Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh #992

Closed
#996
Closed
Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh#992
#996
Labels
safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team

Description

@louisgv
louisgv
opened on Feb 13, 2026

Security Finding

Severity: HIGH
File: .claude/skills/setup-agent-team/security.sh:356,715,918
Category: injection
Scanner: security/shell-scanner

Description

The SLACK_WEBHOOK environment variable is embedded directly into heredocs containing curl commands without validation. This creates a command injection vulnerability if an attacker can control the SLACK_WEBHOOK value.

Vulnerable code pattern (lines 356, 715, 918):

SLACK_WEBHOOK="${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-NOT_SET}"if [ -n"\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" ] && [ "\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ];then
curl -s -X POST "\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}"fi

If SLACK_WEBHOOK contains shell metacharacters or command substitutions (e.g., $(malicious_command) or backticks), they will be executed when the heredoc is evaluated.

Attack Scenario

An attacker who can set the SLACK_WEBHOOK environment variable (e.g., via GitHub Actions secrets manipulation, compromised CI environment, or local execution with crafted env vars) could inject arbitrary commands:

export SLACK_WEBHOOK='https://example.com/webhook"; malicious_command; echo "'

Remediation

Option 1: Validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format (recommended)

# Add validation before usevalidate_slack_webhook() {
local webhook="$1"if [[ !"$webhook"=~ ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/ ]];then
log_error "Invalid SLACK_WEBHOOK format. Must be a valid Slack webhook URL."return 1
fi
}
# Then use:if [[ -n"${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-}" ]] && [[ "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ]];then
validate_slack_webhook "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"||return 1
curl -s -X POST "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}"fi

Option 2: Use printf with %q for safe quoting

if [[ -n"${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-}" ]] && [[ "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ]];thenlocal safe_webhook
safe_webhook=$(printf '%q'"${SLACK_WEBHOOK}")eval"curl -s -X POST ${safe_webhook} -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}'"fi

Option 3: Avoid heredocs for this pattern

Move the Slack notification logic out of heredocs entirely and call it directly in the script, avoiding variable expansion in heredocs.

Affected Lines

  • Line 356: Triage mode Slack notification
  • Line 715: Review-all mode Slack notification
  • Line 918: Scan mode Slack notification

References

  • CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command
  • OWASP: Command Injection
  • Bash best practices: Always validate external input before embedding in commands

Found By

Automated security scan of shell scripts changed in last 24 hours (2026-02-13)

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    safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team

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      , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
       blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

      Skip to content
      Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh #992
      Closed
      #996
      Closed
      Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh#992
      #996
      Labels
      safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
      Description
      @louisgv
      louisgv
      opened on Feb 13, 2026
      Security Finding
      Severity: HIGH
      File: .claude/skills/setup-agent-team/security.sh:356,715,918
      Category: injection
      Scanner: security/shell-scanner
      Description
      The SLACK_WEBHOOK environment variable is embedded directly into heredocs containing curl commands without validation. This creates a command injection vulnerability if an attacker can control the SLACK_WEBHOOK value.
      Vulnerable code pattern (lines 356, 715, 918):
      SLACK_WEBHOOK="${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-NOT_SET}"if [ -n"\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" ] && [ "\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ];then
curl -s -X POST "\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}"fi
      If SLACK_WEBHOOK contains shell metacharacters or command substitutions (e.g., $(malicious_command) or backticks), they will be executed when the heredoc is evaluated.
      Attack Scenario
      An attacker who can set the SLACK_WEBHOOK environment variable (e.g., via GitHub Actions secrets manipulation, compromised CI environment, or local execution with crafted env vars) could inject arbitrary commands:
      export SLACK_WEBHOOK='https://example.com/webhook"; malicious_command; echo "'
      Remediation
      Option 1: Validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format (recommended)
      # Add validation before usevalidate_slack_webhook() {
local webhook="$1"if [[ !"$webhook"=~ ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/ ]];then
log_error "Invalid SLACK_WEBHOOK format. Must be a valid Slack webhook URL."return 1
fi
}
# Then use:if [[ -n"${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-}" ]] && [[ "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ]];then
validate_slack_webhook "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"||return 1
curl -s -X POST "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}"fi
      Option 2: Use printf with %q for safe quoting
      if [[ -n"${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-}" ]] && [[ "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ]];thenlocal safe_webhook
safe_webhook=$(printf '%q'"${SLACK_WEBHOOK}")eval"curl -s -X POST ${safe_webhook} -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}'"fi
      Option 3: Avoid heredocs for this pattern
      Move the Slack notification logic out of heredocs entirely and call it directly in the script, avoiding variable expansion in heredocs.
      Affected Lines
      • Line 356: Triage mode Slack notification
      • Line 715: Review-all mode Slack notification
      • Line 918: Scan mode Slack notification
      References
      • CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command
      • OWASP: Command Injection
      • Bash best practices: Always validate external input before embedding in commands
      Found By
      Automated security scan of shell scripts changed in last 24 hours (2026-02-13)
      Metadata
      Metadata
      Assignees
      No one assigned
        Labels
        safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
        Type
        No type
        Projects
        No projects
          Milestone
          No milestone
          Relationships
          None yet
          Development
          No branches or pull requests
          Issue actions
          
