fix: tighten API CORS policy to trusted origins - #90

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fix: tighten API CORS policy to trusted origins#90
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Description
This fix addresses a misconfigured CORS policy that allowed any external origin to make cross-origin requests to the Doubtfire API. Previously, the server responded with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and accepted any headers and methods, meaning malicious websites could send requests to the API via a victim's browser.
Changes made:
doubtfire-api/config/application.rb

Replaced the wildcard origins '*' with a strict origin allowlist
Default trusted origins include http://localhost:4200 and https://#{config.institution[:host]}
Added optional override via CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS environment variable (comma-separated)
Added explicit Origin validation logic that checks the incoming Origin header against the allowlist before permitting CORS
Restricted allowed headers to: Content-Type, Authorization, Accept
Restricted allowed methods to: GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS

doubtfire-api/app/api/api_root.rb

Removed manual wildcard CORS headers from the API before block (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and Access-Control-Request-Method: *)
Request IP thread variable logic was left untouched

Fixes # (CORS misconfiguration issue)
Type of change

Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)

How Has This Been Tested?
The fix was verified using Burp Suite Repeater and curl from a Kali Linux machine targeting the Windows-hosted API.
Test 1 — Untrusted origin is blocked:

Sent GET /api/activity_types HTTP/1.1 with header Origin: https://evil.com
Confirmed response does not return Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * or echo back evil.com

Test 2 — Trusted origin is allowed:

Sent same request with header Origin: http://localhost:4200
Confirmed response returns Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://localhost:4200

curl command used:
bashcurl -X GET http://localhost:3000/api/activity_types
-H "Origin: https://evil.com"
-H "Accept: application/json"
-v 2>&1 | grep -i "access-control"
Checklist:

My code follows the style guidelines of this project
I have performed a self-review of my own code
I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
I have made corresponding changes to the documentation if appropriate
My changes generate no new warnings
I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works
I have created or extended unit tests to address my new additions
New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
Any dependent changes have been merged and published in downstream modules

Replace wildcard CORS behavior with whitelist validation and restrict allowed headers/methods so only trusted frontend origins can make cross-origin API requests.
Made-with: Cursor
@AjayPAnand

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I’ve reviewed and tested the changes, and the behaviour aligns with the intended fix:

Requests with an untrusted Origin (e.g. http://evil.com) are correctly not granted with wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * or reflected back.
Requests from trusted origins (e.g. http://localhost:4200) correctly receive the expected Access-Control-Allow-Origin header.
Browser-based testing confirms that cross-origin requests from non-allowed domains are blocked as expected.
Manual testing via curl and browser dev tools shows the allowlist enforcement is working correctly.

The removal of wildcard CORS headers from api_root.rb and the introduction of a strict origin allowlist in application.rb is a solid approach and significantly reduces the risk of CSRF-like abuse via cross-origin browser requests.

Postman Screenshot verification:
image

Postman Screenshot:
image

Example.com domain
image

Localhost:4200 Screenshot
image

@sabdosh

sabdosh commented Apr 26, 2026

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Tested locally. Untrusted origin (evil.com) no longer receives Access-Control-Allow-Origin. Trusted origin (localhost:4200) is correctly allowed. CORS misconfiguration successfully remediated.

Screenshot 2026-04-26 at 4 59 14 pm

@SteveDalaSteveDala left a comment

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Looks good to me and seems to be a sensible change to the security of the application.

@224599437 please open an upstream pull request (against doubtfire-api)

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@224599437@AjayPAnand@sabdosh@SteveDala
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all
 blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '
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fix: tighten API CORS policy to trusted origins - #90

Open
224599437 wants to merge 1 commit into
thoth-tech:10.0.xfrom
224599437:10.0.x
Open

fix: tighten API CORS policy to trusted origins#90
224599437 wants to merge 1 commit into
thoth-tech:10.0.xfrom
224599437:10.0.x

Conversation

@224599437

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Description
This fix addresses a misconfigured CORS policy that allowed any external origin to make cross-origin requests to the Doubtfire API. Previously, the server responded with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and accepted any headers and methods, meaning malicious websites could send requests to the API via a victim's browser.
Changes made:
doubtfire-api/config/application.rb

