82 changes: 82 additions & 0 deletions .changeset/share-link-probe-policy-gate.md
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
---
"@objectstack/plugin-sharing": minor
"@objectstack/runtime": minor
---

fix(sharing): gate the share-link route probe on `publicSharing.enabled`, at both probe sites (#14637)

**BREAKING** runtime behaviour change on a published HTTP path:
`GET /api/v1/share-links/:token/resolve` answers `404 INVALID_OR_EXPIRED` where
it used to answer `401 NEEDS_PASSWORD` / `401 WRONG_PASSWORD` /
`401 SIGN_IN_REQUIRED` / `410 EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED`, for every link whose object
has `publicSharing.enabled` switched off. Shipped as `minor` under the repo's
launch-window convention (a breaking change does not burn a major while the
stack is in lockstep). No published export is added, removed or re-shaped; the
level carries the breaking banner, not a surface change.

#14033 made `publicSharing.enabled` a standing policy: `resolveToken()` re-reads
the object's current block on every redemption and refuses a switched-off link
with the same undifferentiated `null` a revoked, expired, unknown or ineligible
token gets — because, in that gate's own words, for a caller who may hold
nothing but a token a distinguishable "sharing is off for this object" is an
**existence oracle**.

The HTTP layer above it then re-opened exactly that oracle. Both share-link
surfaces run a row probe after `resolveToken()` returns null, to answer with a
more useful status, and both answered from the `sys_share_link` row with no
knowledge of the object's block. So an anonymous caller could still tell a
real-but-switched-off token from an unknown one three ways: a row carrying
`password_hash` drew `401 NEEDS_PASSWORD`, the same row with any password drew
`401 WRONG_PASSWORD` — including a **correct** password, which is both an oracle
and a lie, since that link can serve nothing — and a row with
`audience: 'signed_in'` drew `401 SIGN_IN_REQUIRED`. A security property stated
in one layer and defeated in the layer above it is worse than one never claimed,
because the next reader believes the comment.

**What changed.** Both probes read the object's standing policy before they
answer from the row, and when the block is off every arm falls through to the
generic `404 INVALID_OR_EXPIRED` that unknown, revoked, expired and ineligible
tokens already give — byte-for-byte the answer a token that never existed
receives. The `410 EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED` arm is included: gating only the two 401
arms would leave a third class of link answer and a rule about which arms are
gated. An object whose schema the engine cannot answer for is `enabled: false`
by `getPolicy`'s definition and is refused the same way — fail-closed, the same
definition `createLink` and `resolveToken` already use.

The fix lands at **both** sites in one change, because the probe exists twice:
`plugin-sharing`'s REST routes, and the `/share-links` dispatcher domain in
`@objectstack/runtime` that is the designed primary surface for cloud's
per-environment kernels (`registerShareLinkRoutes: false`). Fixing one would
have moved the oracle to whichever embedding uses the other.

**Nothing else moves.** With the block ON, every refusal is exactly what it was:
`NEEDS_PASSWORD`, `WRONG_PASSWORD`, `SIGN_IN_REQUIRED` and `EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED`
are unchanged in status, code and message, and a correct password or a signed-in
viewer still resolves the record. Mint-time behaviour is untouched, no
`sys_share_link` row is written or read differently, and no error code is added
or retired.

**Consumer impact.** A viewer that branches on the refusal STATUS sees TWO
changes, for links on a switched-off object only — and the measured consumer
branches on status alone. On the objectui console at `67dadd6`,
`apps/console/src/pages/SharedRecordPage.tsx` lines 70-85 dispatch on
`res.status` and never on the body's error code, so:

- all three 401 arms (`NEEDS_PASSWORD`, `WRONG_PASSWORD`, `SIGN_IN_REQUIRED`)
rendered the password prompt and now render the 404 copy, "This link is
invalid or no longer available.";
- the 410 arm rendered "This link has expired or was revoked." and now renders
that same 404 copy.

Both shifts are the intended outcome and were accepted with the ruling: a
correct password on such a link yields nothing, so prompting for one teaches the
holder to open a door that is bricked up, and "expired or revoked" is a claim
about a token whose existence the caller must not be able to confirm. Links on
objects whose block is on are unaffected — prompt, 410 copy and 200 render
included.

Maintainer ruling 2026-09-03 (decision batch #17, item 1), verbatim 「同意」,
adopting option A over option B (keep the 401 and document the accepted oracle)
and option C (gate only the two 401 arms, rejected as proliferation).

<!-- adr-0087: not-required (no-migration-prescription) Nothing authorable is removed, renamed or re-shaped: `publicSharing.enabled` keeps its name, type, default and accept-set, and this change is only WHICH HTTP STATUS the route layer answers with while that switch is off. There is no tombstone for `objectstack migrate meta` to carry and no mechanical rewrite it could perform on any consumer — a deployment that wants the 401 affordance back enables the object's block, which is an authoring decision, not a migration. -->
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ The largest single consumer — **17 of the 106 sites**.
| 34 | `revoke()` deletes directly, **before** the non-manual-source guard | Get: the evaluator can revoke its own grants. Lose: the `CONFLICT` guard that warns a rule-materialised grant will be silently re-granted on the next reconcile | `plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts:1476` (guard at `:1501`) |
| 35 | `listShares()` skips the management gate | Get: full enumeration of who can see a record | `plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts:1528` |
| 36 | `sys_record_share` reads are **not** self-scoped | Get: tenant-wide share listing without `manage_sharing` | `sharing-plugin.ts:1088` |
| 37 | Share-link policy `enabled` check bypassed; system callers re-enter under a system context | Get: link **creation** while the policy is off — resolution is **not** bypassed since #14033 (`publicSharing.enabled` is a standing policy held at every redemption): a link minted this way does not resolve until the block is enabled | `plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts:449`, `:503`, `:507`, `:580`, `:610` |
| 37 | Share-link policy `enabled` check bypassed; system callers re-enter under a system context | Get: link **creation** while the policy is off — resolution is **not** bypassed since #14033 (`publicSharing.enabled` is a standing policy held at every redemption): a link minted this way does not resolve until the block is enabled | `plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts:469`, `:523`, `:527`, `:600`, `:630` |
| 38 | Sharing-rule provenance stamp skipped | Lose: the row is not marked as an admin customization — seeder / `defineRule` / boot reconcilers are "the package door" | `sharing-rule-provenance.ts:47` |
| 39 | Sharing-rule service write + delete paths return early | Lose: the manage-rules gate on the service surface, and the platform-global-rule delete guard | `sharing-rule-service.ts:165`, `:390` |

Expand Down
Loading
Loading
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all
 blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '
Skip to content
82 changes: 82 additions & 0 deletions .changeset/share-link-probe-policy-gate.md
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
---
"@objectstack/plugin-sharing": minor
"@objectstack/runtime": minor
---

fix(sharing): gate the share-link route probe on `publicSharing.enabled`, at both probe sites (#14637)

**BREAKING** runtime behaviour change on a published HTTP path:
`GET /api/v1/share-links/:token/resolve` answers `404 INVALID_OR_EXPIRED` where
it used to answer `401 NEEDS_PASSWORD` / `401 WRONG_PASSWORD` /
`401 SIGN_IN_REQUIRED` / `410 EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED`, for every link whose object
has `publicSharing.enabled` switched off. Shipped as `minor` under the repo's
launch-window convention (a breaking change does not burn a major while the
stack is in lockstep). No published export is added, removed or re-shaped; the
level carries the breaking banner, not a surface change.

