Published skill teaches that X-Tenant-ID is what makes tenant scoping work — the framework scopes from the session, and trusting the header as identity is the recorded vulnerability #5704

Closed
#6974
Closed
Published skill teaches that X-Tenant-ID is what makes tenant scoping work — the framework scopes from the session, and trusting the header as identity is the recorded vulnerability#5704
#6974
Assignees
os-sam
Labels
domain:uiobjectui ui stream: fix lands on the published library or apps — objectui execution seatpm:dispatched

Description

@os-sales
os-sales
opened on Aug 22, 2026

Found while documenting the X-Tenant-ID edge contract for #5279. Filed rather than fixed: skills/** is a published surface outside that card's fence, and edits there carry their own budget rules.

The text

skills/objectui/guides/auth-permissions.md, "Multi-tenancy":

There is no client-side tenancy layer. Tenant scoping is server-enforced:
createAuthenticatedFetch (@object-ui/auth) injects the active
organization as the X-Tenant-ID header on every API call, and the backend
applies row-level isolation.

The first sentence is right. The second joins two facts with a colon that reads as cause and effect — the client sends the header, therefore the backend isolates rows — and that implication is false.

What is actually true

  • Row scoping comes from the session, not the header.resolveAuthzContext (framework, packages/core/src/security/resolve-authz-context.ts) derives tenantId from the API-key principal or from session.activeOrganizationId, and from no request header. The framework pins it: packages/verify/src/harness.org-context.test.ts — "session.activeOrganizationId is the ONE field resolveAuthzContext reads into tenantId".
  • The header is an edge routing hint, consumed by the cloud edge to pick a tenant database / environment. It is one of six configurable identification sources in TenantRoutingConfigSchema (@objectstack/spec/cloud), and by default it ranks second, behind subdomain.
  • Trusting the header as identity is a recorded vulnerability. The framework's plugin-sharing documents that its old default trusted x-user-id / x-tenant-id and that this "let a client forge attribution and enumerate/revoke other users' links"; the secure default reads no identity from headers.
  • "on every API call" is inaccurate in both directions. The stamp is skipped entirely until AuthProvider's async organization chain resolves (the unstamped-first-request window), and it is not gated on the URL being an API call the way Authorization is.

Why it matters more than a wording nit

This is a published skill — it is what an agent or integrator reads before wiring multi-tenancy. The belief it plants ("the header is what enforces tenancy") is exactly the belief that leads someone to trust x-tenant-id server-side, which is the failure plugin-sharing already had to remove once. It also points the wrong way when the header is missing: a reader who thinks isolation depends on it will treat the first-boot window as a security hole rather than what it is, a routing-input gap.

Where the correct text now lives

packages/auth/README.md gains "The X-Tenant-ID edge contract" in the #5279 PR — what the header means, who stamps it, who reads it, what a reader may and may not assume, and the unstamped-first-request window. The skill's paragraph can be repointed at that section; the correction is roughly a sentence, not an expansion.

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domain:uiobjectui ui stream: fix lands on the published library or apps — objectui execution seatpm:dispatched

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    , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
     blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

    Skip to content
    Published skill teaches that X-Tenant-ID is what makes tenant scoping work — the framework scopes from the session, and trusting the header as identity is the recorded vulnerability #5704
    Closed
    #6974
    Closed
    Published skill teaches that X-Tenant-ID is what makes tenant scoping work — the framework scopes from the session, and trusting the header as identity is the recorded vulnerability#5704
    #6974
    Assignees
    os-sam
    Labels
    domain:uiobjectui ui stream: fix lands on the published library or apps — objectui execution seatpm:dispatched
    Description
    @os-sales
    os-sales
    opened on Aug 22, 2026
    Found while documenting the X-Tenant-ID edge contract for #5279. Filed rather than fixed: skills/** is a published surface outside that card's fence, and edits there carry their own budget rules.
    The text
    skills/objectui/guides/auth-permissions.md, "Multi-tenancy":
    There is no client-side tenancy layer. Tenant scoping is server-enforced:
    createAuthenticatedFetch (@object-ui/auth) injects the active
    
