This repository was archived by the owner on Sep 6, 2023. It is now read-only.

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Trust

The trust repo is archived. The code has been moved into https://github.com/project-machine/mos.

Legacy

Trust provides secure unattended boot of systems (hardware and virtual machines). It protects the keys for encrypted filesystem, as well as a per-machine provisioned certificate/keypair. It ensures that only an OS (kernel, initrd (initial filesystem), and kernel command-line) which has been signed by you will be able to read these keys.

Trust is currently implemented using a combination of UEFI secureboot and TPM2. Other hardware assisted architectures are also possible, and should be easy to implement as alternative implementations of the Truststore interface.

The following steps implement the trust workflow:

  1. 'trust provision' - This step takes a key and certificate which the machine can use to uniquely and securely identify itself, e.g. to form a cluster with peers.
  2. 'trust preinit' - This is run as the first step of an OS install sequence. it will generate a new LUKS passphrase, overwrite the existing one on the TPM, and load the new LUKS passphrase in the root user keyring for use by the installer. It will not load any pre-existing LUKS passphrase, or load the provisioned key.
  3. 'trust setup' - This is run during the signed initrd to copy the secrets out of the TPM. Currently the LUKS passphrase is stored in root user keyring, and the provisioned key and certificate are stored in a private tmpfs. Early (signed) userspace can, before enabling network, mount all filesystems, and remove the LUKS key from keyring. It can also load the provisioned key into the TPM and unmount the tmpfs.

Trust also offers the following subcommands for administration:

'trust new-uuid --keysetname ' - generates a unique product-uuid, rsa 2048-bit keypair, and an x509 certificate signed by the manifestCA found in the keys repo name with --keysetname. The uuid is placed in Subject's CN attribute of the certificate. i.e. Subject: CN = manifest PRODUCT:62d38d9f-0d1d-441b-be21-5a7f4173fde1 The new uuid, keypair, and certificate are placed in the user's local config directory, i.e. ~/.config/machine/trust/manifest/.

'trust initkeyset --keysetname [ --org ]' - generates a new keys repository containing new keypairs, certs, and uuids. The new key repository is located in the user's data directory, ~/.local/share/machine/trust/keys/. The --org specifies the Organization attribute in the X509 Subject of the generated certificates. The key repo may be used whereever a keysetname is required.

'trust keyset pcr7data keysetName --passwdPolicy <pathname> \
--luksPolicy <pathname> \
--pcr7-tpm <pathname> \
--pcr7-prod <pathname> \
--pcr7-limited <pathname>
Adds the specified data to the named keyset. This generates
the "pcr7data" directory in the keyset.

Exported functions in trust:

doSudiCert(VMname, keysetname string) - Generates a unique uuid, rsa 2048-bit sudi keypair, and x509 certificate that is signed by the SudiCA found in the keys repo named with keysetname. This function is only called during provisioning. A unique uuid is also generated and added to the Subject's CN field of the certificate as well as the Product UUID. i.e. "Subject: CN = 4cc76b82-948c-44b8-948c-1cc9a7d460d0, serialNumber = PID:bc564363-2a8e-44fe-bb0e-54c7f9988ecf SN:4cc76b82-948c-44b8-948c-1cc9a7d460d0"

Notes

  1. This is based on the concepts and scripts published at https://github.com/puzzleos/tpm_eapol_scripts and presented at LSS 2021 by Paul Moore and Joy Latten at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfJDmfPP1OA).

  2. mos ('machine-os') will and mb ('machine-builder') will implement the proper placement of the trust commands, as well as the secure bootstrap of userspace.

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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all \u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003e blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "github.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '
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This repository was archived by the owner on Sep 6, 2023. It is now read-only.

Repository files navigation

Trust

The trust repo is archived. The code has been moved into https://github.com/project-machine/mos.

Legacy

Trust provides secure unattended boot of systems (hardware and virtual machines). It protects the keys for encrypted filesystem, as well as a per-machine provisioned certificate/keypair. It ensures that only an OS (kernel, initrd (initial filesystem), and kernel command-line) which has been signed by you will be able to read these keys.

Trust is currently implemented using a combination of UEFI secureboot and TPM2. Other hardware assisted architectures are also possible, and should be easy to implement as alternative implementations of the Truststore interface.