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

          Skip to content
          Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh #992
          Closed
          #996
          Closed
          Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh#992
          #996
          Labels
          safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
          Description
          @louisgv
          louisgv
          opened on Feb 13, 2026
          Security Finding
          Severity: HIGH
          File: .claude/skills/setup-agent-team/security.sh:356,715,918
          Category: injection
          Scanner: security/shell-scanner
          Description
          The SLACK_WEBHOOK environment variable is embedded directly into heredocs containing curl commands without validation. This creates a command injection vulnerability if an attacker can control the SLACK_WEBHOOK value.
          Vulnerable code pattern (lines 356, 715, 918):
          SLACK_WEBHOOK="${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-NOT_SET}"if [ -n"\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" ] && [ "\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ];then
curl -s -X POST "\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}"fi
          If SLACK_WEBHOOK contains shell metacharacters or command substitutions (e.g., $(malicious_command) or backticks), they will be executed when the heredoc is evaluated.
          Attack Scenario
          An attacker who can set the SLACK_WEBHOOK environment variable (e.g., via GitHub Actions secrets manipulation, compromised CI environment, or local execution with crafted env vars) could inject arbitrary commands:
          export SLACK_WEBHOOK='https://example.com/webhook"; malicious_command; echo "'
          Remediation
          Option 1: Validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format (recommended)
          # Add validation before usevalidate_slack_webhook() {
local webhook="$1"if [[ !"$webhook"=~ ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/ ]];then
log_error "Invalid SLACK_WEBHOOK format. Must be a valid Slack webhook URL."return 1
fi
}
# Then use:if [[ -n"${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-}" ]] && [[ "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ]];then
validate_slack_webhook "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"||return 1
curl -s -X POST "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}"fi
          Option 2: Use printf with %q for safe quoting
          if [[ -n"${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-}" ]] && [[ "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ]];thenlocal safe_webhook
safe_webhook=$(printf '%q'"${SLACK_WEBHOOK}")eval"curl -s -X POST ${safe_webhook} -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}'"fi
          Option 3: Avoid heredocs for this pattern
          Move the Slack notification logic out of heredocs entirely and call it directly in the script, avoiding variable expansion in heredocs.
          Affected Lines
          • Line 356: Triage mode Slack notification
          • Line 715: Review-all mode Slack notification
          • Line 918: Scan mode Slack notification
          References
          • CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command
          • OWASP: Command Injection
          • Bash best practices: Always validate external input before embedding in commands
          Found By
          Automated security scan of shell scripts changed in last 24 hours (2026-02-13)
          Metadata
          Metadata
          Assignees
          No one assigned
            Labels
            safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
            Type
            No type
            Projects
            No projects
              Milestone
              No milestone
              Relationships
              None yet
              Development
              No branches or pull requests
              Issue actions
              