organization as the X-Tenant-ID header on every API call, and the backend
    
applies row-level isolation.
    The first sentence is right. The second joins two facts with a colon that reads as cause and effect — the client sends the header, therefore the backend isolates rows — and that implication is false.
    What is actually true
    • Row scoping comes from the session, not the header.resolveAuthzContext (framework, packages/core/src/security/resolve-authz-context.ts) derives tenantId from the API-key principal or from session.activeOrganizationId, and from no request header. The framework pins it: packages/verify/src/harness.org-context.test.ts — "session.activeOrganizationId is the ONE field resolveAuthzContext reads into tenantId".
    • The header is an edge routing hint, consumed by the cloud edge to pick a tenant database / environment. It is one of six configurable identification sources in TenantRoutingConfigSchema (@objectstack/spec/cloud), and by default it ranks second, behind subdomain.
    • Trusting the header as identity is a recorded vulnerability. The framework's plugin-sharing documents that its old default trusted x-user-id / x-tenant-id and that this "let a client forge attribution and enumerate/revoke other users' links"; the secure default reads no identity from headers.
    • "on every API call" is inaccurate in both directions. The stamp is skipped entirely until AuthProvider's async organization chain resolves (the unstamped-first-request window), and it is not gated on the URL being an API call the way Authorization is.
    Why it matters more than a wording nit
    This is a published skill — it is what an agent or integrator reads before wiring multi-tenancy. The belief it plants ("the header is what enforces tenancy") is exactly the belief that leads someone to trust x-tenant-id server-side, which is the failure plugin-sharing already had to remove once. It also points the wrong way when the header is missing: a reader who thinks isolation depends on it will treat the first-boot window as a security hole rather than what it is, a routing-input gap.
    Where the correct text now lives
    packages/auth/README.md gains "The X-Tenant-ID edge contract" in the #5279 PR — what the header means, who stamps it, who reads it, what a reader may and may not assume, and the unstamped-first-request window. The skill's paragraph can be repointed at that section; the correction is roughly a sentence, not an expansion.
    Metadata
    Metadata
    Assignees
    Labels
    domain:uiobjectui ui stream: fix lands on the published library or apps — objectui execution seatpm:dispatched
    Type
    No type
    Projects
    No projects
      Milestone
      No milestone
      Relationships
      None yet
      Development
      No branches or pull requests
      Issue actions
      
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

      Skip to content
      Published skill teaches that X-Tenant-ID is what makes tenant scoping work — the framework scopes from the session, and trusting the header as identity is the recorded vulnerability #5704
      Closed
      #6974
      Closed
      Published skill teaches that X-Tenant-ID is what makes tenant scoping work — the framework scopes from the session, and trusting the header as identity is the recorded vulnerability#5704
      #6974
      Assignees
      os-sam
      Labels
      domain:uiobjectui ui stream: fix lands on the published library or apps — objectui execution seatpm:dispatched
      Description
      @os-sales
      os-sales
      opened on Aug 22, 2026
      Found while documenting the X-Tenant-ID edge contract for #5279. Filed rather than fixed: skills/** is a published surface outside that card's fence, and edits there carry their own budget rules.
      The text
      skills/objectui/guides/auth-permissions.md, "Multi-tenancy":
      There is no client-side tenancy layer. Tenant scoping is server-enforced:
      createAuthenticatedFetch (@object-ui/auth) injects the active
      
organization as the X-Tenant-ID header on every API call, and the backend
      
applies row-level isolation.
      The first sentence is right. The second joins two facts with a colon that reads as cause and effect — the client sends the header, therefore the backend isolates rows — and that implication is false.
      What is actually true
      • Row scoping comes from the session, not the header.resolveAuthzContext (framework, packages/core/src/security/resolve-authz-context.ts) derives tenantId from the API-key principal or from session.activeOrganizationId, and from no request header. The framework pins it: packages/verify/src/harness.org-context.test.ts — "session.activeOrganizationId is the ONE field resolveAuthzContext reads into tenantId".
      • The header is an edge routing hint, consumed by the cloud edge to pick a tenant database / environment. It is one of six configurable identification sources in TenantRoutingConfigSchema (@objectstack/spec/cloud), and by default it ranks second, behind subdomain.
      • Trusting the header as identity is a recorded vulnerability. The framework's plugin-sharing documents that its old default trusted x-user-id / x-tenant-id and that this "let a client forge attribution and enumerate/revoke other users' links"; the secure default reads no identity from headers.
      • "on every API call" is inaccurate in both directions. The stamp is skipped entirely until AuthProvider's async organization chain resolves (the unstamped-first-request window), and it is not gated on the URL being an API call the way Authorization is.
      Why it matters more than a wording nit
      This is a published skill — it is what an agent or integrator reads before wiring multi-tenancy. The belief it plants ("the header is what enforces tenancy") is exactly the belief that leads someone to trust x-tenant-id server-side, which is the failure plugin-sharing already had to remove once. It also points the wrong way when the header is missing: a reader who thinks isolation depends on it will treat the first-boot window as a security hole rather than what it is, a routing-input gap.
      Where the correct text now lives
      packages/auth/README.md gains "The X-Tenant-ID edge contract" in the #5279 PR — what the header means, who stamps it, who reads it, what a reader may and may not assume, and the unstamped-first-request window. The skill's paragraph can be repointed at that section; the correction is roughly a sentence, not an expansion.
      Metadata
      Metadata
      Assignees
      Labels
      domain:uiobjectui ui stream: fix lands on the published library or apps — objectui execution seatpm:dispatched
      Type
      No type
      Projects
      No projects
        Milestone
        No milestone
        Relationships
        None yet
        Development
        No branches or pull requests
        Issue actions
        