The following steps implement the trust workflow:

  1. 'trust provision' - This step takes a key and certificate which the machine can use to uniquely and securely identify itself, e.g. to form a cluster with peers.
  2. 'trust preinit' - This is run as the first step of an OS install sequence. it will generate a new LUKS passphrase, overwrite the existing one on the TPM, and load the new LUKS passphrase in the root user keyring for use by the installer. It will not load any pre-existing LUKS passphrase, or load the provisioned key.
  3. 'trust setup' - This is run during the signed initrd to copy the secrets out of the TPM. Currently the LUKS passphrase is stored in root user keyring, and the provisioned key and certificate are stored in a private tmpfs. Early (signed) userspace can, before enabling network, mount all filesystems, and remove the LUKS key from keyring. It can also load the provisioned key into the TPM and unmount the tmpfs.

Trust also offers the following subcommands for administration:

'trust new-uuid --keysetname ' - generates a unique product-uuid, rsa 2048-bit keypair, and an x509 certificate signed by the manifestCA found in the keys repo name with --keysetname. The uuid is placed in Subject's CN attribute of the certificate. i.e. Subject: CN = manifest PRODUCT:62d38d9f-0d1d-441b-be21-5a7f4173fde1 The new uuid, keypair, and certificate are placed in the user's local config directory, i.e. ~/.config/machine/trust/manifest/.

'trust initkeyset --keysetname [ --org ]' - generates a new keys repository containing new keypairs, certs, and uuids. The new key repository is located in the user's data directory, ~/.local/share/machine/trust/keys/. The --org specifies the Organization attribute in the X509 Subject of the generated certificates. The key repo may be used whereever a keysetname is required.

'trust keyset pcr7data keysetName --passwdPolicy <pathname> \
--luksPolicy <pathname> \
--pcr7-tpm <pathname> \
--pcr7-prod <pathname> \
--pcr7-limited <pathname>
Adds the specified data to the named keyset. This generates
the "pcr7data" directory in the keyset.

Exported functions in trust:

doSudiCert(VMname, keysetname string) - Generates a unique uuid, rsa 2048-bit sudi keypair, and x509 certificate that is signed by the SudiCA found in the keys repo named with keysetname. This function is only called during provisioning. A unique uuid is also generated and added to the Subject's CN field of the certificate as well as the Product UUID. i.e. "Subject: CN = 4cc76b82-948c-44b8-948c-1cc9a7d460d0, serialNumber = PID:bc564363-2a8e-44fe-bb0e-54c7f9988ecf SN:4cc76b82-948c-44b8-948c-1cc9a7d460d0"

Notes

  1. This is based on the concepts and scripts published at https://github.com/puzzleos/tpm_eapol_scripts and presented at LSS 2021 by Paul Moore and Joy Latten at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfJDmfPP1OA).

  2. mos ('machine-os') will and mb ('machine-builder') will implement the proper placement of the trust commands, as well as the secure bootstrap of userspace.

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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content
This repository was archived by the owner on Sep 6, 2023. It is now read-only.

Repository files navigation

Trust

The trust repo is archived. The code has been moved into https://github.com/project-machine/mos.

Legacy

Trust provides secure unattended boot of systems (hardware and virtual machines). It protects the keys for encrypted filesystem, as well as a per-machine provisioned certificate/keypair. It ensures that only an OS (kernel, initrd (initial filesystem), and kernel command-line) which has been signed by you will be able to read these keys.

Trust is currently implemented using a combination of UEFI secureboot and TPM2. Other hardware assisted architectures are also possible, and should be easy to implement as alternative implementations of the Truststore interface.

The following steps implement the trust workflow:

  1. 'trust provision' - This step takes a key and certificate which the machine can use to uniquely and securely identify itself, e.g. to form a cluster with peers.
  2. 'trust preinit' - This is run as the first step of an OS install sequence. it will generate a new LUKS passphrase, overwrite the existing one on the TPM, and load the new LUKS passphrase in the root user keyring for use by the installer. It will not load any pre-existing LUKS passphrase, or load the provisioned key.
  3. 'trust setup' - This is run during the signed initrd to copy the secrets out of the TPM. Currently the LUKS passphrase is stored in root user keyring, and the provisioned key and certificate are stored in a private tmpfs. Early (signed) userspace can, before enabling network, mount all filesystems, and remove the LUKS key from keyring. It can also load the provisioned key into the TPM and unmount the tmpfs.

