Security: uchebuzz-coder/abilities

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting a Vulnerability

Do NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

Email security@openhome.xyz with:

  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce
  • Affected Ability (name + path in repo)
  • Potential impact (data exposure, arbitrary execution, etc.)

Response Timeline

SeverityAcknowledgmentFix Target
Critical24 hours7 days
High48 hours14 days
Medium5 business days30 days
Low10 business daysNext release

Supported Versions

BranchSupported
main✅
dev✅ (pre-release)
Older tags❌

What We Scan For

Every community Ability PR is reviewed against these criteria before merge:

Prohibited Patterns

  • Hardcoded secrets: No API keys, tokens, passwords, or credentials in source code
  • Dynamic code execution: No eval(), exec(), compile(), __import__(), or importlib usage
  • Shell access: No os.system(), subprocess.*, os.popen(), or backtick execution
  • File system abuse: No reads/writes outside the Ability's own directory
  • Network exfiltration: No undocumented outbound HTTP requests; all external API calls must be declared in the Ability's README
  • Pickle/deserialization: No pickle.loads(), yaml.load() (without SafeLoader), or marshal.loads()
  • Prompt injection vectors: No user input passed unsanitized into system-level prompts via text_to_text_response()

Required Patterns

  • All Abilities must use the CapabilityWorker SDK — direct platform internals access is forbidden
  • #{{register_capability}} This line is required boilerplate — copy it exactly.
  • resume_normal_flow() must be called on every exit path to return control to the Agent

Security Best Practices for Contributors

  1. Use environment variables or the OpenHome dashboard's API key settings for secrets — never commit them
  2. Validate and sanitize all input from user_response() before passing it to APIs or LLM prompts
  3. Scope all file operations to os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
  4. Document every external API call in your Ability's README, including what data is sent
  5. Pin dependency versions if your Ability requires external packages

Scope

This policy covers all code in the openhome-dev/abilities repository:

  • official/ — maintained by OpenHome
  • community/ — contributed by the community
  • templates/ — starter code
  • validate_ability.py — CI validation script
  • .github/workflows/ — CI/CD pipelines

There aren't any published security advisories

, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
 blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

