,22 @@ metadata:

---

## Quick Reference — Detailed Rules

For comprehensive documentation with incorrect/correct examples:

- **[Naming Conventions](./rules/naming.md)** — snake_case rules, option values, config properties
- **[Field Types](./rules/field-types.md)** — All 49 field types with decision tree and configs
- **[Relationships](./rules/relationships.md)** — lookup vs master_detail, junction patterns, delete behaviors
- **[Validation Rules](./rules/validation.md)** — All validation types, script inversion, severity levels
- **[Index Strategy](./rules/indexing.md)** — btree/gin/gist/fulltext, composite indexes, partial indexes
- **[Data Lifecycle & Retention](./rules/lifecycle.md)** — `lifecycle` classes (record/audit/telemetry/transient/event), retention/TTL/rotation/archive policies; ❗ append-only objects must declare one (distinct from lifecycle *hooks* below)
- **[Lifecycle Hooks](./references/data-hooks.md)** — the 8 lifecycle events, `handler` vs sandboxed `body` (ctx + capability contract), registration, canonical patterns
- **[Datasources & Federation](./rules/datasources.md)** — `defineDatasource`, external/federated objects (`remoteName`/`columnMap`), auto-connect gating, credentials; ❌ no `field.columnName` on external objects
- **[Security & Access Control](./rules/security.md)** — permission sets, assignment rows, RLS policies, `secret` / `requiredPermissions`, `tenancy`, platform-global posture

---

## Core Concepts

### Object Definition
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -280,21 +296,6 @@ export const Invoice = ObjectSchema.create({

---

## Quick Reference — Detailed Rules

For comprehensive documentation with incorrect/correct examples:

- **[Naming Conventions](./rules/naming.md)** — snake_case rules, option values, config properties
- **[Field Types](./rules/field-types.md)** — All 49 field types with decision tree and configs
- **[Relationships](./rules/relationships.md)** — lookup vs master_detail, junction patterns, delete behaviors
- **[Validation Rules](./rules/validation.md)** — All validation types, script inversion, severity levels
- **[Index Strategy](./rules/indexing.md)** — btree/gin/gist/fulltext, composite indexes, partial indexes
- **[Data Lifecycle & Retention](./rules/lifecycle.md)** — `lifecycle` classes (record/audit/telemetry/transient/event), retention/TTL/rotation/archive policies; ❗ append-only objects must declare one (distinct from lifecycle *hooks* below)
- **[Lifecycle Hooks](./references/data-hooks.md)** — the 8 lifecycle events, `handler` vs sandboxed `body` (ctx + capability contract), registration, canonical patterns
- **[Datasources & Federation](./rules/datasources.md)** — `defineDatasource`, external/federated objects (`remoteName`/`columnMap`), auto-connect gating, credentials; ❌ no `field.columnName` on external objects

---

## Quick-Start Template

<!-- os:check -->
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -544,67 +545,7 @@ Per-object access control is authored in **permission sets**, not on the object
schema. There is no object-level `permissions` key (and no `hooks` key either) —
`ObjectSchema.create()` **rejects** both as unknown keys.

### Object-level permissions (RBAC)

Grant CRUD access per object with boolean bits on a permission set:

<!-- os:check -->
```typescript
import { definePermissionSet } from '@objectstack/spec';

export const salesUser = definePermissionSet({
name: 'sales_user',
objects: {
account: { allowRead: true, allowCreate: true, allowEdit: true },
contact: { allowRead: true },
},
});

// Register it on the stack root under `permissions` — NOT `permissionSets`:
// defineStack({ permissions: [salesUser], ... })
```

- **Stack key: `permissions`.** The collection is named for the metadata kind,
not for the factory, so `definePermissionSet()` output goes into
`defineStack({ permissions: [...] })`. `permissionSets:` is **refused at
load** — the top level is strict, so the stack fails with an
`Unrecognized key(s) on this stack definition` error naming the key, never a
silent drop. `ObjectStackDefinitionSchema`
(`node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/stack.zod.ts`) is the enumeration of
record; `objectstack-platform` lists every top-level key.
- Bits: `allowCreate` / `allowRead` / `allowEdit` / `allowDelete`, plus
`allowTransfer` (ownership change), `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords`
(super-user, bypass sharing).
- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts`
- Combine with `enable.apiMethods` to also restrict the HTTP surface.

### Assigning a permission set to a user

Declaring a set grants nobody anything — an assignment is **data**: one row in
the join object **`sys_user_permission_set`** (`@objectstack/plugin-security`),
carrying `user_id`, `permission_set_id`, and an optional `organization_id`
(`null` = every org context). Optional `valid_from` / `valid_until` bound a
half-open window checked at resolution time; `granted_by` is stamped by the
gate on insert — never author it.

⚠️ **`permission_set_id` takes the `sys_permission_set` RECORD ID, not the set's
`name`.** Grants resolve by loading `sys_permission_set` **by `id`**, so a `name`
in that field matches nothing, raises no error, and silently grants nothing.
Declared sets are upserted by `name` with a **generated** `id` on `kernel:ready`
(ADR-0086 D5) — that id differs per environment, so resolve it first.

Assignment is therefore two calls, both `POST /api/v1/data/{object}`
(`…/query` with a QueryAST body for the read): look up the set's `id` in
`sys_permission_set` by `name`, then insert
`{ user_id, permission_set_id, organization_id }` into
`sys_user_permission_set`. Only a tenant admin — or a delegated `adminScope`
carrying `manageAssignments` for that set and user (ADR-0090 D12) — may write
it; plain CRUD bits on the table are not enough.

**Grant looks inert?** Check in order: a `name` in `permission_set_id`; the set
is `active: false`; the validity window has passed; `organization_id` mismatch.
`GET /api/v1/security/explain?object=&operation=&userId=` answers from the
enforcing code path (explaining another user needs `manage_users`).
Full rules: **[Security & Access Control](./rules/security.md)**.

### Access depth (scope-depth) — the ERP "see my unit / my unit and below" axis

Expand All@@ -618,163 +559,6 @@ paid `@objectstack/security-enterprise` plugin, **fail closed to `own`** without
it, and `defineStack` errors unless the grant declares
`requires: ['hierarchy-security']`. Schema: `PermissionSetSchema.objects.*`.

### Row-Level Security (RLS)

The **enforced** RLS surface is a list of `rowLevelSecurity` policies on a
**permission set / profile** (`PermissionSetSchema.rowLevelSecurity`), *not* a
CEL predicate on the object. Each policy carries a `using` (read filter) and/or
`check` (write filter) **string** predicate. The compiler ANDs `using` into
every read for users carrying that set; `check` gates writes. (`@objectstack/plugin-security`
re-reads the target row through the write filter before single-id `update`/`delete`.)

```typescript
// in a permission set (definePermissionSet)
rowLevelSecurity: [
{
name: 'own_records',
object: 'account', // REQUIRED per policy
operation: 'all', // singular: select|insert|update|delete|all
using: 'owner_id == current_user.id', // read scope
check: 'owner_id == current_user.id', // write scope
},
{
name: 'org_isolation',
object: 'contact',
operation: 'select',
using: 'organization_id == current_user.organization_id',
},
]
```

Predicates are **canonical CEL** (ADR-0058): `field == current_user.<prop>`,
`field == 'literal'`, `field in current_user.<array>`, comparisons (`>`/`<`/`>=`/`<=`),
`&&`/`||`/`!`, and `== null` checks all lower to a pushdown filter. **No** cross-object
traversal or subqueries — those are a compile error (ADR-0055), never silently dropped.
A legacy SQL-style `=` / `IN (...)` predicate still compiles via a **deprecated** bridge
(emits a warning) but should be authored in CEL. The compiler resolves these
`current_user.*` placeholders:

| Placeholder | Resolves to |
|:--|:--|
| `current_user.id` | the caller's user id (ownership) |
| `current_user.email` | the caller's email (ADR-0056) |
| `current_user.organization_id` | the caller's tenant |
| `current_user.org_user_ids` | ids of users in the same org (for `IN`) |
| `current_user.positions` | the caller's positions (for `IN`; ADR-0090 D3) |

- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts` (policy shape),
`node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/rls.zod.ts` (predicate grammar).
- Owner-scoping shortcut: the built-in `member_default` set already owner-scopes
writes via `owner_only_writes` / `owner_only_deletes`, and an object's
`sharingModel` (`private` / `public_read` / `public_read_write` / `controlled_by_parent`, ADR-0056 D1)
is the declarative way to set the org-wide default — prefer those over
hand-written policies for the common cases.

### Sensitive fields — `secret` type + `requiredPermissions`

`maskingRule` is **live** (plugin-security's FieldMasker enforces it). The real
channels are:

**Encrypted-at-rest values — `type: 'secret'` (ADR-0100).** For reversible
machine credentials (DB passwords, API keys, tokens): the engine encrypts the
value on write via the registered `ICryptoProvider`, stores the ciphertext
handle in `sys_secret`, persists only an opaque ref on the row, and masks the
value on read. **Fail-closed:** with no crypto provider registered, writes
throw rather than persist cleartext.

```typescript
fields: {
api_key: { type: 'secret', label: 'API Key' },
}
```

**Per-field access gating — `requiredPermissions` (ADR-0066 D3).** Capabilities
required to READ/EDIT the field. A field declaring `requiredPermissions` is
**masked on read and denied on write** unless the caller holds ALL listed
capabilities — an AND-gate that is strictest-wins over permission-set field
grants. Enforced by plugin-security's FieldMasker.

```typescript
fields: {
ssn: {
type: 'text',
requiredPermissions: ['view_pii'], // mask on read / deny on write without it
},
}
```

- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/data/field.zod.ts`
(`secret` field type, `requiredPermissions`)

### Multi-tenancy

For SaaS, set `tenancy` on the object schema for row-level tenant isolation
(the tenant field is injected on write and enforced on read). The block is
**strict** — exactly two keys:

```typescript
tenancy: {
enabled: true, // enable row-level tenant isolation
// tenantField — NO default; omit it and the driver uses `organization_id`
}
```

- **Database-per-tenant isolation is not object metadata** — it is an
environment/deployment choice (each environment carries its own database URL).
- Platform/env-global objects declare `tenancy: { enabled: false }` to opt out
of org row-scoping (see the visibility-posture recipe below).