Replaced the wildcard origins '*' with a strict origin allowlist
Default trusted origins include http://localhost:4200 and https://#{config.institution[:host]}
Added optional override via CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS environment variable (comma-separated)
Added explicit Origin validation logic that checks the incoming Origin header against the allowlist before permitting CORS
Restricted allowed headers to: Content-Type, Authorization, Accept
Restricted allowed methods to: GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS

doubtfire-api/app/api/api_root.rb

Removed manual wildcard CORS headers from the API before block (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and Access-Control-Request-Method: *)
Request IP thread variable logic was left untouched

Fixes # (CORS misconfiguration issue)
Type of change

Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)

How Has This Been Tested?
The fix was verified using Burp Suite Repeater and curl from a Kali Linux machine targeting the Windows-hosted API.
Test 1 — Untrusted origin is blocked:

Sent GET /api/activity_types HTTP/1.1 with header Origin: https://evil.com
Confirmed response does not return Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * or echo back evil.com

Test 2 — Trusted origin is allowed:

Sent same request with header Origin: http://localhost:4200
Confirmed response returns Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://localhost:4200

curl command used:
bashcurl -X GET http://localhost:3000/api/activity_types
-H "Origin: https://evil.com"
-H "Accept: application/json"
-v 2>&1 | grep -i "access-control"
Checklist:

My code follows the style guidelines of this project
I have performed a self-review of my own code
I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
I have made corresponding changes to the documentation if appropriate
My changes generate no new warnings
I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works
I have created or extended unit tests to address my new additions
New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
Any dependent changes have been merged and published in downstream modules

Replace wildcard CORS behavior with whitelist validation and restrict allowed headers/methods so only trusted frontend origins can make cross-origin API requests.
Made-with: Cursor
@AjayPAnand

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Copy Markdown

I’ve reviewed and tested the changes, and the behaviour aligns with the intended fix:

Requests with an untrusted Origin (e.g. http://evil.com) are correctly not granted with wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * or reflected back.
Requests from trusted origins (e.g. http://localhost:4200) correctly receive the expected Access-Control-Allow-Origin header.
Browser-based testing confirms that cross-origin requests from non-allowed domains are blocked as expected.
Manual testing via curl and browser dev tools shows the allowlist enforcement is working correctly.

The removal of wildcard CORS headers from api_root.rb and the introduction of a strict origin allowlist in application.rb is a solid approach and significantly reduces the risk of CSRF-like abuse via cross-origin browser requests.

Postman Screenshot verification:
image

Postman Screenshot:
image

Example.com domain
image

Localhost:4200 Screenshot
image

@sabdosh

sabdosh commented Apr 26, 2026

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Tested locally. Untrusted origin (evil.com) no longer receives Access-Control-Allow-Origin. Trusted origin (localhost:4200) is correctly allowed. CORS misconfiguration successfully remediated.

Screenshot 2026-04-26 at 4 59 14 pm

@SteveDalaSteveDala left a comment

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Looks good to me and seems to be a sensible change to the security of the application.

@224599437 please open an upstream pull request (against doubtfire-api)

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Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

4 participants

@224599437@AjayPAnand@sabdosh@SteveDala
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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fix: tighten API CORS policy to trusted origins - #90

Open
224599437 wants to merge 1 commit into
thoth-tech:10.0.xfrom
224599437:10.0.x
Open

fix: tighten API CORS policy to trusted origins#90
224599437 wants to merge 1 commit into
thoth-tech:10.0.xfrom
224599437:10.0.x

Conversation

@224599437

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Description
This fix addresses a misconfigured CORS policy that allowed any external origin to make cross-origin requests to the Doubtfire API. Previously, the server responded with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and accepted any headers and methods, meaning malicious websites could send requests to the API via a victim's browser.
Changes made:
doubtfire-api/config/application.rb

Replaced the wildcard origins '*' with a strict origin allowlist
Default trusted origins include http://localhost:4200 and https://#{config.institution[:host]}
Added optional override via CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS environment variable (comma-separated)
Added explicit Origin validation logic that checks the incoming Origin header against the allowlist before permitting CORS
Restricted allowed headers to: Content-Type, Authorization, Accept
Restricted allowed methods to: GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS

doubtfire-api/app/api/api_root.rb

Removed manual wildcard CORS headers from the API before block (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and Access-Control-Request-Method: *)
Request IP thread variable logic was left untouched