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

        Skip to content
        Published skill teaches that X-Tenant-ID is what makes tenant scoping work — the framework scopes from the session, and trusting the header as identity is the recorded vulnerability #5704
        Closed
        #6974
        Closed
        Published skill teaches that X-Tenant-ID is what makes tenant scoping work — the framework scopes from the session, and trusting the header as identity is the recorded vulnerability#5704
        #6974
        Assignees
        os-sam
        Labels
        domain:uiobjectui ui stream: fix lands on the published library or apps — objectui execution seatpm:dispatched
        Description
        @os-sales
        os-sales
        opened on Aug 22, 2026
        Found while documenting the X-Tenant-ID edge contract for #5279. Filed rather than fixed: skills/** is a published surface outside that card's fence, and edits there carry their own budget rules.
        The text
        skills/objectui/guides/auth-permissions.md, "Multi-tenancy":
        There is no client-side tenancy layer. Tenant scoping is server-enforced:
        createAuthenticatedFetch (@object-ui/auth) injects the active
        
organization as the X-Tenant-ID header on every API call, and the backend
        
applies row-level isolation.
        The first sentence is right. The second joins two facts with a colon that reads as cause and effect — the client sends the header, therefore the backend isolates rows — and that implication is false.
        What is actually true
        • Row scoping comes from the session, not the header.resolveAuthzContext (framework, packages/core/src/security/resolve-authz-context.ts) derives tenantId from the API-key principal or from session.activeOrganizationId, and from no request header. The framework pins it: packages/verify/src/harness.org-context.test.ts — "session.activeOrganizationId is the ONE field resolveAuthzContext reads into tenantId".
        • The header is an edge routing hint, consumed by the cloud edge to pick a tenant database / environment. It is one of six configurable identification sources in TenantRoutingConfigSchema (@objectstack/spec/cloud), and by default it ranks second, behind subdomain.
        • Trusting the header as identity is a recorded vulnerability. The framework's plugin-sharing documents that its old default trusted x-user-id / x-tenant-id and that this "let a client forge attribution and enumerate/revoke other users' links"; the secure default reads no identity from headers.
        • "on every API call" is inaccurate in both directions. The stamp is skipped entirely until AuthProvider's async organization chain resolves (the unstamped-first-request window), and it is not gated on the URL being an API call the way Authorization is.
        Why it matters more than a wording nit
        This is a published skill — it is what an agent or integrator reads before wiring multi-tenancy. The belief it plants ("the header is what enforces tenancy") is exactly the belief that leads someone to trust x-tenant-id server-side, which is the failure plugin-sharing already had to remove once. It also points the wrong way when the header is missing: a reader who thinks isolation depends on it will treat the first-boot window as a security hole rather than what it is, a routing-input gap.
        Where the correct text now lives
        packages/auth/README.md gains "The X-Tenant-ID edge contract" in the #5279 PR — what the header means, who stamps it, who reads it, what a reader may and may not assume, and the unstamped-first-request window. The skill's paragraph can be repointed at that section; the correction is roughly a sentence, not an expansion.
        Metadata
        Metadata
        Assignees
        Labels
        domain:uiobjectui ui stream: fix lands on the published library or apps — objectui execution seatpm:dispatched
        Type
        No type
        Projects
        No projects
          Milestone
          No milestone
          Relationships
          None yet
          Development
          No branches or pull requests
          Issue actions
          