#14033 made `publicSharing.enabled` a standing policy: `resolveToken()` re-reads
the object's current block on every redemption and refuses a switched-off link
with the same undifferentiated `null` a revoked, expired, unknown or ineligible
token gets — because, in that gate's own words, for a caller who may hold
nothing but a token a distinguishable "sharing is off for this object" is an
**existence oracle**.

The HTTP layer above it then re-opened exactly that oracle. Both share-link
surfaces run a row probe after `resolveToken()` returns null, to answer with a
more useful status, and both answered from the `sys_share_link` row with no
knowledge of the object's block. So an anonymous caller could still tell a
real-but-switched-off token from an unknown one three ways: a row carrying
`password_hash` drew `401 NEEDS_PASSWORD`, the same row with any password drew
`401 WRONG_PASSWORD` — including a **correct** password, which is both an oracle
and a lie, since that link can serve nothing — and a row with
`audience: 'signed_in'` drew `401 SIGN_IN_REQUIRED`. A security property stated
in one layer and defeated in the layer above it is worse than one never claimed,
because the next reader believes the comment.

**What changed.** Both probes read the object's standing policy before they
answer from the row, and when the block is off every arm falls through to the
generic `404 INVALID_OR_EXPIRED` that unknown, revoked, expired and ineligible
tokens already give — byte-for-byte the answer a token that never existed
receives. The `410 EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED` arm is included: gating only the two 401
arms would leave a third class of link answer and a rule about which arms are
gated. An object whose schema the engine cannot answer for is `enabled: false`
by `getPolicy`'s definition and is refused the same way — fail-closed, the same
definition `createLink` and `resolveToken` already use.

The fix lands at **both** sites in one change, because the probe exists twice:
`plugin-sharing`'s REST routes, and the `/share-links` dispatcher domain in
`@objectstack/runtime` that is the designed primary surface for cloud's
per-environment kernels (`registerShareLinkRoutes: false`). Fixing one would
have moved the oracle to whichever embedding uses the other.

**Nothing else moves.** With the block ON, every refusal is exactly what it was:
`NEEDS_PASSWORD`, `WRONG_PASSWORD`, `SIGN_IN_REQUIRED` and `EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED`
are unchanged in status, code and message, and a correct password or a signed-in
viewer still resolves the record. Mint-time behaviour is untouched, no
`sys_share_link` row is written or read differently, and no error code is added
or retired.

**Consumer impact.** A viewer that branches on the refusal STATUS sees TWO
changes, for links on a switched-off object only — and the measured consumer
branches on status alone. On the objectui console at `67dadd6`,
`apps/console/src/pages/SharedRecordPage.tsx` lines 70-85 dispatch on
`res.status` and never on the body's error code, so:

- all three 401 arms (`NEEDS_PASSWORD`, `WRONG_PASSWORD`, `SIGN_IN_REQUIRED`)
rendered the password prompt and now render the 404 copy, "This link is
invalid or no longer available.";
- the 410 arm rendered "This link has expired or was revoked." and now renders
that same 404 copy.

Both shifts are the intended outcome and were accepted with the ruling: a
correct password on such a link yields nothing, so prompting for one teaches the
holder to open a door that is bricked up, and "expired or revoked" is a claim
about a token whose existence the caller must not be able to confirm. Links on
objects whose block is on are unaffected — prompt, 410 copy and 200 render
included.

Maintainer ruling 2026-09-03 (decision batch #17, item 1), verbatim 「同意」,
adopting option A over option B (keep the 401 and document the accepted oracle)
and option C (gate only the two 401 arms, rejected as proliferation).

<!-- adr-0087: not-required (no-migration-prescription) Nothing authorable is removed, renamed or re-shaped: `publicSharing.enabled` keeps its name, type, default and accept-set, and this change is only WHICH HTTP STATUS the route layer answers with while that switch is off. There is no tombstone for `objectstack migrate meta` to carry and no mechanical rewrite it could perform on any consumer — a deployment that wants the 401 affordance back enables the object's block, which is an authoring decision, not a migration. -->
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ The largest single consumer — **17 of the 106 sites**.
| 34 | `revoke()` deletes directly, **before** the non-manual-source guard | Get: the evaluator can revoke its own grants. Lose: the `CONFLICT` guard that warns a rule-materialised grant will be silently re-granted on the next reconcile | `plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts:1476` (guard at `:1501`) |
| 35 | `listShares()` skips the management gate | Get: full enumeration of who can see a record | `plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts:1528` |
| 36 | `sys_record_share` reads are **not** self-scoped | Get: tenant-wide share listing without `manage_sharing` | `sharing-plugin.ts:1088` |
| 37 | Share-link policy `enabled` check bypassed; system callers re-enter under a system context | Get: link **creation** while the policy is off — resolution is **not** bypassed since #14033 (`publicSharing.enabled` is a standing policy held at every redemption): a link minted this way does not resolve until the block is enabled | `plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts:449`, `:503`, `:507`, `:580`, `:610` |
| 37 | Share-link policy `enabled` check bypassed; system callers re-enter under a system context | Get: link **creation** while the policy is off — resolution is **not** bypassed since #14033 (`publicSharing.enabled` is a standing policy held at every redemption): a link minted this way does not resolve until the block is enabled | `plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts:469`, `:523`, `:527`, `:600`, `:630` |
| 38 | Sharing-rule provenance stamp skipped | Lose: the row is not marked as an admin customization — seeder / `defineRule` / boot reconcilers are "the package door" | `sharing-rule-provenance.ts:47` |
| 39 | Sharing-rule service write + delete paths return early | Lose: the manage-rules gate on the service surface, and the platform-global-rule delete guard | `sharing-rule-service.ts:165`, `:390` |

Expand Down
Loading
Loading
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content
82 changes: 82 additions & 0 deletions .changeset/share-link-probe-policy-gate.md
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
---
"@objectstack/plugin-sharing": minor
"@objectstack/runtime": minor
---

fix(sharing): gate the share-link route probe on `publicSharing.enabled`, at both probe sites (#14637)

**BREAKING** runtime behaviour change on a published HTTP path:
`GET /api/v1/share-links/:token/resolve` answers `404 INVALID_OR_EXPIRED` where
it used to answer `401 NEEDS_PASSWORD` / `401 WRONG_PASSWORD` /
`401 SIGN_IN_REQUIRED` / `410 EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED`, for every link whose object
has `publicSharing.enabled` switched off. Shipped as `minor` under the repo's
launch-window convention (a breaking change does not burn a major while the
stack is in lockstep). No published export is added, removed or re-shaped; the
level carries the breaking banner, not a surface change.

