fix(metadata-protocol): key the #3050 authoring gate on authoringChannel so ADR-0090 D11 OWD rules run on host-config deployments

[claude]

Fixes#7674

Premise re-verified on current main (6a9dec62c) before implementing

The card's line numbers came from framework 92f26f75. Both halves still held, at slightly different lines:

• (a) the OWD posture is lint-only at runtime: env can widen a packaged object's sharingModel via OS_METADATA_WRITABLE, and external≤internal (ADR-0090 D11) is never enforced on the write path #3050 gate call site was still if (this.environmentId !== undefined) — packages/metadata-protocol/src/protocol.ts:10058 (card said ~L10003).
• (b) the #4463 运行时发布门在 host-config 拓扑(environmentId 未绑定)上整体不跑——#5086 只把 code-only 拒绝移出了同一条短路 #6710authoringChannel infrastructure was where the card said: constructor parameter at protocol.ts:2929 (default 'environment'), assertRuntimeAuthoringRules early-returning for 'package-author' at protocol.ts:3094.

Two further facts measured while confirming the premise, both of which sharpen the case rather than change it:

1. packages/lint/src/authoring-rules.ts marks its own validateSecurityPosture rule CLI_ONLY, and its surfaceReason states the grounds verbatim: "Already gated at this surface by a DIFFERENT mechanism: plugin-security registers an ADR-0094 authoring gate on object ... that enforces the same OWD posture rules on every runtime write." That claim was false on every host-config deployment, so the posture was declared-not-enforced on both tables at once.
2. A repo-wide grep for owd_external_wider found exactly two files: the gate source and its own unit test. object-posture-gate.test.ts was 18/18 green throughout, on a gate nothing ever called.

The change

One predicate at the #3050 call site, keyed on the declared channel exactly as #6710 keyed its sibling:

-if(this.environmentId!==undefined){+if(this.authoringChannel!=='package-author'){awaitthis.runAuthoringGate({ ... });}

runAuthoringGate itself is untouched, and so is the surrounding save path — the change is additive at the call site, per the serialization constraint on this file. The rest of the protocol diff is comment correction: three docblocks said in prose that the #3050 gate keeps reading environmentId, and one of those sentences is exactly how the defect survived #6710 by one gate.

One behaviour cell flips beyond the defect, deliberately. A kernel with an environment id and a declared 'package-author' channel was gated before and is not now. That is #6710's direction applied honestly rather than half-applied: a caller that claims to be the package author is treated as one by both doors, and package authoring is gated at build time instead — validateSecurityPosture is CLI_ONLY, and R1's own message prescribes that route ("widen it in the package source and publish through the package pipeline"). No assembly in this repo declares that channel today; only the genuine control plane may.

The missing test, which was the other half of the deliverable

New: packages/rest/src/meta-object-owd-gate.test.ts (12 cases). Nothing hand-built — a real better-sqlite3 :memory: engine, a real ObjectStackProtocolImplementation on the host-config topology (no environment id, no declared channel, asserted in the harness rather than assumed), the real registerObjectPostureGate wiring security-plugin.ts performs at init, and the real PUT /api/v1/meta/:type/:name route.

• R2 — {sharingModel:'private', externalSharingModel:'public_read'} answers 403 owd_external_wider on the active path, the draft path (?mode=draft) and package authoring (?package=) — the issue's three measured 200s. Plus the unset-internal case (an absent sharingModel is private under ADR-0090 D1).
• R1 — an environment overlay widening a packaged object's internal, and one widening only its external side, both answer 403 owd_widening_forbidden. R1 belongs here and not only in the unit suite because on a host config it is the only guard: the ADR-0005 two-tier authorization that would normally refuse an overlay of a packaged object is itself scoped to environmentId !== undefined.
• Every refusal asserts code AND status, and also that nothing was persisted — a 403 answered after the row landed would still be the defect, and a status-only assertion cannot see it.
• Negative direction, treated as load-bearing: four legal OWD pairs still save and store a row; a tightening overlay of a packaged object is still allowed (R1 is directional); and the package-author channel still bypasses the gate, so the #4463 运行时发布门在 host-config 拓扑(environmentId 未绑定)上整体不跑——#5086 只把 code-only 拒绝移出了同一条短路 #6710 carve-out is intact. That last case is green before and after on purpose — it pins the thing that must not move.

Also replaced, not re-spelled: protocol.runtime-authoring-gate.test.ts carried a case asserting "the #3050 authoring gate keeps its own environmentId !== undefined scope check, and it must stay keyed there". That sentence was the defect written down as a pin, and it could not see the hole because it only drove the control-plane row through the package-author channel — the one column where both keys agree. It is now a four-cell matrix over (environmentId x authoringChannel), which is what makes the two keys distinguishable, plus a case showing both gates live on the topology that had neither.