Trust also offers the following subcommands for administration:

'trust new-uuid --keysetname ' - generates a unique product-uuid, rsa 2048-bit keypair, and an x509 certificate signed by the manifestCA found in the keys repo name with --keysetname. The uuid is placed in Subject's CN attribute of the certificate. i.e. Subject: CN = manifest PRODUCT:62d38d9f-0d1d-441b-be21-5a7f4173fde1 The new uuid, keypair, and certificate are placed in the user's local config directory, i.e. ~/.config/machine/trust/manifest/.

'trust initkeyset --keysetname [ --org ]' - generates a new keys repository containing new keypairs, certs, and uuids. The new key repository is located in the user's data directory, ~/.local/share/machine/trust/keys/. The --org specifies the Organization attribute in the X509 Subject of the generated certificates. The key repo may be used whereever a keysetname is required.

'trust keyset pcr7data keysetName --passwdPolicy <pathname> \
--luksPolicy <pathname> \
--pcr7-tpm <pathname> \
--pcr7-prod <pathname> \
--pcr7-limited <pathname>
Adds the specified data to the named keyset. This generates
the "pcr7data" directory in the keyset.

Exported functions in trust:

doSudiCert(VMname, keysetname string) - Generates a unique uuid, rsa 2048-bit sudi keypair, and x509 certificate that is signed by the SudiCA found in the keys repo named with keysetname. This function is only called during provisioning. A unique uuid is also generated and added to the Subject's CN field of the certificate as well as the Product UUID. i.e. "Subject: CN = 4cc76b82-948c-44b8-948c-1cc9a7d460d0, serialNumber = PID:bc564363-2a8e-44fe-bb0e-54c7f9988ecf SN:4cc76b82-948c-44b8-948c-1cc9a7d460d0"

Notes

  1. This is based on the concepts and scripts published at https://github.com/puzzleos/tpm_eapol_scripts and presented at LSS 2021 by Paul Moore and Joy Latten at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfJDmfPP1OA).

  2. mos ('machine-os') will and mb ('machine-builder') will implement the proper placement of the trust commands, as well as the secure bootstrap of userspace.

About

never

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2 stars

Watchers

5 watching

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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length \u003e 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content
This repository was archived by the owner on Sep 6, 2023. It is now read-only.

Repository files navigation

Trust

The trust repo is archived. The code has been moved into https://github.com/project-machine/mos.

Legacy

Trust provides secure unattended boot of systems (hardware and virtual machines). It protects the keys for encrypted filesystem, as well as a per-machine provisioned certificate/keypair. It ensures that only an OS (kernel, initrd (initial filesystem), and kernel command-line) which has been signed by you will be able to read these keys.

Trust is currently implemented using a combination of UEFI secureboot and TPM2. Other hardware assisted architectures are also possible, and should be easy to implement as alternative implementations of the Truststore interface.

The following steps implement the trust workflow:

  1. 'trust provision' - This step takes a key and certificate which the machine can use to uniquely and securely identify itself, e.g. to form a cluster with peers.
  2. 'trust preinit' - This is run as the first step of an OS install sequence. it will generate a new LUKS passphrase, overwrite the existing one on the TPM, and load the new LUKS passphrase in the root user keyring for use by the installer. It will not load any pre-existing LUKS passphrase, or load the provisioned key.
  3. 'trust setup' - This is run during the signed initrd to copy the secrets out of the TPM. Currently the LUKS passphrase is stored in root user keyring, and the provisioned key and certificate are stored in a private tmpfs. Early (signed) userspace can, before enabling network, mount all filesystems, and remove the LUKS key from keyring. It can also load the provisioned key into the TPM and unmount the tmpfs.

