chore(deps): update dependency js-yaml to v4.3.1 [security]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
js-yaml	4.1.1 → 4.3.1

---

JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases

CVE-2026-53550 / GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

More information

Details

Summary

A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in js-yaml merge-key processing (<<) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence.
This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service.

Details

The issue is in merge handling inside lib/loader.js:

• storeMappingPair(...) iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is tag:yaml.org,2002:merge.
• For each element, it calls mergeMappings(...).
• mergeMappings(...) computes Object.keys(source) and performs _hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key) checks for each key.

When input is of the form:

a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0}
b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]}
all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time.
Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows.
Relevant code path:
lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge')
lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...)

Root cause

File: lib/loader.js
Function: storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode,
valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos)
Lines: ~359-366

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}

When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element
is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does

sourceKeys = Object.keys(source);
for (index = 0; index < sourceKeys.length; index += 1) {
key = sourceKeys[index];
if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) {
setProperty(destination, key, source[key]);
overridableKeys[key] = true;
}
}

Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object
via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same
reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs:

• one Object.keys(source) call (O(K))
• K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination

Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final
object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge.

YAML semantics for <<: are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources,
so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off.

PoC

Environment:
js-yaml version: 4.1.1
Node.js: v24.5.0
Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently)
Reproduction script:
Create many keys in one anchored map (&a).
Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...].
Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a).
Observed repeated runs (same machine):
K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms
K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms
K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms
K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms
K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms
Control (single merge, similar key counts):
K=2000: ~1–2 ms
K=4000: ~3 ms
K=8000: ~5 ms
Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation.

Impact

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity).
Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability.

Suggested fix:

Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of
the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics:

dedupe in storeMappingPair:

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
var seen = new Set();
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
var src = valueNode[index];
if (seen.has(src)) continue; // idempotent; skip redundant alias
seen.add(src);
mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53550
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

js-yaml: YAML merge-key chains can force quadratic CPU consumption

CVE-2026-59869 / GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m

More information

Details

Impact

js-yaml can spend quadratic CPU time parsing a document whose size grows only linearly. The issue is triggered by a chain of mappings where each mapping merges the previous one:

a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }a1: &a1 { <<: *a0, k1: 1 }a2: &a2 { <<: *a1, k2: 2 }a3: &a3 { <<: *a2, k3: 3 }
...
b: *aN

For each new mapping, the loader has to enumerate the keys inherited from the previous mapping. With N chained mappings, this results in roughly 1 + 2 + ... + N merged-key visits, i.e., O(N^2) work for O(N) input size.

PoC

From N = 4000 delay become > 1s (doc size < 100K)

import{performance}from'node:perf_hooks'import{Buffer}from'node:buffer'import{load,YAML11_SCHEMA}from'js-yaml'constn=Number(process.argv[2]||4000)functionmakeMergeChain(count){constlines=['a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }']for(leti=1;i<count;i++){lines.push(`a${i}: &a${i} { <<: *a${i-1}, k${i}: ${i} }`)}lines.push(`b: *a${count-1}`)return`${lines.join('\n')}\n`}constsource=makeMergeChain(n)console.log(source.split('\n').slice(0,8).join('\n'))console.log('...')console.log(source.split('\n').slice(-4).join('\n'))console.log()console.log(`N: ${n}`)console.log(`YAML size: ${Buffer.byteLength(source)} bytes`)conststarted=performance.now()constresult=load(source,{schema: YAML11_SCHEMA})constelapsed=performance.now()-startedconsole.log(`parse time: ${elapsed.toFixed(1)} ms`)console.log(`top-level keys: ${Object.keys(result).length}`)console.log(`b keys: ${Object.keys(result.b).length}`)

Patches

Fix released. The most robust protection is to limit the total number of merged keys per parse call. This should close all past and future edge cases with merge. The default 10K-key limit should be okay in most cases.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59869
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/24f13e79ee1343a7e30bd6f6c9d9cdbf0ac9b2b7
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/59423c6f8cdc78742ac00e25a4dd39ef16b702e4
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/3.15.0
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/4.3.0
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

JS-YAML: Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (3.x and 4.x) — CVE-2026-59870 fix not backported

GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

More information

Details

Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x)

Summary

resolveYamlOmap() enforces key uniqueness for !!omap sequences with a linear
scan (objectKeys.indexOf(...)) inside the per-element loop, making resolution
O(n²) in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore
consumes disproportionate CPU inside yaml.load(), giving a denial of service
against any consumer that parses untrusted YAML.

!!omap is registered in the default schema
(lib/schema/default.js → require('../type/omap')), so a plain
yaml.load(untrustedInput) with no options is affected — no custom schema or
non-default configuration is required.

This is the same weakness as CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm, which was
fixed in the 5.x line in 5.2.1. That fix was never backported: both currently
maintained legacy lines still carry the original implementation.

Affected versions

Line	Latest tested	Status
3.x	3.15.0	Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:29
4.x	4.3.0	Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:30
5.x	5.2.2	Not affected — fixed in 5.2.1 (uses a Set)

Both figures are the newest release of each line at the time of writing, so
this is not a "you are on an old version" issue.

Details

lib/type/omap.js (js-yaml 4.3.0):

if(objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)===-1)objectKeys.push(pairKey)elsereturnfalse

objectKeys grows by one element per entry, and Array.prototype.indexOf is a
linear scan, so resolving an n-entry !!omap performs roughly
1 + 2 + … + n comparisons — quadratic in n. The work happens synchronously
inside yaml.load(), blocking the event loop for its whole duration.

The 5.x line already solves exactly this by tracking seen keys in a Set
(src/tag/sequence/omap.ts):

if(carrier.seen.has(key))return'duplicate key in ordered map'carrier.seen.add(key)

Proof of concept

// poc.js — node poc.jsconstyaml=require('js-yaml');constdoc=n=>'!!omap\n'+Array.from({length: n},(_,i)=>`- k${i}: ${i}`).join('\n')+'\n';for(constnof[10000,20000,40000,80000]){constd=doc(n),t=Date.now();yaml.load(d);// default schema, no optionsconsole.log(`n=${n} bytes=${d.length} load=${Date.now()-t}ms`);}

Measured (node v20.20.2, default heap, no flags)

js-yaml 4.3.0

n=10000 bytes=137787 load=54ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=169ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=646ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2607ms

js-yaml 3.15.0

n=10000 bytes=137787 load=53ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=166ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=641ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2567ms

Runtime grows by a factor of ~4 for each doubling of n, which is the
signature of O(n²) (linear growth would be ~2×).

Scaling further: a 2.48 MB document with 150,000 entries blocked
yaml.load() for 10.8 seconds.

Impact

Any service that parses attacker-influenced YAML with js-yaml 3.x or 4.x can be
stalled with a small input. Because the loop is synchronous, a single request
blocks the Node.js event loop and stalls every other request in the process —
so the amplification is per-process, not just per-request.

Suggested severity: consistent with CVE-2026-59870 (the same weakness in
5.x), i.e. Availability-only impact, network attack vector, no privileges or
user interaction required.

Suggested fix

Mirror the 5.x fix — replace the linear scan with a Set:

// lib/type/omap.jsconstseen=newSet()// ...if(seen.has(pairKey))returnfalseseen.add(pairKey)

This preserves the existing duplicate-key rejection semantics exactly while
making resolution O(n). A maxOmapLength-style cap would also work, but the
Set matches what 5.x already ships and requires no new option.

References

• CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm — same weakness in 5.0.0–5.2.0, fixed in 5.2.1
• lib/type/omap.js (3.x, 4.x) — the affected resolver
• lib/schema/default.js — registers !!omap in the default schema

Discovery

Found by an automated static-analysis and executed-proof-of-concept scanner run
against js-yaml 4.2.0, then manually verified against 3.15.0 and 4.3.0 by
executing the proof of concept above. All timings in this report were measured
on the current releases of each line, not on the version originally scanned.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

nodeca/js-yaml (js-yaml)

v4.3.1

Compare Source

v4.3.0

Compare Source

v4.2.0

Compare Source

Added

• Added docs/safety.md with notes about processing untrusted YAML.
• Added maxDepth (100) loader option. Not a problem, but gives a better
  exception instead of RangeError on stack overflow.
• Added maxMergeSeqLength (20) loader option. Not a problem after merge fix,
  but an additional restriction for safety.
• Added sourcemaps to dist/ builds.