Fixes # (CORS misconfiguration issue)
Type of change

Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)

How Has This Been Tested?
The fix was verified using Burp Suite Repeater and curl from a Kali Linux machine targeting the Windows-hosted API.
Test 1 — Untrusted origin is blocked:

Sent GET /api/activity_types HTTP/1.1 with header Origin: https://evil.com
Confirmed response does not return Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * or echo back evil.com

Test 2 — Trusted origin is allowed:

Sent same request with header Origin: http://localhost:4200
Confirmed response returns Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://localhost:4200

curl command used:
bashcurl -X GET http://localhost:3000/api/activity_types
-H "Origin: https://evil.com"
-H "Accept: application/json"
-v 2>&1 | grep -i "access-control"
Checklist:

My code follows the style guidelines of this project
I have performed a self-review of my own code
I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
I have made corresponding changes to the documentation if appropriate
My changes generate no new warnings
I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works
I have created or extended unit tests to address my new additions
New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
Any dependent changes have been merged and published in downstream modules

Replace wildcard CORS behavior with whitelist validation and restrict allowed headers/methods so only trusted frontend origins can make cross-origin API requests.
Made-with: Cursor
@AjayPAnand

Copy link
Copy Markdown

I’ve reviewed and tested the changes, and the behaviour aligns with the intended fix:

Requests with an untrusted Origin (e.g. http://evil.com) are correctly not granted with wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * or reflected back.
Requests from trusted origins (e.g. http://localhost:4200) correctly receive the expected Access-Control-Allow-Origin header.
Browser-based testing confirms that cross-origin requests from non-allowed domains are blocked as expected.
Manual testing via curl and browser dev tools shows the allowlist enforcement is working correctly.

The removal of wildcard CORS headers from api_root.rb and the introduction of a strict origin allowlist in application.rb is a solid approach and significantly reduces the risk of CSRF-like abuse via cross-origin browser requests.

Postman Screenshot verification:
image

Postman Screenshot:
image

Example.com domain
image

Localhost:4200 Screenshot
image

@sabdosh

sabdosh commented Apr 26, 2026

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Tested locally. Untrusted origin (evil.com) no longer receives Access-Control-Allow-Origin. Trusted origin (localhost:4200) is correctly allowed. CORS misconfiguration successfully remediated.

Screenshot 2026-04-26 at 4 59 14 pm

@SteveDalaSteveDala left a comment

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Looks good to me and seems to be a sensible change to the security of the application.

@224599437 please open an upstream pull request (against doubtfire-api)

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Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

4 participants

@224599437@AjayPAnand@sabdosh@SteveDala
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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fix: tighten API CORS policy to trusted origins - #90

Open
224599437 wants to merge 1 commit into
thoth-tech:10.0.xfrom
224599437:10.0.x
Open

fix: tighten API CORS policy to trusted origins#90
224599437 wants to merge 1 commit into
thoth-tech:10.0.xfrom
224599437:10.0.x

Conversation

@224599437

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Description
This fix addresses a misconfigured CORS policy that allowed any external origin to make cross-origin requests to the Doubtfire API. Previously, the server responded with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and accepted any headers and methods, meaning malicious websites could send requests to the API via a victim's browser.
Changes made:
doubtfire-api/config/application.rb

Replaced the wildcard origins '*' with a strict origin allowlist
Default trusted origins include http://localhost:4200 and https://#{config.institution[:host]}
Added optional override via CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS environment variable (comma-separated)
Added explicit Origin validation logic that checks the incoming Origin header against the allowlist before permitting CORS
Restricted allowed headers to: Content-Type, Authorization, Accept
Restricted allowed methods to: GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS

doubtfire-api/app/api/api_root.rb

Removed manual wildcard CORS headers from the API before block (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and Access-Control-Request-Method: *)
Request IP thread variable logic was left untouched

Fixes # (CORS misconfiguration issue)
Type of change

Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)

How Has This Been Tested?
The fix was verified using Burp Suite Repeater and curl from a Kali Linux machine targeting the Windows-hosted API.
Test 1 — Untrusted origin is blocked:

Sent GET /api/activity_types HTTP/1.1 with header Origin: https://evil.com
Confirmed response does not return Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * or echo back evil.com

Test 2 — Trusted origin is allowed:

Sent same request with header Origin: http://localhost:4200
Confirmed response returns Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://localhost:4200

curl command used:
bashcurl -X GET http://localhost:3000/api/activity_types
-H "Origin: https://evil.com"
-H "Accept: application/json"
-v 2>&1 | grep -i "access-control"
Checklist:

My code follows the style guidelines of this project
I have performed a self-review of my own code
I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
I have made corresponding changes to the documentation if appropriate
My changes generate no new warnings
I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works
I have created or extended unit tests to address my new additions
New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
Any dependent changes have been merged and published in downstream modules

Replace wildcard CORS behavior with whitelist validation and restrict allowed headers/methods so only trusted frontend origins can make cross-origin API requests.
Made-with: Cursor
@AjayPAnand

Copy link
Copy Markdown

I’ve reviewed and tested the changes, and the behaviour aligns with the intended fix:

Requests with an untrusted Origin (e.g. http://evil.com) are correctly not granted with wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * or reflected back.
Requests from trusted origins (e.g. http://localhost:4200) correctly receive the expected Access-Control-Allow-Origin header.
Browser-based testing confirms that cross-origin requests from non-allowed domains are blocked as expected.
Manual testing via curl and browser dev tools shows the allowlist enforcement is working correctly.

The removal of wildcard CORS headers from api_root.rb and the introduction of a strict origin allowlist in application.rb is a solid approach and significantly reduces the risk of CSRF-like abuse via cross-origin browser requests.

Postman Screenshot verification:
image

Postman Screenshot:
image

Example.com domain
image

Localhost:4200 Screenshot
image

@sabdosh

sabdosh commented Apr 26, 2026

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Tested locally. Untrusted origin (evil.com) no longer receives Access-Control-Allow-Origin. Trusted origin (localhost:4200) is correctly allowed. CORS misconfiguration successfully remediated.

Screenshot 2026-04-26 at 4 59 14 pm

@SteveDalaSteveDala left a comment

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Looks good to me and seems to be a sensible change to the security of the application.

@224599437 please open an upstream pull request (against doubtfire-api)

Sign up for freeto join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

None yet

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

4 participants

@224599437@AjayPAnand@sabdosh@SteveDala
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "youtube.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
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fix: tighten API CORS policy to trusted origins - #90

Open
224599437 wants to merge 1 commit into
thoth-tech:10.0.xfrom
224599437:10.0.x
Open

fix: tighten API CORS policy to trusted origins#90
224599437 wants to merge 1 commit into
thoth-tech:10.0.xfrom
224599437:10.0.x

Conversation

@224599437

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Description
This fix addresses a misconfigured CORS policy that allowed any external origin to make cross-origin requests to the Doubtfire API. Previously, the server responded with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and accepted any headers and methods, meaning malicious websites could send requests to the API via a victim's browser.
Changes made:
doubtfire-api/config/application.rb

Replaced the wildcard origins '*' with a strict origin allowlist
Default trusted origins include http://localhost:4200 and https://#{config.institution[:host]}
Added optional override via CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS environment variable (comma-separated)
Added explicit Origin validation logic that checks the incoming Origin header against the allowlist before permitting CORS
Restricted allowed headers to: Content-Type, Authorization, Accept
Restricted allowed methods to: GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS

doubtfire-api/app/api/api_root.rb

Removed manual wildcard CORS headers from the API before block (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and Access-Control-Request-Method: *)
Request IP thread variable logic was left untouched

Fixes # (CORS misconfiguration issue)
Type of change

Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)

How Has This Been Tested?
The fix was verified using Burp Suite Repeater and curl from a Kali Linux machine targeting the Windows-hosted API.
Test 1 — Untrusted origin is blocked:

Sent GET /api/activity_types HTTP/1.1 with header Origin: https://evil.com
Confirmed response does not return Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * or echo back evil.com

Test 2 — Trusted origin is allowed:

Sent same request with header Origin: http://localhost:4200
Confirmed response returns Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://localhost:4200

curl command used:
bashcurl -X GET http://localhost:3000/api/activity_types
-H "Origin: https://evil.com"
-H "Accept: application/json"
-v 2>&1 | grep -i "access-control"
Checklist:

My code follows the style guidelines of this project
I have performed a self-review of my own code
I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
I have made corresponding changes to the documentation if appropriate
My changes generate no new warnings
I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works
I have created or extended unit tests to address my new additions
New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
Any dependent changes have been merged and published in downstream modules

