release-train: develop -> staging

.github/workflows/add-to-kanban.yml

@@ -9,6 +9,11 @@ on:
 jobs:
  add-to-project:
  runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+ # NO GITHUB_TOKEN AT ALL (saadqbal, #2181). Every call in this job authenticates
+ # as the App, so the workflow token needs nothing -- and an empty grant is the
+ # only version of that claim a reader can check. Free, and it means the least-
+ # privilege story covers both credentials in the job rather than just the loud one.
+ permissions: {}
  steps:
  # Board writes authenticate as the tracebloc-release-train App (backend#2036),
  # not a human's PAT. `owner:` yields an ORG-scoped installation token; a
@@ -25,6 +30,60 @@ jobs:
  app-id: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_TRAIN_APP_ID }}
  private-key: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_TRAIN_APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
  owner: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
+ # SCOPED TO THIS REPO, or the two reads below land org-wide (saadqbal,
+ # #2181). `owner:` alone does not narrow anything -- run 32239403796 says
+ # so in as many words: "Input 'repositories' is not set. Creating token for
+ # all repositories owned by tracebloc." A token calling itself
+ # least-privilege while carrying issue+PR read across all 19 installed
+ # repos is the claim this PR exists to stop making.
+ #
+ # `organization_projects` is an ORG-level permission and is not affected by
+ # repo scoping, so the board write should be unchanged -- but that is an
+ # assumption, and it is the same class of assumption that broke the first
+ # attempt, so the verification run is what settles it rather than this
+ # comment. If it is wrong the failure is LOUD (see below), which is what
+ # makes trying it cheap.
+ repositories: ${{ github.event.repository.name }}
+ # Least privilege (backend#2166): without any `permission-*` the token
+ # carries the App's FULL installation grant. actions/add-to-project needs
+ # THREE scopes, not one: it must RESOLVE the triggering issue/PR node
+ # before it can add it to the board, so it needs read on both content
+ # types (this workflow fires on `issues` and `pull_request`) in addition
+ # to the project write. Projects-write alone leaves the node unresolvable
+ # -- the add fails with "Could not resolve to a node with the global id".
+ #
+ # WHAT IS ACTUALLY DEMONSTRATED, and what is not. Stated narrowly because
+ # two earlier versions of this paragraph each overclaimed in a different
+ # direction, and this text is copied verbatim into 17 repos -- a wrong
+ # argument here is a wrong argument 17 times, in a byte-compared file
+ # nobody re-derives.
+ #
+ # DEMONSTRATED: a MISSING READ scope fails loudly. Run 32239403796 on this
+ # branch, at commit 218f0b13 (projects-write only), errored with
+ # `Could not resolve to a node with the global id` and the job went RED --
+ # `add-to-project` routes GraphQL errors through `setFailed`.
+ #
+ # NOT DEMONSTRATED: the case the FIRST version of this comment described --
+ # the token resolving the node fine and then 403ing the BOARD WRITE. No run
+ # has ever produced it. So "fails loudly" is proven for the read scopes and
+ # is an expectation, not a measurement, for the write.
+ #
+ # AND ONE RUN THAT LOOKED LIKE EVIDENCE IS NOT (aptracebloc). The previous
+ # wording cited run 32237283072 as a second scope failure. It is not one:
+ # it ran on `develop`, whose file at that sha passes NO `permission-*` at
+ # all (the App's full grant), and it failed on
+ # `Could not resolve to a node with the global id of I_kwDONNfQt88...` --
+ # a node a fully-privileged token also cannot see, i.e. an issue that no
+ # longer exists (this workflow fires on `issues: transferred`). Run
+ # 32237067262, the SAME develop sha, succeeded 2m34s earlier. A dead node,
+ # not a permission.
+ #
+ # The proof this is right is therefore still a LANDED CARD, not a passing
+ # mint: a mint can succeed with a scope the board write then needs and
+ # lacks, and that is the one path nothing here has exercised.
+ permission-issues: read
+ permission-pull-requests: read
+ permission-organization-projects: write
 
  - uses: actions/add-to-project@5afcf98fcd03f1c2f92c3c83f58ae24323cc57fd # v2.0.0
  with:

.github/workflows/backend-fixtures-drift.yml

@@ -19,12 +19,24 @@ name: Backend fixtures drift
 # org Actions secret. Until that secret exists the job SKIPS with a warning
 # instead of failing: the gate is inert, not red (same activation model as
 # the public PII gate's denylist secret).
+#
+# THAT ACTIVATION PHASE IS OVER. The secret has existed since 2026-08-05 and
+# this check is being armed as a required context (backend#2212), so the
+# skip-with-a-warning path is now a fail-open: a *required* check that exits 0
+# when it cannot run is worse than an advisory one, because it also looks
+# solved. It now FAILS instead -- see the step below for the three-way split
+# and why a public repo needs an override label rather than a silent pass.
 
