fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent injection - #996

Merged
louisgv merged 1 commit into
mainfrom
fix/slack-webhook-injection
Feb 13, 2026
Merged

fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent injection#996
louisgv merged 1 commit into
mainfrom
fix/slack-webhook-injection

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@la14-1

@la14-1la14-1 commented Feb 13, 2026

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Summary

  • Added early validation of SLACK_WEBHOOK env var format (must match ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/)
  • Invalid values are cleared with a warning, preventing injection via heredoc expansion at lines 356, 715, and 918
  • Stopped leaking the full webhook URL into prompt text (replaced with yes/no indicator)

Fixes#992

-- refactor/security-auditor

@louisgv
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent command injection
5009940
SLACK_WEBHOOK was embedded directly in heredocs at three locations,
allowing potential command injection if the env var contained shell
metacharacters. Added early validation requiring the URL to match
the expected Slack webhook format (https://hooks.slack.com/...).
Also stopped leaking the full webhook URL into prompt text.
Fixes#992
Agent: security-auditor
louisgv
louisgv approved these changes Feb 13, 2026
View reviewed changes

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Security Review

Verdict: APPROVED

Findings

No security issues found. This PR is a pure security improvement:

  1. SLACK_WEBHOOK validation (line 28): Properly validates format against ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/ regex before use in heredoc expansions, preventing potential injection. Gracefully disables rather than hard-failing.

  2. Credential leak fix (line 721): Replaces full webhook URL exposure in prompt text with a yes/no indicator, preventing secret leakage into Claude Code prompts.

Tests

  • bash -n: PASS
  • bun test: N/A (no .ts changes)
  • curl|bash pattern: OK (not affected)
  • macOS compat: OK ([[ =~ ]] works in bash 3.2)

-- security/pr-reviewer

@louisgvlouisgv added the security-approved Security review approved label Feb 13, 2026
@louisgv
louisgv merged commit b39a691 into mainFeb 13, 2026
2 checks passed
@louisgv
louisgv deleted the fix/slack-webhook-injection branch February 13, 2026 20:28
@la14-1la14-1 mentioned this pull request Feb 13, 2026
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Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh

2 participants

@la14-1@louisgv
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
 blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

Skip to content
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent injection - #996
Merged
louisgv merged 1 commit into
mainfrom 
fix/slack-webhook-injection
Feb 13, 2026
Merged
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent injection#996
louisgv merged 1 commit into
mainfrom 
fix/slack-webhook-injection
Conversation
@la14-1
@la14-1la14-1
commented
Feb 13, 2026

Copy link


Copy Markdown

Collaborator
Summary
  • Added early validation of SLACK_WEBHOOK env var format (must match ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/)
  • Invalid values are cleared with a warning, preventing injection via heredoc expansion at lines 356, 715, and 918
  • Stopped leaking the full webhook URL into prompt text (replaced with yes/no indicator)
Fixes#992
-- refactor/security-auditor
@louisgv
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent command injection
5009940
SLACK_WEBHOOK was embedded directly in heredocs at three locations,
allowing potential command injection if the env var contained shell
metacharacters. Added early validation requiring the URL to match
the expected Slack webhook format (https://hooks.slack.com/...).
Also stopped leaking the full webhook URL into prompt text.
Fixes#992
Agent: security-auditor
louisgv
louisgv
approved these changes
Feb 13, 2026
View reviewed changes
@louisgvlouisgv
left a comment


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Security Review
Verdict: APPROVED
Findings
No security issues found. This PR is a pure security improvement:
  1. SLACK_WEBHOOK validation (line 28): Properly validates format against ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/ regex before use in heredoc expansions, preventing potential injection. Gracefully disables rather than hard-failing.
  2. Credential leak fix (line 721): Replaces full webhook URL exposure in prompt text with a yes/no indicator, preventing secret leakage into Claude Code prompts.
Tests
  • bash -n: PASS
  • bun test: N/A (no .ts changes)
  • curl|bash pattern: OK (not affected)
  • macOS compat: OK ([[ =~ ]] works in bash 3.2)
-- security/pr-reviewer
@louisgvlouisgv
added
the 
security-approved
Security review approved
label
Feb 13, 2026
@louisgv
louisgv
merged commit b39a691
into
mainFeb 13, 2026

2 checks passed

@louisgv
louisgv
deleted the

fix/slack-webhook-injection

branch
February 13, 2026 20:28
@la14-1la14-1
mentioned this pull request
Feb 13, 2026

Closed

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Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh


2 participants

@la14-1@louisgv

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent injection - #996
Merged
louisgv merged 1 commit into
mainfrom 
fix/slack-webhook-injection
Feb 13, 2026
Merged
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent injection#996
louisgv merged 1 commit into
mainfrom 
fix/slack-webhook-injection
Conversation
@la14-1
@la14-1la14-1
commented
Feb 13, 2026

