fix(platform-objects): drop the dead Setup › Advanced › Signing Keys (JWKS) nav entry (#7544)

[huangyiirene]

Fixes#7544

Setup › Advanced › Signing Keys (JWKS) could never load, for any persona. sys_jwks declares enable.apiEnabled: false / apiMethods: [], so the list request answers OBJECT_API_DISABLED (404) — and the console masked that as a generic "No identity records" empty state, so the surface read as "you have no signing keys" rather than "this page cannot work".

The premise was testable, and it held

The dispatch ruled prune the entry, ⛔ never "enable the surface", on a premise I was asked to falsify: sys_jwks holds live JWT signing-key material and its API-disabled state is deliberate. Measured on origin/main:

Claim	Measurement	Verdict
Holds private key material	sys-jwks.object.ts:56 — private_key: Field.textarea({ description: 'JSON-serialized JWK private key (encrypted at rest)' })	✅ confirmed
API-disabled deliberately	Same shape as the six sys_oauth_* token/consent stores; apiMethods: [] fails CLOSED by design (#3391); access.default: 'private' pinned by platform-objects.test.ts "secure-by-default posture" and by authz-conformance.matrix.ts	✅ confirmed
No declared surface reads it over the API	The three plugin-auth readers (auth-manager.ts, auth-schema-config.ts, jwt-key-algorithm.ts) go through better-auth's adapter under a system context, not REST	✅ confirmed
The entry is dead for everyone	apiAccessDenialFromEnable (rest-server.ts:1658) is a pure function of enable — no user, no permissions, no context — and enforceApiAccess passes it only object metadata	✅ confirmed

So the fork is settled by measurement, not only by ruling: the object is right and the entry was wrong.

The in-code comment was the actual bug report

The dispatch flagged setup-nav.contributions.ts:137 as a possible primary source. It contradicted itself:

nav_jwks is capability-gated (like nav_api_keys): sys_jwks is access.default:'private' (ADR-0066 ④ — signing keys), so a non-admin's list request 403s server-side

That describes a permission outcome, which reads as though an admin could list the keys. None could — the 404 precedes and ignores permissions entirely. The comment documented an intent the object's own enable block had already made unreachable, which is why the entry survived review. It is replaced with what actually happens.

What landed

• nav_jwks removed from SETUP_NAV_CONTRIBUTIONS, folded into the comment two lines below that already governs this exact class (sys_verification / sys_device_code omit list, so they get no browse entry). sys_jwks was the only one of the repo's seven API-disabled objects that still had a nav entry.
• Four apps.setup.navigation.nav_jwks labels moved into DEAD_SETUP_NAV_IDS (setup-nav-dead-key-tombstone.test.ts), following the order that file states: nav item and label die in one commit. ⚠️ The sys_jwksobject labels in the four *.objects.generated.ts bundles are untouched — the object still exists, so no os i18n extract --fill=default was run and the approvals: sys_approval_request.approval_reject / approval_recall declare both confirmText and params, so one decision opens two sequential dialogs #7278 / platform-objects: 16 more actions declare both confirmText and params, so one click opens two sequential dialogs (same shape as #7278) #7309 trap is not in play.
• New invariant in platform-objects.test.ts: every contributed type: 'object' Setup entry must target an object that can actually serve a list, judged through the same single derivation source the REST gate uses (resolveEffectiveApiMethods / isApiOperationAllowed, 跟踪:UI 操作按钮与 apiMethods 白名单一致性契约落地(#3026 设计定稿) #3391) in the same order. Unclassifiable new targets fail loudly rather than dropping out of coverage.
• QA checklist corrected.builtin-apps-nav-render — the item whose run produced this card — instructed the next runner to confirm nav_jwks is "PRESENT for admin". Left as written it would have filed this removal as a regression. Beyond the dispatch's named file surface; called out here deliberately.
• content/docs/ui/setup-app.mdx repeated the same stale "non-admins are denied server-side" claim.

⛔ sys_jwks's enable block is unchanged, and a test now pins that it stays apiEnabled: false / apiMethods: [] / access.default: 'private'. better-auth keeps signing and verifying tokens through its adapter.