Changed

• Stop resolving numbers with underscores as numeric scalars, #​627.
• Switched dev toolchains to Vite / neostandard.
• Updated demo.
• Reorganized tests.
• dist/ files are no longer kept in the repository.

Fixed

• Fix parsing of properties on the first implicit block mapping key, #​62.
• Fix trailing whitespace handling when folding flow scalar lines, #​307.
• Reject top-level block scalars without content indentation, #​280.
• Ensure numbers survive round-trip, #​737.
• Fix test coverage for issue #​221.
• Fix flow scalar trailing whitespace folding, #​307.
• Fix digits in YAML named tag handles.

Security

• Fix potential DoS via quadratic complexity in merge - deduplicate repeated
  elements (makes sense for malformed files > 10K).

---

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[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
js-yaml	4.1.1 → 4.3.1

---

JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases

CVE-2026-53550 / GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

More information

Details

Summary

A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in js-yaml merge-key processing (<<) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence.
This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service.

Details

The issue is in merge handling inside lib/loader.js:

• storeMappingPair(...) iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is tag:yaml.org,2002:merge.
• For each element, it calls mergeMappings(...).
• mergeMappings(...) computes Object.keys(source) and performs _hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key) checks for each key.

When input is of the form:

a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0}
b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]}
all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time.
Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows.
Relevant code path:
lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge')
lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...)

Root cause

File: lib/loader.js
Function: storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode,
valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos)
Lines: ~359-366

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}

When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element
is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does

sourceKeys = Object.keys(source);
for (index = 0; index < sourceKeys.length; index += 1) {
key = sourceKeys[index];
if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) {
setProperty(destination, key, source[key]);
overridableKeys[key] = true;
}
}

Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object
via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same
reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs:

• one Object.keys(source) call (O(K))
• K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination

Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final
object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge.

YAML semantics for <<: are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources,
so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off.

PoC

Environment:
js-yaml version: 4.1.1
Node.js: v24.5.0
Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently)
Reproduction script:
Create many keys in one anchored map (&a).
Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...].
Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a).
Observed repeated runs (same machine):
K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms
K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms
K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms
K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms
K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms
Control (single merge, similar key counts):
K=2000: ~1–2 ms
K=4000: ~3 ms
K=8000: ~5 ms
Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation.

Impact

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity).
Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability.

Suggested fix:

Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of
the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics:

dedupe in storeMappingPair:

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
var seen = new Set();
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
var src = valueNode[index];
if (seen.has(src)) continue; // idempotent; skip redundant alias
seen.add(src);
mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53550
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

js-yaml: YAML merge-key chains can force quadratic CPU consumption

CVE-2026-59869 / GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m

More information

Details

Impact

js-yaml can spend quadratic CPU time parsing a document whose size grows only linearly. The issue is triggered by a chain of mappings where each mapping merges the previous one:

a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }a1: &a1 { <<: *a0, k1: 1 }a2: &a2 { <<: *a1, k2: 2 }a3: &a3 { <<: *a2, k3: 3 }
...
b: *aN

For each new mapping, the loader has to enumerate the keys inherited from the previous mapping. With N chained mappings, this results in roughly 1 + 2 + ... + N merged-key visits, i.e., O(N^2) work for O(N) input size.

PoC

From N = 4000 delay become > 1s (doc size < 100K)

import{performance}from'node:perf_hooks'import{Buffer}from'node:buffer'import{load,YAML11_SCHEMA}from'js-yaml'constn=Number(process.argv[2]||4000)functionmakeMergeChain(count){constlines=['a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }']for(leti=1;i<count;i++){lines.push(`a${i}: &a${i} { <<: *a${i-1}, k${i}: ${i} }`)}lines.push(`b: *a${count-1}`)return`${lines.join('\n')}\n`}constsource=makeMergeChain(n)console.log(source.split('\n').slice(0,8).join('\n'))console.log('...')console.log(source.split('\n').slice(-4).join('\n'))console.log()console.log(`N: ${n}`)console.log(`YAML size: ${Buffer.byteLength(source)} bytes`)conststarted=performance.now()constresult=load(source,{schema: YAML11_SCHEMA})constelapsed=performance.now()-startedconsole.log(`parse time: ${elapsed.toFixed(1)} ms`)console.log(`top-level keys: ${Object.keys(result).length}`)console.log(`b keys: ${Object.keys(result.b).length}`)

Patches

Fix released. The most robust protection is to limit the total number of merged keys per parse call. This should close all past and future edge cases with merge. The default 10K-key limit should be okay in most cases.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59869
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/24f13e79ee1343a7e30bd6f6c9d9cdbf0ac9b2b7
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/59423c6f8cdc78742ac00e25a4dd39ef16b702e4
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/3.15.0
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/4.3.0
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

JS-YAML: Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (3.x and 4.x) — CVE-2026-59870 fix not backported

GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

More information

Details

Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x)

Summary

resolveYamlOmap() enforces key uniqueness for !!omap sequences with a linear
scan (objectKeys.indexOf(...)) inside the per-element loop, making resolution
O(n²) in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore
consumes disproportionate CPU inside yaml.load(), giving a denial of service
against any consumer that parses untrusted YAML.

!!omap is registered in the default schema
(lib/schema/default.js → require('../type/omap')), so a plain
yaml.load(untrustedInput) with no options is affected — no custom schema or
non-default configuration is required.

This is the same weakness as CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm, which was
fixed in the 5.x line in 5.2.1. That fix was never backported: both currently
maintained legacy lines still carry the original implementation.

Affected versions

Line	Latest tested	Status
3.x	3.15.0	Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:29
4.x	4.3.0	Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:30
5.x	5.2.2	Not affected — fixed in 5.2.1 (uses a Set)

Both figures are the newest release of each line at the time of writing, so
this is not a "you are on an old version" issue.

Details

lib/type/omap.js (js-yaml 4.3.0):

if(objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)===-1)objectKeys.push(pairKey)elsereturnfalse

objectKeys grows by one element per entry, and Array.prototype.indexOf is a
linear scan, so resolving an n-entry !!omap performs roughly
1 + 2 + … + n comparisons — quadratic in n. The work happens synchronously
inside yaml.load(), blocking the event loop for its whole duration.

The 5.x line already solves exactly this by tracking seen keys in a Set
(src/tag/sequence/omap.ts):

if(carrier.seen.has(key))return'duplicate key in ordered map'carrier.seen.add(key)

Proof of concept

// poc.js — node poc.jsconstyaml=require('js-yaml');constdoc=n=>'!!omap\n'+Array.from({length: n},(_,i)=>`- k${i}: ${i}`).join('\n')+'\n';for(constnof[10000,20000,40000,80000]){constd=doc(n),t=Date.now();yaml.load(d);// default schema, no optionsconsole.log(`n=${n} bytes=${d.length} load=${Date.now()-t}ms`);}

Measured (node v20.20.2, default heap, no flags)

js-yaml 4.3.0

n=10000 bytes=137787 load=54ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=169ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=646ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2607ms

js-yaml 3.15.0

n=10000 bytes=137787 load=53ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=166ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=641ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2567ms

Runtime grows by a factor of ~4 for each doubling of n, which is the
signature of O(n²) (linear growth would be ~2×).

Scaling further: a 2.48 MB document with 150,000 entries blocked
yaml.load() for 10.8 seconds.

Impact

Any service that parses attacker-influenced YAML with js-yaml 3.x or 4.x can be
stalled with a small input. Because the loop is synchronous, a single request
blocks the Node.js event loop and stalls every other request in the process —
so the amplification is per-process, not just per-request.