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

          Skip to content
          Published skill teaches that X-Tenant-ID is what makes tenant scoping work — the framework scopes from the session, and trusting the header as identity is the recorded vulnerability #5704
          Closed
          #6974
          Closed
          Published skill teaches that X-Tenant-ID is what makes tenant scoping work — the framework scopes from the session, and trusting the header as identity is the recorded vulnerability#5704
          #6974
          Assignees
          os-sam
          Labels
          domain:uiobjectui ui stream: fix lands on the published library or apps — objectui execution seatpm:dispatched
          Description
          @os-sales
          os-sales
          opened on Aug 22, 2026
          Found while documenting the X-Tenant-ID edge contract for #5279. Filed rather than fixed: skills/** is a published surface outside that card's fence, and edits there carry their own budget rules.
          The text
          skills/objectui/guides/auth-permissions.md, "Multi-tenancy":
          There is no client-side tenancy layer. Tenant scoping is server-enforced:
          createAuthenticatedFetch (@object-ui/auth) injects the active
          
organization as the X-Tenant-ID header on every API call, and the backend
          
applies row-level isolation.
          The first sentence is right. The second joins two facts with a colon that reads as cause and effect — the client sends the header, therefore the backend isolates rows — and that implication is false.
          What is actually true
          • Row scoping comes from the session, not the header.resolveAuthzContext (framework, packages/core/src/security/resolve-authz-context.ts) derives tenantId from the API-key principal or from session.activeOrganizationId, and from no request header. The framework pins it: packages/verify/src/harness.org-context.test.ts — "session.activeOrganizationId is the ONE field resolveAuthzContext reads into tenantId".
          • The header is an edge routing hint, consumed by the cloud edge to pick a tenant database / environment. It is one of six configurable identification sources in TenantRoutingConfigSchema (@objectstack/spec/cloud), and by default it ranks second, behind subdomain.
          • Trusting the header as identity is a recorded vulnerability. The framework's plugin-sharing documents that its old default trusted x-user-id / x-tenant-id and that this "let a client forge attribution and enumerate/revoke other users' links"; the secure default reads no identity from headers.
          • "on every API call" is inaccurate in both directions. The stamp is skipped entirely until AuthProvider's async organization chain resolves (the unstamped-first-request window), and it is not gated on the URL being an API call the way Authorization is.
          Why it matters more than a wording nit
          This is a published skill — it is what an agent or integrator reads before wiring multi-tenancy. The belief it plants ("the header is what enforces tenancy") is exactly the belief that leads someone to trust x-tenant-id server-side, which is the failure plugin-sharing already had to remove once. It also points the wrong way when the header is missing: a reader who thinks isolation depends on it will treat the first-boot window as a security hole rather than what it is, a routing-input gap.
          Where the correct text now lives
          packages/auth/README.md gains "The X-Tenant-ID edge contract" in the #5279 PR — what the header means, who stamps it, who reads it, what a reader may and may not assume, and the unstamped-first-request window. The skill's paragraph can be repointed at that section; the correction is roughly a sentence, not an expansion.
          Metadata
          Metadata
          Assignees
          Labels
          domain:uiobjectui ui stream: fix lands on the published library or apps — objectui execution seatpm:dispatched
          Type
          No type
          Projects
          No projects
            Milestone
            No milestone
            Relationships
            None yet
            Development
            No branches or pull requests
            Issue actions
            
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

            Skip to content
            Published skill teaches that X-Tenant-ID is what makes tenant scoping work — the framework scopes from the session, and trusting the header as identity is the recorded vulnerability #5704
            Closed
            #6974
            Closed
            Published skill teaches that X-Tenant-ID is what makes tenant scoping work — the framework scopes from the session, and trusting the header as identity is the recorded vulnerability#5704
            #6974
            Assignees
            os-sam
            Labels
            domain:uiobjectui ui stream: fix lands on the published library or apps — objectui execution seatpm:dispatched
            Description
            @os-sales
            os-sales
            opened on Aug 22, 2026
            Found while documenting the X-Tenant-ID edge contract for #5279. Filed rather than fixed: skills/** is a published surface outside that card's fence, and edits there carry their own budget rules.
            The text
            skills/objectui/guides/auth-permissions.md, "Multi-tenancy":
            There is no client-side tenancy layer. Tenant scoping is server-enforced:
            createAuthenticatedFetch (@object-ui/auth) injects the active
            
