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feat(security): ADR-0091 L2 — delegation of duty (职务代理) - #2810
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A holder of a delegatable position may hand off their OWN authority, time-boxed, WITHOUT being an administrator — the one self-service branch of the D12 gate. - spec: PositionSchema.delegatable (default false) + sys_position.delegatable - D12 gate: self-service branch on sys_user_position insert — approves iff the row is a well-formed delegation: delegated_from = writer, mandatory valid_until (future, within the 30-day ceiling), mandatory reason, and the writer holds the position DIRECTLY (validity-filtered; a delegated holding is not re-delegatable — chains cut). Insert-only → not self-renewable. A delegatable position distributing an adminScope set is rejected fail-closed (administration is never self-delegated — D12 containment). Dual audit: granted_by (writer) + delegated_from (authority source) - explain: buildContextForUser surfaces delegation provenance; the principal layer attributes a delegated position 'via delegation from X, until Y' - proof (ADR-0054): position.delegatable is a bound high-risk class with an end-to-end dogfood proof — a gated delegation write over the real HTTP API, then the delegate's grant resolving in-window and dying at valid_until via the real resolver - docs: authorization.mdx delegation section; ADR-0091 phasing L2 landed Tests: gate 38 (16 new delegation cases), explain 14, spec 6688, core 94, plugin-security 286 — all green; dogfood delegation-of-duty 5/5; liveness gate (bound proof resolves); role-word + authz-resolver guards pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012oLzaP8n7A3YKFmgaHWC8H
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012oLzaP8n7A3YKFmgaHWC8H
…gistry conflicts Both this branch and the merged ADR-0057 lifecycle work (#2791) appended a HIGH_RISK_CLASSES entry and extended the BOUND_PROOF_PATHS expectation: kept BOTH ('delegation' → position/delegatable, 'data-lifecycle' → object/lifecycle). proof-registry tests and the spec-liveness gate pass on the merged tree. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BNBzMWmSECrbiEDdVzwBt3
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📓 Docs Drift CheckThis PR changes 3 package(s): 98 hand-written doc(s) reference the affected code and may need an implementation-accuracy re-verification:
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What
ADR-0091 L2 (delegation half). Builds on the L1 validity substrate: a holder of a
delegatableposition may self-service hand off their own authority, time-boxed — the one branch of the D12 gate open to a non-administrator.D3 — the self-service delegation branch
A non-admin (no
adminScope, no tenant-superuser wildcard) hitting the D12 gate is normally denied. L2 adds a branch: asys_user_positioninsert that stampsdelegated_fromis judged as a delegation and approved iff every invariant holds:delegated_from= the writervalid_until, future, ≤ 30-day ceilingreasondelegatable: truePositionSchema.delegatable, default false)adminScope-carrying setDual audit:
granted_by(writer) +delegated_from(authority source), both stamped/recorded.Explain (D3 rule 5)
buildContextForUsersurfaces delegation provenance; the principal layer attributes a delegated position "via delegation from X, until Y".Proof (ADR-0054)
position.delegatableis registered as a bound high-risk class with an end-to-end dogfood proof (delegation-of-duty): a gated delegation write over the real HTTP API, then the delegate's grant resolving in-window and dying atvalid_untilvia the realresolveAuthzContext— the L1 filter on the real persisted row. Access dies with no cleanup job.Tests
delegation-of-dutyLiveness gate: bound proof resolves.
check:role-word,check:authz-resolver,check-changeset-fixedall pass.Not in this PR
Break-glass activation workflow and recertification campaigns stay enterprise (D7); their community shapes are the L1 substrate. Early revocation of a delegation is an admin/expiry concern, not a self-service affordance in L2.
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https://claude.ai/code/session_012oLzaP8n7A3YKFmgaHWC8H
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