Suggested severity: consistent with CVE-2026-59870 (the same weakness in
5.x), i.e. Availability-only impact, network attack vector, no privileges or
user interaction required.

Suggested fix

Mirror the 5.x fix — replace the linear scan with a Set:

// lib/type/omap.jsconstseen=newSet()// ...if(seen.has(pairKey))returnfalseseen.add(pairKey)

This preserves the existing duplicate-key rejection semantics exactly while
making resolution O(n). A maxOmapLength-style cap would also work, but the
Set matches what 5.x already ships and requires no new option.

References

• CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm — same weakness in 5.0.0–5.2.0, fixed in 5.2.1
• lib/type/omap.js (3.x, 4.x) — the affected resolver
• lib/schema/default.js — registers !!omap in the default schema

Discovery

Found by an automated static-analysis and executed-proof-of-concept scanner run
against js-yaml 4.2.0, then manually verified against 3.15.0 and 4.3.0 by
executing the proof of concept above. All timings in this report were measured
on the current releases of each line, not on the version originally scanned.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

nodeca/js-yaml (js-yaml)

v4.3.1

Compare Source

v4.3.0

Compare Source

v4.2.0

Compare Source

Added

• Added docs/safety.md with notes about processing untrusted YAML.
• Added maxDepth (100) loader option. Not a problem, but gives a better
  exception instead of RangeError on stack overflow.
• Added maxMergeSeqLength (20) loader option. Not a problem after merge fix,
  but an additional restriction for safety.
• Added sourcemaps to dist/ builds.

Changed

• Stop resolving numbers with underscores as numeric scalars, #​627.
• Switched dev toolchains to Vite / neostandard.
• Updated demo.
• Reorganized tests.
• dist/ files are no longer kept in the repository.

Fixed

• Fix parsing of properties on the first implicit block mapping key, #​62.
• Fix trailing whitespace handling when folding flow scalar lines, #​307.
• Reject top-level block scalars without content indentation, #​280.
• Ensure numbers survive round-trip, #​737.
• Fix test coverage for issue #​221.
• Fix flow scalar trailing whitespace folding, #​307.
• Fix digits in YAML named tag handles.

Security

• Fix potential DoS via quadratic complexity in merge - deduplicate repeated
  elements (makes sense for malformed files > 10K).

---

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
js-yaml	4.1.1 → 4.3.1

---

JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases

CVE-2026-53550 / GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

More information

Details

Summary

A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in js-yaml merge-key processing (<<) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence.
This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service.

Details

The issue is in merge handling inside lib/loader.js:

• storeMappingPair(...) iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is tag:yaml.org,2002:merge.
• For each element, it calls mergeMappings(...).
• mergeMappings(...) computes Object.keys(source) and performs _hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key) checks for each key.

When input is of the form:

a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0}
b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]}
all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time.
Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows.
Relevant code path:
lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge')
lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...)

Root cause

File: lib/loader.js
Function: storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode,
valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos)
Lines: ~359-366

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}

When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element
is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does

sourceKeys = Object.keys(source);
for (index = 0; index < sourceKeys.length; index += 1) {
key = sourceKeys[index];
if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) {
setProperty(destination, key, source[key]);
overridableKeys[key] = true;
}
}

Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object
via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same
reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs:

• one Object.keys(source) call (O(K))
• K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination

Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final
object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge.

YAML semantics for <<: are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources,
so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off.

PoC

Environment:
js-yaml version: 4.1.1
Node.js: v24.5.0
Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently)
Reproduction script:
Create many keys in one anchored map (&a).
Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...].
Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a).
Observed repeated runs (same machine):
K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms
K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms
K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms
K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms
K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms
Control (single merge, similar key counts):
K=2000: ~1–2 ms
K=4000: ~3 ms
K=8000: ~5 ms
Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation.

Impact

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity).
Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability.

Suggested fix:

Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of
the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics:

dedupe in storeMappingPair:

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
var seen = new Set();
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
var src = valueNode[index];
if (seen.has(src)) continue; // idempotent; skip redundant alias
seen.add(src);
mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53550
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

js-yaml: YAML merge-key chains can force quadratic CPU consumption

CVE-2026-59869 / GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m

More information

Details

Impact

js-yaml can spend quadratic CPU time parsing a document whose size grows only linearly. The issue is triggered by a chain of mappings where each mapping merges the previous one:

a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }a1: &a1 { <<: *a0, k1: 1 }a2: &a2 { <<: *a1, k2: 2 }a3: &a3 { <<: *a2, k3: 3 }
...
b: *aN

For each new mapping, the loader has to enumerate the keys inherited from the previous mapping. With N chained mappings, this results in roughly 1 + 2 + ... + N merged-key visits, i.e., O(N^2) work for O(N) input size.

PoC

From N = 4000 delay become > 1s (doc size < 100K)

import{performance}from'node:perf_hooks'import{Buffer}from'node:buffer'import{load,YAML11_SCHEMA}from'js-yaml'constn=Number(process.argv[2]||4000)functionmakeMergeChain(count){constlines=['a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }']for(leti=1;i<count;i++){lines.push(`a${i}: &a${i} { <<: *a${i-1}, k${i}: ${i} }`)}lines.push(`b: *a${count-1}`)return`${lines.join('\n')}\n`}constsource=makeMergeChain(n)console.log(source.split('\n').slice(0,8).join('\n'))console.log('...')console.log(source.split('\n').slice(-4).join('\n'))console.log()console.log(`N: ${n}`)console.log(`YAML size: ${Buffer.byteLength(source)} bytes`)conststarted=performance.now()constresult=load(source,{schema: YAML11_SCHEMA})constelapsed=performance.now()-startedconsole.log(`parse time: ${elapsed.toFixed(1)} ms`)console.log(`top-level keys: ${Object.keys(result).length}`)console.log(`b keys: ${Object.keys(result.b).length}`)

Patches

Fix released. The most robust protection is to limit the total number of merged keys per parse call. This should close all past and future edge cases with merge. The default 10K-key limit should be okay in most cases.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59869
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/24f13e79ee1343a7e30bd6f6c9d9cdbf0ac9b2b7
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/59423c6f8cdc78742ac00e25a4dd39ef16b702e4
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/3.15.0
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/4.3.0
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

JS-YAML: Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (3.x and 4.x) — CVE-2026-59870 fix not backported

GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

More information

Details

Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x)

Summary

resolveYamlOmap() enforces key uniqueness for !!omap sequences with a linear
scan (objectKeys.indexOf(...)) inside the per-element loop, making resolution
O(n²) in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore
consumes disproportionate CPU inside yaml.load(), giving a denial of service
against any consumer that parses untrusted YAML.

!!omap is registered in the default schema
(lib/schema/default.js → require('../type/omap')), so a plain
yaml.load(untrustedInput) with no options is affected — no custom schema or
non-default configuration is required.

This is the same weakness as CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm, which was
fixed in the 5.x line in 5.2.1. That fix was never backported: both currently
maintained legacy lines still carry the original implementation.

Affected versions

Line	Latest tested	Status
3.x	3.15.0	Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:29
4.x	4.3.0	Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:30
5.x	5.2.2	Not affected — fixed in 5.2.1 (uses a Set)

Both figures are the newest release of each line at the time of writing, so
this is not a "you are on an old version" issue.

Details

lib/type/omap.js (js-yaml 4.3.0):

if(objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)===-1)objectKeys.push(pairKey)elsereturnfalse

objectKeys grows by one element per entry, and Array.prototype.indexOf is a
linear scan, so resolving an n-entry !!omap performs roughly
1 + 2 + … + n comparisons — quadratic in n. The work happens synchronously
inside yaml.load(), blocking the event loop for its whole duration.

