AsicSharp

Create and verify ASiC-S and ASiC-E (Associated Signature Containers) with RFC 3161 timestamps in .NET.

Prove that data existed at a specific point in time using trusted Timestamp Authorities (TSA) like DigiCert — without needing your own signing certificate.

What is this?

ASiC containers are ZIP files (per ETSI EN 319 162) that bundle your files with cryptographic timestamps:

• ASiC-S (Simple) — A single file with a timestamp token
• ASiC-E (Extended) — Multiple files with an ASiCManifest XML listing each file's digest, timestamped together

This proves that this exact data existed at this exact time, signed by a trusted third party. The format is recognized by the EU eIDAS regulation for legal validity.

Installation

Library (for your application)

dotnet add package AsicSharp

CLI Tool (global)

dotnet tool install -g AsicSharp.Cli

Quick Start

Library Usage

usingAsicSharp.Configuration;usingAsicSharp.Services;// Standalone (no DI)usingvarhttpClient=newHttpClient();varoptions=newAsicTimestampOptions{TimestampAuthorityUrl=WellKnownTsa.DigiCert};vartsaClient=newTsaClient(httpClient,options);varasicService=newAsicService(tsaClient,options);// Create a timestamped container (single file → ASiC-S)vardata=File.ReadAllBytes("contract.pdf");varresult=awaitasicService.CreateAsync(data,"contract.pdf");File.WriteAllBytes("contract.pdf.asics",result.ContainerBytes);Console.WriteLine($"Timestamped at: {result.Timestamp:O}");// Create an ASiC-E container (multiple files)varfiles=newList<(stringFileName,byte[]Data)>{("contract.pdf",File.ReadAllBytes("contract.pdf")),("annex.pdf",File.ReadAllBytes("annex.pdf"))};varextended=awaitasicService.CreateExtendedAsync(files);File.WriteAllBytes("bundle.asice",extended.ContainerBytes);// Verify any container (auto-detects ASiC-S or ASiC-E)varverification=asicService.VerifyFile("contract.pdf.asics");Console.WriteLine($"Valid: {verification.IsValid}");Console.WriteLine($"Timestamp: {verification.Timestamp:O}");Console.WriteLine($"TSA: {verification.TsaCertificate?.Subject}");// Renew timestamp for long-term archival (adds archive timestamp per ETSI EN 319 162-1 §5.4)varrenewed=awaitasicService.RenewFileAsync("contract.pdf.asics");File.WriteAllBytes("contract.pdf.asics",renewed.ContainerBytes);Console.WriteLine($"Renewed at: {renewed.Timestamp:O}");

Large Files: Streaming

The byte[] API above holds the payload and the finished container in memory at once. For large files, three members avoid that entirely — the payload is hashed in chunks and copied straight into the container:

// Create without materialising the payload or the containerawaitusing(varinput=File.OpenRead("huge-archive.zip"))awaitusing(varoutput=File.Create("huge-archive.zip.asics")){varresult=awaitasicService.CreateToStreamAsync(input,"huge-archive.zip",output);Console.WriteLine($"Wrote {result.BytesWritten:N0} bytes, stamped {result.Timestamp:O}");}// Verify in place, without copying the container into a byte[]awaitusing(varcontainer=File.OpenRead("huge-archive.zip.asics")){varverification=asicService.Verify(container);Console.WriteLine($"Valid: {verification.IsValid}");}// Extract straight back out to a streamawaitusing(varcontainer=File.OpenRead("huge-archive.zip.asics"))awaitusing(varrestored=File.Create("restored.zip")){varfileName=awaitasicService.ExtractToStreamAsync(container,restored);Console.WriteLine($"Extracted {fileName}");}

Streaming a 64 MB payload allocates roughly 300 KB, against 128 MB+ for the byte[] path.

Three things to know:

• All three require a seekable stream.CreateToStreamAsync reads the payload twice, because the TSA must see its hash before the first byte can be written; on the read side, ZipArchive does not reject a forward-only stream — it silently buffers the whole thing, which would defeat the purpose. A non-seekable stream throws ArgumentException; the byte[] overloads are the fallback.
• CreateToStreamAsync cannot add a CAdES signature and throws NotSupportedException if SigningCertificate is set, since signing needs the whole payload in memory.
• CreateAsync(Stream, …) is not one of these. It buffers the stream into a byte[] internally; it saves you the read, not the memory. ASiC-E creation and renewal are byte[]-only.

With Dependency Injection

// In Startup / Program.csbuilder.Services.AddAsicSharp(options =>{options.TimestampAuthorityUrl=WellKnownTsa.DigiCert;options.HashAlgorithm=HashAlgorithmName.SHA256;});// Or bind from configurationbuilder.Services.AddAsicSharp(builder.Configuration.GetSection("AsicTimestamp"));

// appsettings.json
{
"AsicTimestamp": {
"TimestampAuthorityUrl": "http://timestamp.digicert.com",
"HashAlgorithm": "SHA256",
"RequestSignerCertificates": true,
"UseNonce": true,
"Timeout": "00:00:30",
"MaxFileSize": 10485760
}
}

Falling back to another TSA

A single TSA is a single point of failure. Set TimestampAuthorityUrls and each URL is tried in order until one answers; the request only fails once every one of them has. The URL that actually answered comes back on AsicCreateResult.TimestampAuthorityUrl, which may not be the first you listed.

