[P2][security] /api/social/students returns every user in the DB — authenticated but not scoped #342

Closed
#353
Closed
[P2][security] /api/social/students returns every user in the DB — authenticated but not scoped#342
#353
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AndresL230
Labels
P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposure

Description

@AndresL230
AndresL230
opened on Jul 15, 2026

Found while reviewing #253 (now closed as obsolete). This is on main today and was not introduced by that PR.

The behavior

backend/routes/social.pyget_students returns a profile for every user in the database — display name, streak, course list, mastery stats (mastered/learning/struggling counts), and top concepts.

It is authenticated but not scoped. social.py:426:

user_id=get_session_user_id(request) # assigned and never used

That call enforces "is logged in" and nothing else — the value is dead code. There is no require_self / require_admin, and neither quite fits (require_self guards a target user_id).

So any authenticated user can enumerate every other user, across all courses, offerings, and terms, along with their academic performance.

Why this needs a decision, not just a patch

The docstring ("Return a lightweight profile for every user in the DB") reads as intentional — this looks like it backs a student-discovery / class-intel surface. So the question isn't "is it a bug", it's what the intended visibility boundary is:

  • Same offering only? (enrollments → offering_id matching the viewer's)
  • Same abstract course, any offering/term?
  • Same term?
  • Opt-in directory, with a privacy setting?

Mastery data in particular is academic-performance information about identifiable students. Worth an explicit call rather than an implicit one.

Note

The repo has prior art for this class of fix in calendar scoping (test_calendar_scoping_enrollment.py, test_calendar_read_enrollment.py, test_calendar_sibling_write_scoping.py) — the enrollment-scoping pattern is established, just not applied here.

Per conventions this should resolve through services/academics.py rather than hand-rolling the embed. Note academics.py currently exposes user_offering_ids_for_course / offering_course_id but has no bulk "names for all enrollments" helper — which is likely why both this and #253 hand-rolled it. Adding that helper is probably a prerequisite.

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    , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
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}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

    Skip to content
    [P2][security] /api/social/students returns every user in the DB — authenticated but not scoped #342
    Closed
    #353
    Closed
    [P2][security] /api/social/students returns every user in the DB — authenticated but not scoped#342
    #353
    Assignees
    AndresL230
    Labels
    P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposure
    Description
    @AndresL230
    AndresL230
    opened on Jul 15, 2026
    Found while reviewing #253 (now closed as obsolete). This is on main today and was not introduced by that PR.
    The behavior
    backend/routes/social.pyget_students returns a profile for every user in the database — display name, streak, course list, mastery stats (mastered/learning/struggling counts), and top concepts.
    It is authenticated but not scoped. social.py:426:
    user_id=get_session_user_id(request) # assigned and never used
    That call enforces "is logged in" and nothing else — the value is dead code. There is no require_self / require_admin, and neither quite fits (require_self guards a target user_id).
    So any authenticated user can enumerate every other user, across all courses, offerings, and terms, along with their academic performance.
    Why this needs a decision, not just a patch
    The docstring ("Return a lightweight profile for every user in the DB") reads as intentional — this looks like it backs a student-discovery / class-intel surface. So the question isn't "is it a bug", it's what the intended visibility boundary is:
    • Same offering only? (enrollments → offering_id matching the viewer's)
    • Same abstract course, any offering/term?
    • Same term?
    • Opt-in directory, with a privacy setting?
    Mastery data in particular is academic-performance information about identifiable students. Worth an explicit call rather than an implicit one.
    Note
    The repo has prior art for this class of fix in calendar scoping (test_calendar_scoping_enrollment.py, test_calendar_read_enrollment.py, test_calendar_sibling_write_scoping.py) — the enrollment-scoping pattern is established, just not applied here.
    Per conventions this should resolve through services/academics.py rather than hand-rolling the embed. Note academics.py currently exposes user_offering_ids_for_course / offering_course_id but has no bulk "names for all enrollments" helper — which is likely why both this and #253 hand-rolled it. Adding that helper is probably a prerequisite.
    Metadata
    Metadata
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    P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposure
    Type
    No type
    Projects
    No projects
      Milestone
      No milestone
      Relationships
      None yet
      Development
      No branches or pull requests
      Issue actions
      