Replace wildcard CORS behavior with whitelist validation and restrict allowed headers/methods so only trusted frontend origins can make cross-origin API requests.
Made-with: Cursor
@AjayPAnand

Copy link
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I’ve reviewed and tested the changes, and the behaviour aligns with the intended fix:

Requests with an untrusted Origin (e.g. http://evil.com) are correctly not granted with wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * or reflected back.
Requests from trusted origins (e.g. http://localhost:4200) correctly receive the expected Access-Control-Allow-Origin header.
Browser-based testing confirms that cross-origin requests from non-allowed domains are blocked as expected.
Manual testing via curl and browser dev tools shows the allowlist enforcement is working correctly.

The removal of wildcard CORS headers from api_root.rb and the introduction of a strict origin allowlist in application.rb is a solid approach and significantly reduces the risk of CSRF-like abuse via cross-origin browser requests.

Postman Screenshot verification:
image

Postman Screenshot:
image

Example.com domain
image

Localhost:4200 Screenshot
image

@sabdosh

sabdosh commented Apr 26, 2026

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Tested locally. Untrusted origin (evil.com) no longer receives Access-Control-Allow-Origin. Trusted origin (localhost:4200) is correctly allowed. CORS misconfiguration successfully remediated.

Screenshot 2026-04-26 at 4 59 14 pm

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Looks good to me and seems to be a sensible change to the security of the application.

@224599437 please open an upstream pull request (against doubtfire-api)

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@224599437@AjayPAnand@sabdosh@SteveDala
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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fix: tighten API CORS policy to trusted origins - #90

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fix: tighten API CORS policy to trusted origins#90
224599437 wants to merge 1 commit into
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@224599437

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Description
This fix addresses a misconfigured CORS policy that allowed any external origin to make cross-origin requests to the Doubtfire API. Previously, the server responded with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and accepted any headers and methods, meaning malicious websites could send requests to the API via a victim's browser.
Changes made:
doubtfire-api/config/application.rb

Replaced the wildcard origins '*' with a strict origin allowlist
Default trusted origins include http://localhost:4200 and https://#{config.institution[:host]}
Added optional override via CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS environment variable (comma-separated)
Added explicit Origin validation logic that checks the incoming Origin header against the allowlist before permitting CORS
Restricted allowed headers to: Content-Type, Authorization, Accept
Restricted allowed methods to: GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS

doubtfire-api/app/api/api_root.rb

Removed manual wildcard CORS headers from the API before block (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and Access-Control-Request-Method: *)
Request IP thread variable logic was left untouched

Fixes # (CORS misconfiguration issue)
Type of change

Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)

How Has This Been Tested?
The fix was verified using Burp Suite Repeater and curl from a Kali Linux machine targeting the Windows-hosted API.
Test 1 — Untrusted origin is blocked:

Sent GET /api/activity_types HTTP/1.1 with header Origin: https://evil.com
Confirmed response does not return Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * or echo back evil.com

Test 2 — Trusted origin is allowed:

Sent same request with header Origin: http://localhost:4200
Confirmed response returns Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://localhost:4200

curl command used:
bashcurl -X GET http://localhost:3000/api/activity_types
-H "Origin: https://evil.com"
-H "Accept: application/json"
-v 2>&1 | grep -i "access-control"
Checklist:

My code follows the style guidelines of this project
I have performed a self-review of my own code
I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
I have made corresponding changes to the documentation if appropriate
My changes generate no new warnings
I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works
I have created or extended unit tests to address my new additions
New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
Any dependent changes have been merged and published in downstream modules

Replace wildcard CORS behavior with whitelist validation and restrict allowed headers/methods so only trusted frontend origins can make cross-origin API requests.
Made-with: Cursor
@AjayPAnand

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I’ve reviewed and tested the changes, and the behaviour aligns with the intended fix:

Requests with an untrusted Origin (e.g. http://evil.com) are correctly not granted with wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * or reflected back.
Requests from trusted origins (e.g. http://localhost:4200) correctly receive the expected Access-Control-Allow-Origin header.
Browser-based testing confirms that cross-origin requests from non-allowed domains are blocked as expected.
Manual testing via curl and browser dev tools shows the allowlist enforcement is working correctly.