#14033 made `publicSharing.enabled` a standing policy: `resolveToken()` re-reads
the object's current block on every redemption and refuses a switched-off link
with the same undifferentiated `null` a revoked, expired, unknown or ineligible
token gets — because, in that gate's own words, for a caller who may hold
nothing but a token a distinguishable "sharing is off for this object" is an
**existence oracle**.

The HTTP layer above it then re-opened exactly that oracle. Both share-link
surfaces run a row probe after `resolveToken()` returns null, to answer with a
more useful status, and both answered from the `sys_share_link` row with no
knowledge of the object's block. So an anonymous caller could still tell a
real-but-switched-off token from an unknown one three ways: a row carrying
`password_hash` drew `401 NEEDS_PASSWORD`, the same row with any password drew
`401 WRONG_PASSWORD` — including a **correct** password, which is both an oracle
and a lie, since that link can serve nothing — and a row with
`audience: 'signed_in'` drew `401 SIGN_IN_REQUIRED`. A security property stated
in one layer and defeated in the layer above it is worse than one never claimed,
because the next reader believes the comment.

**What changed.** Both probes read the object's standing policy before they
answer from the row, and when the block is off every arm falls through to the
generic `404 INVALID_OR_EXPIRED` that unknown, revoked, expired and ineligible
tokens already give — byte-for-byte the answer a token that never existed
receives. The `410 EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED` arm is included: gating only the two 401
arms would leave a third class of link answer and a rule about which arms are
gated. An object whose schema the engine cannot answer for is `enabled: false`
by `getPolicy`'s definition and is refused the same way — fail-closed, the same
definition `createLink` and `resolveToken` already use.

The fix lands at **both** sites in one change, because the probe exists twice:
`plugin-sharing`'s REST routes, and the `/share-links` dispatcher domain in
`@objectstack/runtime` that is the designed primary surface for cloud's
per-environment kernels (`registerShareLinkRoutes: false`). Fixing one would
have moved the oracle to whichever embedding uses the other.

**Nothing else moves.** With the block ON, every refusal is exactly what it was:
`NEEDS_PASSWORD`, `WRONG_PASSWORD`, `SIGN_IN_REQUIRED` and `EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED`
are unchanged in status, code and message, and a correct password or a signed-in
viewer still resolves the record. Mint-time behaviour is untouched, no
`sys_share_link` row is written or read differently, and no error code is added
or retired.

**Consumer impact.** A viewer that branches on the refusal STATUS sees TWO
changes, for links on a switched-off object only — and the measured consumer
branches on status alone. On the objectui console at `67dadd6`,
`apps/console/src/pages/SharedRecordPage.tsx` lines 70-85 dispatch on
`res.status` and never on the body's error code, so:

- all three 401 arms (`NEEDS_PASSWORD`, `WRONG_PASSWORD`, `SIGN_IN_REQUIRED`)
rendered the password prompt and now render the 404 copy, "This link is
invalid or no longer available.";
- the 410 arm rendered "This link has expired or was revoked." and now renders
that same 404 copy.

Both shifts are the intended outcome and were accepted with the ruling: a
correct password on such a link yields nothing, so prompting for one teaches the
holder to open a door that is bricked up, and "expired or revoked" is a claim
about a token whose existence the caller must not be able to confirm. Links on
objects whose block is on are unaffected — prompt, 410 copy and 200 render
included.

Maintainer ruling 2026-09-03 (decision batch #17, item 1), verbatim 「同意」,
adopting option A over option B (keep the 401 and document the accepted oracle)
and option C (gate only the two 401 arms, rejected as proliferation).

<!-- adr-0087: not-required (no-migration-prescription) Nothing authorable is removed, renamed or re-shaped: `publicSharing.enabled` keeps its name, type, default and accept-set, and this change is only WHICH HTTP STATUS the route layer answers with while that switch is off. There is no tombstone for `objectstack migrate meta` to carry and no mechanical rewrite it could perform on any consumer — a deployment that wants the 401 affordance back enables the object's block, which is an authoring decision, not a migration. -->
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ The largest single consumer — **17 of the 106 sites**.
| 34 | `revoke()` deletes directly, **before** the non-manual-source guard | Get: the evaluator can revoke its own grants. Lose: the `CONFLICT` guard that warns a rule-materialised grant will be silently re-granted on the next reconcile | `plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts:1476` (guard at `:1501`) |
| 35 | `listShares()` skips the management gate | Get: full enumeration of who can see a record | `plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts:1528` |
| 36 | `sys_record_share` reads are **not** self-scoped | Get: tenant-wide share listing without `manage_sharing` | `sharing-plugin.ts:1088` |
| 37 | Share-link policy `enabled` check bypassed; system callers re-enter under a system context | Get: link **creation** while the policy is off — resolution is **not** bypassed since #14033 (`publicSharing.enabled` is a standing policy held at every redemption): a link minted this way does not resolve until the block is enabled | `plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts:449`, `:503`, `:507`, `:580`, `:610` |
| 37 | Share-link policy `enabled` check bypassed; system callers re-enter under a system context | Get: link **creation** while the policy is off — resolution is **not** bypassed since #14033 (`publicSharing.enabled` is a standing policy held at every redemption): a link minted this way does not resolve until the block is enabled | `plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts:469`, `:523`, `:527`, `:600`, `:630` |
| 38 | Sharing-rule provenance stamp skipped | Lose: the row is not marked as an admin customization — seeder / `defineRule` / boot reconcilers are "the package door" | `sharing-rule-provenance.ts:47` |
| 39 | Sharing-rule service write + delete paths return early | Lose: the manage-rules gate on the service surface, and the platform-global-rule delete guard | `sharing-rule-service.ts:165`, `:390` |

Expand Down
Loading
Loading
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content
82 changes: 82 additions & 0 deletions .changeset/share-link-probe-policy-gate.md
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
---
"@objectstack/plugin-sharing": minor
"@objectstack/runtime": minor
---

fix(sharing): gate the share-link route probe on `publicSharing.enabled`, at both probe sites (#14637)

**BREAKING** runtime behaviour change on a published HTTP path:
`GET /api/v1/share-links/:token/resolve` answers `404 INVALID_OR_EXPIRED` where
it used to answer `401 NEEDS_PASSWORD` / `401 WRONG_PASSWORD` /
`401 SIGN_IN_REQUIRED` / `410 EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED`, for every link whose object
has `publicSharing.enabled` switched off. Shipped as `minor` under the repo's
launch-window convention (a breaking change does not burn a major while the
stack is in lockstep). No published export is added, removed or re-shaped; the
level carries the breaking banner, not a surface change.