### Platform-global / admin-only objects (visibility posture)

Some system/config objects are **env-global** (not partitioned per org) and
should be visible to a **platform admin env-wide** but hidden from members —
e.g. identity tables a plugin writes via its own adapter (`sys_sso_provider`,
OAuth clients). These hit a non-obvious interaction:

- Reads of a tenant object pass the **Layer 0 tenant wall** (ADR-0095 D1): an
`organization_id == <the caller's organization>` filter AND-composed ahead of
every business RLS policy. Any row whose `organization_id` is **null or
absent** (common for adapter-written rows that never get the tenant stamp) is
**denied** — the list renders empty. Single-tenant deployments never hit this;
the wall is inert there.
- The `viewAllRecords` superuser bit is **posture-gated and wall-blind**: it
short-circuits **business RLS only**, and only on objects whose posture allows
it (`access.default: 'private'`, `tenancy: { enabled: false }`, or a
better-auth-managed identity table). It never crosses the Layer 0 wall —
crossing takes a *true platform admin* (the superuser bit **and** a
platform-exclusive capability: `manage_metadata`, `manage_platform_settings`,
`studio.access`, `manage_users`) on one of those same postures. So an org
admin holding the superuser bit stays org-scoped, and on an ordinary tenant
object nobody crosses — the admin sees 0 rows too.

**Recipe — env-global, admin-only object that admins can fully see:**

```typescript
tenancy: { enabled: false }, // not a tenant object → Layer 0 contributes nothing
requiredPermissions: ['manage_platform_settings'], // capability AND-gate → members get 403
```

> ⚠️ **Both keys are load-bearing — neither works alone.**
> `tenancy: { enabled: false }` *by itself* switches the wall off for **every**
> caller, and any permission set carrying a wildcard (`'*'`) read grant then
> reads every row env-wide — the shipped `viewer_readonly` still carries one, as
> may an app-declared default profile or a customer-authored set. (The
> `member_default` baseline is **not** one of them: it is explicit-allow and
> grants only the objects it names.) `requiredPermissions` *by itself* leaves the
> object a tenant object, so the wall keeps denying the untagged rows and even a
> platform admin sees nothing. The pair is the correct combo (admin sees all,
> non-admins 403), and `requiredPermissions` is the half that holds however
> permissive the caller's grants are — it is an AND-gate checked **before** the
> CRUD grant. Posture model: ADR-0066; tenant wall: ADR-0095 D1.

### Cross-skill notes

- **API auth providers** (OIDC, JWT, API key) live in **objectstack-api**.
- **Kernel-level RBAC services** (role inheritance, custom policy engines)
live in **objectstack-platform**.
- **CEL predicate syntax** (`P\`...\``, operators, functions) lives in
**objectstack-formula**.

---

## Metadata Protection (`protection`)
Expand Down
Loading
Loading
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "youtube.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
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skills(data): split security into rules/security.md under #14296 item 1 (package net −64 tokens) + DATA-B-06#14673

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Merged
os-zhuang merged 5 commits into from
Sep 2, 2026
+237 −235
Merged

skills(data): split security into rules/security.md under #14296 item 1 (package net −64 tokens) + DATA-B-06 #14673

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1847127
skills(data): split Security & Access Control into rules/security.md
claude Sep 2, 2026
680040c
skills(data): move the rules routing table above Core Concepts
claude Sep 2, 2026
965eafc
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14297-sk…
claude Sep 2, 2026
f7d8eae
chore(gates): ratchet-DOWN the role-word baseline for objectstack-data
claude Sep 2, 2026
b3b3cda
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14297-sk…
claude Sep 2, 2026
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10 changes: 9 additions & 1 deletion scripts/check-skills-token-ratchet.mjs
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -313,7 +313,11 @@ export const CEILINGS = new Map([
// a transition gate written as a `validations[]` invariant bricks rows that
// were legal when stored, and an invariant written as `requiredWhen` never
// enforces itself at all. +110 tokens, 1 absorbed by headroom, ceiling +109.
['skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md', 13892],
// 13892 -> 10009: RE-LOCK at the landed count after the `rules/security.md`
// split (#14296 item 1 = A, condition (b)). The raise recorded above is spent
// and its headroom leaves with it; the moved text is priced in its own row
// below, so the package total is unchanged by the re-lock itself.
['skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md', 10009],
['skills/objectstack-formula/SKILL.md', 6002], // -53 (was 6055)
['skills/objectstack-i18n/SKILL.md', 6338], // -11 (was 6349)
// 12705 -> 12984 (2026-08-31 app-repo-principles raise, see the block above).
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -408,6 +412,10 @@ export const CEILINGS = new Map([
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/lifecycle.md', 1590],
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/naming.md', 773],
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/relationships.md', 3778],
// NEW FILE (#14296 item 1 = A, condition (b)): the entry's Security & Access
// Control block moved here whole. Pinned at its landed count — no headroom,
// because a split that arrives with budget is a raise wearing a new path.
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/security.md', 2480],
// 3024 -> 3109 (2026-08-31 app-repo-principles raise, see the block above).
// Severity Levels listed the three values and left the CHOICE unstated: a
// block rests on a judgement a person made, so a machine-inferred signal — a
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion scripts/role-word-baseline.json
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
"content/docs/ui/forms.mdx": 3,
"skills/objectstack-ai/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-automation/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md": 2,
"skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-data/rules/relationships.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-platform/SKILL.md": 2,
"skills/objectstack-query/rules/filters.md": 8,
Expand Down
250 changes: 17 additions & 233 deletions skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -37,6 +37,22 @@ metadata:

---

## Quick Reference — Detailed Rules

For comprehensive documentation with incorrect/correct examples:

- **[Naming Conventions](./rules/naming.md)** — snake_case rules, option values, config properties
- **[Field Types](./rules/field-types.md)** — All 49 field types with decision tree and configs
- **[Relationships](./rules/relationships.md)** — lookup vs master_detail, junction patterns, delete behaviors
- **[Validation Rules](./rules/validation.md)** — All validation types, script inversion, severity levels
- **[Index Strategy](./rules/indexing.md)** — btree/gin/gist/fulltext, composite indexes, partial indexes
- **[Data Lifecycle & Retention](./rules/lifecycle.md)** — `lifecycle` classes (record/audit/telemetry/transient/event), retention/TTL/rotation/archive policies; ❗ append-only objects must declare one (distinct from lifecycle *hooks* below)
- **[Lifecycle Hooks](./references/data-hooks.md)** — the 8 lifecycle events, `handler` vs sandboxed `body` (ctx + capability contract), registration, canonical patterns
- **[Datasources & Federation](./rules/datasources.md)** — `defineDatasource`, external/federated objects (`remoteName`/`columnMap`), auto-connect gating, credentials; ❌ no `field.columnName` on external objects
- **[Security & Access Control](./rules/security.md)** — permission sets, assignment rows, RLS policies, `secret` / `requiredPermissions`, `tenancy`, platform-global posture

---

## Core Concepts

### Object Definition
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -280,21 +296,6 @@ export const Invoice = ObjectSchema.create({

---

## Quick Reference — Detailed Rules

For comprehensive documentation with incorrect/correct examples:

- **[Naming Conventions](./rules/naming.md)** — snake_case rules, option values, config properties
- **[Field Types](./rules/field-types.md)** — All 49 field types with decision tree and configs
- **[Relationships](./rules/relationships.md)** — lookup vs master_detail, junction patterns, delete behaviors
- **[Validation Rules](./rules/validation.md)** — All validation types, script inversion, severity levels
- **[Index Strategy](./rules/indexing.md)** — btree/gin/gist/fulltext, composite indexes, partial indexes
- **[Data Lifecycle & Retention](./rules/lifecycle.md)** — `lifecycle` classes (record/audit/telemetry/transient/event), retention/TTL/rotation/archive policies; ❗ append-only objects must declare one (distinct from lifecycle *hooks* below)
- **[Lifecycle Hooks](./references/data-hooks.md)** — the 8 lifecycle events, `handler` vs sandboxed `body` (ctx + capability contract), registration, canonical patterns
- **[Datasources & Federation](./rules/datasources.md)** — `defineDatasource`, external/federated objects (`remoteName`/`columnMap`), auto-connect gating, credentials; ❌ no `field.columnName` on external objects

---

## Quick-Start Template

<!-- os:check -->
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -544,67 +545,7 @@ Per-object access control is authored in **permission sets**, not on the object
schema. There is no object-level `permissions` key (and no `hooks` key either) —
`ObjectSchema.create()` **rejects** both as unknown keys.