The 5.x line already solves exactly this by tracking seen keys in a Set
(src/tag/sequence/omap.ts):

if(carrier.seen.has(key))return'duplicate key in ordered map'carrier.seen.add(key)

Proof of concept

// poc.js — node poc.jsconstyaml=require('js-yaml');constdoc=n=>'!!omap\n'+Array.from({length: n},(_,i)=>`- k${i}: ${i}`).join('\n')+'\n';for(constnof[10000,20000,40000,80000]){constd=doc(n),t=Date.now();yaml.load(d);// default schema, no optionsconsole.log(`n=${n} bytes=${d.length} load=${Date.now()-t}ms`);}

Measured (node v20.20.2, default heap, no flags)

js-yaml 4.3.0

n=10000 bytes=137787 load=54ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=169ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=646ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2607ms

js-yaml 3.15.0

n=10000 bytes=137787 load=53ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=166ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=641ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2567ms

Runtime grows by a factor of ~4 for each doubling of n, which is the
signature of O(n²) (linear growth would be ~2×).

Scaling further: a 2.48 MB document with 150,000 entries blocked
yaml.load() for 10.8 seconds.

Impact

Any service that parses attacker-influenced YAML with js-yaml 3.x or 4.x can be
stalled with a small input. Because the loop is synchronous, a single request
blocks the Node.js event loop and stalls every other request in the process —
so the amplification is per-process, not just per-request.

Suggested severity: consistent with CVE-2026-59870 (the same weakness in
5.x), i.e. Availability-only impact, network attack vector, no privileges or
user interaction required.

Suggested fix

Mirror the 5.x fix — replace the linear scan with a Set:

// lib/type/omap.jsconstseen=newSet()// ...if(seen.has(pairKey))returnfalseseen.add(pairKey)

This preserves the existing duplicate-key rejection semantics exactly while
making resolution O(n). A maxOmapLength-style cap would also work, but the
Set matches what 5.x already ships and requires no new option.

References

• CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm — same weakness in 5.0.0–5.2.0, fixed in 5.2.1
• lib/type/omap.js (3.x, 4.x) — the affected resolver
• lib/schema/default.js — registers !!omap in the default schema

Discovery

Found by an automated static-analysis and executed-proof-of-concept scanner run
against js-yaml 4.2.0, then manually verified against 3.15.0 and 4.3.0 by
executing the proof of concept above. All timings in this report were measured
on the current releases of each line, not on the version originally scanned.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

nodeca/js-yaml (js-yaml)

v4.3.1

Compare Source

v4.3.0

Compare Source

v4.2.0

Compare Source

Added

• Added docs/safety.md with notes about processing untrusted YAML.
• Added maxDepth (100) loader option. Not a problem, but gives a better
  exception instead of RangeError on stack overflow.
• Added maxMergeSeqLength (20) loader option. Not a problem after merge fix,
  but an additional restriction for safety.
• Added sourcemaps to dist/ builds.

Changed

• Stop resolving numbers with underscores as numeric scalars, #​627.
• Switched dev toolchains to Vite / neostandard.
• Updated demo.
• Reorganized tests.
• dist/ files are no longer kept in the repository.

Fixed

• Fix parsing of properties on the first implicit block mapping key, #​62.
• Fix trailing whitespace handling when folding flow scalar lines, #​307.
• Reject top-level block scalars without content indentation, #​280.
• Ensure numbers survive round-trip, #​737.
• Fix test coverage for issue #​221.
• Fix flow scalar trailing whitespace folding, #​307.
• Fix digits in YAML named tag handles.

Security

• Fix potential DoS via quadratic complexity in merge - deduplicate repeated
  elements (makes sense for malformed files > 10K).

---

Configuration

📅 Schedule: (UTC)

• Branch creation
  • At any time (no schedule defined)
• Automerge
  • At any time (no schedule defined)

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

---

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---

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🚀 Integration Test Results

npm-pr-version action test:

• ✅ Version generation: 0.0.0-PR-97--968404f
• ✅ package.json update: Successful
• ✅ Format validation: Passed

The action is working correctly! 🎉

[github-actions]

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✅ All tests passed successfully!

• Linting: ✅ Passed
• Unit tests: ✅ Passed
• Integration tests: ✅ Passed

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[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
js-yaml	4.1.1 → 4.3.1

---

JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases

CVE-2026-53550 / GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

More information

Details

Summary

A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in js-yaml merge-key processing (<<) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence.
This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service.

Details

The issue is in merge handling inside lib/loader.js:

• storeMappingPair(...) iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is tag:yaml.org,2002:merge.
• For each element, it calls mergeMappings(...).
• mergeMappings(...) computes Object.keys(source) and performs _hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key) checks for each key.

When input is of the form:

a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0}
b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]}
all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time.
Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows.
Relevant code path:
lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge')
lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...)

Root cause

File: lib/loader.js
Function: storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode,
valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos)
Lines: ~359-366

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}

When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element
is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does

sourceKeys = Object.keys(source);
for (index = 0; index < sourceKeys.length; index += 1) {
key = sourceKeys[index];
if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) {
setProperty(destination, key, source[key]);
overridableKeys[key] = true;
}
}

Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object
via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same
reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs:

• one Object.keys(source) call (O(K))
• K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination

Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final
object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge.

YAML semantics for <<: are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources,
so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off.

PoC

Environment:
js-yaml version: 4.1.1
Node.js: v24.5.0
Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently)
Reproduction script:
Create many keys in one anchored map (&a).
Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...].
Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a).
Observed repeated runs (same machine):
K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms
K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms
K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms
K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms
K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms
Control (single merge, similar key counts):
K=2000: ~1–2 ms
K=4000: ~3 ms
K=8000: ~5 ms
Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation.

Impact

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity).
Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability.

Suggested fix:

Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of
the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics:

dedupe in storeMappingPair:

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
var seen = new Set();
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
var src = valueNode[index];
if (seen.has(src)) continue; // idempotent; skip redundant alias
seen.add(src);
mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53550
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

js-yaml: YAML merge-key chains can force quadratic CPU consumption

CVE-2026-59869 / GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m

More information

Details

Impact

js-yaml can spend quadratic CPU time parsing a document whose size grows only linearly. The issue is triggered by a chain of mappings where each mapping merges the previous one:

a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }a1: &a1 { <<: *a0, k1: 1 }a2: &a2 { <<: *a1, k2: 2 }a3: &a3 { <<: *a2, k3: 3 }
...
b: *aN

For each new mapping, the loader has to enumerate the keys inherited from the previous mapping. With N chained mappings, this results in roughly 1 + 2 + ... + N merged-key visits, i.e., O(N^2) work for O(N) input size.

PoC

From N = 4000 delay become > 1s (doc size < 100K)

import{performance}from'node:perf_hooks'import{Buffer}from'node:buffer'import{load,YAML11_SCHEMA}from'js-yaml'constn=Number(process.argv[2]||4000)functionmakeMergeChain(count){constlines=['a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }']for(leti=1;i<count;i++){lines.push(`a${i}: &a${i} { <<: *a${i-1}, k${i}: ${i} }`)}lines.push(`b: *a${count-1}`)return`${lines.join('\n')}\n`}constsource=makeMergeChain(n)console.log(source.split('\n').slice(0,8).join('\n'))console.log('...')console.log(source.split('\n').slice(-4).join('\n'))console.log()console.log(`N: ${n}`)console.log(`YAML size: ${Buffer.byteLength(source)} bytes`)conststarted=performance.now()constresult=load(source,{schema: YAML11_SCHEMA})constelapsed=performance.now()-startedconsole.log(`parse time: ${elapsed.toFixed(1)} ms`)console.log(`top-level keys: ${Object.keys(result).length}`)console.log(`b keys: ${Object.keys(result.b).length}`)

Patches

Fix released. The most robust protection is to limit the total number of merged keys per parse call. This should close all past and future edge cases with merge. The default 10K-key limit should be okay in most cases.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59869
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/24f13e79ee1343a7e30bd6f6c9d9cdbf0ac9b2b7
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/59423c6f8cdc78742ac00e25a4dd39ef16b702e4
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/3.15.0
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/4.3.0
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

JS-YAML: Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (3.x and 4.x) — CVE-2026-59870 fix not backported

GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

More information

Details

Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x)

Summary

resolveYamlOmap() enforces key uniqueness for !!omap sequences with a linear
scan (objectKeys.indexOf(...)) inside the per-element loop, making resolution
O(n²) in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore
consumes disproportionate CPU inside yaml.load(), giving a denial of service
against any consumer that parses untrusted YAML.