Verification

Reverse-verified (fix committed first, then the entry re-added — never against an uncommitted edit):

State	Result
Fix in place	342 passed (342)
nav_jwks re-added	3 failed | 131 passed

The three reds are the three claims: nav entries whose destination answers 4xx on list — see #7544: expected [ 'nav_jwks → sys_jwks' ] to deeply equal [], the id-specific assertion, and the tombstone's expected [ 'nav_jwks' ] to deeply equal [].

One iteration was needed to earn that first message: sys_jwks initially fell into the unclassified branch, so the gate reported only that it had never heard of the object. Listing the removed object in the lookup table makes a re-added entry fail on why it is dead (commit 2).

The negative direction is asserted.nav_api_keys → sys_api_key — the card's own control, same machinery, no 4xx — must keep working: the invariant test proves it still lists, so a fix that pruned both would fail here.

All gates run on the tree after merging origin/main (d91fad5c, which touched packages/spec incl. object.zod.ts and rest-server.ts — both packages this change reasons about, so §10's full re-run applied, not the scoped one):

Gate	Result
@objectstack/platform-objects	342 passed
@objectstack/cli	1190 passed
@objectstack/runtime	2086 passed
@objectstack/dogfood	588 passed, 3 skipped
check:app-nav-i18n	OK — boots the real composition: 53 merged setup nav ids (was 54), all labelled in 4 locales
check:i18n / check:i18n-coverage	OK — 9 packages in sync; 660 baselined, none new
check:nul-bytes / check-platform-checklist	OK
spec check:generated	13/13 up to date
typecheck + eslint (changed files)	clean

⭐ Reported, not implemented: the general gap

The card's more valuable half — a requiredPermissions gate cannot prune an API-disabled object — is not fixed here, per the dispatch's ⛔. What I measured about it:

filterAppForUser (rest-server.ts:2976-3056) gates _unpublished, app- and item-level requiredPermissions, requiresService (ADR-0057 D10), and collapses empty groups (#7380). Its own docblock names what it does not gate:

NOT gated here: visible (CEL) at any level, and requiresObject — both are still evaluated client-side only. That asymmetry is deliberate and pinned in rest.test.ts.

Nothing in nav filtering consults enable.apiEnabled at all. So re-pointing this entry at a requiresObject gate would not have pruned it either — it would have shipped in the /meta payload exactly as before, which is also why the sibling defect (the Account app served whole to a member denied every backing object) survives despite using requiresObject. There is today no declaration a nav entry can carry that expresses "prune when the destination cannot serve", which is what makes deletion the only honest repair available rather than merely the chosen one.

Closing that is a contract-face change (domain:spec) and belongs in its own card.

Separately, still open: the console masks a 404 as a generic empty state. That masking is untouched here and still applies to other objects — a page that cannot work will keep reading as a page with no records. Flagged as the dispatch asked; it is a objectui surface, not this repo's.

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Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated (UTC)
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📓 Docs Drift Check

This PR changes 1 package(s): @objectstack/platform-objects.

2 hand-written doc(s) reference the affected code and may need an implementation-accuracy re-verification:

• content/docs/plugins/packages.mdx(via @objectstack/platform-objects)
• content/docs/ui/setup-app.mdx(via @objectstack/platform-objects)

Advisory only. To re-verify, run the docs-accuracy-audit workflow scoped to these files:
node scripts/docs-audit/affected-docs.mjs origin/main → pass the list as args.docs.

[huangyiirene]

ACCEPT — domain:metadata seat, PM review. Binds to head 5e63357. ⚠️ Re-verify if the head moves.

The ruling's premise was falsifiable and the dev tested all four halves rather than implementing against it. That is the outcome the three-partition brief exists to produce. Everything below I measured myself on the branch — ⛔ not read off the report.

Review gates, each measured

Gate (set at dispatch)	Probe	Result
The entry is actually gone, not re-gated	id: 'nav_jwks' in setup-nav.contributions.ts	main 1 → branch 0 ✅
⭐ CONTROL — nav_api_keys must survive	id: 'nav_api_keys', same file	main 1 → branch 1 ✅
⛔ The object is untouched	git diff on src/objects/**	empty ✅
⚠️The --fill=default trap (#7278/#7309)	git diff on *objects.generated.ts	empty ✅
…and no English seeded into a non-en bundle	+ lines in es-ES.ts / ja-JP.ts	none — pure deletions ✅
⛔ content/docs/releases/ untouched	git diff --name-only	empty ✅
Changeset	.changeset/setup-nav-jwks-dead-entry.md, platform-objects: patch	present ✅
Fixes #7544 is the first body line	read directly	✅

⚠️ My own first pass misread this: git grep -c 'nav_jwks' returns 1 on the branch, which looked like a survivor. It is the replacement comment. The declaration form (id: 'nav_jwks') is the discriminating probe, and it is zero. Recording the false positive because the loose grep is the one a later reader will reach for first.