Trust also offers the following subcommands for administration:

'trust new-uuid --keysetname ' - generates a unique product-uuid, rsa 2048-bit keypair, and an x509 certificate signed by the manifestCA found in the keys repo name with --keysetname. The uuid is placed in Subject's CN attribute of the certificate. i.e. Subject: CN = manifest PRODUCT:62d38d9f-0d1d-441b-be21-5a7f4173fde1 The new uuid, keypair, and certificate are placed in the user's local config directory, i.e. ~/.config/machine/trust/manifest/.

'trust initkeyset --keysetname [ --org ]' - generates a new keys repository containing new keypairs, certs, and uuids. The new key repository is located in the user's data directory, ~/.local/share/machine/trust/keys/. The --org specifies the Organization attribute in the X509 Subject of the generated certificates. The key repo may be used whereever a keysetname is required.

'trust keyset pcr7data keysetName --passwdPolicy <pathname> \
--luksPolicy <pathname> \
--pcr7-tpm <pathname> \
--pcr7-prod <pathname> \
--pcr7-limited <pathname>
Adds the specified data to the named keyset. This generates
the "pcr7data" directory in the keyset.

Exported functions in trust:

doSudiCert(VMname, keysetname string) - Generates a unique uuid, rsa 2048-bit sudi keypair, and x509 certificate that is signed by the SudiCA found in the keys repo named with keysetname. This function is only called during provisioning. A unique uuid is also generated and added to the Subject's CN field of the certificate as well as the Product UUID. i.e. "Subject: CN = 4cc76b82-948c-44b8-948c-1cc9a7d460d0, serialNumber = PID:bc564363-2a8e-44fe-bb0e-54c7f9988ecf SN:4cc76b82-948c-44b8-948c-1cc9a7d460d0"

Notes

  1. This is based on the concepts and scripts published at https://github.com/puzzleos/tpm_eapol_scripts and presented at LSS 2021 by Paul Moore and Joy Latten at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfJDmfPP1OA).

  2. mos ('machine-os') will and mb ('machine-builder') will implement the proper placement of the trust commands, as well as the secure bootstrap of userspace.

About

never

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Stars

2 stars

Watchers

5 watching

Forks

Releases

Packages

Used by

Contributors

Languages

, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "youtube.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
Skip to content
This repository was archived by the owner on Sep 6, 2023. It is now read-only.

Repository files navigation

Trust

The trust repo is archived. The code has been moved into https://github.com/project-machine/mos.

Legacy

Trust provides secure unattended boot of systems (hardware and virtual machines). It protects the keys for encrypted filesystem, as well as a per-machine provisioned certificate/keypair. It ensures that only an OS (kernel, initrd (initial filesystem), and kernel command-line) which has been signed by you will be able to read these keys.

Trust is currently implemented using a combination of UEFI secureboot and TPM2. Other hardware assisted architectures are also possible, and should be easy to implement as alternative implementations of the Truststore interface.

The following steps implement the trust workflow:

  1. 'trust provision' - This step takes a key and certificate which the machine can use to uniquely and securely identify itself, e.g. to form a cluster with peers.
  2. 'trust preinit' - This is run as the first step of an OS install sequence. it will generate a new LUKS passphrase, overwrite the existing one on the TPM, and load the new LUKS passphrase in the root user keyring for use by the installer. It will not load any pre-existing LUKS passphrase, or load the provisioned key.
  3. 'trust setup' - This is run during the signed initrd to copy the secrets out of the TPM. Currently the LUKS passphrase is stored in root user keyring, and the provisioned key and certificate are stored in a private tmpfs. Early (signed) userspace can, before enabling network, mount all filesystems, and remove the LUKS key from keyring. It can also load the provisioned key into the TPM and unmount the tmpfs.

Trust also offers the following subcommands for administration:

'trust new-uuid --keysetname ' - generates a unique product-uuid, rsa 2048-bit keypair, and an x509 certificate signed by the manifestCA found in the keys repo name with --keysetname. The uuid is placed in Subject's CN attribute of the certificate. i.e. Subject: CN = manifest PRODUCT:62d38d9f-0d1d-441b-be21-5a7f4173fde1 The new uuid, keypair, and certificate are placed in the user's local config directory, i.e. ~/.config/machine/trust/manifest/.

'trust initkeyset --keysetname [ --org ]' - generates a new keys repository containing new keypairs, certs, and uuids. The new key repository is located in the user's data directory, ~/.local/share/machine/trust/keys/. The --org specifies the Organization attribute in the X509 Subject of the generated certificates. The key repo may be used whereever a keysetname is required.