!!omap is registered in the default schema
(lib/schema/default.js → require('../type/omap')), so a plain
yaml.load(untrustedInput) with no options is affected — no custom schema or
non-default configuration is required.

This is the same weakness as CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm, which was
fixed in the 5.x line in 5.2.1. That fix was never backported: both currently
maintained legacy lines still carry the original implementation.

Affected versions

Line	Latest tested	Status
3.x	3.15.0	Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:29
4.x	4.3.0	Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:30
5.x	5.2.2	Not affected — fixed in 5.2.1 (uses a Set)

Both figures are the newest release of each line at the time of writing, so
this is not a "you are on an old version" issue.

Details

lib/type/omap.js (js-yaml 4.3.0):

if(objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)===-1)objectKeys.push(pairKey)elsereturnfalse

objectKeys grows by one element per entry, and Array.prototype.indexOf is a
linear scan, so resolving an n-entry !!omap performs roughly
1 + 2 + … + n comparisons — quadratic in n. The work happens synchronously
inside yaml.load(), blocking the event loop for its whole duration.

The 5.x line already solves exactly this by tracking seen keys in a Set
(src/tag/sequence/omap.ts):

if(carrier.seen.has(key))return'duplicate key in ordered map'carrier.seen.add(key)

Proof of concept

// poc.js — node poc.jsconstyaml=require('js-yaml');constdoc=n=>'!!omap\n'+Array.from({length: n},(_,i)=>`- k${i}: ${i}`).join('\n')+'\n';for(constnof[10000,20000,40000,80000]){constd=doc(n),t=Date.now();yaml.load(d);// default schema, no optionsconsole.log(`n=${n} bytes=${d.length} load=${Date.now()-t}ms`);}

Measured (node v20.20.2, default heap, no flags)

js-yaml 4.3.0

n=10000 bytes=137787 load=54ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=169ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=646ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2607ms

js-yaml 3.15.0

n=10000 bytes=137787 load=53ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=166ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=641ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2567ms

Runtime grows by a factor of ~4 for each doubling of n, which is the
signature of O(n²) (linear growth would be ~2×).

Scaling further: a 2.48 MB document with 150,000 entries blocked
yaml.load() for 10.8 seconds.

Impact

Any service that parses attacker-influenced YAML with js-yaml 3.x or 4.x can be
stalled with a small input. Because the loop is synchronous, a single request
blocks the Node.js event loop and stalls every other request in the process —
so the amplification is per-process, not just per-request.

Suggested severity: consistent with CVE-2026-59870 (the same weakness in
5.x), i.e. Availability-only impact, network attack vector, no privileges or
user interaction required.

Suggested fix

Mirror the 5.x fix — replace the linear scan with a Set:

// lib/type/omap.jsconstseen=newSet()// ...if(seen.has(pairKey))returnfalseseen.add(pairKey)

This preserves the existing duplicate-key rejection semantics exactly while
making resolution O(n). A maxOmapLength-style cap would also work, but the
Set matches what 5.x already ships and requires no new option.

References

• CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm — same weakness in 5.0.0–5.2.0, fixed in 5.2.1
• lib/type/omap.js (3.x, 4.x) — the affected resolver
• lib/schema/default.js — registers !!omap in the default schema

Discovery

Found by an automated static-analysis and executed-proof-of-concept scanner run
against js-yaml 4.2.0, then manually verified against 3.15.0 and 4.3.0 by
executing the proof of concept above. All timings in this report were measured
on the current releases of each line, not on the version originally scanned.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

nodeca/js-yaml (js-yaml)

v4.3.1

Compare Source

v4.3.0

Compare Source

v4.2.0

Compare Source

Added

• Added docs/safety.md with notes about processing untrusted YAML.
• Added maxDepth (100) loader option. Not a problem, but gives a better
  exception instead of RangeError on stack overflow.
• Added maxMergeSeqLength (20) loader option. Not a problem after merge fix,
  but an additional restriction for safety.
• Added sourcemaps to dist/ builds.

Changed

• Stop resolving numbers with underscores as numeric scalars, #​627.
• Switched dev toolchains to Vite / neostandard.
• Updated demo.
• Reorganized tests.
• dist/ files are no longer kept in the repository.

Fixed

• Fix parsing of properties on the first implicit block mapping key, #​62.
• Fix trailing whitespace handling when folding flow scalar lines, #​307.
• Reject top-level block scalars without content indentation, #​280.
• Ensure numbers survive round-trip, #​737.
• Fix test coverage for issue #​221.
• Fix flow scalar trailing whitespace folding, #​307.
• Fix digits in YAML named tag handles.

Security

• Fix potential DoS via quadratic complexity in merge - deduplicate repeated
  elements (makes sense for malformed files > 10K).

---

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♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

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---

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
js-yaml	4.1.1 → 4.3.1

---

JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases

CVE-2026-53550 / GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

More information

Details

Summary

A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in js-yaml merge-key processing (<<) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence.
This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service.

Details

The issue is in merge handling inside lib/loader.js:

• storeMappingPair(...) iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is tag:yaml.org,2002:merge.
• For each element, it calls mergeMappings(...).
• mergeMappings(...) computes Object.keys(source) and performs _hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key) checks for each key.

When input is of the form:

a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0}
b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]}
all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time.
Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows.
Relevant code path:
lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge')
lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...)

Root cause

File: lib/loader.js
Function: storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode,
valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos)
Lines: ~359-366

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}

When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element
is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does

sourceKeys = Object.keys(source);
for (index = 0; index < sourceKeys.length; index += 1) {
key = sourceKeys[index];
if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) {
setProperty(destination, key, source[key]);
overridableKeys[key] = true;
}
}

Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object
via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same
reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs:

• one Object.keys(source) call (O(K))
• K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination

Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final
object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge.

YAML semantics for <<: are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources,
so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off.

PoC

Environment:
js-yaml version: 4.1.1
Node.js: v24.5.0
Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently)
Reproduction script:
Create many keys in one anchored map (&a).
Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...].
Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a).
Observed repeated runs (same machine):
K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms
K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms
K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms
K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms
K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms
Control (single merge, similar key counts):
K=2000: ~1–2 ms
K=4000: ~3 ms
K=8000: ~5 ms
Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation.

Impact

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity).
Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability.

Suggested fix:

Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of
the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics:

dedupe in storeMappingPair:

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
var seen = new Set();
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
var src = valueNode[index];
if (seen.has(src)) continue; // idempotent; skip redundant alias
seen.add(src);
mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53550
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

js-yaml: YAML merge-key chains can force quadratic CPU consumption

CVE-2026-59869 / GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m

More information

Details

Impact

js-yaml can spend quadratic CPU time parsing a document whose size grows only linearly. The issue is triggered by a chain of mappings where each mapping merges the previous one:

a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }a1: &a1 { <<: *a0, k1: 1 }a2: &a2 { <<: *a1, k2: 2 }a3: &a3 { <<: *a2, k3: 3 }
...
b: *aN

For each new mapping, the loader has to enumerate the keys inherited from the previous mapping. With N chained mappings, this results in roughly 1 + 2 + ... + N merged-key visits, i.e., O(N^2) work for O(N) input size.