Copy link


Copy Markdown

Collaborator
Summary
  • Added early validation of SLACK_WEBHOOK env var format (must match ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/)
  • Invalid values are cleared with a warning, preventing injection via heredoc expansion at lines 356, 715, and 918
  • Stopped leaking the full webhook URL into prompt text (replaced with yes/no indicator)
Fixes#992
-- refactor/security-auditor
@louisgv
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent command injection
5009940
SLACK_WEBHOOK was embedded directly in heredocs at three locations,
allowing potential command injection if the env var contained shell
metacharacters. Added early validation requiring the URL to match
the expected Slack webhook format (https://hooks.slack.com/...).
Also stopped leaking the full webhook URL into prompt text.
Fixes#992
Agent: security-auditor
louisgv
louisgv
approved these changes
Feb 13, 2026
View reviewed changes
@louisgvlouisgv
left a comment


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Security Review
Verdict: APPROVED
Findings
No security issues found. This PR is a pure security improvement:
  1. SLACK_WEBHOOK validation (line 28): Properly validates format against ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/ regex before use in heredoc expansions, preventing potential injection. Gracefully disables rather than hard-failing.
  2. Credential leak fix (line 721): Replaces full webhook URL exposure in prompt text with a yes/no indicator, preventing secret leakage into Claude Code prompts.
Tests
  • bash -n: PASS
  • bun test: N/A (no .ts changes)
  • curl|bash pattern: OK (not affected)
  • macOS compat: OK ([[ =~ ]] works in bash 3.2)
-- security/pr-reviewer
@louisgvlouisgv
added
the 
security-approved
Security review approved
label
Feb 13, 2026
@louisgv
louisgv
merged commit b39a691
into
mainFeb 13, 2026

2 checks passed

@louisgv
louisgv
deleted the

fix/slack-webhook-injection

branch
February 13, 2026 20:28
@la14-1la14-1
mentioned this pull request
Feb 13, 2026

Closed

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Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh


2 participants

@la14-1@louisgv

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent injection - #996
Merged
louisgv merged 1 commit into
mainfrom 
fix/slack-webhook-injection
Feb 13, 2026
Merged
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent injection#996
louisgv merged 1 commit into
mainfrom 
fix/slack-webhook-injection
Conversation
@la14-1
@la14-1la14-1
commented
Feb 13, 2026

Copy link


Copy Markdown

Collaborator
Summary
  • Added early validation of SLACK_WEBHOOK env var format (must match ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/)
  • Invalid values are cleared with a warning, preventing injection via heredoc expansion at lines 356, 715, and 918
  • Stopped leaking the full webhook URL into prompt text (replaced with yes/no indicator)
Fixes#992
-- refactor/security-auditor
@louisgv
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent command injection
5009940
SLACK_WEBHOOK was embedded directly in heredocs at three locations,
allowing potential command injection if the env var contained shell
metacharacters. Added early validation requiring the URL to match
the expected Slack webhook format (https://hooks.slack.com/...).
Also stopped leaking the full webhook URL into prompt text.
Fixes#992
Agent: security-auditor
louisgv
louisgv
approved these changes
Feb 13, 2026
View reviewed changes
@louisgvlouisgv
left a comment


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Security Review
Verdict: APPROVED
Findings
No security issues found. This PR is a pure security improvement:
  1. SLACK_WEBHOOK validation (line 28): Properly validates format against ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/ regex before use in heredoc expansions, preventing potential injection. Gracefully disables rather than hard-failing.
  2. Credential leak fix (line 721): Replaces full webhook URL exposure in prompt text with a yes/no indicator, preventing secret leakage into Claude Code prompts.
Tests
  • bash -n: PASS
  • bun test: N/A (no .ts changes)
  • curl|bash pattern: OK (not affected)
  • macOS compat: OK ([[ =~ ]] works in bash 3.2)
-- security/pr-reviewer
@louisgvlouisgv
added
the 
security-approved
Security review approved
label
Feb 13, 2026
@louisgv
louisgv
merged commit b39a691
into
mainFeb 13, 2026

2 checks passed

@louisgv
louisgv
deleted the

fix/slack-webhook-injection

branch
February 13, 2026 20:28
@la14-1la14-1
mentioned this pull request
Feb 13, 2026

Closed

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Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh


2 participants

@la14-1@louisgv

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

Skip to content
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent injection - #996
Merged
louisgv merged 1 commit into
mainfrom 
fix/slack-webhook-injection
Feb 13, 2026
Merged
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent injection#996
louisgv merged 1 commit into
mainfrom 
fix/slack-webhook-injection
Conversation
@la14-1
@la14-1la14-1
commented
Feb 13, 2026