Skip to content
Security: uchebuzz-coder/abilities
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a Vulnerability
Do NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Email security@openhome.xyz with:
  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce
  • Affected Ability (name + path in repo)
  • Potential impact (data exposure, arbitrary execution, etc.)
Response Timeline
SeverityAcknowledgmentFix Target
Critical24 hours7 days
High48 hours14 days
Medium5 business days30 days
Low10 business daysNext release
Supported Versions
BranchSupported
main✅
dev✅ (pre-release)
Older tags❌
What We Scan For
Every community Ability PR is reviewed against these criteria before merge:
Prohibited Patterns
  • Hardcoded secrets: No API keys, tokens, passwords, or credentials in source code
  • Dynamic code execution: No eval(), exec(), compile(), __import__(), or importlib usage
  • Shell access: No os.system(), subprocess.*, os.popen(), or backtick execution
  • File system abuse: No reads/writes outside the Ability's own directory
  • Network exfiltration: No undocumented outbound HTTP requests; all external API calls must be declared in the Ability's README
  • Pickle/deserialization: No pickle.loads(), yaml.load() (without SafeLoader), or marshal.loads()
  • Prompt injection vectors: No user input passed unsanitized into system-level prompts via text_to_text_response()
Required Patterns
  • All Abilities must use the CapabilityWorker SDK — direct platform internals access is forbidden
  • #{{register_capability}} This line is required boilerplate — copy it exactly.
  • resume_normal_flow() must be called on every exit path to return control to the Agent
Security Best Practices for Contributors
  1. Use environment variables or the OpenHome dashboard's API key settings for secrets — never commit them
  2. Validate and sanitize all input from user_response() before passing it to APIs or LLM prompts
  3. Scope all file operations to os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
  4. Document every external API call in your Ability's README, including what data is sent
  5. Pin dependency versions if your Ability requires external packages
Scope
This policy covers all code in the openhome-dev/abilities repository:
  • official/ — maintained by OpenHome
  • community/ — contributed by the community
  • templates/ — starter code
  • validate_ability.py — CI validation script
  • .github/workflows/ — CI/CD pipelines
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: uchebuzz-coder/abilities
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a Vulnerability
Do NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Email security@openhome.xyz with:
  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce
  • Affected Ability (name + path in repo)
  • Potential impact (data exposure, arbitrary execution, etc.)
Response Timeline
SeverityAcknowledgmentFix Target
Critical24 hours7 days
High48 hours14 days
Medium5 business days30 days
Low10 business daysNext release
Supported Versions
BranchSupported
main✅
dev✅ (pre-release)
Older tags❌
What We Scan For
Every community Ability PR is reviewed against these criteria before merge:
Prohibited Patterns
  • Hardcoded secrets: No API keys, tokens, passwords, or credentials in source code
  • Dynamic code execution: No eval(), exec(), compile(), __import__(), or importlib usage
  • Shell access: No os.system(), subprocess.*, os.popen(), or backtick execution
  • File system abuse: No reads/writes outside the Ability's own directory
  • Network exfiltration: No undocumented outbound HTTP requests; all external API calls must be declared in the Ability's README
  • Pickle/deserialization: No pickle.loads(), yaml.load() (without SafeLoader), or marshal.loads()
  • Prompt injection vectors: No user input passed unsanitized into system-level prompts via text_to_text_response()
Required Patterns
  • All Abilities must use the CapabilityWorker SDK — direct platform internals access is forbidden
  • #{{register_capability}} This line is required boilerplate — copy it exactly.
  • resume_normal_flow() must be called on every exit path to return control to the Agent
Security Best Practices for Contributors
  1. Use environment variables or the OpenHome dashboard's API key settings for secrets — never commit them
  2. Validate and sanitize all input from user_response() before passing it to APIs or LLM prompts
  3. Scope all file operations to os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
  4. Document every external API call in your Ability's README, including what data is sent
  5. Pin dependency versions if your Ability requires external packages
Scope
This policy covers all code in the openhome-dev/abilities repository:
  • official/ — maintained by OpenHome
  • community/ — contributed by the community
  • templates/ — starter code
  • validate_ability.py — CI validation script
  • .github/workflows/ — CI/CD pipelines
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: uchebuzz-coder/abilities
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a Vulnerability
Do NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Email security@openhome.xyz with:
  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce
  • Affected Ability (name + path in repo)
  • Potential impact (data exposure, arbitrary execution, etc.)
Response Timeline
SeverityAcknowledgmentFix Target
Critical24 hours7 days
High48 hours14 days
Medium5 business days30 days
Low10 business daysNext release
Supported Versions
BranchSupported
main✅
dev✅ (pre-release)
Older tags❌
What We Scan For
Every community Ability PR is reviewed against these criteria before merge:
Prohibited Patterns
  • Hardcoded secrets: No API keys, tokens, passwords, or credentials in source code
  • Dynamic code execution: No eval(), exec(), compile(), __import__(), or importlib usage
  • Shell access: No os.system(), subprocess.*, os.popen(), or backtick execution
  • File system abuse: No reads/writes outside the Ability's own directory
  • Network exfiltration: No undocumented outbound HTTP requests; all external API calls must be declared in the Ability's README
  • Pickle/deserialization: No pickle.loads(), yaml.load() (without SafeLoader), or marshal.loads()
  • Prompt injection vectors: No user input passed unsanitized into system-level prompts via text_to_text_response()
Required Patterns
  • All Abilities must use the CapabilityWorker SDK — direct platform internals access is forbidden
  • #{{register_capability}} This line is required boilerplate — copy it exactly.
  • resume_normal_flow() must be called on every exit path to return control to the Agent
Security Best Practices for Contributors
  1. Use environment variables or the OpenHome dashboard's API key settings for secrets — never commit them
  2. Validate and sanitize all input from user_response() before passing it to APIs or LLM prompts
  3. Scope all file operations to os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
  4. Document every external API call in your Ability's README, including what data is sent
  5. Pin dependency versions if your Ability requires external packages
Scope
This policy covers all code in the openhome-dev/abilities repository:
  • official/ — maintained by OpenHome
  • community/ — contributed by the community
  • templates/ — starter code
  • validate_ability.py — CI validation script
  • .github/workflows/ — CI/CD pipelines
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