The removal of wildcard CORS headers from api_root.rb and the introduction of a strict origin allowlist in application.rb is a solid approach and significantly reduces the risk of CSRF-like abuse via cross-origin browser requests.

Postman Screenshot verification:
image

Postman Screenshot:
image

Example.com domain
image

Localhost:4200 Screenshot
image

@sabdosh

sabdosh commented Apr 26, 2026

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Tested locally. Untrusted origin (evil.com) no longer receives Access-Control-Allow-Origin. Trusted origin (localhost:4200) is correctly allowed. CORS misconfiguration successfully remediated.

Screenshot 2026-04-26 at 4 59 14 pm

@SteveDalaSteveDala left a comment

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Looks good to me and seems to be a sensible change to the security of the application.

@224599437 please open an upstream pull request (against doubtfire-api)

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@224599437@AjayPAnand@sabdosh@SteveDala
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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fix: tighten API CORS policy to trusted origins - #90

Open
224599437 wants to merge 1 commit into
thoth-tech:10.0.xfrom
224599437:10.0.x
Open

fix: tighten API CORS policy to trusted origins#90
224599437 wants to merge 1 commit into
thoth-tech:10.0.xfrom
224599437:10.0.x

Conversation

@224599437

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Description
This fix addresses a misconfigured CORS policy that allowed any external origin to make cross-origin requests to the Doubtfire API. Previously, the server responded with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and accepted any headers and methods, meaning malicious websites could send requests to the API via a victim's browser.
Changes made:
doubtfire-api/config/application.rb

Replaced the wildcard origins '*' with a strict origin allowlist
Default trusted origins include http://localhost:4200 and https://#{config.institution[:host]}
Added optional override via CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS environment variable (comma-separated)
Added explicit Origin validation logic that checks the incoming Origin header against the allowlist before permitting CORS
Restricted allowed headers to: Content-Type, Authorization, Accept
Restricted allowed methods to: GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS

doubtfire-api/app/api/api_root.rb

Removed manual wildcard CORS headers from the API before block (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and Access-Control-Request-Method: *)
Request IP thread variable logic was left untouched

Fixes # (CORS misconfiguration issue)
Type of change

Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)

How Has This Been Tested?
The fix was verified using Burp Suite Repeater and curl from a Kali Linux machine targeting the Windows-hosted API.
Test 1 — Untrusted origin is blocked:

Sent GET /api/activity_types HTTP/1.1 with header Origin: https://evil.com
Confirmed response does not return Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * or echo back evil.com

Test 2 — Trusted origin is allowed:

Sent same request with header Origin: http://localhost:4200
Confirmed response returns Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://localhost:4200

curl command used:
bashcurl -X GET http://localhost:3000/api/activity_types
-H "Origin: https://evil.com"
-H "Accept: application/json"
-v 2>&1 | grep -i "access-control"
Checklist:

My code follows the style guidelines of this project
I have performed a self-review of my own code
I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
I have made corresponding changes to the documentation if appropriate
My changes generate no new warnings
I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works
I have created or extended unit tests to address my new additions
New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
Any dependent changes have been merged and published in downstream modules

Replace wildcard CORS behavior with whitelist validation and restrict allowed headers/methods so only trusted frontend origins can make cross-origin API requests.
Made-with: Cursor
@AjayPAnand

Copy link
Copy Markdown

I’ve reviewed and tested the changes, and the behaviour aligns with the intended fix:

Requests with an untrusted Origin (e.g. http://evil.com) are correctly not granted with wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * or reflected back.
Requests from trusted origins (e.g. http://localhost:4200) correctly receive the expected Access-Control-Allow-Origin header.
Browser-based testing confirms that cross-origin requests from non-allowed domains are blocked as expected.
Manual testing via curl and browser dev tools shows the allowlist enforcement is working correctly.

The removal of wildcard CORS headers from api_root.rb and the introduction of a strict origin allowlist in application.rb is a solid approach and significantly reduces the risk of CSRF-like abuse via cross-origin browser requests.

Postman Screenshot verification:
image

Postman Screenshot:
image

Example.com domain
image

Localhost:4200 Screenshot
image

@sabdosh

sabdosh commented Apr 26, 2026

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Tested locally. Untrusted origin (evil.com) no longer receives Access-Control-Allow-Origin. Trusted origin (localhost:4200) is correctly allowed. CORS misconfiguration successfully remediated.