Copy link


Copy Markdown

Collaborator
Summary
  • Added early validation of SLACK_WEBHOOK env var format (must match ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/)
  • Invalid values are cleared with a warning, preventing injection via heredoc expansion at lines 356, 715, and 918
  • Stopped leaking the full webhook URL into prompt text (replaced with yes/no indicator)
Fixes#992
-- refactor/security-auditor
@louisgv
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent command injection
5009940
SLACK_WEBHOOK was embedded directly in heredocs at three locations,
allowing potential command injection if the env var contained shell
metacharacters. Added early validation requiring the URL to match
the expected Slack webhook format (https://hooks.slack.com/...).
Also stopped leaking the full webhook URL into prompt text.
Fixes#992
Agent: security-auditor
louisgv
louisgv
approved these changes
Feb 13, 2026
View reviewed changes
@louisgvlouisgv
left a comment


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Security Review
Verdict: APPROVED
Findings
No security issues found. This PR is a pure security improvement:
  1. SLACK_WEBHOOK validation (line 28): Properly validates format against ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/ regex before use in heredoc expansions, preventing potential injection. Gracefully disables rather than hard-failing.
  2. Credential leak fix (line 721): Replaces full webhook URL exposure in prompt text with a yes/no indicator, preventing secret leakage into Claude Code prompts.
Tests
  • bash -n: PASS
  • bun test: N/A (no .ts changes)
  • curl|bash pattern: OK (not affected)
  • macOS compat: OK ([[ =~ ]] works in bash 3.2)
-- security/pr-reviewer
@louisgvlouisgv
added
the 
security-approved
Security review approved
label
Feb 13, 2026
@louisgv
louisgv
merged commit b39a691
into
mainFeb 13, 2026

2 checks passed

@louisgv
louisgv
deleted the

fix/slack-webhook-injection

branch
February 13, 2026 20:28
@la14-1la14-1
mentioned this pull request
Feb 13, 2026

Closed

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Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh


2 participants

@la14-1@louisgv

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent injection - #996
Merged
louisgv merged 1 commit into
mainfrom 
fix/slack-webhook-injection
Feb 13, 2026
Merged
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent injection#996
louisgv merged 1 commit into
mainfrom 
fix/slack-webhook-injection
Conversation
@la14-1
@la14-1la14-1
commented
Feb 13, 2026

Copy link


Copy Markdown

Collaborator
Summary
  • Added early validation of SLACK_WEBHOOK env var format (must match ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/)
  • Invalid values are cleared with a warning, preventing injection via heredoc expansion at lines 356, 715, and 918
  • Stopped leaking the full webhook URL into prompt text (replaced with yes/no indicator)
Fixes#992
-- refactor/security-auditor
@louisgv
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent command injection
5009940
SLACK_WEBHOOK was embedded directly in heredocs at three locations,
allowing potential command injection if the env var contained shell
metacharacters. Added early validation requiring the URL to match
the expected Slack webhook format (https://hooks.slack.com/...).
Also stopped leaking the full webhook URL into prompt text.
Fixes#992
Agent: security-auditor
louisgv
louisgv
approved these changes
Feb 13, 2026
View reviewed changes
@louisgvlouisgv
left a comment


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Security Review
Verdict: APPROVED
Findings
No security issues found. This PR is a pure security improvement:
  1. SLACK_WEBHOOK validation (line 28): Properly validates format against ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/ regex before use in heredoc expansions, preventing potential injection. Gracefully disables rather than hard-failing.
  2. Credential leak fix (line 721): Replaces full webhook URL exposure in prompt text with a yes/no indicator, preventing secret leakage into Claude Code prompts.
Tests
  • bash -n: PASS
  • bun test: N/A (no .ts changes)
  • curl|bash pattern: OK (not affected)
  • macOS compat: OK ([[ =~ ]] works in bash 3.2)
-- security/pr-reviewer
@louisgvlouisgv
added
the 
security-approved
Security review approved
label
Feb 13, 2026
@louisgv
louisgv
merged commit b39a691
into
mainFeb 13, 2026

2 checks passed

@louisgv
louisgv
deleted the

fix/slack-webhook-injection

branch
February 13, 2026 20:28
@la14-1la14-1
mentioned this pull request
Feb 13, 2026

Closed

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@louisgvlouisgvlouisgv approved these changes

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Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh


2 participants

@la14-1@louisgv

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

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fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent injection - #996
Merged
louisgv merged 1 commit into
mainfrom 
fix/slack-webhook-injection
Feb 13, 2026
Merged
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent injection#996
louisgv merged 1 commit into
mainfrom 
fix/slack-webhook-injection
Conversation
@la14-1
@la14-1la14-1
commented
Feb 13, 2026