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

      Skip to content
      [P2][security] /api/social/students returns every user in the DB — authenticated but not scoped #342
      Closed
      #353
      Closed
      [P2][security] /api/social/students returns every user in the DB — authenticated but not scoped#342
      #353
      Assignees
      AndresL230
      Labels
      P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposure
      Description
      @AndresL230
      AndresL230
      opened on Jul 15, 2026
      Found while reviewing #253 (now closed as obsolete). This is on main today and was not introduced by that PR.
      The behavior
      backend/routes/social.pyget_students returns a profile for every user in the database — display name, streak, course list, mastery stats (mastered/learning/struggling counts), and top concepts.
      It is authenticated but not scoped. social.py:426:
      user_id=get_session_user_id(request) # assigned and never used
      That call enforces "is logged in" and nothing else — the value is dead code. There is no require_self / require_admin, and neither quite fits (require_self guards a target user_id).
      So any authenticated user can enumerate every other user, across all courses, offerings, and terms, along with their academic performance.
      Why this needs a decision, not just a patch
      The docstring ("Return a lightweight profile for every user in the DB") reads as intentional — this looks like it backs a student-discovery / class-intel surface. So the question isn't "is it a bug", it's what the intended visibility boundary is:
      • Same offering only? (enrollments → offering_id matching the viewer's)
      • Same abstract course, any offering/term?
      • Same term?
      • Opt-in directory, with a privacy setting?
      Mastery data in particular is academic-performance information about identifiable students. Worth an explicit call rather than an implicit one.
      Note
      The repo has prior art for this class of fix in calendar scoping (test_calendar_scoping_enrollment.py, test_calendar_read_enrollment.py, test_calendar_sibling_write_scoping.py) — the enrollment-scoping pattern is established, just not applied here.
      Per conventions this should resolve through services/academics.py rather than hand-rolling the embed. Note academics.py currently exposes user_offering_ids_for_course / offering_course_id but has no bulk "names for all enrollments" helper — which is likely why both this and #253 hand-rolled it. Adding that helper is probably a prerequisite.
      Metadata
      Metadata
      Assignees
      Labels
      P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposure
      Type
      No type
      Projects
      No projects
        Milestone
        No milestone
        Relationships
        None yet
        Development
        No branches or pull requests
        Issue actions
        
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

        Skip to content
        [P2][security] /api/social/students returns every user in the DB — authenticated but not scoped #342
        Closed
        #353
        Closed
        [P2][security] /api/social/students returns every user in the DB — authenticated but not scoped#342
        #353
        Assignees
        AndresL230
        Labels
        P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposure
        Description
        @AndresL230
        AndresL230
        opened on Jul 15, 2026
        Found while reviewing #253 (now closed as obsolete). This is on main today and was not introduced by that PR.
        The behavior
        backend/routes/social.pyget_students returns a profile for every user in the database — display name, streak, course list, mastery stats (mastered/learning/struggling counts), and top concepts.
        It is authenticated but not scoped. social.py:426:
        user_id=get_session_user_id(request) # assigned and never used
        That call enforces "is logged in" and nothing else — the value is dead code. There is no require_self / require_admin, and neither quite fits (require_self guards a target user_id).
        So any authenticated user can enumerate every other user, across all courses, offerings, and terms, along with their academic performance.
        Why this needs a decision, not just a patch
        The docstring ("Return a lightweight profile for every user in the DB") reads as intentional — this looks like it backs a student-discovery / class-intel surface. So the question isn't "is it a bug", it's what the intended visibility boundary is:
        • Same offering only? (enrollments → offering_id matching the viewer's)
        • Same abstract course, any offering/term?
        • Same term?
        • Opt-in directory, with a privacy setting?
        Mastery data in particular is academic-performance information about identifiable students. Worth an explicit call rather than an implicit one.
        Note
        The repo has prior art for this class of fix in calendar scoping (test_calendar_scoping_enrollment.py, test_calendar_read_enrollment.py, test_calendar_sibling_write_scoping.py) — the enrollment-scoping pattern is established, just not applied here.
        Per conventions this should resolve through services/academics.py rather than hand-rolling the embed. Note academics.py currently exposes user_offering_ids_for_course / offering_course_id but has no bulk "names for all enrollments" helper — which is likely why both this and #253 hand-rolled it. Adding that helper is probably a prerequisite.
        Metadata
        Metadata
        Assignees
        Labels
        P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposure
        Type
        No type
        Projects
        No projects
          Milestone
          No milestone
          Relationships
          None yet
          Development
          No branches or pull requests
          Issue actions
          