### Object-level permissions (RBAC)

Grant CRUD access per object with boolean bits on a permission set:

<!-- os:check -->
```typescript
import { definePermissionSet } from '@objectstack/spec';

export const salesUser = definePermissionSet({
name: 'sales_user',
objects: {
account: { allowRead: true, allowCreate: true, allowEdit: true },
contact: { allowRead: true },
},
});

// Register it on the stack root under `permissions` — NOT `permissionSets`:
// defineStack({ permissions: [salesUser], ... })
```

- **Stack key: `permissions`.** The collection is named for the metadata kind,
not for the factory, so `definePermissionSet()` output goes into
`defineStack({ permissions: [...] })`. `permissionSets:` is **refused at
load** — the top level is strict, so the stack fails with an
`Unrecognized key(s) on this stack definition` error naming the key, never a
silent drop. `ObjectStackDefinitionSchema`
(`node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/stack.zod.ts`) is the enumeration of
record; `objectstack-platform` lists every top-level key.
- Bits: `allowCreate` / `allowRead` / `allowEdit` / `allowDelete`, plus
`allowTransfer` (ownership change), `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords`
(super-user, bypass sharing).
- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts`
- Combine with `enable.apiMethods` to also restrict the HTTP surface.

### Assigning a permission set to a user

Declaring a set grants nobody anything — an assignment is **data**: one row in
the join object **`sys_user_permission_set`** (`@objectstack/plugin-security`),
carrying `user_id`, `permission_set_id`, and an optional `organization_id`
(`null` = every org context). Optional `valid_from` / `valid_until` bound a
half-open window checked at resolution time; `granted_by` is stamped by the
gate on insert — never author it.

⚠️ **`permission_set_id` takes the `sys_permission_set` RECORD ID, not the set's
`name`.** Grants resolve by loading `sys_permission_set` **by `id`**, so a `name`
in that field matches nothing, raises no error, and silently grants nothing.
Declared sets are upserted by `name` with a **generated** `id` on `kernel:ready`
(ADR-0086 D5) — that id differs per environment, so resolve it first.

Assignment is therefore two calls, both `POST /api/v1/data/{object}`
(`…/query` with a QueryAST body for the read): look up the set's `id` in
`sys_permission_set` by `name`, then insert
`{ user_id, permission_set_id, organization_id }` into
`sys_user_permission_set`. Only a tenant admin — or a delegated `adminScope`
carrying `manageAssignments` for that set and user (ADR-0090 D12) — may write
it; plain CRUD bits on the table are not enough.

**Grant looks inert?** Check in order: a `name` in `permission_set_id`; the set
is `active: false`; the validity window has passed; `organization_id` mismatch.
`GET /api/v1/security/explain?object=&operation=&userId=` answers from the
enforcing code path (explaining another user needs `manage_users`).
Full rules: **[Security & Access Control](./rules/security.md)**.

### Access depth (scope-depth) — the ERP "see my unit / my unit and below" axis

Expand All@@ -618,163 +559,6 @@ paid `@objectstack/security-enterprise` plugin, **fail closed to `own`** without
it, and `defineStack` errors unless the grant declares
`requires: ['hierarchy-security']`. Schema: `PermissionSetSchema.objects.*`.

### Row-Level Security (RLS)

The **enforced** RLS surface is a list of `rowLevelSecurity` policies on a
**permission set / profile** (`PermissionSetSchema.rowLevelSecurity`), *not* a
CEL predicate on the object. Each policy carries a `using` (read filter) and/or
`check` (write filter) **string** predicate. The compiler ANDs `using` into
every read for users carrying that set; `check` gates writes. (`@objectstack/plugin-security`
re-reads the target row through the write filter before single-id `update`/`delete`.)

```typescript
// in a permission set (definePermissionSet)
rowLevelSecurity: [
{
name: 'own_records',
object: 'account', // REQUIRED per policy
operation: 'all', // singular: select|insert|update|delete|all
using: 'owner_id == current_user.id', // read scope
check: 'owner_id == current_user.id', // write scope
},
{
name: 'org_isolation',
object: 'contact',
operation: 'select',
using: 'organization_id == current_user.organization_id',
},
]
```

Predicates are **canonical CEL** (ADR-0058): `field == current_user.<prop>`,
`field == 'literal'`, `field in current_user.<array>`, comparisons (`>`/`<`/`>=`/`<=`),
`&&`/`||`/`!`, and `== null` checks all lower to a pushdown filter. **No** cross-object
traversal or subqueries — those are a compile error (ADR-0055), never silently dropped.
A legacy SQL-style `=` / `IN (...)` predicate still compiles via a **deprecated** bridge
(emits a warning) but should be authored in CEL. The compiler resolves these
`current_user.*` placeholders:

| Placeholder | Resolves to |
|:--|:--|
| `current_user.id` | the caller's user id (ownership) |
| `current_user.email` | the caller's email (ADR-0056) |
| `current_user.organization_id` | the caller's tenant |
| `current_user.org_user_ids` | ids of users in the same org (for `IN`) |
| `current_user.positions` | the caller's positions (for `IN`; ADR-0090 D3) |

- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts` (policy shape),
`node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/rls.zod.ts` (predicate grammar).
- Owner-scoping shortcut: the built-in `member_default` set already owner-scopes
writes via `owner_only_writes` / `owner_only_deletes`, and an object's
`sharingModel` (`private` / `public_read` / `public_read_write` / `controlled_by_parent`, ADR-0056 D1)
is the declarative way to set the org-wide default — prefer those over
hand-written policies for the common cases.

### Sensitive fields — `secret` type + `requiredPermissions`

`maskingRule` is **live** (plugin-security's FieldMasker enforces it). The real
channels are:

**Encrypted-at-rest values — `type: 'secret'` (ADR-0100).** For reversible
machine credentials (DB passwords, API keys, tokens): the engine encrypts the
value on write via the registered `ICryptoProvider`, stores the ciphertext
handle in `sys_secret`, persists only an opaque ref on the row, and masks the
value on read. **Fail-closed:** with no crypto provider registered, writes
throw rather than persist cleartext.

```typescript
fields: {
api_key: { type: 'secret', label: 'API Key' },
}
```

**Per-field access gating — `requiredPermissions` (ADR-0066 D3).** Capabilities
required to READ/EDIT the field. A field declaring `requiredPermissions` is
**masked on read and denied on write** unless the caller holds ALL listed
capabilities — an AND-gate that is strictest-wins over permission-set field
grants. Enforced by plugin-security's FieldMasker.

```typescript
fields: {
ssn: {
type: 'text',
requiredPermissions: ['view_pii'], // mask on read / deny on write without it
},
}
```

- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/data/field.zod.ts`
(`secret` field type, `requiredPermissions`)

### Multi-tenancy

For SaaS, set `tenancy` on the object schema for row-level tenant isolation
(the tenant field is injected on write and enforced on read). The block is
**strict** — exactly two keys:

```typescript
tenancy: {
enabled: true, // enable row-level tenant isolation
// tenantField — NO default; omit it and the driver uses `organization_id`
}
```

- **Database-per-tenant isolation is not object metadata** — it is an
environment/deployment choice (each environment carries its own database URL).
- Platform/env-global objects declare `tenancy: { enabled: false }` to opt out
of org row-scoping (see the visibility-posture recipe below).

### Platform-global / admin-only objects (visibility posture)

Some system/config objects are **env-global** (not partitioned per org) and
should be visible to a **platform admin env-wide** but hidden from members —
e.g. identity tables a plugin writes via its own adapter (`sys_sso_provider`,
OAuth clients). These hit a non-obvious interaction:

- Reads of a tenant object pass the **Layer 0 tenant wall** (ADR-0095 D1): an
`organization_id == <the caller's organization>` filter AND-composed ahead of
every business RLS policy. Any row whose `organization_id` is **null or
absent** (common for adapter-written rows that never get the tenant stamp) is
**denied** — the list renders empty. Single-tenant deployments never hit this;
the wall is inert there.
- The `viewAllRecords` superuser bit is **posture-gated and wall-blind**: it
short-circuits **business RLS only**, and only on objects whose posture allows
it (`access.default: 'private'`, `tenancy: { enabled: false }`, or a
better-auth-managed identity table). It never crosses the Layer 0 wall —
crossing takes a *true platform admin* (the superuser bit **and** a
platform-exclusive capability: `manage_metadata`, `manage_platform_settings`,
`studio.access`, `manage_users`) on one of those same postures. So an org
admin holding the superuser bit stays org-scoped, and on an ordinary tenant
object nobody crosses — the admin sees 0 rows too.

**Recipe — env-global, admin-only object that admins can fully see:**

```typescript
tenancy: { enabled: false }, // not a tenant object → Layer 0 contributes nothing
requiredPermissions: ['manage_platform_settings'], // capability AND-gate → members get 403
```

> ⚠️ **Both keys are load-bearing — neither works alone.**
> `tenancy: { enabled: false }` *by itself* switches the wall off for **every**
> caller, and any permission set carrying a wildcard (`'*'`) read grant then
> reads every row env-wide — the shipped `viewer_readonly` still carries one, as
> may an app-declared default profile or a customer-authored set. (The
> `member_default` baseline is **not** one of them: it is explicit-allow and
> grants only the objects it names.) `requiredPermissions` *by itself* leaves the
> object a tenant object, so the wall keeps denying the untagged rows and even a
> platform admin sees nothing. The pair is the correct combo (admin sees all,
> non-admins 403), and `requiredPermissions` is the half that holds however
> permissive the caller's grants are — it is an AND-gate checked **before** the
> CRUD grant. Posture model: ADR-0066; tenant wall: ADR-0095 D1.