PoC

From N = 4000 delay become > 1s (doc size < 100K)

import{performance}from'node:perf_hooks'import{Buffer}from'node:buffer'import{load,YAML11_SCHEMA}from'js-yaml'constn=Number(process.argv[2]||4000)functionmakeMergeChain(count){constlines=['a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }']for(leti=1;i<count;i++){lines.push(`a${i}: &a${i} { <<: *a${i-1}, k${i}: ${i} }`)}lines.push(`b: *a${count-1}`)return`${lines.join('\n')}\n`}constsource=makeMergeChain(n)console.log(source.split('\n').slice(0,8).join('\n'))console.log('...')console.log(source.split('\n').slice(-4).join('\n'))console.log()console.log(`N: ${n}`)console.log(`YAML size: ${Buffer.byteLength(source)} bytes`)conststarted=performance.now()constresult=load(source,{schema: YAML11_SCHEMA})constelapsed=performance.now()-startedconsole.log(`parse time: ${elapsed.toFixed(1)} ms`)console.log(`top-level keys: ${Object.keys(result).length}`)console.log(`b keys: ${Object.keys(result.b).length}`)

Patches

Fix released. The most robust protection is to limit the total number of merged keys per parse call. This should close all past and future edge cases with merge. The default 10K-key limit should be okay in most cases.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59869
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/24f13e79ee1343a7e30bd6f6c9d9cdbf0ac9b2b7
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/59423c6f8cdc78742ac00e25a4dd39ef16b702e4
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/3.15.0
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/4.3.0
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

JS-YAML: Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (3.x and 4.x) — CVE-2026-59870 fix not backported

GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

More information

Details

Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x)

Summary

resolveYamlOmap() enforces key uniqueness for !!omap sequences with a linear
scan (objectKeys.indexOf(...)) inside the per-element loop, making resolution
O(n²) in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore
consumes disproportionate CPU inside yaml.load(), giving a denial of service
against any consumer that parses untrusted YAML.

!!omap is registered in the default schema
(lib/schema/default.js → require('../type/omap')), so a plain
yaml.load(untrustedInput) with no options is affected — no custom schema or
non-default configuration is required.

This is the same weakness as CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm, which was
fixed in the 5.x line in 5.2.1. That fix was never backported: both currently
maintained legacy lines still carry the original implementation.

Affected versions

Line	Latest tested	Status
3.x	3.15.0	Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:29
4.x	4.3.0	Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:30
5.x	5.2.2	Not affected — fixed in 5.2.1 (uses a Set)

Both figures are the newest release of each line at the time of writing, so
this is not a "you are on an old version" issue.

Details

lib/type/omap.js (js-yaml 4.3.0):

if(objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)===-1)objectKeys.push(pairKey)elsereturnfalse

objectKeys grows by one element per entry, and Array.prototype.indexOf is a
linear scan, so resolving an n-entry !!omap performs roughly
1 + 2 + … + n comparisons — quadratic in n. The work happens synchronously
inside yaml.load(), blocking the event loop for its whole duration.

The 5.x line already solves exactly this by tracking seen keys in a Set
(src/tag/sequence/omap.ts):

if(carrier.seen.has(key))return'duplicate key in ordered map'carrier.seen.add(key)

Proof of concept

// poc.js — node poc.jsconstyaml=require('js-yaml');constdoc=n=>'!!omap\n'+Array.from({length: n},(_,i)=>`- k${i}: ${i}`).join('\n')+'\n';for(constnof[10000,20000,40000,80000]){constd=doc(n),t=Date.now();yaml.load(d);// default schema, no optionsconsole.log(`n=${n} bytes=${d.length} load=${Date.now()-t}ms`);}

Measured (node v20.20.2, default heap, no flags)

js-yaml 4.3.0

n=10000 bytes=137787 load=54ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=169ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=646ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2607ms

js-yaml 3.15.0

n=10000 bytes=137787 load=53ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=166ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=641ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2567ms

Runtime grows by a factor of ~4 for each doubling of n, which is the
signature of O(n²) (linear growth would be ~2×).

Scaling further: a 2.48 MB document with 150,000 entries blocked
yaml.load() for 10.8 seconds.

Impact

Any service that parses attacker-influenced YAML with js-yaml 3.x or 4.x can be
stalled with a small input. Because the loop is synchronous, a single request
blocks the Node.js event loop and stalls every other request in the process —
so the amplification is per-process, not just per-request.

Suggested severity: consistent with CVE-2026-59870 (the same weakness in
5.x), i.e. Availability-only impact, network attack vector, no privileges or
user interaction required.

Suggested fix

Mirror the 5.x fix — replace the linear scan with a Set:

// lib/type/omap.jsconstseen=newSet()// ...if(seen.has(pairKey))returnfalseseen.add(pairKey)

This preserves the existing duplicate-key rejection semantics exactly while
making resolution O(n). A maxOmapLength-style cap would also work, but the
Set matches what 5.x already ships and requires no new option.

References

• CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm — same weakness in 5.0.0–5.2.0, fixed in 5.2.1
• lib/type/omap.js (3.x, 4.x) — the affected resolver
• lib/schema/default.js — registers !!omap in the default schema

Discovery

Found by an automated static-analysis and executed-proof-of-concept scanner run
against js-yaml 4.2.0, then manually verified against 3.15.0 and 4.3.0 by
executing the proof of concept above. All timings in this report were measured
on the current releases of each line, not on the version originally scanned.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

nodeca/js-yaml (js-yaml)

v4.3.1

Compare Source

v4.3.0

Compare Source

v4.2.0

Compare Source

Added

• Added docs/safety.md with notes about processing untrusted YAML.
• Added maxDepth (100) loader option. Not a problem, but gives a better
  exception instead of RangeError on stack overflow.
• Added maxMergeSeqLength (20) loader option. Not a problem after merge fix,
  but an additional restriction for safety.
• Added sourcemaps to dist/ builds.

Changed

• Stop resolving numbers with underscores as numeric scalars, #​627.
• Switched dev toolchains to Vite / neostandard.
• Updated demo.
• Reorganized tests.
• dist/ files are no longer kept in the repository.

Fixed

• Fix parsing of properties on the first implicit block mapping key, #​62.
• Fix trailing whitespace handling when folding flow scalar lines, #​307.
• Reject top-level block scalars without content indentation, #​280.
• Ensure numbers survive round-trip, #​737.
• Fix test coverage for issue #​221.
• Fix flow scalar trailing whitespace folding, #​307.
• Fix digits in YAML named tag handles.

Security

• Fix potential DoS via quadratic complexity in merge - deduplicate repeated
  elements (makes sense for malformed files > 10K).

---

Configuration

📅 Schedule: (UTC)

• Branch creation
  • At any time (no schedule defined)
• Automerge
  • At any time (no schedule defined)

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

---

• If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

---

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

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🚀 Integration Test Results

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• ✅ Version generation: 0.0.0-PR-97--968404f
• ✅ package.json update: Successful
• ✅ Format validation: Passed

The action is working correctly! 🎉

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🧪 Test Results

✅ All tests passed successfully!

• Linting: ✅ Passed
• Unit tests: ✅ Passed
• Integration tests: ✅ Passed

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
js-yaml	4.1.1 → 4.3.1

---

JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases

CVE-2026-53550 / GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

More information

Details

Summary

A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in js-yaml merge-key processing (<<) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence.
This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service.

Details

The issue is in merge handling inside lib/loader.js:

• storeMappingPair(...) iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is tag:yaml.org,2002:merge.
• For each element, it calls mergeMappings(...).
• mergeMappings(...) computes Object.keys(source) and performs _hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key) checks for each key.

When input is of the form:

a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0}
b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]}
all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time.
Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows.
Relevant code path:
lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge')
lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...)

Root cause

File: lib/loader.js
Function: storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode,
valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos)
Lines: ~359-366

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}

When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element
is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does

sourceKeys = Object.keys(source);
for (index = 0; index < sourceKeys.length; index += 1) {
key = sourceKeys[index];
if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) {
setProperty(destination, key, source[key]);
overridableKeys[key] = true;
}
}

Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object
via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same
reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs:

• one Object.keys(source) call (O(K))
• K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination

Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final
object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge.

YAML semantics for <<: are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources,
so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off.

PoC

Environment:
js-yaml version: 4.1.1
Node.js: v24.5.0
Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently)
Reproduction script:
Create many keys in one anchored map (&a).
Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...].
Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a).
Observed repeated runs (same machine):
K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms
K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms
K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms
K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms
K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms
Control (single merge, similar key counts):
K=2000: ~1–2 ms
K=4000: ~3 ms
K=8000: ~5 ms
Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation.