 on:
  push:
  branches: [develop, main]
  pull_request:
  branches: [develop, main]
+ # labeled/unlabeled so the skip-fixtures-drift override actually re-runs the
+ # gate. The default types are opened/synchronize/reopened, so without these
+ # applying the label would change nothing until the next push -- exactly the
+ # bug Bugbot caught on version-bump-gate-caller.yml's skip-version-gate.
+ types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, ready_for_review, labeled, unlabeled]
  workflow_dispatch:
 
 permissions:
@@ -42,13 +54,69 @@ jobs:
  steps:
  - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
 
+ # Three-way, because this repo is PUBLIC and the two reasons the token can
+ # be missing are not the same thing:
+ #
+ # token present -> run the check (the normal path)
+ # absent, Dependabot PR -> PASS with a ::notice::. Dependabot runs get
+ # DEPENDABOT-scoped secrets, never Actions
+ # secrets, so the token is empty on them
+ # however correctly it is set -- and unlike a
+ # fork, head.repo.fork is FALSE, so they would
+ # otherwise land in the misconfiguration branch
+ # below and block every security bump (Bugbot,
+ # averaging-service#367). Safe to defer here:
+ # a dependency bump cannot alter
+ # internal/api/testdata/*.json, and if it did,
+ # internal/api/contracts_test.go replays every
+ # fixture through the real decode paths under
+ # the REQUIRED `Test` check, with no token.
+ # Divergence from the pinned backend ref is
+ # re-checked by the push run on develop/main,
+ # where Actions secrets are available. Set the
+ # token as a Dependabot secret too and this
+ # branch stops being reached.
+ # absent, fork PR -> FAIL. GitHub does not expose repo secrets to
+ # forks by design, so the check genuinely
+ # cannot run. A maintainer verifies the
+ # fixtures by hand and applies
+ # `skip-fixtures-drift`, which is a permanent
+ # artifact on the PR -- the same model as
+ # skip-fr-gate. Passing forks silently would
+ # fail open on exactly the contributions that
+ # warrant the most scrutiny.
+ # absent, not a fork -> FAIL. The secret was removed, rotated or
+ # expired. That is a misconfiguration, and it
+ # used to read as a clean run.
+ #
+ # Every ${{ }} goes through env:, never into the run: body.
  - name: scripts/sync-backend-fixtures.sh --check
  env:
  BACKEND_CONTRACTS_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.BACKEND_CONTRACTS_TOKEN }}
+ IS_FORK: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.fork || false }}
+ # The PR author, not github.actor: stable across re-runs of the same PR.
+ PR_AUTHOR: ${{ github.event.pull_request.user.login }}
+ OVERRIDE: ${{ contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'skip-fixtures-drift') }}
  run: |
- if [ -z "$BACKEND_CONTRACTS_TOKEN" ]; then
- echo "::warning::BACKEND_CONTRACTS_TOKEN is not set — skipping the backend fixtures drift check." \
- "Add a read-only (Contents: read) token for tracebloc/backend as a repo/org Actions secret to activate this gate."
+ set -uo pipefail
+
+ if [ "$OVERRIDE" = "true" ]; then
+ echo "::warning title=Backend fixtures drift OVERRIDDEN::The skip-fixtures-drift label is applied, so this gate did NOT verify internal/api/testdata/*.json against tracebloc/backend. Whoever applied the label is asserting they checked the fixtures by hand. The label stays on the PR as the record."
  exit 0
  fi
- ./scripts/sync-backend-fixtures.sh --check
+
+ if [ -n "$BACKEND_CONTRACTS_TOKEN" ]; then
+ exec ./scripts/sync-backend-fixtures.sh --check
+ fi
+
+ if [ "$PR_AUTHOR" = "dependabot[bot]" ]; then
+ echo "::notice title=Backend fixtures drift deferred::Dependabot runs receive Dependabot-scoped secrets, not Actions secrets, so BACKEND_CONTRACTS_TOKEN is empty here by design. A dependency bump cannot alter internal/api/testdata/*.json, and internal/api/contracts_test.go replays every fixture through the real decode paths under the required Test check without needing a token. Drift against the pinned backend ref is re-checked by the push run on develop/main. Set BACKEND_CONTRACTS_TOKEN as a Dependabot secret too for full coverage here."
+ exit 0
+ fi
+
+ if [ "$IS_FORK" = "true" ]; then
+ echo "::error title=Backend fixtures drift could not run::This PR is from a fork, and GitHub does not expose BACKEND_CONTRACTS_TOKEN to forks, so the vendored fixtures could not be checked against tracebloc/backend. A maintainer must verify internal/api/testdata/*.json by hand and apply the 'skip-fixtures-drift' label. Refusing to report green on a check that did not run (backend#2212)."
+ else
+ echo "::error title=BACKEND_CONTRACTS_TOKEN is missing::The secret is not readable on this run, so the backend fixtures drift check did not execute. It is expected on develop/main PRs from this repo -- if it was rotated or removed, restore a read-only (Contents: read) token for tracebloc/backend as a repo/org Actions secret. This step used to exit 0 here, which reported a check that never ran as a passing one (backend#2212)."
+ fi
+ exit 1