### Cross-skill notes

- **API auth providers** (OIDC, JWT, API key) live in **objectstack-api**.
- **Kernel-level RBAC services** (role inheritance, custom policy engines)
live in **objectstack-platform**.
- **CEL predicate syntax** (`P\`...\``, operators, functions) lives in
**objectstack-formula**.

---

## Metadata Protection (`protection`)
Expand Down
Loading
Loading
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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Merged
os-zhuang merged 5 commits into from
Sep 2, 2026
+237 −235
Merged

skills(data): split security into rules/security.md under #14296 item 1 (package net −64 tokens) + DATA-B-06 #14673

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1847127
skills(data): split Security & Access Control into rules/security.md
claude Sep 2, 2026
680040c
skills(data): move the rules routing table above Core Concepts
claude Sep 2, 2026
965eafc
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14297-sk…
claude Sep 2, 2026
f7d8eae
chore(gates): ratchet-DOWN the role-word baseline for objectstack-data
claude Sep 2, 2026
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14297-sk…
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10 changes: 9 additions & 1 deletion scripts/check-skills-token-ratchet.mjs
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -313,7 +313,11 @@ export const CEILINGS = new Map([
// a transition gate written as a `validations[]` invariant bricks rows that
// were legal when stored, and an invariant written as `requiredWhen` never
// enforces itself at all. +110 tokens, 1 absorbed by headroom, ceiling +109.
['skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md', 13892],
// 13892 -> 10009: RE-LOCK at the landed count after the `rules/security.md`
// split (#14296 item 1 = A, condition (b)). The raise recorded above is spent
// and its headroom leaves with it; the moved text is priced in its own row
// below, so the package total is unchanged by the re-lock itself.
['skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md', 10009],
['skills/objectstack-formula/SKILL.md', 6002], // -53 (was 6055)
['skills/objectstack-i18n/SKILL.md', 6338], // -11 (was 6349)
// 12705 -> 12984 (2026-08-31 app-repo-principles raise, see the block above).
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -408,6 +412,10 @@ export const CEILINGS = new Map([
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/lifecycle.md', 1590],
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/naming.md', 773],
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/relationships.md', 3778],
// NEW FILE (#14296 item 1 = A, condition (b)): the entry's Security & Access
// Control block moved here whole. Pinned at its landed count — no headroom,
// because a split that arrives with budget is a raise wearing a new path.
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/security.md', 2480],
// 3024 -> 3109 (2026-08-31 app-repo-principles raise, see the block above).
// Severity Levels listed the three values and left the CHOICE unstated: a
// block rests on a judgement a person made, so a machine-inferred signal — a
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion scripts/role-word-baseline.json
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
"content/docs/ui/forms.mdx": 3,
"skills/objectstack-ai/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-automation/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md": 2,
"skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-data/rules/relationships.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-platform/SKILL.md": 2,
"skills/objectstack-query/rules/filters.md": 8,
Expand Down
250 changes: 17 additions & 233 deletions skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -37,6 +37,22 @@ metadata:

---

## Quick Reference — Detailed Rules

For comprehensive documentation with incorrect/correct examples:

- **[Naming Conventions](./rules/naming.md)** — snake_case rules, option values, config properties
- **[Field Types](./rules/field-types.md)** — All 49 field types with decision tree and configs
- **[Relationships](./rules/relationships.md)** — lookup vs master_detail, junction patterns, delete behaviors
- **[Validation Rules](./rules/validation.md)** — All validation types, script inversion, severity levels
- **[Index Strategy](./rules/indexing.md)** — btree/gin/gist/fulltext, composite indexes, partial indexes
- **[Data Lifecycle & Retention](./rules/lifecycle.md)** — `lifecycle` classes (record/audit/telemetry/transient/event), retention/TTL/rotation/archive policies; ❗ append-only objects must declare one (distinct from lifecycle *hooks* below)
- **[Lifecycle Hooks](./references/data-hooks.md)** — the 8 lifecycle events, `handler` vs sandboxed `body` (ctx + capability contract), registration, canonical patterns
- **[Datasources & Federation](./rules/datasources.md)** — `defineDatasource`, external/federated objects (`remoteName`/`columnMap`), auto-connect gating, credentials; ❌ no `field.columnName` on external objects
- **[Security & Access Control](./rules/security.md)** — permission sets, assignment rows, RLS policies, `secret` / `requiredPermissions`, `tenancy`, platform-global posture

---

## Core Concepts

### Object Definition
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -280,21 +296,6 @@ export const Invoice = ObjectSchema.create({

---

## Quick Reference — Detailed Rules

For comprehensive documentation with incorrect/correct examples:

- **[Naming Conventions](./rules/naming.md)** — snake_case rules, option values, config properties
- **[Field Types](./rules/field-types.md)** — All 49 field types with decision tree and configs
- **[Relationships](./rules/relationships.md)** — lookup vs master_detail, junction patterns, delete behaviors
- **[Validation Rules](./rules/validation.md)** — All validation types, script inversion, severity levels
- **[Index Strategy](./rules/indexing.md)** — btree/gin/gist/fulltext, composite indexes, partial indexes
- **[Data Lifecycle & Retention](./rules/lifecycle.md)** — `lifecycle` classes (record/audit/telemetry/transient/event), retention/TTL/rotation/archive policies; ❗ append-only objects must declare one (distinct from lifecycle *hooks* below)
- **[Lifecycle Hooks](./references/data-hooks.md)** — the 8 lifecycle events, `handler` vs sandboxed `body` (ctx + capability contract), registration, canonical patterns
- **[Datasources & Federation](./rules/datasources.md)** — `defineDatasource`, external/federated objects (`remoteName`/`columnMap`), auto-connect gating, credentials; ❌ no `field.columnName` on external objects

---

## Quick-Start Template

<!-- os:check -->
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -544,67 +545,7 @@ Per-object access control is authored in **permission sets**, not on the object
schema. There is no object-level `permissions` key (and no `hooks` key either) —
`ObjectSchema.create()` **rejects** both as unknown keys.

### Object-level permissions (RBAC)

Grant CRUD access per object with boolean bits on a permission set:

<!-- os:check -->
```typescript
import { definePermissionSet } from '@objectstack/spec';

export const salesUser = definePermissionSet({
name: 'sales_user',
objects: {
account: { allowRead: true, allowCreate: true, allowEdit: true },
contact: { allowRead: true },
},
});

// Register it on the stack root under `permissions` — NOT `permissionSets`:
// defineStack({ permissions: [salesUser], ... })
```

- **Stack key: `permissions`.** The collection is named for the metadata kind,
not for the factory, so `definePermissionSet()` output goes into
`defineStack({ permissions: [...] })`. `permissionSets:` is **refused at
load** — the top level is strict, so the stack fails with an
`Unrecognized key(s) on this stack definition` error naming the key, never a
silent drop. `ObjectStackDefinitionSchema`
(`node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/stack.zod.ts`) is the enumeration of
record; `objectstack-platform` lists every top-level key.
- Bits: `allowCreate` / `allowRead` / `allowEdit` / `allowDelete`, plus
`allowTransfer` (ownership change), `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords`
(super-user, bypass sharing).
- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts`
- Combine with `enable.apiMethods` to also restrict the HTTP surface.

### Assigning a permission set to a user

Declaring a set grants nobody anything — an assignment is **data**: one row in
the join object **`sys_user_permission_set`** (`@objectstack/plugin-security`),
carrying `user_id`, `permission_set_id`, and an optional `organization_id`
(`null` = every org context). Optional `valid_from` / `valid_until` bound a
half-open window checked at resolution time; `granted_by` is stamped by the
gate on insert — never author it.

⚠️ **`permission_set_id` takes the `sys_permission_set` RECORD ID, not the set's
`name`.** Grants resolve by loading `sys_permission_set` **by `id`**, so a `name`
in that field matches nothing, raises no error, and silently grants nothing.
Declared sets are upserted by `name` with a **generated** `id` on `kernel:ready`
(ADR-0086 D5) — that id differs per environment, so resolve it first.

Assignment is therefore two calls, both `POST /api/v1/data/{object}`
(`…/query` with a QueryAST body for the read): look up the set's `id` in
`sys_permission_set` by `name`, then insert
`{ user_id, permission_set_id, organization_id }` into
`sys_user_permission_set`. Only a tenant admin — or a delegated `adminScope`
carrying `manageAssignments` for that set and user (ADR-0090 D12) — may write
it; plain CRUD bits on the table are not enough.

**Grant looks inert?** Check in order: a `name` in `permission_set_id`; the set
is `active: false`; the validity window has passed; `organization_id` mismatch.
`GET /api/v1/security/explain?object=&operation=&userId=` answers from the
enforcing code path (explaining another user needs `manage_users`).
Full rules: **[Security & Access Control](./rules/security.md)**.

### Access depth (scope-depth) — the ERP "see my unit / my unit and below" axis

Expand All@@ -618,163 +559,6 @@ paid `@objectstack/security-enterprise` plugin, **fail closed to `own`** without
it, and `defineStack` errors unless the grant declares
`requires: ['hierarchy-security']`. Schema: `PermissionSetSchema.objects.*`.