'trust keyset pcr7data keysetName --passwdPolicy <pathname> \
--luksPolicy <pathname> \
--pcr7-tpm <pathname> \
--pcr7-prod <pathname> \
--pcr7-limited <pathname>
Adds the specified data to the named keyset. This generates
the "pcr7data" directory in the keyset.

Exported functions in trust:

doSudiCert(VMname, keysetname string) - Generates a unique uuid, rsa 2048-bit sudi keypair, and x509 certificate that is signed by the SudiCA found in the keys repo named with keysetname. This function is only called during provisioning. A unique uuid is also generated and added to the Subject's CN field of the certificate as well as the Product UUID. i.e. "Subject: CN = 4cc76b82-948c-44b8-948c-1cc9a7d460d0, serialNumber = PID:bc564363-2a8e-44fe-bb0e-54c7f9988ecf SN:4cc76b82-948c-44b8-948c-1cc9a7d460d0"

Notes

  1. This is based on the concepts and scripts published at https://github.com/puzzleos/tpm_eapol_scripts and presented at LSS 2021 by Paul Moore and Joy Latten at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfJDmfPP1OA).

  2. mos ('machine-os') will and mb ('machine-builder') will implement the proper placement of the trust commands, as well as the secure bootstrap of userspace.

About

never

Resources

Stars

2 stars

Watchers

5 watching

Forks

Releases

Packages

Used by

Contributors

Languages

, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content
This repository was archived by the owner on Sep 6, 2023. It is now read-only.

Repository files navigation

Trust

The trust repo is archived. The code has been moved into https://github.com/project-machine/mos.

Legacy

Trust provides secure unattended boot of systems (hardware and virtual machines). It protects the keys for encrypted filesystem, as well as a per-machine provisioned certificate/keypair. It ensures that only an OS (kernel, initrd (initial filesystem), and kernel command-line) which has been signed by you will be able to read these keys.

Trust is currently implemented using a combination of UEFI secureboot and TPM2. Other hardware assisted architectures are also possible, and should be easy to implement as alternative implementations of the Truststore interface.

The following steps implement the trust workflow:

  1. 'trust provision' - This step takes a key and certificate which the machine can use to uniquely and securely identify itself, e.g. to form a cluster with peers.
  2. 'trust preinit' - This is run as the first step of an OS install sequence. it will generate a new LUKS passphrase, overwrite the existing one on the TPM, and load the new LUKS passphrase in the root user keyring for use by the installer. It will not load any pre-existing LUKS passphrase, or load the provisioned key.
  3. 'trust setup' - This is run during the signed initrd to copy the secrets out of the TPM. Currently the LUKS passphrase is stored in root user keyring, and the provisioned key and certificate are stored in a private tmpfs. Early (signed) userspace can, before enabling network, mount all filesystems, and remove the LUKS key from keyring. It can also load the provisioned key into the TPM and unmount the tmpfs.

Trust also offers the following subcommands for administration:

'trust new-uuid --keysetname ' - generates a unique product-uuid, rsa 2048-bit keypair, and an x509 certificate signed by the manifestCA found in the keys repo name with --keysetname. The uuid is placed in Subject's CN attribute of the certificate. i.e. Subject: CN = manifest PRODUCT:62d38d9f-0d1d-441b-be21-5a7f4173fde1 The new uuid, keypair, and certificate are placed in the user's local config directory, i.e. ~/.config/machine/trust/manifest/.

'trust initkeyset --keysetname [ --org ]' - generates a new keys repository containing new keypairs, certs, and uuids. The new key repository is located in the user's data directory, ~/.local/share/machine/trust/keys/. The --org specifies the Organization attribute in the X509 Subject of the generated certificates. The key repo may be used whereever a keysetname is required.

'trust keyset pcr7data keysetName --passwdPolicy <pathname> \
--luksPolicy <pathname> \
--pcr7-tpm <pathname> \
--pcr7-prod <pathname> \
--pcr7-limited <pathname>
Adds the specified data to the named keyset. This generates
the "pcr7data" directory in the keyset.