organization as the X-Tenant-ID header on every API call, and the backend
            
applies row-level isolation.
            The first sentence is right. The second joins two facts with a colon that reads as cause and effect — the client sends the header, therefore the backend isolates rows — and that implication is false.
            What is actually true
            • Row scoping comes from the session, not the header.resolveAuthzContext (framework, packages/core/src/security/resolve-authz-context.ts) derives tenantId from the API-key principal or from session.activeOrganizationId, and from no request header. The framework pins it: packages/verify/src/harness.org-context.test.ts — "session.activeOrganizationId is the ONE field resolveAuthzContext reads into tenantId".
            • The header is an edge routing hint, consumed by the cloud edge to pick a tenant database / environment. It is one of six configurable identification sources in TenantRoutingConfigSchema (@objectstack/spec/cloud), and by default it ranks second, behind subdomain.
            • Trusting the header as identity is a recorded vulnerability. The framework's plugin-sharing documents that its old default trusted x-user-id / x-tenant-id and that this "let a client forge attribution and enumerate/revoke other users' links"; the secure default reads no identity from headers.
            • "on every API call" is inaccurate in both directions. The stamp is skipped entirely until AuthProvider's async organization chain resolves (the unstamped-first-request window), and it is not gated on the URL being an API call the way Authorization is.
            Why it matters more than a wording nit
            This is a published skill — it is what an agent or integrator reads before wiring multi-tenancy. The belief it plants ("the header is what enforces tenancy") is exactly the belief that leads someone to trust x-tenant-id server-side, which is the failure plugin-sharing already had to remove once. It also points the wrong way when the header is missing: a reader who thinks isolation depends on it will treat the first-boot window as a security hole rather than what it is, a routing-input gap.
            Where the correct text now lives
            packages/auth/README.md gains "The X-Tenant-ID edge contract" in the #5279 PR — what the header means, who stamps it, who reads it, what a reader may and may not assume, and the unstamped-first-request window. The skill's paragraph can be repointed at that section; the correction is roughly a sentence, not an expansion.
            Metadata
            Metadata
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            Labels
            domain:uiobjectui ui stream: fix lands on the published library or apps — objectui execution seatpm:dispatched
            Type
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              None yet
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              No branches or pull requests
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

              Skip to content
              Published skill teaches that X-Tenant-ID is what makes tenant scoping work — the framework scopes from the session, and trusting the header as identity is the recorded vulnerability #5704
              Closed
              #6974
              Closed
              Published skill teaches that X-Tenant-ID is what makes tenant scoping work — the framework scopes from the session, and trusting the header as identity is the recorded vulnerability#5704
              #6974
              Assignees
              os-sam
              Labels
              domain:uiobjectui ui stream: fix lands on the published library or apps — objectui execution seatpm:dispatched
              Description
              @os-sales
              os-sales
              opened on Aug 22, 2026
              Found while documenting the X-Tenant-ID edge contract for #5279. Filed rather than fixed: skills/** is a published surface outside that card's fence, and edits there carry their own budget rules.
              The text
              skills/objectui/guides/auth-permissions.md, "Multi-tenancy":
              There is no client-side tenancy layer. Tenant scoping is server-enforced:
              createAuthenticatedFetch (@object-ui/auth) injects the active
              
organization as the X-Tenant-ID header on every API call, and the backend
              
applies row-level isolation.
              The first sentence is right. The second joins two facts with a colon that reads as cause and effect — the client sends the header, therefore the backend isolates rows — and that implication is false.
              What is actually true
              • Row scoping comes from the session, not the header.resolveAuthzContext (framework, packages/core/src/security/resolve-authz-context.ts) derives tenantId from the API-key principal or from session.activeOrganizationId, and from no request header. The framework pins it: packages/verify/src/harness.org-context.test.ts — "session.activeOrganizationId is the ONE field resolveAuthzContext reads into tenantId".
              • The header is an edge routing hint, consumed by the cloud edge to pick a tenant database / environment. It is one of six configurable identification sources in TenantRoutingConfigSchema (@objectstack/spec/cloud), and by default it ranks second, behind subdomain.
              • Trusting the header as identity is a recorded vulnerability. The framework's plugin-sharing documents that its old default trusted x-user-id / x-tenant-id and that this "let a client forge attribution and enumerate/revoke other users' links"; the secure default reads no identity from headers.
              • "on every API call" is inaccurate in both directions. The stamp is skipped entirely until AuthProvider's async organization chain resolves (the unstamped-first-request window), and it is not gated on the URL being an API call the way Authorization is.
              Why it matters more than a wording nit
              This is a published skill — it is what an agent or integrator reads before wiring multi-tenancy. The belief it plants ("the header is what enforces tenancy") is exactly the belief that leads someone to trust x-tenant-id server-side, which is the failure plugin-sharing already had to remove once. It also points the wrong way when the header is missing: a reader who thinks isolation depends on it will treat the first-boot window as a security hole rather than what it is, a routing-input gap.
              Where the correct text now lives
              packages/auth/README.md gains "The X-Tenant-ID edge contract" in the #5279 PR — what the header means, who stamps it, who reads it, what a reader may and may not assume, and the unstamped-first-request window. The skill's paragraph can be repointed at that section; the correction is roughly a sentence, not an expansion.
              Metadata
              Metadata
              Assignees
              Labels
              domain:uiobjectui ui stream: fix lands on the published library or apps — objectui execution seatpm:dispatched
              Type
              No type
              Projects
              No projects
                Milestone
                No milestone
                Relationships
                None yet
                Development
                No branches or pull requests
                Issue actions
                
