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feat(identity): sys_user 放开档案字段标准编辑 affordance（ADR-0092 D4，closes #2817） - #2832
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… fields (ADR-0092 D4)
sys_user gains userActions:{edit:true} (create/import/delete stay off).
name/image are editable; email, email_verified, two_factor_enabled, role,
banned/ban_reason/ban_expires, ai_access, manager_id,
primary_business_unit_id and every system-managed stamp are marked
readonly so the standard edit form renders them non-editable.
Safe because the server boundary is the identity write guard (ADR-0092
D2, #2828): a user-context sys_user update may only touch {name, image}
regardless of what a form submits. The readonly flags are UX only.
Verified in the running Console: the object metadata sent to the client
carries userActions.edit=true and the correct per-field readonly flags;
the row 'Edit' action appears; the edit form surfaces only name/image;
and — the risk this issue flagged — the create_user/invite_user dialogs
keep email/role editable (action params do not inherit field readonly).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YGAN5VvvBi4YRGwpNT6e21The latest updates on your projects. Learn more about Vercel for GitHub.
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📓 Docs Drift CheckThis PR changes 2 package(s): 5 hand-written doc(s) reference the affected code and may need an implementation-accuracy re-verification:
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…ect FLS + bump objectui to sys_user edit-form fix (ADR-0092 D4) Completes ADR-0092 D4 end-to-end (#2817). Three parts brought the standard sys_user edit form to life for platform admins, verified in a running Console (edit name → persisted; email/role stay read-only): 1. foldWildcardSuperUser in /me/permissions (hono-plugin): the per-object FLS map now folds the '*' modifyAll/viewAll super-user grant into every object entry, so the client mirrors the server's actual enforcement (checkObjectPermission is most-permissive, no deny-wins). Fixes the false-negative where a platform admin who also holds organization_admin (denies identity writes) saw sys_user.allowEdit:false and a disabled form, though the server accepts the write (PATCH → 200). ADR-0057 D10. 2. .objectui-sha bump to 5da9905 — pulls in objectui#2395 (ObjectForm honors userActions.edit instead of blanket-disabling managed objects). 3. sys_user userActions.edit + field readonly governance (earlier commit). The identity write guard (#2828) still restricts the actual write to {name, image}; these changes only correct which affordances the UI shows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YGAN5VvvBi4YRGwpNT6e21
…ission ∩ guard (ADR-0092 complete fix) Completes the /me/permissions consistency fix. foldWildcardSuperUser alone fixed the false-NEGATIVE (admin couldn't see sys_user editable) but introduced a false-POSITIVE: it reported allowEdit:true for every better-auth identity table, including ones the identity write guard (#2828) actually blocks (sys_member, sys_account, sys_session, …). clampManagedObjectWrites re-applies the guard's user-context policy: a managedBy:'better-auth' object is writable only where it opted in via userActions.{edit,create,delete} (sys_user → edit; the field readonly flags then narrow it to {name,image}). Only better-auth objects are clamped — system/config/append-only have no such guard, so their permission-set result stands (admin CAN write them; must not under-report). Net: the Console's per-object FLS now equals real server enforcement (permission-set ∩ guard). Verified against a running stack: sys_user allowEdit:true + form editable; sys_member/session/account allowEdit:false (read preserved). +4 unit tests (8 total). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YGAN5VvvBi4YRGwpNT6e21
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July 11, 2026 12:20
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概要
ADR-0092 D4（#2817）——
sys_user档案字段经标准编辑表单可编辑,运行中的 Console 端到端验证通过(编辑 name → 落库;email/role 只读)。守卫 #2828 仍确保用户上下文只能改{name, image}。三块协同改动:
platform-objects）—userActions:{edit:true};name/image可编辑,其余标readonly。/me/permissions提示 = 权限 ∩ 守卫（plugin-hono-server,新增foldWildcardSuperUser+clampManagedObjectWrites+ 8 单测)。.objectui-sha→ 5da9905 — 拉入 objectui feat(auth): per-org MFA + dispatcher/MCP gate (ADR-0069 D3) #2395（ObjectForm按userActions.edit逐字段渲染)。根因与完整修复（浏览器验证中发现,逐层查明)
放开 affordance 后表单仍全禁用,原因是两个独立门:
/me/permissions客户端 FLS 与服务端强制不一致。服务端对身份表有两层强制:权限集(
checkObjectPermission,最宽松合成、无 deny-wins,admin 的modifyAllRecords通配符放行)∩身份写守卫 #2828(全managedBy:'better-auth'表默认拒用户上下文写,仅sys_user开edit)。/me/permissions原来两层都没反映,于是:foldWildcardSuperUser折入通配符超级用户位 → 修假阴性(admin 看不到 sys_user 可编辑,但PATCH /data/sys_user{name}→200 证明服务端放行)。clampManagedObjectWrites按守卫策略夹回 → 修 fold 引入的假阳性:sys_member/sys_account/sys_session等无白名单托管表夹回allowEdit:false(read 保留),与守卫一致。仅夹better-auth对象(守卫只管它们);system/config/append-only 无此守卫,权限集结果照旧(admin 可经 data API 写,提示不得漏报)。结果:客户端 per-object FLS = 真实服务端强制(权限 ∩ 守卫),双向不一致均消除。此前担心的"admin 在所有 system 表看到编辑按钮"的影响面已由 clamp 消除。
验证
foldWildcardSuperUser+clampManagedObjectWrites(8 例)、objectuiObjectForm.managedEdit(3 例,随 feat(auth): per-org MFA + dispatcher/MCP gate (ADR-0069 D3) #2395)、身份守卫(随 feat(auth): 身份表写守卫 — managedBy:'better-auth' 引擎级强制（ADR-0092 D2/D3/D6，closes #2816） #2828)。plugin-hono-server 全套 64、platform-objects 76 通过。/data/sys_user落库;email/role 不可编辑;Create/Invite 弹窗不受影响。/me/permissions实测:sys_user.allowEdittrue(可编辑)、sys_member/session/account.allowEditfalse(read 保留)—— 与守卫逐表一致。相关
ADR-0092 D4/D5 · closes#2817 · 修复 #2836（权限合成 finding）· 依赖已合并 #2828、objectui #2395 · 关联 #2833
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