The invariant test earns its place

I checked the one thing that could quietly rot: whether canListreimplements the gate or derives it. It derives — resolveEffectiveApiMethods / isApiOperationAllowed imported from @objectstack/spec/data, the same source apiAccessDenialFromEnable (rest-server.ts:1658) uses, in the same order (apiEnabled === false short-circuit first, whitelist second). It also carries a vacuity control (entries.length > 0, contains nav_api_keys), so the toEqual([]) assertions cannot pass by finding nothing.

The unclassified branch is the part I most want kept: a new nav target this package cannot resolve fails loudly instead of dropping out of coverage. That is what turns a one-instance fix into a standing gate.

Reverse-verification is real and in the right order — fix committed first, then the entry re-added → 3 failed | 131 passed, with the failure message naming the reason (nav entries whose destination answers 4xx on list), not merely the fact. The honest note about the first iteration landing in the unclassified branch is worth more than a clean story.

The two out-of-surface files: both kept, one was load-bearing

You flagged going beyond the named surface and offered to revert. ⛔ Don't.

docs/qa/platform-checklist/areas/platform-core.json instructed the next runner to confirm nav_jwks is "PRESENT for admin". Left as written, the next QA run files this removal as a regression and re-opens #7544 — the fix would have been undone by its own verification procedure. Correcting it is not scope creep; omitting it would have been the defect.content/docs/ui/setup-app.mdx repeated the same stale claim, and the Docs Drift Check flagged exactly that file. I checked the second file it flagged, content/docs/plugins/packages.mdx: zero hits for jwks / signing key, so nothing stale is left there. A repo-wide sweep for "Signing Keys" outside the two edited files returns nothing.

⭐ Both splits are now filed — a sentence in a report is not a card

Standing rule on this seat: the existence test for a split is an issue number. Your two reports are cards, not paragraphs:

• Nav gating cannot express "prune when the destination cannot serve" — enable.apiEnabled is never consulted by filterAppForUser #7912 (domain:spec, pm:queue) — nav gating cannot express "prune when the destination cannot serve".
• A list request that 404s with OBJECT_API_DISABLED renders as the generic empty state — "this page cannot work" reads as "you have no records" objectui#4408 — the console masks OBJECT_API_DISABLED as a generic empty state.

Before filing #7912 I re-ran your central measurement independently, because a PM transcribing a dev's mechanism into a card that a third dev implements against is exactly where an unverified claim gets laundered into a specification:

Probe	Result
apiEnabled in rest-server.ts	9 — all in the data-access path (:1665, :2468-2505, :10128, :10177, :10423)
…inside filterAppForUser (:2976-3056)	0
requiresObject in rest-server.ts	1 — the docblock line saying it is not gated there

Confirmed. Your point 1 is the one I carried into #7912 as its load-bearing claim: re-pointing the entry at requiresObjectwould not have pruned it either, so deletion was the only repair available, not merely the one chosen. I filed it as a fork with three readings (make requiresObject server-side / new declaration / derive from objectName with no new key) rather than a task, because overturning the "deliberate and pinned in rest.test.ts" asymmetry is a decision to take in the open.

The #4408 body marks its own mechanism section as ⛔ a PM assumption, not a finding — I have not read that repo's fetch path — and names what to measure first, including whether ADR-0112's code even survives the transport.

Landing

19/24 checks green, 1 skipped, 0 failed; Test Core (3 shards), Dogfood Regression (3/3) and TypeScript Type Check still running. ⛔ in_progress is not green, so auto-merge is armed only once each concludes. Landing is confirmed by a queue branch appearing or a single-parent commit on origin/main — ⛔ never by the auto-merge return value.

Nothing to change. Excellent work — particularly reading the in-code comment as a primary source and finding that it documented an intent the object's own enable block had already made unreachable. That is the finding that explains how the entry survived review, and it would have been invisible to anyone who took the comment at face value.

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