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

                Skip to content
                Published skill teaches that X-Tenant-ID is what makes tenant scoping work — the framework scopes from the session, and trusting the header as identity is the recorded vulnerability #5704
                Closed
                #6974
                Closed
                Published skill teaches that X-Tenant-ID is what makes tenant scoping work — the framework scopes from the session, and trusting the header as identity is the recorded vulnerability#5704
                #6974
                Assignees
                os-sam
                Labels
                domain:uiobjectui ui stream: fix lands on the published library or apps — objectui execution seatpm:dispatched
                Description
                @os-sales
                os-sales
                opened on Aug 22, 2026
                Found while documenting the X-Tenant-ID edge contract for #5279. Filed rather than fixed: skills/** is a published surface outside that card's fence, and edits there carry their own budget rules.
                The text
                skills/objectui/guides/auth-permissions.md, "Multi-tenancy":
                There is no client-side tenancy layer. Tenant scoping is server-enforced:
                createAuthenticatedFetch (@object-ui/auth) injects the active
                
organization as the X-Tenant-ID header on every API call, and the backend
                
applies row-level isolation.
                The first sentence is right. The second joins two facts with a colon that reads as cause and effect — the client sends the header, therefore the backend isolates rows — and that implication is false.
                What is actually true
                • Row scoping comes from the session, not the header.resolveAuthzContext (framework, packages/core/src/security/resolve-authz-context.ts) derives tenantId from the API-key principal or from session.activeOrganizationId, and from no request header. The framework pins it: packages/verify/src/harness.org-context.test.ts — "session.activeOrganizationId is the ONE field resolveAuthzContext reads into tenantId".
                • The header is an edge routing hint, consumed by the cloud edge to pick a tenant database / environment. It is one of six configurable identification sources in TenantRoutingConfigSchema (@objectstack/spec/cloud), and by default it ranks second, behind subdomain.
                • Trusting the header as identity is a recorded vulnerability. The framework's plugin-sharing documents that its old default trusted x-user-id / x-tenant-id and that this "let a client forge attribution and enumerate/revoke other users' links"; the secure default reads no identity from headers.
                • "on every API call" is inaccurate in both directions. The stamp is skipped entirely until AuthProvider's async organization chain resolves (the unstamped-first-request window), and it is not gated on the URL being an API call the way Authorization is.
                Why it matters more than a wording nit
                This is a published skill — it is what an agent or integrator reads before wiring multi-tenancy. The belief it plants ("the header is what enforces tenancy") is exactly the belief that leads someone to trust x-tenant-id server-side, which is the failure plugin-sharing already had to remove once. It also points the wrong way when the header is missing: a reader who thinks isolation depends on it will treat the first-boot window as a security hole rather than what it is, a routing-input gap.
                Where the correct text now lives
                packages/auth/README.md gains "The X-Tenant-ID edge contract" in the #5279 PR — what the header means, who stamps it, who reads it, what a reader may and may not assume, and the unstamped-first-request window. The skill's paragraph can be repointed at that section; the correction is roughly a sentence, not an expansion.
                Metadata
                Metadata
                Assignees
                Labels
                domain:uiobjectui ui stream: fix lands on the published library or apps — objectui execution seatpm:dispatched
                Type
                No type
                Projects
                No projects
                  Milestone
                  No milestone
                  Relationships
                  None yet
                  Development
                  No branches or pull requests
                  Issue actions