### Row-Level Security (RLS)

The **enforced** RLS surface is a list of `rowLevelSecurity` policies on a
**permission set / profile** (`PermissionSetSchema.rowLevelSecurity`), *not* a
CEL predicate on the object. Each policy carries a `using` (read filter) and/or
`check` (write filter) **string** predicate. The compiler ANDs `using` into
every read for users carrying that set; `check` gates writes. (`@objectstack/plugin-security`
re-reads the target row through the write filter before single-id `update`/`delete`.)

```typescript
// in a permission set (definePermissionSet)
rowLevelSecurity: [
{
name: 'own_records',
object: 'account', // REQUIRED per policy
operation: 'all', // singular: select|insert|update|delete|all
using: 'owner_id == current_user.id', // read scope
check: 'owner_id == current_user.id', // write scope
},
{
name: 'org_isolation',
object: 'contact',
operation: 'select',
using: 'organization_id == current_user.organization_id',
},
]
```

Predicates are **canonical CEL** (ADR-0058): `field == current_user.<prop>`,
`field == 'literal'`, `field in current_user.<array>`, comparisons (`>`/`<`/`>=`/`<=`),
`&&`/`||`/`!`, and `== null` checks all lower to a pushdown filter. **No** cross-object
traversal or subqueries — those are a compile error (ADR-0055), never silently dropped.
A legacy SQL-style `=` / `IN (...)` predicate still compiles via a **deprecated** bridge
(emits a warning) but should be authored in CEL. The compiler resolves these
`current_user.*` placeholders:

| Placeholder | Resolves to |
|:--|:--|
| `current_user.id` | the caller's user id (ownership) |
| `current_user.email` | the caller's email (ADR-0056) |
| `current_user.organization_id` | the caller's tenant |
| `current_user.org_user_ids` | ids of users in the same org (for `IN`) |
| `current_user.positions` | the caller's positions (for `IN`; ADR-0090 D3) |

- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts` (policy shape),
`node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/rls.zod.ts` (predicate grammar).
- Owner-scoping shortcut: the built-in `member_default` set already owner-scopes
writes via `owner_only_writes` / `owner_only_deletes`, and an object's
`sharingModel` (`private` / `public_read` / `public_read_write` / `controlled_by_parent`, ADR-0056 D1)
is the declarative way to set the org-wide default — prefer those over
hand-written policies for the common cases.

### Sensitive fields — `secret` type + `requiredPermissions`

`maskingRule` is **live** (plugin-security's FieldMasker enforces it). The real
channels are:

**Encrypted-at-rest values — `type: 'secret'` (ADR-0100).** For reversible
machine credentials (DB passwords, API keys, tokens): the engine encrypts the
value on write via the registered `ICryptoProvider`, stores the ciphertext
handle in `sys_secret`, persists only an opaque ref on the row, and masks the
value on read. **Fail-closed:** with no crypto provider registered, writes
throw rather than persist cleartext.

```typescript
fields: {
api_key: { type: 'secret', label: 'API Key' },
}
```

**Per-field access gating — `requiredPermissions` (ADR-0066 D3).** Capabilities
required to READ/EDIT the field. A field declaring `requiredPermissions` is
**masked on read and denied on write** unless the caller holds ALL listed
capabilities — an AND-gate that is strictest-wins over permission-set field
grants. Enforced by plugin-security's FieldMasker.

```typescript
fields: {
ssn: {
type: 'text',
requiredPermissions: ['view_pii'], // mask on read / deny on write without it
},
}
```

- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/data/field.zod.ts`
(`secret` field type, `requiredPermissions`)

### Multi-tenancy

For SaaS, set `tenancy` on the object schema for row-level tenant isolation
(the tenant field is injected on write and enforced on read). The block is
**strict** — exactly two keys:

```typescript
tenancy: {
enabled: true, // enable row-level tenant isolation
// tenantField — NO default; omit it and the driver uses `organization_id`
}
```

- **Database-per-tenant isolation is not object metadata** — it is an
environment/deployment choice (each environment carries its own database URL).
- Platform/env-global objects declare `tenancy: { enabled: false }` to opt out
of org row-scoping (see the visibility-posture recipe below).

### Platform-global / admin-only objects (visibility posture)

Some system/config objects are **env-global** (not partitioned per org) and
should be visible to a **platform admin env-wide** but hidden from members —
e.g. identity tables a plugin writes via its own adapter (`sys_sso_provider`,
OAuth clients). These hit a non-obvious interaction:

- Reads of a tenant object pass the **Layer 0 tenant wall** (ADR-0095 D1): an
`organization_id == <the caller's organization>` filter AND-composed ahead of
every business RLS policy. Any row whose `organization_id` is **null or
absent** (common for adapter-written rows that never get the tenant stamp) is
**denied** — the list renders empty. Single-tenant deployments never hit this;
the wall is inert there.
- The `viewAllRecords` superuser bit is **posture-gated and wall-blind**: it
short-circuits **business RLS only**, and only on objects whose posture allows
it (`access.default: 'private'`, `tenancy: { enabled: false }`, or a
better-auth-managed identity table). It never crosses the Layer 0 wall —
crossing takes a *true platform admin* (the superuser bit **and** a
platform-exclusive capability: `manage_metadata`, `manage_platform_settings`,
`studio.access`, `manage_users`) on one of those same postures. So an org
admin holding the superuser bit stays org-scoped, and on an ordinary tenant
object nobody crosses — the admin sees 0 rows too.

**Recipe — env-global, admin-only object that admins can fully see:**

```typescript
tenancy: { enabled: false }, // not a tenant object → Layer 0 contributes nothing
requiredPermissions: ['manage_platform_settings'], // capability AND-gate → members get 403
```

> ⚠️ **Both keys are load-bearing — neither works alone.**
> `tenancy: { enabled: false }` *by itself* switches the wall off for **every**
> caller, and any permission set carrying a wildcard (`'*'`) read grant then
> reads every row env-wide — the shipped `viewer_readonly` still carries one, as
> may an app-declared default profile or a customer-authored set. (The
> `member_default` baseline is **not** one of them: it is explicit-allow and
> grants only the objects it names.) `requiredPermissions` *by itself* leaves the
> object a tenant object, so the wall keeps denying the untagged rows and even a
> platform admin sees nothing. The pair is the correct combo (admin sees all,
> non-admins 403), and `requiredPermissions` is the half that holds however
> permissive the caller's grants are — it is an AND-gate checked **before** the
> CRUD grant. Posture model: ADR-0066; tenant wall: ADR-0095 D1.

### Cross-skill notes

- **API auth providers** (OIDC, JWT, API key) live in **objectstack-api**.
- **Kernel-level RBAC services** (role inheritance, custom policy engines)
live in **objectstack-platform**.
- **CEL predicate syntax** (`P\`...\``, operators, functions) lives in
**objectstack-formula**.

---

## Metadata Protection (`protection`)
Expand Down
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Loading
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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Merged
os-zhuang merged 5 commits into from
Sep 2, 2026
+237 −235
Merged

skills(data): split security into rules/security.md under #14296 item 1 (package net −64 tokens) + DATA-B-06 #14673

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1847127
skills(data): split Security & Access Control into rules/security.md
claude Sep 2, 2026
680040c
skills(data): move the rules routing table above Core Concepts
claude Sep 2, 2026
965eafc
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14297-sk…
claude Sep 2, 2026
f7d8eae
chore(gates): ratchet-DOWN the role-word baseline for objectstack-data
claude Sep 2, 2026
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14297-sk…
claude Sep 2, 2026
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10 changes: 9 additions & 1 deletion scripts/check-skills-token-ratchet.mjs
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -313,7 +313,11 @@ export const CEILINGS = new Map([
// a transition gate written as a `validations[]` invariant bricks rows that
// were legal when stored, and an invariant written as `requiredWhen` never
// enforces itself at all. +110 tokens, 1 absorbed by headroom, ceiling +109.
['skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md', 13892],
// 13892 -> 10009: RE-LOCK at the landed count after the `rules/security.md`
// split (#14296 item 1 = A, condition (b)). The raise recorded above is spent
// and its headroom leaves with it; the moved text is priced in its own row
// below, so the package total is unchanged by the re-lock itself.
['skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md', 10009],
['skills/objectstack-formula/SKILL.md', 6002], // -53 (was 6055)
['skills/objectstack-i18n/SKILL.md', 6338], // -11 (was 6349)
// 12705 -> 12984 (2026-08-31 app-repo-principles raise, see the block above).
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -408,6 +412,10 @@ export const CEILINGS = new Map([
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/lifecycle.md', 1590],
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/naming.md', 773],
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/relationships.md', 3778],
// NEW FILE (#14296 item 1 = A, condition (b)): the entry's Security & Access
// Control block moved here whole. Pinned at its landed count — no headroom,
// because a split that arrives with budget is a raise wearing a new path.
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/security.md', 2480],
// 3024 -> 3109 (2026-08-31 app-repo-principles raise, see the block above).
// Severity Levels listed the three values and left the CHOICE unstated: a
// block rests on a judgement a person made, so a machine-inferred signal — a
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion scripts/role-word-baseline.json
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
"content/docs/ui/forms.mdx": 3,
"skills/objectstack-ai/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-automation/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md": 2,
"skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-data/rules/relationships.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-platform/SKILL.md": 2,
"skills/objectstack-query/rules/filters.md": 8,
Expand Down
250 changes: 17 additions & 233 deletions skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md
View file
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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -37,6 +37,22 @@ metadata:

---

## Quick Reference — Detailed Rules

For comprehensive documentation with incorrect/correct examples:

- **[Naming Conventions](./rules/naming.md)** — snake_case rules, option values, config properties
- **[Field Types](./rules/field-types.md)** — All 49 field types with decision tree and configs
- **[Relationships](./rules/relationships.md)** — lookup vs master_detail, junction patterns, delete behaviors
- **[Validation Rules](./rules/validation.md)** — All validation types, script inversion, severity levels
- **[Index Strategy](./rules/indexing.md)** — btree/gin/gist/fulltext, composite indexes, partial indexes
- **[Data Lifecycle & Retention](./rules/lifecycle.md)** — `lifecycle` classes (record/audit/telemetry/transient/event), retention/TTL/rotation/archive policies; ❗ append-only objects must declare one (distinct from lifecycle *hooks* below)
- **[Lifecycle Hooks](./references/data-hooks.md)** — the 8 lifecycle events, `handler` vs sandboxed `body` (ctx + capability contract), registration, canonical patterns
- **[Datasources & Federation](./rules/datasources.md)** — `defineDatasource`, external/federated objects (`remoteName`/`columnMap`), auto-connect gating, credentials; ❌ no `field.columnName` on external objects
- **[Security & Access Control](./rules/security.md)** — permission sets, assignment rows, RLS policies, `secret` / `requiredPermissions`, `tenancy`, platform-global posture

---

## Core Concepts

### Object Definition
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -280,21 +296,6 @@ export const Invoice = ObjectSchema.create({

---

## Quick Reference — Detailed Rules

For comprehensive documentation with incorrect/correct examples:

- **[Naming Conventions](./rules/naming.md)** — snake_case rules, option values, config properties
- **[Field Types](./rules/field-types.md)** — All 49 field types with decision tree and configs
- **[Relationships](./rules/relationships.md)** — lookup vs master_detail, junction patterns, delete behaviors
- **[Validation Rules](./rules/validation.md)** — All validation types, script inversion, severity levels
- **[Index Strategy](./rules/indexing.md)** — btree/gin/gist/fulltext, composite indexes, partial indexes
- **[Data Lifecycle & Retention](./rules/lifecycle.md)** — `lifecycle` classes (record/audit/telemetry/transient/event), retention/TTL/rotation/archive policies; ❗ append-only objects must declare one (distinct from lifecycle *hooks* below)
- **[Lifecycle Hooks](./references/data-hooks.md)** — the 8 lifecycle events, `handler` vs sandboxed `body` (ctx + capability contract), registration, canonical patterns
- **[Datasources & Federation](./rules/datasources.md)** — `defineDatasource`, external/federated objects (`remoteName`/`columnMap`), auto-connect gating, credentials; ❌ no `field.columnName` on external objects

---

## Quick-Start Template

<!-- os:check -->
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -544,67 +545,7 @@ Per-object access control is authored in **permission sets**, not on the object
schema. There is no object-level `permissions` key (and no `hooks` key either) —
`ObjectSchema.create()` **rejects** both as unknown keys.

### Object-level permissions (RBAC)

Grant CRUD access per object with boolean bits on a permission set:

<!-- os:check -->
```typescript
import { definePermissionSet } from '@objectstack/spec';

export const salesUser = definePermissionSet({
name: 'sales_user',
objects: {
account: { allowRead: true, allowCreate: true, allowEdit: true },
contact: { allowRead: true },
},
});

// Register it on the stack root under `permissions` — NOT `permissionSets`:
// defineStack({ permissions: [salesUser], ... })
```

- **Stack key: `permissions`.** The collection is named for the metadata kind,
not for the factory, so `definePermissionSet()` output goes into
`defineStack({ permissions: [...] })`. `permissionSets:` is **refused at
load** — the top level is strict, so the stack fails with an
`Unrecognized key(s) on this stack definition` error naming the key, never a
silent drop. `ObjectStackDefinitionSchema`
(`node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/stack.zod.ts`) is the enumeration of
record; `objectstack-platform` lists every top-level key.
- Bits: `allowCreate` / `allowRead` / `allowEdit` / `allowDelete`, plus
`allowTransfer` (ownership change), `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords`
(super-user, bypass sharing).
- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts`
- Combine with `enable.apiMethods` to also restrict the HTTP surface.

### Assigning a permission set to a user

Declaring a set grants nobody anything — an assignment is **data**: one row in
the join object **`sys_user_permission_set`** (`@objectstack/plugin-security`),
carrying `user_id`, `permission_set_id`, and an optional `organization_id`
(`null` = every org context). Optional `valid_from` / `valid_until` bound a
half-open window checked at resolution time; `granted_by` is stamped by the
gate on insert — never author it.

⚠️ **`permission_set_id` takes the `sys_permission_set` RECORD ID, not the set's
`name`.** Grants resolve by loading `sys_permission_set` **by `id`**, so a `name`
in that field matches nothing, raises no error, and silently grants nothing.
Declared sets are upserted by `name` with a **generated** `id` on `kernel:ready`
(ADR-0086 D5) — that id differs per environment, so resolve it first.

Assignment is therefore two calls, both `POST /api/v1/data/{object}`
(`…/query` with a QueryAST body for the read): look up the set's `id` in
`sys_permission_set` by `name`, then insert
`{ user_id, permission_set_id, organization_id }` into
`sys_user_permission_set`. Only a tenant admin — or a delegated `adminScope`
carrying `manageAssignments` for that set and user (ADR-0090 D12) — may write
it; plain CRUD bits on the table are not enough.

**Grant looks inert?** Check in order: a `name` in `permission_set_id`; the set
is `active: false`; the validity window has passed; `organization_id` mismatch.
`GET /api/v1/security/explain?object=&operation=&userId=` answers from the
enforcing code path (explaining another user needs `manage_users`).
Full rules: **[Security & Access Control](./rules/security.md)**.

### Access depth (scope-depth) — the ERP "see my unit / my unit and below" axis

Expand All@@ -618,163 +559,6 @@ paid `@objectstack/security-enterprise` plugin, **fail closed to `own`** without
it, and `defineStack` errors unless the grant declares
`requires: ['hierarchy-security']`. Schema: `PermissionSetSchema.objects.*`.

### Row-Level Security (RLS)

The **enforced** RLS surface is a list of `rowLevelSecurity` policies on a
**permission set / profile** (`PermissionSetSchema.rowLevelSecurity`), *not* a
CEL predicate on the object. Each policy carries a `using` (read filter) and/or
`check` (write filter) **string** predicate. The compiler ANDs `using` into
every read for users carrying that set; `check` gates writes. (`@objectstack/plugin-security`
re-reads the target row through the write filter before single-id `update`/`delete`.)

```typescript
// in a permission set (definePermissionSet)
rowLevelSecurity: [
{
name: 'own_records',
object: 'account', // REQUIRED per policy
operation: 'all', // singular: select|insert|update|delete|all
using: 'owner_id == current_user.id', // read scope
check: 'owner_id == current_user.id', // write scope
},
{
name: 'org_isolation',
object: 'contact',
operation: 'select',
using: 'organization_id == current_user.organization_id',
},
]
```

Predicates are **canonical CEL** (ADR-0058): `field == current_user.<prop>`,
`field == 'literal'`, `field in current_user.<array>`, comparisons (`>`/`<`/`>=`/`<=`),
`&&`/`||`/`!`, and `== null` checks all lower to a pushdown filter. **No** cross-object
traversal or subqueries — those are a compile error (ADR-0055), never silently dropped.
A legacy SQL-style `=` / `IN (...)` predicate still compiles via a **deprecated** bridge
(emits a warning) but should be authored in CEL. The compiler resolves these
`current_user.*` placeholders:

| Placeholder | Resolves to |
|:--|:--|
| `current_user.id` | the caller's user id (ownership) |
| `current_user.email` | the caller's email (ADR-0056) |
| `current_user.organization_id` | the caller's tenant |
| `current_user.org_user_ids` | ids of users in the same org (for `IN`) |
| `current_user.positions` | the caller's positions (for `IN`; ADR-0090 D3) |

- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts` (policy shape),
`node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/rls.zod.ts` (predicate grammar).
- Owner-scoping shortcut: the built-in `member_default` set already owner-scopes
writes via `owner_only_writes` / `owner_only_deletes`, and an object's
`sharingModel` (`private` / `public_read` / `public_read_write` / `controlled_by_parent`, ADR-0056 D1)
is the declarative way to set the org-wide default — prefer those over
hand-written policies for the common cases.

### Sensitive fields — `secret` type + `requiredPermissions`

`maskingRule` is **live** (plugin-security's FieldMasker enforces it). The real
channels are:

**Encrypted-at-rest values — `type: 'secret'` (ADR-0100).** For reversible
machine credentials (DB passwords, API keys, tokens): the engine encrypts the
value on write via the registered `ICryptoProvider`, stores the ciphertext
handle in `sys_secret`, persists only an opaque ref on the row, and masks the
value on read. **Fail-closed:** with no crypto provider registered, writes
throw rather than persist cleartext.

```typescript
fields: {
api_key: { type: 'secret', label: 'API Key' },
}
```

**Per-field access gating — `requiredPermissions` (ADR-0066 D3).** Capabilities
required to READ/EDIT the field. A field declaring `requiredPermissions` is
**masked on read and denied on write** unless the caller holds ALL listed
capabilities — an AND-gate that is strictest-wins over permission-set field
grants. Enforced by plugin-security's FieldMasker.

```typescript
fields: {
ssn: {
type: 'text',
requiredPermissions: ['view_pii'], // mask on read / deny on write without it
},
}
```

- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/data/field.zod.ts`
(`secret` field type, `requiredPermissions`)

### Multi-tenancy

For SaaS, set `tenancy` on the object schema for row-level tenant isolation
(the tenant field is injected on write and enforced on read). The block is
**strict** — exactly two keys:

```typescript
tenancy: {
enabled: true, // enable row-level tenant isolation
// tenantField — NO default; omit it and the driver uses `organization_id`
}
```

- **Database-per-tenant isolation is not object metadata** — it is an
environment/deployment choice (each environment carries its own database URL).
- Platform/env-global objects declare `tenancy: { enabled: false }` to opt out
of org row-scoping (see the visibility-posture recipe below).