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

          Skip to content
          [P2][security] /api/social/students returns every user in the DB — authenticated but not scoped #342
          Closed
          #353
          Closed
          [P2][security] /api/social/students returns every user in the DB — authenticated but not scoped#342
          #353
          Assignees
          AndresL230
          Labels
          P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposure
          Description
          @AndresL230
          AndresL230
          opened on Jul 15, 2026
          Found while reviewing #253 (now closed as obsolete). This is on main today and was not introduced by that PR.
          The behavior
          backend/routes/social.pyget_students returns a profile for every user in the database — display name, streak, course list, mastery stats (mastered/learning/struggling counts), and top concepts.
          It is authenticated but not scoped. social.py:426:
          user_id=get_session_user_id(request) # assigned and never used
          That call enforces "is logged in" and nothing else — the value is dead code. There is no require_self / require_admin, and neither quite fits (require_self guards a target user_id).
          So any authenticated user can enumerate every other user, across all courses, offerings, and terms, along with their academic performance.
          Why this needs a decision, not just a patch
          The docstring ("Return a lightweight profile for every user in the DB") reads as intentional — this looks like it backs a student-discovery / class-intel surface. So the question isn't "is it a bug", it's what the intended visibility boundary is:
          • Same offering only? (enrollments → offering_id matching the viewer's)
          • Same abstract course, any offering/term?
          • Same term?
          • Opt-in directory, with a privacy setting?
          Mastery data in particular is academic-performance information about identifiable students. Worth an explicit call rather than an implicit one.
          Note
          The repo has prior art for this class of fix in calendar scoping (test_calendar_scoping_enrollment.py, test_calendar_read_enrollment.py, test_calendar_sibling_write_scoping.py) — the enrollment-scoping pattern is established, just not applied here.
          Per conventions this should resolve through services/academics.py rather than hand-rolling the embed. Note academics.py currently exposes user_offering_ids_for_course / offering_course_id but has no bulk "names for all enrollments" helper — which is likely why both this and #253 hand-rolled it. Adding that helper is probably a prerequisite.
          Metadata
          Metadata
          Assignees
          Labels
          P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposure
          Type
          No type
          Projects
          No projects
            Milestone
            No milestone
            Relationships
            None yet
            Development
            No branches or pull requests
            Issue actions
            
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

            Skip to content
            [P2][security] /api/social/students returns every user in the DB — authenticated but not scoped #342
            Closed
            #353
            Closed
            [P2][security] /api/social/students returns every user in the DB — authenticated but not scoped#342
            #353
            Assignees
            AndresL230
            Labels
            P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposure
            Description
            @AndresL230
            AndresL230
            opened on Jul 15, 2026
            Found while reviewing #253 (now closed as obsolete). This is on main today and was not introduced by that PR.
            The behavior
            backend/routes/social.pyget_students returns a profile for every user in the database — display name, streak, course list, mastery stats (mastered/learning/struggling counts), and top concepts.
            It is authenticated but not scoped. social.py:426:
            user_id=get_session_user_id(request) # assigned and never used
            That call enforces "is logged in" and nothing else — the value is dead code. There is no require_self / require_admin, and neither quite fits (require_self guards a target user_id).
            So any authenticated user can enumerate every other user, across all courses, offerings, and terms, along with their academic performance.
            Why this needs a decision, not just a patch
            The docstring ("Return a lightweight profile for every user in the DB") reads as intentional — this looks like it backs a student-discovery / class-intel surface. So the question isn't "is it a bug", it's what the intended visibility boundary is:
            • Same offering only? (enrollments → offering_id matching the viewer's)
            • Same abstract course, any offering/term?
            • Same term?
            • Opt-in directory, with a privacy setting?
            Mastery data in particular is academic-performance information about identifiable students. Worth an explicit call rather than an implicit one.
            Note
            The repo has prior art for this class of fix in calendar scoping (test_calendar_scoping_enrollment.py, test_calendar_read_enrollment.py, test_calendar_sibling_write_scoping.py) — the enrollment-scoping pattern is established, just not applied here.
            Per conventions this should resolve through services/academics.py rather than hand-rolling the embed. Note academics.py currently exposes user_offering_ids_for_course / offering_course_id but has no bulk "names for all enrollments" helper — which is likely why both this and #253 hand-rolled it. Adding that helper is probably a prerequisite.
            Metadata
            Metadata
            Assignees
            Labels
            P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposure
            Type
            No type
            Projects
            No projects
              Milestone
              No milestone
              Relationships
              None yet
              Development
              No branches or pull requests
              Issue actions
              