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

              Skip to content
              Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh #992
              Closed
              #996
              Closed
              Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh#992
              #996
              Labels
              safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
              Description
              @louisgv
              louisgv
              opened on Feb 13, 2026
              Security Finding
              Severity: HIGH
              File: .claude/skills/setup-agent-team/security.sh:356,715,918
              Category: injection
              Scanner: security/shell-scanner
              Description
              The SLACK_WEBHOOK environment variable is embedded directly into heredocs containing curl commands without validation. This creates a command injection vulnerability if an attacker can control the SLACK_WEBHOOK value.
              Vulnerable code pattern (lines 356, 715, 918):
              SLACK_WEBHOOK="${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-NOT_SET}"if [ -n"\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" ] && [ "\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ];then
curl -s -X POST "\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}"fi
              If SLACK_WEBHOOK contains shell metacharacters or command substitutions (e.g., $(malicious_command) or backticks), they will be executed when the heredoc is evaluated.
              Attack Scenario
              An attacker who can set the SLACK_WEBHOOK environment variable (e.g., via GitHub Actions secrets manipulation, compromised CI environment, or local execution with crafted env vars) could inject arbitrary commands:
              export SLACK_WEBHOOK='https://example.com/webhook"; malicious_command; echo "'
              Remediation
              Option 1: Validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format (recommended)
              # Add validation before usevalidate_slack_webhook() {
local webhook="$1"if [[ !"$webhook"=~ ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/ ]];then
log_error "Invalid SLACK_WEBHOOK format. Must be a valid Slack webhook URL."return 1
fi
}
# Then use:if [[ -n"${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-}" ]] && [[ "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ]];then
validate_slack_webhook "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"||return 1
curl -s -X POST "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}"fi
              Option 2: Use printf with %q for safe quoting
              if [[ -n"${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-}" ]] && [[ "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ]];thenlocal safe_webhook
safe_webhook=$(printf '%q'"${SLACK_WEBHOOK}")eval"curl -s -X POST ${safe_webhook} -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}'"fi
              Option 3: Avoid heredocs for this pattern
              Move the Slack notification logic out of heredocs entirely and call it directly in the script, avoiding variable expansion in heredocs.
              Affected Lines
              • Line 356: Triage mode Slack notification
              • Line 715: Review-all mode Slack notification
              • Line 918: Scan mode Slack notification
              References
              • CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command
              • OWASP: Command Injection
              • Bash best practices: Always validate external input before embedding in commands
              Found By
              Automated security scan of shell scripts changed in last 24 hours (2026-02-13)
              Metadata
              Metadata
              Assignees
              No one assigned
                Labels
                safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
                Type
                No type
                Projects
                No projects
                  Milestone
                  No milestone
                  Relationships
                  None yet
                  Development
                  No branches or pull requests
                  Issue actions
                  
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

                  Skip to content
                  Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh #992
                  Closed
                  #996
                  Closed
                  Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh#992
                  #996
                  Labels
                  safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
                  Description
                  @louisgv
                  louisgv
                  opened on Feb 13, 2026
                  Security Finding
                  Severity: HIGH
                  File: .claude/skills/setup-agent-team/security.sh:356,715,918
                  Category: injection
                  Scanner: security/shell-scanner
                  Description
                  The SLACK_WEBHOOK environment variable is embedded directly into heredocs containing curl commands without validation. This creates a command injection vulnerability if an attacker can control the SLACK_WEBHOOK value.
                  Vulnerable code pattern (lines 356, 715, 918):
                  SLACK_WEBHOOK="${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-NOT_SET}"if [ -n"\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" ] && [ "\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ];then
curl -s -X POST "\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}"fi
                  If SLACK_WEBHOOK contains shell metacharacters or command substitutions (e.g., $(malicious_command) or backticks), they will be executed when the heredoc is evaluated.
                  Attack Scenario
                  An attacker who can set the SLACK_WEBHOOK environment variable (e.g., via GitHub Actions secrets manipulation, compromised CI environment, or local execution with crafted env vars) could inject arbitrary commands:
                  export SLACK_WEBHOOK='https://example.com/webhook"; malicious_command; echo "'
                  Remediation
                  Option 1: Validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format (recommended)
                  # Add validation before usevalidate_slack_webhook() {
local webhook="$1"if [[ !"$webhook"=~ ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/ ]];then
log_error "Invalid SLACK_WEBHOOK format. Must be a valid Slack webhook URL."return 1
fi
}
# Then use:if [[ -n"${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-}" ]] && [[ "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ]];then
validate_slack_webhook "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"||return 1
curl -s -X POST "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}"fi
                  Option 2: Use printf with %q for safe quoting
                  if [[ -n"${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-}" ]] && [[ "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ]];thenlocal safe_webhook
safe_webhook=$(printf '%q'"${SLACK_WEBHOOK}")eval"curl -s -X POST ${safe_webhook} -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}'"fi
                  Option 3: Avoid heredocs for this pattern
                  Move the Slack notification logic out of heredocs entirely and call it directly in the script, avoiding variable expansion in heredocs.
                  Affected Lines
                  • Line 356: Triage mode Slack notification
                  • Line 715: Review-all mode Slack notification
                  • Line 918: Scan mode Slack notification
                  References
                  • CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command
                  • OWASP: Command Injection
                  • Bash best practices: Always validate external input before embedding in commands
                  Found By
                  Automated security scan of shell scripts changed in last 24 hours (2026-02-13)
                  Metadata
                  Metadata
                  Assignees
                  No one assigned
                    Labels
                    safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
                    Type
                    No type
                    Projects
                    No projects
                      Milestone
                      No milestone
                      Relationships
                      None yet
                      Development
                      No branches or pull requests
                      Issue actions
                      