Screenshot 2026-04-26 at 4 59 14 pm

@SteveDalaSteveDala left a comment

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Looks good to me and seems to be a sensible change to the security of the application.

@224599437 please open an upstream pull request (against doubtfire-api)

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Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

4 participants

@224599437@AjayPAnand@sabdosh@SteveDala
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); } })(); })();
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fix: tighten API CORS policy to trusted origins - #90

Open
224599437 wants to merge 1 commit into
thoth-tech:10.0.xfrom
224599437:10.0.x
Open

fix: tighten API CORS policy to trusted origins#90
224599437 wants to merge 1 commit into
thoth-tech:10.0.xfrom
224599437:10.0.x

Conversation

@224599437

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Description
This fix addresses a misconfigured CORS policy that allowed any external origin to make cross-origin requests to the Doubtfire API. Previously, the server responded with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and accepted any headers and methods, meaning malicious websites could send requests to the API via a victim's browser.
Changes made:
doubtfire-api/config/application.rb

Replaced the wildcard origins '*' with a strict origin allowlist
Default trusted origins include http://localhost:4200 and https://#{config.institution[:host]}
Added optional override via CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS environment variable (comma-separated)
Added explicit Origin validation logic that checks the incoming Origin header against the allowlist before permitting CORS
Restricted allowed headers to: Content-Type, Authorization, Accept
Restricted allowed methods to: GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS

doubtfire-api/app/api/api_root.rb

Removed manual wildcard CORS headers from the API before block (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and Access-Control-Request-Method: *)
Request IP thread variable logic was left untouched

Fixes # (CORS misconfiguration issue)
Type of change

Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)

How Has This Been Tested?
The fix was verified using Burp Suite Repeater and curl from a Kali Linux machine targeting the Windows-hosted API.
Test 1 — Untrusted origin is blocked:

Sent GET /api/activity_types HTTP/1.1 with header Origin: https://evil.com
Confirmed response does not return Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * or echo back evil.com

Test 2 — Trusted origin is allowed:

Sent same request with header Origin: http://localhost:4200
Confirmed response returns Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://localhost:4200

curl command used:
bashcurl -X GET http://localhost:3000/api/activity_types
-H "Origin: https://evil.com"
-H "Accept: application/json"
-v 2>&1 | grep -i "access-control"
Checklist:

My code follows the style guidelines of this project
I have performed a self-review of my own code
I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
I have made corresponding changes to the documentation if appropriate
My changes generate no new warnings
I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works
I have created or extended unit tests to address my new additions
New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
Any dependent changes have been merged and published in downstream modules

Replace wildcard CORS behavior with whitelist validation and restrict allowed headers/methods so only trusted frontend origins can make cross-origin API requests.
Made-with: Cursor
@AjayPAnand

Copy link
Copy Markdown

I’ve reviewed and tested the changes, and the behaviour aligns with the intended fix:

Requests with an untrusted Origin (e.g. http://evil.com) are correctly not granted with wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * or reflected back.
Requests from trusted origins (e.g. http://localhost:4200) correctly receive the expected Access-Control-Allow-Origin header.
Browser-based testing confirms that cross-origin requests from non-allowed domains are blocked as expected.
Manual testing via curl and browser dev tools shows the allowlist enforcement is working correctly.

The removal of wildcard CORS headers from api_root.rb and the introduction of a strict origin allowlist in application.rb is a solid approach and significantly reduces the risk of CSRF-like abuse via cross-origin browser requests.

Postman Screenshot verification:
image

Postman Screenshot:
image

Example.com domain
image

Localhost:4200 Screenshot
image

@sabdosh

sabdosh commented Apr 26, 2026

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Tested locally. Untrusted origin (evil.com) no longer receives Access-Control-Allow-Origin. Trusted origin (localhost:4200) is correctly allowed. CORS misconfiguration successfully remediated.

Screenshot 2026-04-26 at 4 59 14 pm

@SteveDalaSteveDala left a comment

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Looks good to me and seems to be a sensible change to the security of the application.

@224599437 please open an upstream pull request (against doubtfire-api)

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Labels

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Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

4 participants

@224599437@AjayPAnand@sabdosh@SteveDala