Exported functions in trust:

doSudiCert(VMname, keysetname string) - Generates a unique uuid, rsa 2048-bit sudi keypair, and x509 certificate that is signed by the SudiCA found in the keys repo named with keysetname. This function is only called during provisioning. A unique uuid is also generated and added to the Subject's CN field of the certificate as well as the Product UUID. i.e. "Subject: CN = 4cc76b82-948c-44b8-948c-1cc9a7d460d0, serialNumber = PID:bc564363-2a8e-44fe-bb0e-54c7f9988ecf SN:4cc76b82-948c-44b8-948c-1cc9a7d460d0"

Notes

  1. This is based on the concepts and scripts published at https://github.com/puzzleos/tpm_eapol_scripts and presented at LSS 2021 by Paul Moore and Joy Latten at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfJDmfPP1OA).

  2. mos ('machine-os') will and mb ('machine-builder') will implement the proper placement of the trust commands, as well as the secure bootstrap of userspace.

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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content
This repository was archived by the owner on Sep 6, 2023. It is now read-only.

Repository files navigation

Trust

The trust repo is archived. The code has been moved into https://github.com/project-machine/mos.

Legacy

Trust provides secure unattended boot of systems (hardware and virtual machines). It protects the keys for encrypted filesystem, as well as a per-machine provisioned certificate/keypair. It ensures that only an OS (kernel, initrd (initial filesystem), and kernel command-line) which has been signed by you will be able to read these keys.

Trust is currently implemented using a combination of UEFI secureboot and TPM2. Other hardware assisted architectures are also possible, and should be easy to implement as alternative implementations of the Truststore interface.

The following steps implement the trust workflow:

  1. 'trust provision' - This step takes a key and certificate which the machine can use to uniquely and securely identify itself, e.g. to form a cluster with peers.
  2. 'trust preinit' - This is run as the first step of an OS install sequence. it will generate a new LUKS passphrase, overwrite the existing one on the TPM, and load the new LUKS passphrase in the root user keyring for use by the installer. It will not load any pre-existing LUKS passphrase, or load the provisioned key.
  3. 'trust setup' - This is run during the signed initrd to copy the secrets out of the TPM. Currently the LUKS passphrase is stored in root user keyring, and the provisioned key and certificate are stored in a private tmpfs. Early (signed) userspace can, before enabling network, mount all filesystems, and remove the LUKS key from keyring. It can also load the provisioned key into the TPM and unmount the tmpfs.

Trust also offers the following subcommands for administration:

'trust new-uuid --keysetname ' - generates a unique product-uuid, rsa 2048-bit keypair, and an x509 certificate signed by the manifestCA found in the keys repo name with --keysetname. The uuid is placed in Subject's CN attribute of the certificate. i.e. Subject: CN = manifest PRODUCT:62d38d9f-0d1d-441b-be21-5a7f4173fde1 The new uuid, keypair, and certificate are placed in the user's local config directory, i.e. ~/.config/machine/trust/manifest/.

'trust initkeyset --keysetname [ --org ]' - generates a new keys repository containing new keypairs, certs, and uuids. The new key repository is located in the user's data directory, ~/.local/share/machine/trust/keys/. The --org specifies the Organization attribute in the X509 Subject of the generated certificates. The key repo may be used whereever a keysetname is required.

'trust keyset pcr7data keysetName --passwdPolicy <pathname> \
--luksPolicy <pathname> \
--pcr7-tpm <pathname> \
--pcr7-prod <pathname> \
--pcr7-limited <pathname>
Adds the specified data to the named keyset. This generates
the "pcr7data" directory in the keyset.

Exported functions in trust:

doSudiCert(VMname, keysetname string) - Generates a unique uuid, rsa 2048-bit sudi keypair, and x509 certificate that is signed by the SudiCA found in the keys repo named with keysetname. This function is only called during provisioning. A unique uuid is also generated and added to the Subject's CN field of the certificate as well as the Product UUID. i.e. "Subject: CN = 4cc76b82-948c-44b8-948c-1cc9a7d460d0, serialNumber = PID:bc564363-2a8e-44fe-bb0e-54c7f9988ecf SN:4cc76b82-948c-44b8-948c-1cc9a7d460d0"

Notes

  1. This is based on the concepts and scripts published at https://github.com/puzzleos/tpm_eapol_scripts and presented at LSS 2021 by Paul Moore and Joy Latten at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfJDmfPP1OA).