Skip to content
Security: uchebuzz-coder/abilities
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a Vulnerability
Do NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Email security@openhome.xyz with:
  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce
  • Affected Ability (name + path in repo)
  • Potential impact (data exposure, arbitrary execution, etc.)
Response Timeline
SeverityAcknowledgmentFix Target
Critical24 hours7 days
High48 hours14 days
Medium5 business days30 days
Low10 business daysNext release
Supported Versions
BranchSupported
main✅
dev✅ (pre-release)
Older tags❌
What We Scan For
Every community Ability PR is reviewed against these criteria before merge:
Prohibited Patterns
  • Hardcoded secrets: No API keys, tokens, passwords, or credentials in source code
  • Dynamic code execution: No eval(), exec(), compile(), __import__(), or importlib usage
  • Shell access: No os.system(), subprocess.*, os.popen(), or backtick execution
  • File system abuse: No reads/writes outside the Ability's own directory
  • Network exfiltration: No undocumented outbound HTTP requests; all external API calls must be declared in the Ability's README
  • Pickle/deserialization: No pickle.loads(), yaml.load() (without SafeLoader), or marshal.loads()
  • Prompt injection vectors: No user input passed unsanitized into system-level prompts via text_to_text_response()
Required Patterns
  • All Abilities must use the CapabilityWorker SDK — direct platform internals access is forbidden
  • #{{register_capability}} This line is required boilerplate — copy it exactly.
  • resume_normal_flow() must be called on every exit path to return control to the Agent
Security Best Practices for Contributors
  1. Use environment variables or the OpenHome dashboard's API key settings for secrets — never commit them
  2. Validate and sanitize all input from user_response() before passing it to APIs or LLM prompts
  3. Scope all file operations to os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
  4. Document every external API call in your Ability's README, including what data is sent
  5. Pin dependency versions if your Ability requires external packages
Scope
This policy covers all code in the openhome-dev/abilities repository:
  • official/ — maintained by OpenHome
  • community/ — contributed by the community
  • templates/ — starter code
  • validate_ability.py — CI validation script
  • .github/workflows/ — CI/CD pipelines
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: uchebuzz-coder/abilities
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a Vulnerability
Do NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Email security@openhome.xyz with:
  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce
  • Affected Ability (name + path in repo)
  • Potential impact (data exposure, arbitrary execution, etc.)
Response Timeline
SeverityAcknowledgmentFix Target
Critical24 hours7 days
High48 hours14 days
Medium5 business days30 days
Low10 business daysNext release
Supported Versions
BranchSupported
main✅
dev✅ (pre-release)
Older tags❌
What We Scan For
Every community Ability PR is reviewed against these criteria before merge:
Prohibited Patterns
  • Hardcoded secrets: No API keys, tokens, passwords, or credentials in source code
  • Dynamic code execution: No eval(), exec(), compile(), __import__(), or importlib usage
  • Shell access: No os.system(), subprocess.*, os.popen(), or backtick execution
  • File system abuse: No reads/writes outside the Ability's own directory
  • Network exfiltration: No undocumented outbound HTTP requests; all external API calls must be declared in the Ability's README
  • Pickle/deserialization: No pickle.loads(), yaml.load() (without SafeLoader), or marshal.loads()
  • Prompt injection vectors: No user input passed unsanitized into system-level prompts via text_to_text_response()
Required Patterns
  • All Abilities must use the CapabilityWorker SDK — direct platform internals access is forbidden
  • #{{register_capability}} This line is required boilerplate — copy it exactly.
  • resume_normal_flow() must be called on every exit path to return control to the Agent
Security Best Practices for Contributors
  1. Use environment variables or the OpenHome dashboard's API key settings for secrets — never commit them
  2. Validate and sanitize all input from user_response() before passing it to APIs or LLM prompts
  3. Scope all file operations to os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
  4. Document every external API call in your Ability's README, including what data is sent
  5. Pin dependency versions if your Ability requires external packages
Scope
This policy covers all code in the openhome-dev/abilities repository:
  • official/ — maintained by OpenHome
  • community/ — contributed by the community
  • templates/ — starter code
  • validate_ability.py — CI validation script
  • .github/workflows/ — CI/CD pipelines
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: uchebuzz-coder/abilities
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a Vulnerability
Do NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Email security@openhome.xyz with:
  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce
  • Affected Ability (name + path in repo)
  • Potential impact (data exposure, arbitrary execution, etc.)
Response Timeline
SeverityAcknowledgmentFix Target
Critical24 hours7 days
High48 hours14 days
Medium5 business days30 days
Low10 business daysNext release
Supported Versions
BranchSupported
main✅
dev✅ (pre-release)
Older tags❌
What We Scan For
Every community Ability PR is reviewed against these criteria before merge:
Prohibited Patterns
  • Hardcoded secrets: No API keys, tokens, passwords, or credentials in source code
  • Dynamic code execution: No eval(), exec(), compile(), __import__(), or importlib usage
  • Shell access: No os.system(), subprocess.*, os.popen(), or backtick execution
  • File system abuse: No reads/writes outside the Ability's own directory
  • Network exfiltration: No undocumented outbound HTTP requests; all external API calls must be declared in the Ability's README
  • Pickle/deserialization: No pickle.loads(), yaml.load() (without SafeLoader), or marshal.loads()
  • Prompt injection vectors: No user input passed unsanitized into system-level prompts via text_to_text_response()
Required Patterns
  • All Abilities must use the CapabilityWorker SDK — direct platform internals access is forbidden
  • #{{register_capability}} This line is required boilerplate — copy it exactly.
  • resume_normal_flow() must be called on every exit path to return control to the Agent
Security Best Practices for Contributors
  1. Use environment variables or the OpenHome dashboard's API key settings for secrets — never commit them
  2. Validate and sanitize all input from user_response() before passing it to APIs or LLM prompts
  3. Scope all file operations to os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
  4. Document every external API call in your Ability's README, including what data is sent
  5. Pin dependency versions if your Ability requires external packages
Scope
This policy covers all code in the openhome-dev/abilities repository:
  • official/ — maintained by OpenHome
  • community/ — contributed by the community
  • templates/ — starter code
  • validate_ability.py — CI validation script
  • .github/workflows/ — CI/CD pipelines
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