#14033 made `publicSharing.enabled` a standing policy: `resolveToken()` re-reads
the object's current block on every redemption and refuses a switched-off link
with the same undifferentiated `null` a revoked, expired, unknown or ineligible
token gets — because, in that gate's own words, for a caller who may hold
nothing but a token a distinguishable "sharing is off for this object" is an
**existence oracle**.

The HTTP layer above it then re-opened exactly that oracle. Both share-link
surfaces run a row probe after `resolveToken()` returns null, to answer with a
more useful status, and both answered from the `sys_share_link` row with no
knowledge of the object's block. So an anonymous caller could still tell a
real-but-switched-off token from an unknown one three ways: a row carrying
`password_hash` drew `401 NEEDS_PASSWORD`, the same row with any password drew
`401 WRONG_PASSWORD` — including a **correct** password, which is both an oracle
and a lie, since that link can serve nothing — and a row with
`audience: 'signed_in'` drew `401 SIGN_IN_REQUIRED`. A security property stated
in one layer and defeated in the layer above it is worse than one never claimed,
because the next reader believes the comment.

**What changed.** Both probes read the object's standing policy before they
answer from the row, and when the block is off every arm falls through to the
generic `404 INVALID_OR_EXPIRED` that unknown, revoked, expired and ineligible
tokens already give — byte-for-byte the answer a token that never existed
receives. The `410 EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED` arm is included: gating only the two 401
arms would leave a third class of link answer and a rule about which arms are
gated. An object whose schema the engine cannot answer for is `enabled: false`
by `getPolicy`'s definition and is refused the same way — fail-closed, the same
definition `createLink` and `resolveToken` already use.

The fix lands at **both** sites in one change, because the probe exists twice:
`plugin-sharing`'s REST routes, and the `/share-links` dispatcher domain in
`@objectstack/runtime` that is the designed primary surface for cloud's
per-environment kernels (`registerShareLinkRoutes: false`). Fixing one would
have moved the oracle to whichever embedding uses the other.

**Nothing else moves.** With the block ON, every refusal is exactly what it was:
`NEEDS_PASSWORD`, `WRONG_PASSWORD`, `SIGN_IN_REQUIRED` and `EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED`
are unchanged in status, code and message, and a correct password or a signed-in
viewer still resolves the record. Mint-time behaviour is untouched, no
`sys_share_link` row is written or read differently, and no error code is added
or retired.

**Consumer impact.** A viewer that branches on the refusal STATUS sees TWO
changes, for links on a switched-off object only — and the measured consumer
branches on status alone. On the objectui console at `67dadd6`,
`apps/console/src/pages/SharedRecordPage.tsx` lines 70-85 dispatch on
`res.status` and never on the body's error code, so:

- all three 401 arms (`NEEDS_PASSWORD`, `WRONG_PASSWORD`, `SIGN_IN_REQUIRED`)
rendered the password prompt and now render the 404 copy, "This link is
invalid or no longer available.";
- the 410 arm rendered "This link has expired or was revoked." and now renders
that same 404 copy.

Both shifts are the intended outcome and were accepted with the ruling: a
correct password on such a link yields nothing, so prompting for one teaches the
holder to open a door that is bricked up, and "expired or revoked" is a claim
about a token whose existence the caller must not be able to confirm. Links on
objects whose block is on are unaffected — prompt, 410 copy and 200 render
included.

Maintainer ruling 2026-09-03 (decision batch #17, item 1), verbatim 「同意」,
adopting option A over option B (keep the 401 and document the accepted oracle)
and option C (gate only the two 401 arms, rejected as proliferation).

<!-- adr-0087: not-required (no-migration-prescription) Nothing authorable is removed, renamed or re-shaped: `publicSharing.enabled` keeps its name, type, default and accept-set, and this change is only WHICH HTTP STATUS the route layer answers with while that switch is off. There is no tombstone for `objectstack migrate meta` to carry and no mechanical rewrite it could perform on any consumer — a deployment that wants the 401 affordance back enables the object's block, which is an authoring decision, not a migration. -->
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ The largest single consumer — **17 of the 106 sites**.
| 34 | `revoke()` deletes directly, **before** the non-manual-source guard | Get: the evaluator can revoke its own grants. Lose: the `CONFLICT` guard that warns a rule-materialised grant will be silently re-granted on the next reconcile | `plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts:1476` (guard at `:1501`) |
| 35 | `listShares()` skips the management gate | Get: full enumeration of who can see a record | `plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts:1528` |
| 36 | `sys_record_share` reads are **not** self-scoped | Get: tenant-wide share listing without `manage_sharing` | `sharing-plugin.ts:1088` |
| 37 | Share-link policy `enabled` check bypassed; system callers re-enter under a system context | Get: link **creation** while the policy is off — resolution is **not** bypassed since #14033 (`publicSharing.enabled` is a standing policy held at every redemption): a link minted this way does not resolve until the block is enabled | `plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts:449`, `:503`, `:507`, `:580`, `:610` |
| 37 | Share-link policy `enabled` check bypassed; system callers re-enter under a system context | Get: link **creation** while the policy is off — resolution is **not** bypassed since #14033 (`publicSharing.enabled` is a standing policy held at every redemption): a link minted this way does not resolve until the block is enabled | `plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts:469`, `:523`, `:527`, `:600`, `:630` |
| 38 | Sharing-rule provenance stamp skipped | Lose: the row is not marked as an admin customization — seeder / `defineRule` / boot reconcilers are "the package door" | `sharing-rule-provenance.ts:47` |
| 39 | Sharing-rule service write + delete paths return early | Lose: the manage-rules gate on the service surface, and the platform-global-rule delete guard | `sharing-rule-service.ts:165`, `:390` |

Expand Down
Loading
Loading
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "youtube.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
Skip to content
82 changes: 82 additions & 0 deletions .changeset/share-link-probe-policy-gate.md
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
---
"@objectstack/plugin-sharing": minor
"@objectstack/runtime": minor
---

fix(sharing): gate the share-link route probe on `publicSharing.enabled`, at both probe sites (#14637)

**BREAKING** runtime behaviour change on a published HTTP path:
`GET /api/v1/share-links/:token/resolve` answers `404 INVALID_OR_EXPIRED` where
it used to answer `401 NEEDS_PASSWORD` / `401 WRONG_PASSWORD` /
`401 SIGN_IN_REQUIRED` / `410 EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED`, for every link whose object
has `publicSharing.enabled` switched off. Shipped as `minor` under the repo's
launch-window convention (a breaking change does not burn a major while the
stack is in lockstep). No published export is added, removed or re-shaped; the
level carries the breaking banner, not a surface change.