Impact

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity).
Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability.

Suggested fix:

Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of
the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics:

dedupe in storeMappingPair:

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
var seen = new Set();
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
var src = valueNode[index];
if (seen.has(src)) continue; // idempotent; skip redundant alias
seen.add(src);
mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53550
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

js-yaml: YAML merge-key chains can force quadratic CPU consumption

CVE-2026-59869 / GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m

More information

Details

Impact

js-yaml can spend quadratic CPU time parsing a document whose size grows only linearly. The issue is triggered by a chain of mappings where each mapping merges the previous one:

a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }a1: &a1 { <<: *a0, k1: 1 }a2: &a2 { <<: *a1, k2: 2 }a3: &a3 { <<: *a2, k3: 3 }
...
b: *aN

For each new mapping, the loader has to enumerate the keys inherited from the previous mapping. With N chained mappings, this results in roughly 1 + 2 + ... + N merged-key visits, i.e., O(N^2) work for O(N) input size.

PoC

From N = 4000 delay become > 1s (doc size < 100K)

import{performance}from'node:perf_hooks'import{Buffer}from'node:buffer'import{load,YAML11_SCHEMA}from'js-yaml'constn=Number(process.argv[2]||4000)functionmakeMergeChain(count){constlines=['a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }']for(leti=1;i<count;i++){lines.push(`a${i}: &a${i} { <<: *a${i-1}, k${i}: ${i} }`)}lines.push(`b: *a${count-1}`)return`${lines.join('\n')}\n`}constsource=makeMergeChain(n)console.log(source.split('\n').slice(0,8).join('\n'))console.log('...')console.log(source.split('\n').slice(-4).join('\n'))console.log()console.log(`N: ${n}`)console.log(`YAML size: ${Buffer.byteLength(source)} bytes`)conststarted=performance.now()constresult=load(source,{schema: YAML11_SCHEMA})constelapsed=performance.now()-startedconsole.log(`parse time: ${elapsed.toFixed(1)} ms`)console.log(`top-level keys: ${Object.keys(result).length}`)console.log(`b keys: ${Object.keys(result.b).length}`)

Patches

Fix released. The most robust protection is to limit the total number of merged keys per parse call. This should close all past and future edge cases with merge. The default 10K-key limit should be okay in most cases.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59869
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/24f13e79ee1343a7e30bd6f6c9d9cdbf0ac9b2b7
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/59423c6f8cdc78742ac00e25a4dd39ef16b702e4
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/3.15.0
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/4.3.0
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

JS-YAML: Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (3.x and 4.x) — CVE-2026-59870 fix not backported

GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

More information

Details

Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x)

Summary

resolveYamlOmap() enforces key uniqueness for !!omap sequences with a linear
scan (objectKeys.indexOf(...)) inside the per-element loop, making resolution
O(n²) in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore
consumes disproportionate CPU inside yaml.load(), giving a denial of service
against any consumer that parses untrusted YAML.

!!omap is registered in the default schema
(lib/schema/default.js → require('../type/omap')), so a plain
yaml.load(untrustedInput) with no options is affected — no custom schema or
non-default configuration is required.

This is the same weakness as CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm, which was
fixed in the 5.x line in 5.2.1. That fix was never backported: both currently
maintained legacy lines still carry the original implementation.

Affected versions

Line	Latest tested	Status
3.x	3.15.0	Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:29
4.x	4.3.0	Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:30
5.x	5.2.2	Not affected — fixed in 5.2.1 (uses a Set)

Both figures are the newest release of each line at the time of writing, so
this is not a "you are on an old version" issue.

Details

lib/type/omap.js (js-yaml 4.3.0):

if(objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)===-1)objectKeys.push(pairKey)elsereturnfalse

objectKeys grows by one element per entry, and Array.prototype.indexOf is a
linear scan, so resolving an n-entry !!omap performs roughly
1 + 2 + … + n comparisons — quadratic in n. The work happens synchronously
inside yaml.load(), blocking the event loop for its whole duration.

The 5.x line already solves exactly this by tracking seen keys in a Set
(src/tag/sequence/omap.ts):

if(carrier.seen.has(key))return'duplicate key in ordered map'carrier.seen.add(key)

Proof of concept

// poc.js — node poc.jsconstyaml=require('js-yaml');constdoc=n=>'!!omap\n'+Array.from({length: n},(_,i)=>`- k${i}: ${i}`).join('\n')+'\n';for(constnof[10000,20000,40000,80000]){constd=doc(n),t=Date.now();yaml.load(d);// default schema, no optionsconsole.log(`n=${n} bytes=${d.length} load=${Date.now()-t}ms`);}

Measured (node v20.20.2, default heap, no flags)

js-yaml 4.3.0

n=10000 bytes=137787 load=54ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=169ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=646ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2607ms

js-yaml 3.15.0

n=10000 bytes=137787 load=53ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=166ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=641ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2567ms

Runtime grows by a factor of ~4 for each doubling of n, which is the
signature of O(n²) (linear growth would be ~2×).

Scaling further: a 2.48 MB document with 150,000 entries blocked
yaml.load() for 10.8 seconds.

Impact

Any service that parses attacker-influenced YAML with js-yaml 3.x or 4.x can be
stalled with a small input. Because the loop is synchronous, a single request
blocks the Node.js event loop and stalls every other request in the process —
so the amplification is per-process, not just per-request.

Suggested severity: consistent with CVE-2026-59870 (the same weakness in
5.x), i.e. Availability-only impact, network attack vector, no privileges or
user interaction required.

Suggested fix

Mirror the 5.x fix — replace the linear scan with a Set:

// lib/type/omap.jsconstseen=newSet()// ...if(seen.has(pairKey))returnfalseseen.add(pairKey)

This preserves the existing duplicate-key rejection semantics exactly while
making resolution O(n). A maxOmapLength-style cap would also work, but the
Set matches what 5.x already ships and requires no new option.

References

• CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm — same weakness in 5.0.0–5.2.0, fixed in 5.2.1
• lib/type/omap.js (3.x, 4.x) — the affected resolver
• lib/schema/default.js — registers !!omap in the default schema

Discovery

Found by an automated static-analysis and executed-proof-of-concept scanner run
against js-yaml 4.2.0, then manually verified against 3.15.0 and 4.3.0 by
executing the proof of concept above. All timings in this report were measured
on the current releases of each line, not on the version originally scanned.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

nodeca/js-yaml (js-yaml)

v4.3.1

Compare Source

v4.3.0

Compare Source

v4.2.0

Compare Source

Added

• Added docs/safety.md with notes about processing untrusted YAML.
• Added maxDepth (100) loader option. Not a problem, but gives a better
  exception instead of RangeError on stack overflow.
• Added maxMergeSeqLength (20) loader option. Not a problem after merge fix,
  but an additional restriction for safety.
• Added sourcemaps to dist/ builds.

Changed

• Stop resolving numbers with underscores as numeric scalars, #​627.
• Switched dev toolchains to Vite / neostandard.
• Updated demo.
• Reorganized tests.
• dist/ files are no longer kept in the repository.

Fixed

• Fix parsing of properties on the first implicit block mapping key, #​62.
• Fix trailing whitespace handling when folding flow scalar lines, #​307.
• Reject top-level block scalars without content indentation, #​280.
• Ensure numbers survive round-trip, #​737.
• Fix test coverage for issue #​221.
• Fix flow scalar trailing whitespace folding, #​307.
• Fix digits in YAML named tag handles.

Security

• Fix potential DoS via quadratic complexity in merge - deduplicate repeated
  elements (makes sense for malformed files > 10K).

---

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js-yaml	4.1.1 → 4.3.1

---

JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases

CVE-2026-53550 / GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

More information

Details

Summary

A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in js-yaml merge-key processing (<<) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence.
This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service.