{
"AsicTimestamp": {
"TimestampAuthorityUrls": [
"http://timestamp.digicert.com",
"http://timestamp.sectigo.com",
"https://freetsa.org/tsr"
],
"HashAlgorithm": "SHA256"
}
}

When TimestampAuthorityUrls is non-empty, the singular TimestampAuthorityUrl is ignored.

All options

Option	Default	What it does
TimestampAuthorityUrl	DigiCert	The TSA to use. Ignored when TimestampAuthorityUrls is set.
TimestampAuthorityUrls	(empty)	TSAs to try in order, falling through on failure.
HashAlgorithm	SHA256	Hash for timestamping. SHA384 and SHA512 also supported.
RequestSignerCertificates	true	Ask the TSA to embed its certificate chain in the token. Keep it on — without it, a token cannot be verified offline.
UseNonce	true	Send a random nonce and validate it in the response, so a captured token cannot be replayed as an answer to a new request.
Timeout	30 s	HTTP timeout per TSA request.
MaxFileSize	10 MB	Reject any single data file larger than this, on creation and per ZIP entry on read. null disables the limit.
SigningCertificate	null	When set, a detached CAdES signature (META-INF/signature.p7s) is added, asserting who vouches for the data as well as when it existed.

// In your servicepublicclassMyService{privatereadonlyIAsicService_asicService;publicMyService(IAsicServiceasicService){_asicService=asicService;}publicasyncTaskTimestampDocument(byte[]data,stringfileName){varresult=await_asicService.CreateAsync(data,fileName);// result.ContainerBytes, result.Timestamp, result.DataHash}}

CLI Usage

# Timestamp a single file (ASiC-S)
asicts stamp contract.pdf
asicts stamp contract.pdf --tsa http://timestamp.digicert.com --algorithm SHA256
# Timestamp multiple files (ASiC-E)
asicts stamp contract.pdf annex.pdf terms.txt
# Verify a container (auto-detects ASiC-S or ASiC-E)
asicts verify contract.pdf.asics
asicts verify bundle.asice --verbose
# Renew timestamp for long-term archival
asicts renew contract.pdf.asics
asicts renew bundle.asice --tsa http://timestamp.sectigo.com
# Extract files from any container
asicts extract contract.pdf.asics --output ./extracted/
asicts extract bundle.asice --output ./extracted/
# List known TSA servers
asicts info

Supported Platforms

Target	Status
.NET 10.0	✅
.NET 8.0	✅
.NET Standard 2.1	✅ (.NET Core 3.0+)

Well-Known Timestamp Authorities

TSA	URL	Notes
DigiCert	http://timestamp.digicert.com	Default, widely trusted
Sectigo	http://timestamp.sectigo.com	Formerly Comodo
GlobalSign	http://timestamp.globalsign.com/tsa/r6advanced1
FreeTSA	https://freetsa.org/tsr	Free & open
Apple	http://timestamp.apple.com/ts01
Entrust	http://timestamp.entrust.net/TSS/RFC3161sha2TS

Container Formats

ASiC-S (Simple) — Single File

document.pdf.asics (ZIP)
├── mimetype → "application/vnd.etsi.asic-s+zip"
├── document.pdf → Your original file (unchanged)
└── META-INF/
├── timestamp.tst → RFC 3161 timestamp token (covers the data file)
├── timestamp-002.tst → (After renewal) Archive timestamp covering timestamp.tst
└── signature.p7s → (Optional) CMS/CAdES signature

ASiC-E (Extended) — Multiple Files

bundle.asice (ZIP)
├── mimetype → "application/vnd.etsi.asic-e+zip"
├── contract.pdf → Data file 1
├── annex.pdf → Data file 2
└── META-INF/
├── ASiCManifest.xml → Lists all files with their digests
├── timestamp.tst → RFC 3161 timestamp token (covers the manifest)
├── timestamp-002.tst → (After renewal) Archive timestamp covering timestamp.tst
└── signature.p7s → (Optional) CMS/CAdES signature

The timestamp in ASiC-E covers the ASiCManifest XML, which in turn contains cryptographic digests of every data file — so all files are transitively timestamped.

Because the proof runs through the manifest, AsicCreateResult.DataHash is the manifest's hash on this profile, not any file's. Use FileNames and FileHashes when you mean a specific file — these are the very digests written into the manifest, and both are populated for ASiC-S too, so you never have to branch on the profile:

varresult=awaitasicService.CreateExtendedAsync(files);foreach(varnameinresult.FileNames!)Console.WriteLine($"{name}{result.FileHashes![name]}");Console.WriteLine($"Manifest hash (what the token covers): {result.DataHash}");

Both are null on a result from RenewAsync, which adds a timestamp token and touches no data file.