### Platform-global / admin-only objects (visibility posture)

Some system/config objects are **env-global** (not partitioned per org) and
should be visible to a **platform admin env-wide** but hidden from members —
e.g. identity tables a plugin writes via its own adapter (`sys_sso_provider`,
OAuth clients). These hit a non-obvious interaction:

- Reads of a tenant object pass the **Layer 0 tenant wall** (ADR-0095 D1): an
`organization_id == <the caller's organization>` filter AND-composed ahead of
every business RLS policy. Any row whose `organization_id` is **null or
absent** (common for adapter-written rows that never get the tenant stamp) is
**denied** — the list renders empty. Single-tenant deployments never hit this;
the wall is inert there.
- The `viewAllRecords` superuser bit is **posture-gated and wall-blind**: it
short-circuits **business RLS only**, and only on objects whose posture allows
it (`access.default: 'private'`, `tenancy: { enabled: false }`, or a
better-auth-managed identity table). It never crosses the Layer 0 wall —
crossing takes a *true platform admin* (the superuser bit **and** a
platform-exclusive capability: `manage_metadata`, `manage_platform_settings`,
`studio.access`, `manage_users`) on one of those same postures. So an org
admin holding the superuser bit stays org-scoped, and on an ordinary tenant
object nobody crosses — the admin sees 0 rows too.

**Recipe — env-global, admin-only object that admins can fully see:**

```typescript
tenancy: { enabled: false }, // not a tenant object → Layer 0 contributes nothing
requiredPermissions: ['manage_platform_settings'], // capability AND-gate → members get 403
```

> ⚠️ **Both keys are load-bearing — neither works alone.**
> `tenancy: { enabled: false }` *by itself* switches the wall off for **every**
> caller, and any permission set carrying a wildcard (`'*'`) read grant then
> reads every row env-wide — the shipped `viewer_readonly` still carries one, as
> may an app-declared default profile or a customer-authored set. (The
> `member_default` baseline is **not** one of them: it is explicit-allow and
> grants only the objects it names.) `requiredPermissions` *by itself* leaves the
> object a tenant object, so the wall keeps denying the untagged rows and even a
> platform admin sees nothing. The pair is the correct combo (admin sees all,
> non-admins 403), and `requiredPermissions` is the half that holds however
> permissive the caller's grants are — it is an AND-gate checked **before** the
> CRUD grant. Posture model: ADR-0066; tenant wall: ADR-0095 D1.

### Cross-skill notes

- **API auth providers** (OIDC, JWT, API key) live in **objectstack-api**.
- **Kernel-level RBAC services** (role inheritance, custom policy engines)
live in **objectstack-platform**.
- **CEL predicate syntax** (`P\`...\``, operators, functions) lives in
**objectstack-formula**.

---

## Metadata Protection (`protection`)
Expand Down
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Merged
os-zhuang merged 5 commits into from
Sep 2, 2026
+237 −235
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skills(data): split security into rules/security.md under #14296 item 1 (package net −64 tokens) + DATA-B-06 #14673

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1847127
skills(data): split Security & Access Control into rules/security.md
claude Sep 2, 2026
680040c
skills(data): move the rules routing table above Core Concepts
claude Sep 2, 2026
965eafc
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14297-sk…
claude Sep 2, 2026
f7d8eae
chore(gates): ratchet-DOWN the role-word baseline for objectstack-data
claude Sep 2, 2026
b3b3cda
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/issue-14297-sk…
claude Sep 2, 2026
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10 changes: 9 additions & 1 deletion scripts/check-skills-token-ratchet.mjs
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -313,7 +313,11 @@ export const CEILINGS = new Map([
// a transition gate written as a `validations[]` invariant bricks rows that
// were legal when stored, and an invariant written as `requiredWhen` never
// enforces itself at all. +110 tokens, 1 absorbed by headroom, ceiling +109.
['skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md', 13892],
// 13892 -> 10009: RE-LOCK at the landed count after the `rules/security.md`
// split (#14296 item 1 = A, condition (b)). The raise recorded above is spent
// and its headroom leaves with it; the moved text is priced in its own row
// below, so the package total is unchanged by the re-lock itself.
['skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md', 10009],
['skills/objectstack-formula/SKILL.md', 6002], // -53 (was 6055)
['skills/objectstack-i18n/SKILL.md', 6338], // -11 (was 6349)
// 12705 -> 12984 (2026-08-31 app-repo-principles raise, see the block above).
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -408,6 +412,10 @@ export const CEILINGS = new Map([
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/lifecycle.md', 1590],
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/naming.md', 773],
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/relationships.md', 3778],
// NEW FILE (#14296 item 1 = A, condition (b)): the entry's Security & Access
// Control block moved here whole. Pinned at its landed count — no headroom,
// because a split that arrives with budget is a raise wearing a new path.
['skills/objectstack-data/rules/security.md', 2480],
// 3024 -> 3109 (2026-08-31 app-repo-principles raise, see the block above).
// Severity Levels listed the three values and left the CHOICE unstated: a
// block rests on a judgement a person made, so a machine-inferred signal — a
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion scripts/role-word-baseline.json
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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
"content/docs/ui/forms.mdx": 3,
"skills/objectstack-ai/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-automation/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md": 2,
"skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-data/rules/relationships.md": 1,
"skills/objectstack-platform/SKILL.md": 2,
"skills/objectstack-query/rules/filters.md": 8,
Expand Down
250 changes: 17 additions & 233 deletions skills/objectstack-data/SKILL.md
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Expand Up@@ -37,6 +37,22 @@ metadata:

---

## Quick Reference — Detailed Rules

For comprehensive documentation with incorrect/correct examples:

- **[Naming Conventions](./rules/naming.md)** — snake_case rules, option values, config properties
- **[Field Types](./rules/field-types.md)** — All 49 field types with decision tree and configs
- **[Relationships](./rules/relationships.md)** — lookup vs master_detail, junction patterns, delete behaviors
- **[Validation Rules](./rules/validation.md)** — All validation types, script inversion, severity levels
- **[Index Strategy](./rules/indexing.md)** — btree/gin/gist/fulltext, composite indexes, partial indexes
- **[Data Lifecycle & Retention](./rules/lifecycle.md)** — `lifecycle` classes (record/audit/telemetry/transient/event), retention/TTL/rotation/archive policies; ❗ append-only objects must declare one (distinct from lifecycle *hooks* below)
- **[Lifecycle Hooks](./references/data-hooks.md)** — the 8 lifecycle events, `handler` vs sandboxed `body` (ctx + capability contract), registration, canonical patterns
- **[Datasources & Federation](./rules/datasources.md)** — `defineDatasource`, external/federated objects (`remoteName`/`columnMap`), auto-connect gating, credentials; ❌ no `field.columnName` on external objects
- **[Security & Access Control](./rules/security.md)** — permission sets, assignment rows, RLS policies, `secret` / `requiredPermissions`, `tenancy`, platform-global posture

---

## Core Concepts

### Object Definition
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -280,21 +296,6 @@ export const Invoice = ObjectSchema.create({

---

## Quick Reference — Detailed Rules

For comprehensive documentation with incorrect/correct examples:

- **[Naming Conventions](./rules/naming.md)** — snake_case rules, option values, config properties
- **[Field Types](./rules/field-types.md)** — All 49 field types with decision tree and configs
- **[Relationships](./rules/relationships.md)** — lookup vs master_detail, junction patterns, delete behaviors
- **[Validation Rules](./rules/validation.md)** — All validation types, script inversion, severity levels
- **[Index Strategy](./rules/indexing.md)** — btree/gin/gist/fulltext, composite indexes, partial indexes
- **[Data Lifecycle & Retention](./rules/lifecycle.md)** — `lifecycle` classes (record/audit/telemetry/transient/event), retention/TTL/rotation/archive policies; ❗ append-only objects must declare one (distinct from lifecycle *hooks* below)
- **[Lifecycle Hooks](./references/data-hooks.md)** — the 8 lifecycle events, `handler` vs sandboxed `body` (ctx + capability contract), registration, canonical patterns
- **[Datasources & Federation](./rules/datasources.md)** — `defineDatasource`, external/federated objects (`remoteName`/`columnMap`), auto-connect gating, credentials; ❌ no `field.columnName` on external objects

---

## Quick-Start Template

<!-- os:check -->
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -544,67 +545,7 @@ Per-object access control is authored in **permission sets**, not on the object
schema. There is no object-level `permissions` key (and no `hooks` key either) —
`ObjectSchema.create()` **rejects** both as unknown keys.