#14033 made `publicSharing.enabled` a standing policy: `resolveToken()` re-reads
the object's current block on every redemption and refuses a switched-off link
with the same undifferentiated `null` a revoked, expired, unknown or ineligible
token gets — because, in that gate's own words, for a caller who may hold
nothing but a token a distinguishable "sharing is off for this object" is an
**existence oracle**.

The HTTP layer above it then re-opened exactly that oracle. Both share-link
surfaces run a row probe after `resolveToken()` returns null, to answer with a
more useful status, and both answered from the `sys_share_link` row with no
knowledge of the object's block. So an anonymous caller could still tell a
real-but-switched-off token from an unknown one three ways: a row carrying
`password_hash` drew `401 NEEDS_PASSWORD`, the same row with any password drew
`401 WRONG_PASSWORD` — including a **correct** password, which is both an oracle
and a lie, since that link can serve nothing — and a row with
`audience: 'signed_in'` drew `401 SIGN_IN_REQUIRED`. A security property stated
in one layer and defeated in the layer above it is worse than one never claimed,
because the next reader believes the comment.

**What changed.** Both probes read the object's standing policy before they
answer from the row, and when the block is off every arm falls through to the
generic `404 INVALID_OR_EXPIRED` that unknown, revoked, expired and ineligible
tokens already give — byte-for-byte the answer a token that never existed
receives. The `410 EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED` arm is included: gating only the two 401
arms would leave a third class of link answer and a rule about which arms are
gated. An object whose schema the engine cannot answer for is `enabled: false`
by `getPolicy`'s definition and is refused the same way — fail-closed, the same
definition `createLink` and `resolveToken` already use.

The fix lands at **both** sites in one change, because the probe exists twice:
`plugin-sharing`'s REST routes, and the `/share-links` dispatcher domain in
`@objectstack/runtime` that is the designed primary surface for cloud's
per-environment kernels (`registerShareLinkRoutes: false`). Fixing one would
have moved the oracle to whichever embedding uses the other.

**Nothing else moves.** With the block ON, every refusal is exactly what it was:
`NEEDS_PASSWORD`, `WRONG_PASSWORD`, `SIGN_IN_REQUIRED` and `EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED`
are unchanged in status, code and message, and a correct password or a signed-in
viewer still resolves the record. Mint-time behaviour is untouched, no
`sys_share_link` row is written or read differently, and no error code is added
or retired.

**Consumer impact.** A viewer that branches on the refusal STATUS sees TWO
changes, for links on a switched-off object only — and the measured consumer
branches on status alone. On the objectui console at `67dadd6`,
`apps/console/src/pages/SharedRecordPage.tsx` lines 70-85 dispatch on
`res.status` and never on the body's error code, so:

- all three 401 arms (`NEEDS_PASSWORD`, `WRONG_PASSWORD`, `SIGN_IN_REQUIRED`)
rendered the password prompt and now render the 404 copy, "This link is
invalid or no longer available.";
- the 410 arm rendered "This link has expired or was revoked." and now renders
that same 404 copy.

Both shifts are the intended outcome and were accepted with the ruling: a
correct password on such a link yields nothing, so prompting for one teaches the
holder to open a door that is bricked up, and "expired or revoked" is a claim
about a token whose existence the caller must not be able to confirm. Links on
objects whose block is on are unaffected — prompt, 410 copy and 200 render
included.

Maintainer ruling 2026-09-03 (decision batch #17, item 1), verbatim 「同意」,
adopting option A over option B (keep the 401 and document the accepted oracle)
and option C (gate only the two 401 arms, rejected as proliferation).

<!-- adr-0087: not-required (no-migration-prescription) Nothing authorable is removed, renamed or re-shaped: `publicSharing.enabled` keeps its name, type, default and accept-set, and this change is only WHICH HTTP STATUS the route layer answers with while that switch is off. There is no tombstone for `objectstack migrate meta` to carry and no mechanical rewrite it could perform on any consumer — a deployment that wants the 401 affordance back enables the object's block, which is an authoring decision, not a migration. -->
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ The largest single consumer — **17 of the 106 sites**.
| 34 | `revoke()` deletes directly, **before** the non-manual-source guard | Get: the evaluator can revoke its own grants. Lose: the `CONFLICT` guard that warns a rule-materialised grant will be silently re-granted on the next reconcile | `plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts:1476` (guard at `:1501`) |
| 35 | `listShares()` skips the management gate | Get: full enumeration of who can see a record | `plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts:1528` |
| 36 | `sys_record_share` reads are **not** self-scoped | Get: tenant-wide share listing without `manage_sharing` | `sharing-plugin.ts:1088` |
| 37 | Share-link policy `enabled` check bypassed; system callers re-enter under a system context | Get: link **creation** while the policy is off — resolution is **not** bypassed since #14033 (`publicSharing.enabled` is a standing policy held at every redemption): a link minted this way does not resolve until the block is enabled | `plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts:449`, `:503`, `:507`, `:580`, `:610` |
| 37 | Share-link policy `enabled` check bypassed; system callers re-enter under a system context | Get: link **creation** while the policy is off — resolution is **not** bypassed since #14033 (`publicSharing.enabled` is a standing policy held at every redemption): a link minted this way does not resolve until the block is enabled | `plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts:469`, `:523`, `:527`, `:600`, `:630` |
| 38 | Sharing-rule provenance stamp skipped | Lose: the row is not marked as an admin customization — seeder / `defineRule` / boot reconcilers are "the package door" | `sharing-rule-provenance.ts:47` |
| 39 | Sharing-rule service write + delete paths return early | Lose: the manage-rules gate on the service surface, and the platform-global-rule delete guard | `sharing-rule-service.ts:165`, `:390` |

Expand Down
Loading
Loading
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content
82 changes: 82 additions & 0 deletions .changeset/share-link-probe-policy-gate.md
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
---
"@objectstack/plugin-sharing": minor
"@objectstack/runtime": minor
---

fix(sharing): gate the share-link route probe on `publicSharing.enabled`, at both probe sites (#14637)

**BREAKING** runtime behaviour change on a published HTTP path:
`GET /api/v1/share-links/:token/resolve` answers `404 INVALID_OR_EXPIRED` where
it used to answer `401 NEEDS_PASSWORD` / `401 WRONG_PASSWORD` /
`401 SIGN_IN_REQUIRED` / `410 EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED`, for every link whose object
has `publicSharing.enabled` switched off. Shipped as `minor` under the repo's
launch-window convention (a breaking change does not burn a major while the
stack is in lockstep). No published export is added, removed or re-shaped; the
level carries the breaking banner, not a surface change.