Timestamp Renewal for Long-Term Archival

Timestamp tokens have a validity period tied to the TSA certificate's lifetime (typically 5-10 years). For long-term archival, renew the timestamp before the original TSA certificate expires. Per ETSI EN 319 162-1 §5.4, each archive timestamp covers the previous token's bytes, creating a chain:

timestamp.tst → Covers data (or manifest)
timestamp-002.tst → Covers timestamp.tst bytes
timestamp-003.tst → Covers timestamp-002.tst bytes

Verification walks the full chain, ensuring each link is valid. The original timestamp proves when the data existed; renewal timestamps extend the proof indefinitely.

Optional: Signing with Your Own Certificate

If you need to prove who timestamped the data (not just when), provide a signing certificate:

services.AddAsicSharp(options =>{options.SigningCertificate=newX509Certificate2("cert.pfx","password");});

This adds a CMS/CAdES detached signature (META-INF/signature.p7s) alongside the timestamp.

Verification Details

IsValid is the conjunction of every step. One failing VerificationStep makes the whole container invalid, and Error is then the "; "-joined Detail of each failing step (null when valid). Error is a diagnostic message, not a stable code — don't parse it. Step names, by contrast, are contract: tests assert them and asicts verify -v prints them verbatim.

Valid means unaltered, not trusted. No X509Chain is built for the TSA certificate, so a self-issued TSA still yields IsValid == true. The certificate is handed to you on TsaCertificate precisely so that the trust decision stays yours.

The Verify method returns detailed step-by-step results:

varresult=asicService.Verify(containerBytes);foreach(varstepinresult.Steps){Console.WriteLine($"{(step.Passed?"✓":"✗")}{step.Name}: {step.Detail}");}// ✓ Container structure: Valid ZIP archive// ✓ MIME type: application/vnd.etsi.asic-s+zip// ✓ Data file: contract.pdf (125432 bytes)// ✓ Timestamp token decode: Token decoded, timestamp: 2026-02-28T14:30:00Z// ✓ Timestamp signature: Valid, signed by: CN=DigiCert Timestamp 2024, O=DigiCert// ✓ Data hash match: Hash in timestamp matches data file// The data itself, without a second Extract() call — ASiC-S only, null for ASiC-Eif(result.DataBytesis not null)File.WriteAllBytes("recovered.pdf",result.DataBytes);

What a valid ASiC-E container does not tell you

An ASiC-E timestamp covers the ASiCManifest, and the manifest lists one hash per data file. A ZIP entry the manifest never references is therefore covered by no proof of existence at all — yet the referenced files' proofs are untouched, so the container still verifies.

Those entries are reported rather than ignored:

varresult=asicService.VerifyFile("bundle.asice");// IsValid says "nothing listed in the manifest was altered"Console.WriteLine($"Valid: {result.IsValid}");// ... which is not the same as "every file here was timestamped"if(result.UnreferencedFileNamesis{Count:>0}uncovered)Console.WriteLine($"Not covered by the timestamp: {string.Join(", ",uncovered)}");

UnreferencedFileNames is empty when every entry is referenced and null for ASiC-S, which has no manifest. It deliberately does not affect IsValid, since third-party containers may legitimately carry extra entries — if your policy is that every byte must be covered, enforce it on this list. ExtractAll already refuses to hand back uncovered entries, so a verify-then-extract caller cannot surface unstamped bytes as though they were timestamped.

Errors

Everything this library throws derives from AsicTimestampException, so one catch covers all of it:

AsicTimestampException
├── TimestampAuthorityException — every configured TSA URL failed
├── InvalidAsicContainerException — the container is unreadable or structurally wrong
└── AsicVerificationException — a verification operation could not be completed

try{varresult=awaitasicService.CreateFromFileAsync("contract.pdf");}catch(TimestampAuthorityExceptionex){// No TSA answered — retry later, or add fallbacks via TimestampAuthorityUrlsConsole.Error.WriteLine($"No timestamp authority available: {ex.Message}");}catch(AsicTimestampExceptionex){Console.Error.WriteLine($"Timestamping failed: {ex.Message}");}

Note what does not throw:

• Verify and VerifyFile report, they do not throw. A corrupt ZIP, a missing entry, an undecodable token — all come back as IsValid == false with a failed step. The only exceptions are ArgumentException for empty input and FileNotFoundException for a missing file.
• GetContainerType never throws. Anything unrecognized is AsicContainerType.None.
• Bad arguments still throw ArgumentException from the create, extract and renew paths — an empty payload, a file name containing a path separator, or data over MaxFileSize.

Standards Compliance

• ETSI EN 319 162-1 — Associated Signature Containers (ASiC) baseline (ASiC-S)
• ETSI EN 319 162-2 — Associated Signature Containers extended (ASiC-E)
• ETSI TS 102 918 — ASiCManifest XML schema
• RFC 3161 — Internet X.509 PKI Time-Stamp Protocol
• RFC 5652 — Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
• EU eIDAS Regulation — Electronic identification and trust services

License

MIT — see LICENSE