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

              Skip to content
              [P2][security] /api/social/students returns every user in the DB — authenticated but not scoped #342
              Closed
              #353
              Closed
              [P2][security] /api/social/students returns every user in the DB — authenticated but not scoped#342
              #353
              Assignees
              AndresL230
              Labels
              P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposure
              Description
              @AndresL230
              AndresL230
              opened on Jul 15, 2026
              Found while reviewing #253 (now closed as obsolete). This is on main today and was not introduced by that PR.
              The behavior
              backend/routes/social.pyget_students returns a profile for every user in the database — display name, streak, course list, mastery stats (mastered/learning/struggling counts), and top concepts.
              It is authenticated but not scoped. social.py:426:
              user_id=get_session_user_id(request) # assigned and never used
              That call enforces "is logged in" and nothing else — the value is dead code. There is no require_self / require_admin, and neither quite fits (require_self guards a target user_id).
              So any authenticated user can enumerate every other user, across all courses, offerings, and terms, along with their academic performance.
              Why this needs a decision, not just a patch
              The docstring ("Return a lightweight profile for every user in the DB") reads as intentional — this looks like it backs a student-discovery / class-intel surface. So the question isn't "is it a bug", it's what the intended visibility boundary is:
              • Same offering only? (enrollments → offering_id matching the viewer's)
              • Same abstract course, any offering/term?
              • Same term?
              • Opt-in directory, with a privacy setting?
              Mastery data in particular is academic-performance information about identifiable students. Worth an explicit call rather than an implicit one.
              Note
              The repo has prior art for this class of fix in calendar scoping (test_calendar_scoping_enrollment.py, test_calendar_read_enrollment.py, test_calendar_sibling_write_scoping.py) — the enrollment-scoping pattern is established, just not applied here.
              Per conventions this should resolve through services/academics.py rather than hand-rolling the embed. Note academics.py currently exposes user_offering_ids_for_course / offering_course_id but has no bulk "names for all enrollments" helper — which is likely why both this and #253 hand-rolled it. Adding that helper is probably a prerequisite.
              Metadata
              Metadata
              Assignees
              Labels
              P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposure
              Type
              No type
              Projects
              No projects
                Milestone
                No milestone
                Relationships
                None yet
                Development
                No branches or pull requests
                Issue actions
                
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

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                [P2][security] /api/social/students returns every user in the DB — authenticated but not scoped #342
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                #353
                Closed
                [P2][security] /api/social/students returns every user in the DB — authenticated but not scoped#342
                #353
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                AndresL230
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                P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposure
                Description
                @AndresL230
                AndresL230
                opened on Jul 15, 2026
                Found while reviewing #253 (now closed as obsolete). This is on main today and was not introduced by that PR.
                The behavior
                backend/routes/social.pyget_students returns a profile for every user in the database — display name, streak, course list, mastery stats (mastered/learning/struggling counts), and top concepts.
                It is authenticated but not scoped. social.py:426:
                user_id=get_session_user_id(request) # assigned and never used
                That call enforces "is logged in" and nothing else — the value is dead code. There is no require_self / require_admin, and neither quite fits (require_self guards a target user_id).
                So any authenticated user can enumerate every other user, across all courses, offerings, and terms, along with their academic performance.
                Why this needs a decision, not just a patch
                The docstring ("Return a lightweight profile for every user in the DB") reads as intentional — this looks like it backs a student-discovery / class-intel surface. So the question isn't "is it a bug", it's what the intended visibility boundary is:
                • Same offering only? (enrollments → offering_id matching the viewer's)
                • Same abstract course, any offering/term?
                • Same term?
                • Opt-in directory, with a privacy setting?
                Mastery data in particular is academic-performance information about identifiable students. Worth an explicit call rather than an implicit one.
                Note
                The repo has prior art for this class of fix in calendar scoping (test_calendar_scoping_enrollment.py, test_calendar_read_enrollment.py, test_calendar_sibling_write_scoping.py) — the enrollment-scoping pattern is established, just not applied here.
                Per conventions this should resolve through services/academics.py rather than hand-rolling the embed. Note academics.py currently exposes user_offering_ids_for_course / offering_course_id but has no bulk "names for all enrollments" helper — which is likely why both this and #253 hand-rolled it. Adding that helper is probably a prerequisite.
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                P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposure
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