#14033 made `publicSharing.enabled` a standing policy: `resolveToken()` re-reads
the object's current block on every redemption and refuses a switched-off link
with the same undifferentiated `null` a revoked, expired, unknown or ineligible
token gets — because, in that gate's own words, for a caller who may hold
nothing but a token a distinguishable "sharing is off for this object" is an
**existence oracle**.

The HTTP layer above it then re-opened exactly that oracle. Both share-link
surfaces run a row probe after `resolveToken()` returns null, to answer with a
more useful status, and both answered from the `sys_share_link` row with no
knowledge of the object's block. So an anonymous caller could still tell a
real-but-switched-off token from an unknown one three ways: a row carrying
`password_hash` drew `401 NEEDS_PASSWORD`, the same row with any password drew
`401 WRONG_PASSWORD` — including a **correct** password, which is both an oracle
and a lie, since that link can serve nothing — and a row with
`audience: 'signed_in'` drew `401 SIGN_IN_REQUIRED`. A security property stated
in one layer and defeated in the layer above it is worse than one never claimed,
because the next reader believes the comment.

**What changed.** Both probes read the object's standing policy before they
answer from the row, and when the block is off every arm falls through to the
generic `404 INVALID_OR_EXPIRED` that unknown, revoked, expired and ineligible
tokens already give — byte-for-byte the answer a token that never existed
receives. The `410 EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED` arm is included: gating only the two 401
arms would leave a third class of link answer and a rule about which arms are
gated. An object whose schema the engine cannot answer for is `enabled: false`
by `getPolicy`'s definition and is refused the same way — fail-closed, the same
definition `createLink` and `resolveToken` already use.

The fix lands at **both** sites in one change, because the probe exists twice:
`plugin-sharing`'s REST routes, and the `/share-links` dispatcher domain in
`@objectstack/runtime` that is the designed primary surface for cloud's
per-environment kernels (`registerShareLinkRoutes: false`). Fixing one would
have moved the oracle to whichever embedding uses the other.

**Nothing else moves.** With the block ON, every refusal is exactly what it was:
`NEEDS_PASSWORD`, `WRONG_PASSWORD`, `SIGN_IN_REQUIRED` and `EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED`
are unchanged in status, code and message, and a correct password or a signed-in
viewer still resolves the record. Mint-time behaviour is untouched, no
`sys_share_link` row is written or read differently, and no error code is added
or retired.

**Consumer impact.** A viewer that branches on the refusal STATUS sees TWO
changes, for links on a switched-off object only — and the measured consumer
branches on status alone. On the objectui console at `67dadd6`,
`apps/console/src/pages/SharedRecordPage.tsx` lines 70-85 dispatch on
`res.status` and never on the body's error code, so:

- all three 401 arms (`NEEDS_PASSWORD`, `WRONG_PASSWORD`, `SIGN_IN_REQUIRED`)
rendered the password prompt and now render the 404 copy, "This link is
invalid or no longer available.";
- the 410 arm rendered "This link has expired or was revoked." and now renders
that same 404 copy.

Both shifts are the intended outcome and were accepted with the ruling: a
correct password on such a link yields nothing, so prompting for one teaches the
holder to open a door that is bricked up, and "expired or revoked" is a claim
about a token whose existence the caller must not be able to confirm. Links on
objects whose block is on are unaffected — prompt, 410 copy and 200 render
included.

Maintainer ruling 2026-09-03 (decision batch #17, item 1), verbatim 「同意」,
adopting option A over option B (keep the 401 and document the accepted oracle)
and option C (gate only the two 401 arms, rejected as proliferation).

<!-- adr-0087: not-required (no-migration-prescription) Nothing authorable is removed, renamed or re-shaped: `publicSharing.enabled` keeps its name, type, default and accept-set, and this change is only WHICH HTTP STATUS the route layer answers with while that switch is off. There is no tombstone for `objectstack migrate meta` to carry and no mechanical rewrite it could perform on any consumer — a deployment that wants the 401 affordance back enables the object's block, which is an authoring decision, not a migration. -->
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ The largest single consumer — **17 of the 106 sites**.
| 34 | `revoke()` deletes directly, **before** the non-manual-source guard | Get: the evaluator can revoke its own grants. Lose: the `CONFLICT` guard that warns a rule-materialised grant will be silently re-granted on the next reconcile | `plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts:1476` (guard at `:1501`) |
| 35 | `listShares()` skips the management gate | Get: full enumeration of who can see a record | `plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts:1528` |
| 36 | `sys_record_share` reads are **not** self-scoped | Get: tenant-wide share listing without `manage_sharing` | `sharing-plugin.ts:1088` |
| 37 | Share-link policy `enabled` check bypassed; system callers re-enter under a system context | Get: link **creation** while the policy is off — resolution is **not** bypassed since #14033 (`publicSharing.enabled` is a standing policy held at every redemption): a link minted this way does not resolve until the block is enabled | `plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts:449`, `:503`, `:507`, `:580`, `:610` |
| 37 | Share-link policy `enabled` check bypassed; system callers re-enter under a system context | Get: link **creation** while the policy is off — resolution is **not** bypassed since #14033 (`publicSharing.enabled` is a standing policy held at every redemption): a link minted this way does not resolve until the block is enabled | `plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts:469`, `:523`, `:527`, `:600`, `:630` |
| 38 | Sharing-rule provenance stamp skipped | Lose: the row is not marked as an admin customization — seeder / `defineRule` / boot reconcilers are "the package door" | `sharing-rule-provenance.ts:47` |
| 39 | Sharing-rule service write + delete paths return early | Lose: the manage-rules gate on the service surface, and the platform-global-rule delete guard | `sharing-rule-service.ts:165`, `:390` |

Expand Down
Loading
Loading
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content
82 changes: 82 additions & 0 deletions .changeset/share-link-probe-policy-gate.md
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
---
"@objectstack/plugin-sharing": minor
"@objectstack/runtime": minor
---

fix(sharing): gate the share-link route probe on `publicSharing.enabled`, at both probe sites (#14637)

**BREAKING** runtime behaviour change on a published HTTP path:
`GET /api/v1/share-links/:token/resolve` answers `404 INVALID_OR_EXPIRED` where
it used to answer `401 NEEDS_PASSWORD` / `401 WRONG_PASSWORD` /
`401 SIGN_IN_REQUIRED` / `410 EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED`, for every link whose object
has `publicSharing.enabled` switched off. Shipped as `minor` under the repo's
launch-window convention (a breaking change does not burn a major while the
stack is in lockstep). No published export is added, removed or re-shaped; the
level carries the breaking banner, not a surface change.

