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This revert strips the only origin-header-based CSRF mitigation for session-cookie-authenticated workflow execution. Any page on any origin can now embed a form or fire a
fetchwith credentials toPOST /api/workflows/[id]/execute, and the user's session cookie will be attached by the browser — triggering an arbitrary workflow under their identity. The deleted guard was narrowly scoped: it only fired whenauthType === AuthType.SESSIONand the request was provably cross-origin viaSec-Fetch-Siteor a mismatchedOrigin. If it was causing false-positives for a legitimate caller, that caller (API-key / public-API / internal-JWT) would never have been gated by the check in the first place. The PR description doesn't document what went wrong or what alternative protection replaces this.