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Security: uchebuzz-coder/abilities
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a Vulnerability
Do NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Email security@openhome.xyz with:
  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce
  • Affected Ability (name + path in repo)
  • Potential impact (data exposure, arbitrary execution, etc.)
Response Timeline
SeverityAcknowledgmentFix Target
Critical24 hours7 days
High48 hours14 days
Medium5 business days30 days
Low10 business daysNext release
Supported Versions
BranchSupported
main✅
dev✅ (pre-release)
Older tags❌
What We Scan For
Every community Ability PR is reviewed against these criteria before merge:
Prohibited Patterns
  • Hardcoded secrets: No API keys, tokens, passwords, or credentials in source code
  • Dynamic code execution: No eval(), exec(), compile(), __import__(), or importlib usage
  • Shell access: No os.system(), subprocess.*, os.popen(), or backtick execution
  • File system abuse: No reads/writes outside the Ability's own directory
  • Network exfiltration: No undocumented outbound HTTP requests; all external API calls must be declared in the Ability's README
  • Pickle/deserialization: No pickle.loads(), yaml.load() (without SafeLoader), or marshal.loads()
  • Prompt injection vectors: No user input passed unsanitized into system-level prompts via text_to_text_response()
Required Patterns
  • All Abilities must use the CapabilityWorker SDK — direct platform internals access is forbidden
  • #{{register_capability}} This line is required boilerplate — copy it exactly.
  • resume_normal_flow() must be called on every exit path to return control to the Agent
Security Best Practices for Contributors
  1. Use environment variables or the OpenHome dashboard's API key settings for secrets — never commit them
  2. Validate and sanitize all input from user_response() before passing it to APIs or LLM prompts
  3. Scope all file operations to os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
  4. Document every external API call in your Ability's README, including what data is sent
  5. Pin dependency versions if your Ability requires external packages
Scope
This policy covers all code in the openhome-dev/abilities repository:
  • official/ — maintained by OpenHome
  • community/ — contributed by the community
  • templates/ — starter code
  • validate_ability.py — CI validation script
  • .github/workflows/ — CI/CD pipelines
 There aren't any published security advisories