#14033 made `publicSharing.enabled` a standing policy: `resolveToken()` re-reads
the object's current block on every redemption and refuses a switched-off link
with the same undifferentiated `null` a revoked, expired, unknown or ineligible
token gets — because, in that gate's own words, for a caller who may hold
nothing but a token a distinguishable "sharing is off for this object" is an
**existence oracle**.

The HTTP layer above it then re-opened exactly that oracle. Both share-link
surfaces run a row probe after `resolveToken()` returns null, to answer with a
more useful status, and both answered from the `sys_share_link` row with no
knowledge of the object's block. So an anonymous caller could still tell a
real-but-switched-off token from an unknown one three ways: a row carrying
`password_hash` drew `401 NEEDS_PASSWORD`, the same row with any password drew
`401 WRONG_PASSWORD` — including a **correct** password, which is both an oracle
and a lie, since that link can serve nothing — and a row with
`audience: 'signed_in'` drew `401 SIGN_IN_REQUIRED`. A security property stated
in one layer and defeated in the layer above it is worse than one never claimed,
because the next reader believes the comment.

**What changed.** Both probes read the object's standing policy before they
answer from the row, and when the block is off every arm falls through to the
generic `404 INVALID_OR_EXPIRED` that unknown, revoked, expired and ineligible
tokens already give — byte-for-byte the answer a token that never existed
receives. The `410 EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED` arm is included: gating only the two 401
arms would leave a third class of link answer and a rule about which arms are
gated. An object whose schema the engine cannot answer for is `enabled: false`
by `getPolicy`'s definition and is refused the same way — fail-closed, the same
definition `createLink` and `resolveToken` already use.

The fix lands at **both** sites in one change, because the probe exists twice:
`plugin-sharing`'s REST routes, and the `/share-links` dispatcher domain in
`@objectstack/runtime` that is the designed primary surface for cloud's
per-environment kernels (`registerShareLinkRoutes: false`). Fixing one would
have moved the oracle to whichever embedding uses the other.

**Nothing else moves.** With the block ON, every refusal is exactly what it was:
`NEEDS_PASSWORD`, `WRONG_PASSWORD`, `SIGN_IN_REQUIRED` and `EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED`
are unchanged in status, code and message, and a correct password or a signed-in
viewer still resolves the record. Mint-time behaviour is untouched, no
`sys_share_link` row is written or read differently, and no error code is added
or retired.

**Consumer impact.** A viewer that branches on the refusal STATUS sees TWO
changes, for links on a switched-off object only — and the measured consumer
branches on status alone. On the objectui console at `67dadd6`,
`apps/console/src/pages/SharedRecordPage.tsx` lines 70-85 dispatch on
`res.status` and never on the body's error code, so:

- all three 401 arms (`NEEDS_PASSWORD`, `WRONG_PASSWORD`, `SIGN_IN_REQUIRED`)
rendered the password prompt and now render the 404 copy, "This link is
invalid or no longer available.";
- the 410 arm rendered "This link has expired or was revoked." and now renders
that same 404 copy.

Both shifts are the intended outcome and were accepted with the ruling: a
correct password on such a link yields nothing, so prompting for one teaches the
holder to open a door that is bricked up, and "expired or revoked" is a claim
about a token whose existence the caller must not be able to confirm. Links on
objects whose block is on are unaffected — prompt, 410 copy and 200 render
included.

Maintainer ruling 2026-09-03 (decision batch #17, item 1), verbatim 「同意」,
adopting option A over option B (keep the 401 and document the accepted oracle)
and option C (gate only the two 401 arms, rejected as proliferation).

<!-- adr-0087: not-required (no-migration-prescription) Nothing authorable is removed, renamed or re-shaped: `publicSharing.enabled` keeps its name, type, default and accept-set, and this change is only WHICH HTTP STATUS the route layer answers with while that switch is off. There is no tombstone for `objectstack migrate meta` to carry and no mechanical rewrite it could perform on any consumer — a deployment that wants the 401 affordance back enables the object's block, which is an authoring decision, not a migration. -->
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ The largest single consumer — **17 of the 106 sites**.
| 34 | `revoke()` deletes directly, **before** the non-manual-source guard | Get: the evaluator can revoke its own grants. Lose: the `CONFLICT` guard that warns a rule-materialised grant will be silently re-granted on the next reconcile | `plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts:1476` (guard at `:1501`) |
| 35 | `listShares()` skips the management gate | Get: full enumeration of who can see a record | `plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts:1528` |
| 36 | `sys_record_share` reads are **not** self-scoped | Get: tenant-wide share listing without `manage_sharing` | `sharing-plugin.ts:1088` |
| 37 | Share-link policy `enabled` check bypassed; system callers re-enter under a system context | Get: link **creation** while the policy is off — resolution is **not** bypassed since #14033 (`publicSharing.enabled` is a standing policy held at every redemption): a link minted this way does not resolve until the block is enabled | `plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts:449`, `:503`, `:507`, `:580`, `:610` |
| 37 | Share-link policy `enabled` check bypassed; system callers re-enter under a system context | Get: link **creation** while the policy is off — resolution is **not** bypassed since #14033 (`publicSharing.enabled` is a standing policy held at every redemption): a link minted this way does not resolve until the block is enabled | `plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts:469`, `:523`, `:527`, `:600`, `:630` |
| 38 | Sharing-rule provenance stamp skipped | Lose: the row is not marked as an admin customization — seeder / `defineRule` / boot reconcilers are "the package door" | `sharing-rule-provenance.ts:47` |
| 39 | Sharing-rule service write + delete paths return early | Lose: the manage-rules gate on the service surface, and the platform-global-rule delete guard | `sharing-rule-service.ts:165`, `:390` |

Expand Down
Loading
Loading
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); } })(); })();
Skip to content
82 changes: 82 additions & 0 deletions .changeset/share-link-probe-policy-gate.md
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
---
"@objectstack/plugin-sharing": minor
"@objectstack/runtime": minor
---

fix(sharing): gate the share-link route probe on `publicSharing.enabled`, at both probe sites (#14637)

**BREAKING** runtime behaviour change on a published HTTP path:
`GET /api/v1/share-links/:token/resolve` answers `404 INVALID_OR_EXPIRED` where
it used to answer `401 NEEDS_PASSWORD` / `401 WRONG_PASSWORD` /
`401 SIGN_IN_REQUIRED` / `410 EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED`, for every link whose object
has `publicSharing.enabled` switched off. Shipped as `minor` under the repo's
launch-window convention (a breaking change does not burn a major while the
stack is in lockstep). No published export is added, removed or re-shaped; the
level carries the breaking banner, not a surface change.