Reverse verification — direction predicted before running

Prediction: reverting the one predicate should turn every refusal case red by answering 200 (not by throwing), and leave every negative case green. Measured, after rebuilding metadata-protocol so the test read the reverted dist rather than a stale one:

 x refuses 403 owd_external_wider on 'the active path (bare PUT)' expected 200 to be 403
x refuses 403 owd_external_wider on 'the draft path (?mode=draft)' expected 200 to be 403
x refuses 403 owd_external_wider on 'package authoring (?package=)' expected 200 to be 403
x catches the unset-internal case too expected 200 to be 403
x refuses an env overlay that widens a packaged object's internal OWD expected 'NOT_OVERRIDABLE' to be 'owd_widening_forbidden'
x refuses a widened EXTERNAL side against the packaged baseline expected 'NOT_OVERRIDABLE' to be 'owd_widening_forbidden'
Tests 6 failed | 6 passed (12)

The four R2 cases reproduce the issue's measured 200s in process. The two R1 cases fail differently and informatively: with the gate dead the write travels one door further and is refused by SysMetadataRepository.assertAllowed() as NOT_OVERRIDABLE — a different code from a different layer, which is exactly why a throw-only or "did it fail" assertion would have proven nothing here. All six negative cases stayed green, so the fix adds enforcement without refusing legal authoring.

That run also surfaced a latent order-dependency in the new suite and it is fixed: OS_METADATA_WRITABLE is memoised in two places, and with the fix in place the posture gate refuses first so the repository's memo is never warmed — clearing only the protocol's looks sufficient until the fix comes out. The harness now clears both.

Verification

pnpm --filter @objectstack/metadata-protocol test -> 72 files, 1066 tests passed
pnpm --filter @objectstack/rest test -> 88 files, 1415 tests passed (incl. the new 12)
pnpm --filter @objectstack/plugin-security test -> 46 files, 952 tests passed
pnpm --filter @objectstack/objectql test -> 182 files, 3228 tests passed
pnpm --filter @objectstack/rest typecheck -> clean

Gate families touching this surface, all green locally: check:nul-bytes, check:error-code-casing, check:route-envelope, check:durability-log-level, check:startup-registry-verdict, check:meta-type-normalized, check:published-files, check:engine-double-contract, check:adr-anchors, check:adr-links, check:type-check-coverage, check:empty-changeset, check:adr-0087-registration. The consumer sweep direction used for the build closure was the suffix form ('@objectstack/rest^...', i.e. rest's dependencies) — this change narrows no exported type, so there is no downstream signature surface to sweep.

packages/rest/package.json gains @objectstack/plugin-security as a devDependency so the suite can register the real gate rather than a copy of it. Checked for a cycle first: plugin-security's transitive dependency closure (deps + devDeps, 17 packages) does not reach @objectstack/rest.

Scope

Filed and fixed as an authoring-validation gap, not a live disclosure — external-principal enforcement is #2696-planned, so a wider external baseline discloses nothing today. Nothing here touches external-principal read enforcement.

Not done, and flagged rather than done quietly: scripts/adr-anchors/packages__metadata-protocol__src__protocol.ts.json already exists for this file and anchors ADR-0029 / ADR-0119. Extending it with the ADR-0090 D11 activation would be a reasonable follow-up, but it is a shared satellite of the hottest file in the repo and outside this card's stated surface; the code comment carries the ADR and issue references in the meantime.

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1 Skipped Deployment

Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated (UTC)
objectstack	Ignored		Aug 11, 2026 12:32pm

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📓 Docs Drift Check

This PR changes 1 package(s): @objectstack/metadata-protocol.

3 hand-written doc(s) reference the affected code and may need an implementation-accuracy re-verification:

• content/docs/concepts/metadata-lifecycle.mdx(via @objectstack/metadata-protocol)
• content/docs/kernel/services-checklist.mdx(via @objectstack/metadata-protocol)
• content/docs/protocol/kernel/http-protocol.mdx(via @objectstack/metadata-protocol)

⛔ 1 release-owned page(s) also reference the affected code. These are read-only:

• content/docs/releases/v9.mdx(via @objectstack/metadata-protocol)

content/docs/releases/ is RELEASE-OWNED (AGENTS.md "Documentation Guardrails"): release
notes are written centrally at release time, and a code PR that edits them is the exact PR
that guardrail exists to stop. They are still audited — read-only. If one of them is actually
wrong, file an issue or open a dedicated docs-only PR; do not edit it here.

Advisory only. To re-verify, run the docs-accuracy-audit workflow scoped to these files:
node scripts/docs-audit/affected-docs.mjs origin/main → pass the list as args.docs.