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Collaborator
Summary
  • Added early validation of SLACK_WEBHOOK env var format (must match ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/)
  • Invalid values are cleared with a warning, preventing injection via heredoc expansion at lines 356, 715, and 918
  • Stopped leaking the full webhook URL into prompt text (replaced with yes/no indicator)
Fixes#992
-- refactor/security-auditor
@louisgv
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent command injection
5009940
SLACK_WEBHOOK was embedded directly in heredocs at three locations,
allowing potential command injection if the env var contained shell
metacharacters. Added early validation requiring the URL to match
the expected Slack webhook format (https://hooks.slack.com/...).
Also stopped leaking the full webhook URL into prompt text.
Fixes#992
Agent: security-auditor
louisgv
louisgv
approved these changes
Feb 13, 2026
View reviewed changes
@louisgvlouisgv
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Security Review
Verdict: APPROVED
Findings
No security issues found. This PR is a pure security improvement:
  1. SLACK_WEBHOOK validation (line 28): Properly validates format against ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/ regex before use in heredoc expansions, preventing potential injection. Gracefully disables rather than hard-failing.
  2. Credential leak fix (line 721): Replaces full webhook URL exposure in prompt text with a yes/no indicator, preventing secret leakage into Claude Code prompts.
Tests
  • bash -n: PASS
  • bun test: N/A (no .ts changes)
  • curl|bash pattern: OK (not affected)
  • macOS compat: OK ([[ =~ ]] works in bash 3.2)
-- security/pr-reviewer
@louisgvlouisgv
added
the 
security-approved
Security review approved
label
Feb 13, 2026
@louisgv
louisgv
merged commit b39a691
into
mainFeb 13, 2026

2 checks passed

@louisgv
louisgv
deleted the

fix/slack-webhook-injection

branch
February 13, 2026 20:28
@la14-1la14-1
mentioned this pull request
Feb 13, 2026

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Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh


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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

Skip to content
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent injection - #996
Merged
louisgv merged 1 commit into
mainfrom 
fix/slack-webhook-injection
Feb 13, 2026
Merged
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent injection#996
louisgv merged 1 commit into
mainfrom 
fix/slack-webhook-injection
Conversation
@la14-1
@la14-1la14-1
commented
Feb 13, 2026

Copy link


Copy Markdown

Collaborator
Summary
  • Added early validation of SLACK_WEBHOOK env var format (must match ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/)
  • Invalid values are cleared with a warning, preventing injection via heredoc expansion at lines 356, 715, and 918
  • Stopped leaking the full webhook URL into prompt text (replaced with yes/no indicator)
Fixes#992
-- refactor/security-auditor
@louisgv
fix: validate SLACK_WEBHOOK format to prevent command injection
5009940
SLACK_WEBHOOK was embedded directly in heredocs at three locations,
allowing potential command injection if the env var contained shell
metacharacters. Added early validation requiring the URL to match
the expected Slack webhook format (https://hooks.slack.com/...).
Also stopped leaking the full webhook URL into prompt text.
Fixes#992
Agent: security-auditor
louisgv
louisgv
approved these changes
Feb 13, 2026
View reviewed changes
@louisgvlouisgv
left a comment


Copy link


Copy Markdown

Collaborator
Choose a reason for hiding this comment

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Security Review
Verdict: APPROVED
Findings
No security issues found. This PR is a pure security improvement:
  1. SLACK_WEBHOOK validation (line 28): Properly validates format against ^https://hooks\.slack\.com/ regex before use in heredoc expansions, preventing potential injection. Gracefully disables rather than hard-failing.
  2. Credential leak fix (line 721): Replaces full webhook URL exposure in prompt text with a yes/no indicator, preventing secret leakage into Claude Code prompts.
Tests
  • bash -n: PASS
  • bun test: N/A (no .ts changes)
  • curl|bash pattern: OK (not affected)
  • macOS compat: OK ([[ =~ ]] works in bash 3.2)
-- security/pr-reviewer
@louisgvlouisgv
added
the 
security-approved
Security review approved
label
Feb 13, 2026
@louisgv
louisgv
merged commit b39a691
into
mainFeb 13, 2026

2 checks passed

@louisgv
louisgv
deleted the

fix/slack-webhook-injection

branch
February 13, 2026 20:28
@la14-1la14-1
mentioned this pull request
Feb 13, 2026

Closed

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Reviewers

@louisgvlouisgvlouisgv approved these changes

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Labels

security-approvedSecurity review approved

Projects


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Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

Security: Command injection via SLACK_WEBHOOK in security.sh


2 participants

@la14-1@louisgv