### Object-level permissions (RBAC)

Grant CRUD access per object with boolean bits on a permission set:

<!-- os:check -->
```typescript
import { definePermissionSet } from '@objectstack/spec';

export const salesUser = definePermissionSet({
name: 'sales_user',
objects: {
account: { allowRead: true, allowCreate: true, allowEdit: true },
contact: { allowRead: true },
},
});

// Register it on the stack root under `permissions` — NOT `permissionSets`:
// defineStack({ permissions: [salesUser], ... })
```

- **Stack key: `permissions`.** The collection is named for the metadata kind,
not for the factory, so `definePermissionSet()` output goes into
`defineStack({ permissions: [...] })`. `permissionSets:` is **refused at
load** — the top level is strict, so the stack fails with an
`Unrecognized key(s) on this stack definition` error naming the key, never a
silent drop. `ObjectStackDefinitionSchema`
(`node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/stack.zod.ts`) is the enumeration of
record; `objectstack-platform` lists every top-level key.
- Bits: `allowCreate` / `allowRead` / `allowEdit` / `allowDelete`, plus
`allowTransfer` (ownership change), `viewAllRecords` / `modifyAllRecords`
(super-user, bypass sharing).
- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts`
- Combine with `enable.apiMethods` to also restrict the HTTP surface.

### Assigning a permission set to a user

Declaring a set grants nobody anything — an assignment is **data**: one row in
the join object **`sys_user_permission_set`** (`@objectstack/plugin-security`),
carrying `user_id`, `permission_set_id`, and an optional `organization_id`
(`null` = every org context). Optional `valid_from` / `valid_until` bound a
half-open window checked at resolution time; `granted_by` is stamped by the
gate on insert — never author it.

⚠️ **`permission_set_id` takes the `sys_permission_set` RECORD ID, not the set's
`name`.** Grants resolve by loading `sys_permission_set` **by `id`**, so a `name`
in that field matches nothing, raises no error, and silently grants nothing.
Declared sets are upserted by `name` with a **generated** `id` on `kernel:ready`
(ADR-0086 D5) — that id differs per environment, so resolve it first.

Assignment is therefore two calls, both `POST /api/v1/data/{object}`
(`…/query` with a QueryAST body for the read): look up the set's `id` in
`sys_permission_set` by `name`, then insert
`{ user_id, permission_set_id, organization_id }` into
`sys_user_permission_set`. Only a tenant admin — or a delegated `adminScope`
carrying `manageAssignments` for that set and user (ADR-0090 D12) — may write
it; plain CRUD bits on the table are not enough.

**Grant looks inert?** Check in order: a `name` in `permission_set_id`; the set
is `active: false`; the validity window has passed; `organization_id` mismatch.
`GET /api/v1/security/explain?object=&operation=&userId=` answers from the
enforcing code path (explaining another user needs `manage_users`).
Full rules: **[Security & Access Control](./rules/security.md)**.

### Access depth (scope-depth) — the ERP "see my unit / my unit and below" axis

Expand All@@ -618,163 +559,6 @@ paid `@objectstack/security-enterprise` plugin, **fail closed to `own`** without
it, and `defineStack` errors unless the grant declares
`requires: ['hierarchy-security']`. Schema: `PermissionSetSchema.objects.*`.

### Row-Level Security (RLS)

The **enforced** RLS surface is a list of `rowLevelSecurity` policies on a
**permission set / profile** (`PermissionSetSchema.rowLevelSecurity`), *not* a
CEL predicate on the object. Each policy carries a `using` (read filter) and/or
`check` (write filter) **string** predicate. The compiler ANDs `using` into
every read for users carrying that set; `check` gates writes. (`@objectstack/plugin-security`
re-reads the target row through the write filter before single-id `update`/`delete`.)

```typescript
// in a permission set (definePermissionSet)
rowLevelSecurity: [
{
name: 'own_records',
object: 'account', // REQUIRED per policy
operation: 'all', // singular: select|insert|update|delete|all
using: 'owner_id == current_user.id', // read scope
check: 'owner_id == current_user.id', // write scope
},
{
name: 'org_isolation',
object: 'contact',
operation: 'select',
using: 'organization_id == current_user.organization_id',
},
]
```

Predicates are **canonical CEL** (ADR-0058): `field == current_user.<prop>`,
`field == 'literal'`, `field in current_user.<array>`, comparisons (`>`/`<`/`>=`/`<=`),
`&&`/`||`/`!`, and `== null` checks all lower to a pushdown filter. **No** cross-object
traversal or subqueries — those are a compile error (ADR-0055), never silently dropped.
A legacy SQL-style `=` / `IN (...)` predicate still compiles via a **deprecated** bridge
(emits a warning) but should be authored in CEL. The compiler resolves these
`current_user.*` placeholders:

| Placeholder | Resolves to |
|:--|:--|
| `current_user.id` | the caller's user id (ownership) |
| `current_user.email` | the caller's email (ADR-0056) |
| `current_user.organization_id` | the caller's tenant |
| `current_user.org_user_ids` | ids of users in the same org (for `IN`) |
| `current_user.positions` | the caller's positions (for `IN`; ADR-0090 D3) |

- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts` (policy shape),
`node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/security/rls.zod.ts` (predicate grammar).
- Owner-scoping shortcut: the built-in `member_default` set already owner-scopes
writes via `owner_only_writes` / `owner_only_deletes`, and an object's
`sharingModel` (`private` / `public_read` / `public_read_write` / `controlled_by_parent`, ADR-0056 D1)
is the declarative way to set the org-wide default — prefer those over
hand-written policies for the common cases.

### Sensitive fields — `secret` type + `requiredPermissions`

`maskingRule` is **live** (plugin-security's FieldMasker enforces it). The real
channels are:

**Encrypted-at-rest values — `type: 'secret'` (ADR-0100).** For reversible
machine credentials (DB passwords, API keys, tokens): the engine encrypts the
value on write via the registered `ICryptoProvider`, stores the ciphertext
handle in `sys_secret`, persists only an opaque ref on the row, and masks the
value on read. **Fail-closed:** with no crypto provider registered, writes
throw rather than persist cleartext.

```typescript
fields: {
api_key: { type: 'secret', label: 'API Key' },
}
```

**Per-field access gating — `requiredPermissions` (ADR-0066 D3).** Capabilities
required to READ/EDIT the field. A field declaring `requiredPermissions` is
**masked on read and denied on write** unless the caller holds ALL listed
capabilities — an AND-gate that is strictest-wins over permission-set field
grants. Enforced by plugin-security's FieldMasker.

```typescript
fields: {
ssn: {
type: 'text',
requiredPermissions: ['view_pii'], // mask on read / deny on write without it
},
}
```

- Source: `node_modules/@objectstack/spec/src/data/field.zod.ts`
(`secret` field type, `requiredPermissions`)

### Multi-tenancy

For SaaS, set `tenancy` on the object schema for row-level tenant isolation
(the tenant field is injected on write and enforced on read). The block is
**strict** — exactly two keys:

```typescript
tenancy: {
enabled: true, // enable row-level tenant isolation
// tenantField — NO default; omit it and the driver uses `organization_id`
}
```

- **Database-per-tenant isolation is not object metadata** — it is an
environment/deployment choice (each environment carries its own database URL).
- Platform/env-global objects declare `tenancy: { enabled: false }` to opt out
of org row-scoping (see the visibility-posture recipe below).

### Platform-global / admin-only objects (visibility posture)

Some system/config objects are **env-global** (not partitioned per org) and
should be visible to a **platform admin env-wide** but hidden from members —
e.g. identity tables a plugin writes via its own adapter (`sys_sso_provider`,
OAuth clients). These hit a non-obvious interaction:

- Reads of a tenant object pass the **Layer 0 tenant wall** (ADR-0095 D1): an
`organization_id == <the caller's organization>` filter AND-composed ahead of
every business RLS policy. Any row whose `organization_id` is **null or
absent** (common for adapter-written rows that never get the tenant stamp) is
**denied** — the list renders empty. Single-tenant deployments never hit this;
the wall is inert there.
- The `viewAllRecords` superuser bit is **posture-gated and wall-blind**: it
short-circuits **business RLS only**, and only on objects whose posture allows
it (`access.default: 'private'`, `tenancy: { enabled: false }`, or a
better-auth-managed identity table). It never crosses the Layer 0 wall —
crossing takes a *true platform admin* (the superuser bit **and** a
platform-exclusive capability: `manage_metadata`, `manage_platform_settings`,
`studio.access`, `manage_users`) on one of those same postures. So an org
admin holding the superuser bit stays org-scoped, and on an ordinary tenant
object nobody crosses — the admin sees 0 rows too.

**Recipe — env-global, admin-only object that admins can fully see:**

```typescript
tenancy: { enabled: false }, // not a tenant object → Layer 0 contributes nothing
requiredPermissions: ['manage_platform_settings'], // capability AND-gate → members get 403
```

> ⚠️ **Both keys are load-bearing — neither works alone.**
> `tenancy: { enabled: false }` *by itself* switches the wall off for **every**
> caller, and any permission set carrying a wildcard (`'*'`) read grant then
> reads every row env-wide — the shipped `viewer_readonly` still carries one, as
> may an app-declared default profile or a customer-authored set. (The
> `member_default` baseline is **not** one of them: it is explicit-allow and
> grants only the objects it names.) `requiredPermissions` *by itself* leaves the
> object a tenant object, so the wall keeps denying the untagged rows and even a
> platform admin sees nothing. The pair is the correct combo (admin sees all,
> non-admins 403), and `requiredPermissions` is the half that holds however
> permissive the caller's grants are — it is an AND-gate checked **before** the
> CRUD grant. Posture model: ADR-0066; tenant wall: ADR-0095 D1.

### Cross-skill notes

- **API auth providers** (OIDC, JWT, API key) live in **objectstack-api**.
- **Kernel-level RBAC services** (role inheritance, custom policy engines)
live in **objectstack-platform**.
- **CEL predicate syntax** (`P\`...\``, operators, functions) lives in
**objectstack-formula**.

---

## Metadata Protection (`protection`)
Expand Down
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