#14033 made `publicSharing.enabled` a standing policy: `resolveToken()` re-reads
the object's current block on every redemption and refuses a switched-off link
with the same undifferentiated `null` a revoked, expired, unknown or ineligible
token gets — because, in that gate's own words, for a caller who may hold
nothing but a token a distinguishable "sharing is off for this object" is an
**existence oracle**.

The HTTP layer above it then re-opened exactly that oracle. Both share-link
surfaces run a row probe after `resolveToken()` returns null, to answer with a
more useful status, and both answered from the `sys_share_link` row with no
knowledge of the object's block. So an anonymous caller could still tell a
real-but-switched-off token from an unknown one three ways: a row carrying
`password_hash` drew `401 NEEDS_PASSWORD`, the same row with any password drew
`401 WRONG_PASSWORD` — including a **correct** password, which is both an oracle
and a lie, since that link can serve nothing — and a row with
`audience: 'signed_in'` drew `401 SIGN_IN_REQUIRED`. A security property stated
in one layer and defeated in the layer above it is worse than one never claimed,
because the next reader believes the comment.

**What changed.** Both probes read the object's standing policy before they
answer from the row, and when the block is off every arm falls through to the
generic `404 INVALID_OR_EXPIRED` that unknown, revoked, expired and ineligible
tokens already give — byte-for-byte the answer a token that never existed
receives. The `410 EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED` arm is included: gating only the two 401
arms would leave a third class of link answer and a rule about which arms are
gated. An object whose schema the engine cannot answer for is `enabled: false`
by `getPolicy`'s definition and is refused the same way — fail-closed, the same
definition `createLink` and `resolveToken` already use.

The fix lands at **both** sites in one change, because the probe exists twice:
`plugin-sharing`'s REST routes, and the `/share-links` dispatcher domain in
`@objectstack/runtime` that is the designed primary surface for cloud's
per-environment kernels (`registerShareLinkRoutes: false`). Fixing one would
have moved the oracle to whichever embedding uses the other.

**Nothing else moves.** With the block ON, every refusal is exactly what it was:
`NEEDS_PASSWORD`, `WRONG_PASSWORD`, `SIGN_IN_REQUIRED` and `EXPIRED_OR_REVOKED`
are unchanged in status, code and message, and a correct password or a signed-in
viewer still resolves the record. Mint-time behaviour is untouched, no
`sys_share_link` row is written or read differently, and no error code is added
or retired.

**Consumer impact.** A viewer that branches on the refusal STATUS sees TWO
changes, for links on a switched-off object only — and the measured consumer
branches on status alone. On the objectui console at `67dadd6`,
`apps/console/src/pages/SharedRecordPage.tsx` lines 70-85 dispatch on
`res.status` and never on the body's error code, so:

- all three 401 arms (`NEEDS_PASSWORD`, `WRONG_PASSWORD`, `SIGN_IN_REQUIRED`)
rendered the password prompt and now render the 404 copy, "This link is
invalid or no longer available.";
- the 410 arm rendered "This link has expired or was revoked." and now renders
that same 404 copy.

Both shifts are the intended outcome and were accepted with the ruling: a
correct password on such a link yields nothing, so prompting for one teaches the
holder to open a door that is bricked up, and "expired or revoked" is a claim
about a token whose existence the caller must not be able to confirm. Links on
objects whose block is on are unaffected — prompt, 410 copy and 200 render
included.

Maintainer ruling 2026-09-03 (decision batch #17, item 1), verbatim 「同意」,
adopting option A over option B (keep the 401 and document the accepted oracle)
and option C (gate only the two 401 arms, rejected as proliferation).

<!-- adr-0087: not-required (no-migration-prescription) Nothing authorable is removed, renamed or re-shaped: `publicSharing.enabled` keeps its name, type, default and accept-set, and this change is only WHICH HTTP STATUS the route layer answers with while that switch is off. There is no tombstone for `objectstack migrate meta` to carry and no mechanical rewrite it could perform on any consumer — a deployment that wants the 401 affordance back enables the object's block, which is an authoring decision, not a migration. -->
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ The largest single consumer — **17 of the 106 sites**.
| 34 | `revoke()` deletes directly, **before** the non-manual-source guard | Get: the evaluator can revoke its own grants. Lose: the `CONFLICT` guard that warns a rule-materialised grant will be silently re-granted on the next reconcile | `plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts:1476` (guard at `:1501`) |
| 35 | `listShares()` skips the management gate | Get: full enumeration of who can see a record | `plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts:1528` |
| 36 | `sys_record_share` reads are **not** self-scoped | Get: tenant-wide share listing without `manage_sharing` | `sharing-plugin.ts:1088` |
| 37 | Share-link policy `enabled` check bypassed; system callers re-enter under a system context | Get: link **creation** while the policy is off — resolution is **not** bypassed since #14033 (`publicSharing.enabled` is a standing policy held at every redemption): a link minted this way does not resolve until the block is enabled | `plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts:449`, `:503`, `:507`, `:580`, `:610` |
| 37 | Share-link policy `enabled` check bypassed; system callers re-enter under a system context | Get: link **creation** while the policy is off — resolution is **not** bypassed since #14033 (`publicSharing.enabled` is a standing policy held at every redemption): a link minted this way does not resolve until the block is enabled | `plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts:469`, `:523`, `:527`, `:600`, `:630` |
| 38 | Sharing-rule provenance stamp skipped | Lose: the row is not marked as an admin customization — seeder / `defineRule` / boot reconcilers are "the package door" | `sharing-rule-provenance.ts:47` |
| 39 | Sharing-rule service write + delete paths return early | Lose: the manage-rules gate on the service surface, and the platform-global-rule delete guard | `sharing-rule-service.ts:165`, `:390` |

Expand Down
Loading
Loading