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

                      Skip to content
                      Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh #992
                      Closed
                      #996
                      Closed
                      Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh#992
                      #996
                      Labels
                      safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
                      Description
                      @louisgv
                      louisgv
                      opened on Feb 13, 2026
                      Security Finding
                      Severity: HIGH
                      File: .claude/skills/setup-agent-team/security.sh:356,715,918
                      Category: injection
                      Scanner: security/shell-scanner
                      Description
                      The SLACK_WEBHOOK environment variable is embedded directly into heredocs containing curl commands without validation. This creates a command injection vulnerability if an attacker can control the SLACK_WEBHOOK value.
                      Vulnerable code pattern (lines 356, 715, 918):
                      SLACK_WEBHOOK="${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-NOT_SET}"if [ -n"\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" ] && [ "\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ];then
curl -s -X POST "\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}"fi
                      If SLACK_WEBHOOK contains shell metacharacters or command substitutions (e.g., $(malicious_command) or backticks), they will be executed when the heredoc is evaluated.
                      Attack Scenario
                      An attacker who can set the SLACK_WEBHOOK environment variable (e.g., via GitHub Actions secrets manipulation, compromised CI environment, or local execution with crafted env vars) could inject arbitrary commands:
                      export SLACK_WEBHOOK='https://example.com/webhook"; malicious_command; echo "'
                      Remediation
                      Option 1: Validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format (recommended)
                      # Add validation before usevalidate_slack_webhook() {
local webhook="$1"if [[ !"$webhook"=~ ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/ ]];then
log_error "Invalid SLACK_WEBHOOK format. Must be a valid Slack webhook URL."return 1
fi
}
# Then use:if [[ -n"${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-}" ]] && [[ "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ]];then
validate_slack_webhook "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"||return 1
curl -s -X POST "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}"fi
                      Option 2: Use printf with %q for safe quoting
                      if [[ -n"${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-}" ]] && [[ "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ]];thenlocal safe_webhook
safe_webhook=$(printf '%q'"${SLACK_WEBHOOK}")eval"curl -s -X POST ${safe_webhook} -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}'"fi
                      Option 3: Avoid heredocs for this pattern
                      Move the Slack notification logic out of heredocs entirely and call it directly in the script, avoiding variable expansion in heredocs.
                      Affected Lines
                      • Line 356: Triage mode Slack notification
                      • Line 715: Review-all mode Slack notification
                      • Line 918: Scan mode Slack notification
                      References
                      • CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command
                      • OWASP: Command Injection
                      • Bash best practices: Always validate external input before embedding in commands
                      Found By
                      Automated security scan of shell scripts changed in last 24 hours (2026-02-13)
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                        Labels
                        safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

                          Skip to content
                          Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh #992
                          Closed
                          #996
                          Closed
                          Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh#992
                          #996
                          Labels
                          safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
                          Description
                          @louisgv
                          louisgv
                          opened on Feb 13, 2026
                          Security Finding
                          Severity: HIGH
                          File: .claude/skills/setup-agent-team/security.sh:356,715,918
                          Category: injection
                          Scanner: security/shell-scanner
                          Description
                          The SLACK_WEBHOOK environment variable is embedded directly into heredocs containing curl commands without validation. This creates a command injection vulnerability if an attacker can control the SLACK_WEBHOOK value.
                          Vulnerable code pattern (lines 356, 715, 918):
                          SLACK_WEBHOOK="${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-NOT_SET}"if [ -n"\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" ] && [ "\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ];then
curl -s -X POST "\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}"fi
                          If SLACK_WEBHOOK contains shell metacharacters or command substitutions (e.g., $(malicious_command) or backticks), they will be executed when the heredoc is evaluated.
                          Attack Scenario
                          An attacker who can set the SLACK_WEBHOOK environment variable (e.g., via GitHub Actions secrets manipulation, compromised CI environment, or local execution with crafted env vars) could inject arbitrary commands:
                          export SLACK_WEBHOOK='https://example.com/webhook"; malicious_command; echo "'
                          Remediation
                          Option 1: Validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format (recommended)
                          # Add validation before usevalidate_slack_webhook() {
local webhook="$1"if [[ !"$webhook"=~ ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/ ]];then
log_error "Invalid SLACK_WEBHOOK format. Must be a valid Slack webhook URL."return 1
fi
}
# Then use:if [[ -n"${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-}" ]] && [[ "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ]];then
validate_slack_webhook "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"||return 1
curl -s -X POST "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}"fi
                          Option 2: Use printf with %q for safe quoting
                          if [[ -n"${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-}" ]] && [[ "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ]];thenlocal safe_webhook
safe_webhook=$(printf '%q'"${SLACK_WEBHOOK}")eval"curl -s -X POST ${safe_webhook} -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}'"fi
                          Option 3: Avoid heredocs for this pattern
                          Move the Slack notification logic out of heredocs entirely and call it directly in the script, avoiding variable expansion in heredocs.
                          Affected Lines
                          • Line 356: Triage mode Slack notification
                          • Line 715: Review-all mode Slack notification
                          • Line 918: Scan mode Slack notification
                          References
                          • CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command
                          • OWASP: Command Injection
                          • Bash best practices: Always validate external input before embedding in commands
                          Found By
                          Automated security scan of shell scripts changed in last 24 hours (2026-02-13)
                          Metadata
                          Metadata
                          Assignees
                          No one assigned
                            Labels
                            safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
                            Type
                            No type
                            Projects
                            No projects
                              Milestone
                              No milestone
                              Relationships
                              None yet
                              Development
                              No branches or pull requests
                              Issue actions
                              