  2. mos ('machine-os') will and mb ('machine-builder') will implement the proper placement of the trust commands, as well as the secure bootstrap of userspace.

About

never

Resources

Stars

2 stars

Watchers

5 watching

Forks

Releases

Packages

Used by

Contributors

Languages

, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); } })(); })();
Skip to content
This repository was archived by the owner on Sep 6, 2023. It is now read-only.

Repository files navigation

Trust

The trust repo is archived. The code has been moved into https://github.com/project-machine/mos.

Legacy

Trust provides secure unattended boot of systems (hardware and virtual machines). It protects the keys for encrypted filesystem, as well as a per-machine provisioned certificate/keypair. It ensures that only an OS (kernel, initrd (initial filesystem), and kernel command-line) which has been signed by you will be able to read these keys.

Trust is currently implemented using a combination of UEFI secureboot and TPM2. Other hardware assisted architectures are also possible, and should be easy to implement as alternative implementations of the Truststore interface.

The following steps implement the trust workflow:

  1. 'trust provision' - This step takes a key and certificate which the machine can use to uniquely and securely identify itself, e.g. to form a cluster with peers.
  2. 'trust preinit' - This is run as the first step of an OS install sequence. it will generate a new LUKS passphrase, overwrite the existing one on the TPM, and load the new LUKS passphrase in the root user keyring for use by the installer. It will not load any pre-existing LUKS passphrase, or load the provisioned key.
  3. 'trust setup' - This is run during the signed initrd to copy the secrets out of the TPM. Currently the LUKS passphrase is stored in root user keyring, and the provisioned key and certificate are stored in a private tmpfs. Early (signed) userspace can, before enabling network, mount all filesystems, and remove the LUKS key from keyring. It can also load the provisioned key into the TPM and unmount the tmpfs.

Trust also offers the following subcommands for administration:

'trust new-uuid --keysetname ' - generates a unique product-uuid, rsa 2048-bit keypair, and an x509 certificate signed by the manifestCA found in the keys repo name with --keysetname. The uuid is placed in Subject's CN attribute of the certificate. i.e. Subject: CN = manifest PRODUCT:62d38d9f-0d1d-441b-be21-5a7f4173fde1 The new uuid, keypair, and certificate are placed in the user's local config directory, i.e. ~/.config/machine/trust/manifest/.

'trust initkeyset --keysetname [ --org ]' - generates a new keys repository containing new keypairs, certs, and uuids. The new key repository is located in the user's data directory, ~/.local/share/machine/trust/keys/. The --org specifies the Organization attribute in the X509 Subject of the generated certificates. The key repo may be used whereever a keysetname is required.

'trust keyset pcr7data keysetName --passwdPolicy <pathname> \
--luksPolicy <pathname> \
--pcr7-tpm <pathname> \
--pcr7-prod <pathname> \
--pcr7-limited <pathname>
Adds the specified data to the named keyset. This generates
the "pcr7data" directory in the keyset.

Exported functions in trust:

doSudiCert(VMname, keysetname string) - Generates a unique uuid, rsa 2048-bit sudi keypair, and x509 certificate that is signed by the SudiCA found in the keys repo named with keysetname. This function is only called during provisioning. A unique uuid is also generated and added to the Subject's CN field of the certificate as well as the Product UUID. i.e. "Subject: CN = 4cc76b82-948c-44b8-948c-1cc9a7d460d0, serialNumber = PID:bc564363-2a8e-44fe-bb0e-54c7f9988ecf SN:4cc76b82-948c-44b8-948c-1cc9a7d460d0"

Notes

  1. This is based on the concepts and scripts published at https://github.com/puzzleos/tpm_eapol_scripts and presented at LSS 2021 by Paul Moore and Joy Latten at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfJDmfPP1OA).

  2. mos ('machine-os') will and mb ('machine-builder') will implement the proper placement of the trust commands, as well as the secure bootstrap of userspace.

About

never

Resources

Stars

2 stars

Watchers

5 watching

Forks

Releases

Packages

Used by

Contributors

Languages