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

                              Skip to content
                              Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh #992
                              Closed
                              #996
                              Closed
                              Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh#992
                              #996
                              Labels
                              safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
                              Description
                              @louisgv
                              louisgv
                              opened on Feb 13, 2026
                              Security Finding
                              Severity: HIGH
                              File: .claude/skills/setup-agent-team/security.sh:356,715,918
                              Category: injection
                              Scanner: security/shell-scanner
                              Description
                              The SLACK_WEBHOOK environment variable is embedded directly into heredocs containing curl commands without validation. This creates a command injection vulnerability if an attacker can control the SLACK_WEBHOOK value.
                              Vulnerable code pattern (lines 356, 715, 918):
                              SLACK_WEBHOOK="${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-NOT_SET}"if [ -n"\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" ] && [ "\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ];then
curl -s -X POST "\${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}"fi
                              If SLACK_WEBHOOK contains shell metacharacters or command substitutions (e.g., $(malicious_command) or backticks), they will be executed when the heredoc is evaluated.
                              Attack Scenario
                              An attacker who can set the SLACK_WEBHOOK environment variable (e.g., via GitHub Actions secrets manipulation, compromised CI environment, or local execution with crafted env vars) could inject arbitrary commands:
                              export SLACK_WEBHOOK='https://example.com/webhook"; malicious_command; echo "'
                              Remediation
                              Option 1: Validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format (recommended)
                              # Add validation before usevalidate_slack_webhook() {
local webhook="$1"if [[ !"$webhook"=~ ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/ ]];then
log_error "Invalid SLACK_WEBHOOK format. Must be a valid Slack webhook URL."return 1
fi
}
# Then use:if [[ -n"${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-}" ]] && [[ "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ]];then
validate_slack_webhook "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"||return 1
curl -s -X POST "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}"fi
                              Option 2: Use printf with %q for safe quoting
                              if [[ -n"${SLACK_WEBHOOK:-}" ]] && [[ "${SLACK_WEBHOOK}"!="NOT_SET" ]];thenlocal safe_webhook
safe_webhook=$(printf '%q'"${SLACK_WEBHOOK}")eval"curl -s -X POST ${safe_webhook} -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"text\":\":mag: Issue #${ISSUE_NUM} needs human review...\"}'"fi
                              Option 3: Avoid heredocs for this pattern
                              Move the Slack notification logic out of heredocs entirely and call it directly in the script, avoiding variable expansion in heredocs.
                              Affected Lines
                              • Line 356: Triage mode Slack notification
                              • Line 715: Review-all mode Slack notification
                              • Line 918: Scan mode Slack notification
                              References
                              • CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command
                              • OWASP: Command Injection
                              • Bash best practices: Always validate external input before embedding in commands
                              Found By
                              Automated security scan of shell scripts changed in last 24 hours (2026-02-13)
                              Metadata
                              Metadata
                              Assignees
                              No one assigned
                                Labels
                                safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
                                Type
                                No type
                                Projects
                                No projects
                                  Milestone
                                  No milestone
                                  Relationships
                                  None yet
                                  Development
                                  No branches or pull requests
                                  Issue actions