Details

The issue is in merge handling inside lib/loader.js:

• storeMappingPair(...) iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is tag:yaml.org,2002:merge.
• For each element, it calls mergeMappings(...).
• mergeMappings(...) computes Object.keys(source) and performs _hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key) checks for each key.

When input is of the form:

a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0}
b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]}
all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time.
Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows.
Relevant code path:
lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge')
lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...)

Root cause

File: lib/loader.js
Function: storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode,
valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos)
Lines: ~359-366

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}

When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element
is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does

sourceKeys = Object.keys(source);
for (index = 0; index < sourceKeys.length; index += 1) {
key = sourceKeys[index];
if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) {
setProperty(destination, key, source[key]);
overridableKeys[key] = true;
}
}

Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object
via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same
reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs:

• one Object.keys(source) call (O(K))
• K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination

Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final
object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge.

YAML semantics for <<: are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources,
so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off.

PoC

Environment:
js-yaml version: 4.1.1
Node.js: v24.5.0
Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently)
Reproduction script:
Create many keys in one anchored map (&a).
Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...].
Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a).
Observed repeated runs (same machine):
K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms
K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms
K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms
K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms
K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms
Control (single merge, similar key counts):
K=2000: ~1–2 ms
K=4000: ~3 ms
K=8000: ~5 ms
Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation.

Impact

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity).
Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability.

Suggested fix:

Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of
the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics:

dedupe in storeMappingPair:

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
var seen = new Set();
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
var src = valueNode[index];
if (seen.has(src)) continue; // idempotent; skip redundant alias
seen.add(src);
mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53550
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

js-yaml: YAML merge-key chains can force quadratic CPU consumption

CVE-2026-59869 / GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m

More information

Details

Impact

js-yaml can spend quadratic CPU time parsing a document whose size grows only linearly. The issue is triggered by a chain of mappings where each mapping merges the previous one:

a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }a1: &a1 { <<: *a0, k1: 1 }a2: &a2 { <<: *a1, k2: 2 }a3: &a3 { <<: *a2, k3: 3 }
...
b: *aN

For each new mapping, the loader has to enumerate the keys inherited from the previous mapping. With N chained mappings, this results in roughly 1 + 2 + ... + N merged-key visits, i.e., O(N^2) work for O(N) input size.

PoC

From N = 4000 delay become > 1s (doc size < 100K)

import{performance}from'node:perf_hooks'import{Buffer}from'node:buffer'import{load,YAML11_SCHEMA}from'js-yaml'constn=Number(process.argv[2]||4000)functionmakeMergeChain(count){constlines=['a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }']for(leti=1;i<count;i++){lines.push(`a${i}: &a${i} { <<: *a${i-1}, k${i}: ${i} }`)}lines.push(`b: *a${count-1}`)return`${lines.join('\n')}\n`}constsource=makeMergeChain(n)console.log(source.split('\n').slice(0,8).join('\n'))console.log('...')console.log(source.split('\n').slice(-4).join('\n'))console.log()console.log(`N: ${n}`)console.log(`YAML size: ${Buffer.byteLength(source)} bytes`)conststarted=performance.now()constresult=load(source,{schema: YAML11_SCHEMA})constelapsed=performance.now()-startedconsole.log(`parse time: ${elapsed.toFixed(1)} ms`)console.log(`top-level keys: ${Object.keys(result).length}`)console.log(`b keys: ${Object.keys(result.b).length}`)

Patches

Fix released. The most robust protection is to limit the total number of merged keys per parse call. This should close all past and future edge cases with merge. The default 10K-key limit should be okay in most cases.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59869
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/24f13e79ee1343a7e30bd6f6c9d9cdbf0ac9b2b7
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/59423c6f8cdc78742ac00e25a4dd39ef16b702e4
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/3.15.0
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/4.3.0
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

JS-YAML: Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (3.x and 4.x) — CVE-2026-59870 fix not backported

GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

More information

Details

Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x)

Summary

resolveYamlOmap() enforces key uniqueness for !!omap sequences with a linear
scan (objectKeys.indexOf(...)) inside the per-element loop, making resolution
O(n²) in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore
consumes disproportionate CPU inside yaml.load(), giving a denial of service
against any consumer that parses untrusted YAML.

!!omap is registered in the default schema
(lib/schema/default.js → require('../type/omap')), so a plain
yaml.load(untrustedInput) with no options is affected — no custom schema or
non-default configuration is required.

This is the same weakness as CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm, which was
fixed in the 5.x line in 5.2.1. That fix was never backported: both currently
maintained legacy lines still carry the original implementation.

Affected versions

Line	Latest tested	Status
3.x	3.15.0	Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:29
4.x	4.3.0	Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:30
5.x	5.2.2	Not affected — fixed in 5.2.1 (uses a Set)

Both figures are the newest release of each line at the time of writing, so
this is not a "you are on an old version" issue.

Details

lib/type/omap.js (js-yaml 4.3.0):

if(objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)===-1)objectKeys.push(pairKey)elsereturnfalse

objectKeys grows by one element per entry, and Array.prototype.indexOf is a
linear scan, so resolving an n-entry !!omap performs roughly
1 + 2 + … + n comparisons — quadratic in n. The work happens synchronously
inside yaml.load(), blocking the event loop for its whole duration.

The 5.x line already solves exactly this by tracking seen keys in a Set
(src/tag/sequence/omap.ts):

if(carrier.seen.has(key))return'duplicate key in ordered map'carrier.seen.add(key)

Proof of concept

// poc.js — node poc.jsconstyaml=require('js-yaml');constdoc=n=>'!!omap\n'+Array.from({length: n},(_,i)=>`- k${i}: ${i}`).join('\n')+'\n';for(constnof[10000,20000,40000,80000]){constd=doc(n),t=Date.now();yaml.load(d);// default schema, no optionsconsole.log(`n=${n} bytes=${d.length} load=${Date.now()-t}ms`);}

Measured (node v20.20.2, default heap, no flags)

js-yaml 4.3.0

n=10000 bytes=137787 load=54ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=169ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=646ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2607ms

js-yaml 3.15.0

n=10000 bytes=137787 load=53ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=166ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=641ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2567ms

Runtime grows by a factor of ~4 for each doubling of n, which is the
signature of O(n²) (linear growth would be ~2×).

Scaling further: a 2.48 MB document with 150,000 entries blocked
yaml.load() for 10.8 seconds.

Impact

Any service that parses attacker-influenced YAML with js-yaml 3.x or 4.x can be
stalled with a small input. Because the loop is synchronous, a single request
blocks the Node.js event loop and stalls every other request in the process —
so the amplification is per-process, not just per-request.

Suggested severity: consistent with CVE-2026-59870 (the same weakness in
5.x), i.e. Availability-only impact, network attack vector, no privileges or
user interaction required.

Suggested fix

Mirror the 5.x fix — replace the linear scan with a Set:

// lib/type/omap.jsconstseen=newSet()// ...if(seen.has(pairKey))returnfalseseen.add(pairKey)

This preserves the existing duplicate-key rejection semantics exactly while
making resolution O(n). A maxOmapLength-style cap would also work, but the
Set matches what 5.x already ships and requires no new option.

References

• CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm — same weakness in 5.0.0–5.2.0, fixed in 5.2.1
• lib/type/omap.js (3.x, 4.x) — the affected resolver
• lib/schema/default.js — registers !!omap in the default schema

Discovery

Found by an automated static-analysis and executed-proof-of-concept scanner run
against js-yaml 4.2.0, then manually verified against 3.15.0 and 4.3.0 by
executing the proof of concept above. All timings in this report were measured
on the current releases of each line, not on the version originally scanned.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

nodeca/js-yaml (js-yaml)

v4.3.1

Compare Source

v4.3.0

Compare Source

v4.2.0

Compare Source

Added

• Added docs/safety.md with notes about processing untrusted YAML.
• Added maxDepth (100) loader option. Not a problem, but gives a better
  exception instead of RangeError on stack overflow.
• Added maxMergeSeqLength (20) loader option. Not a problem after merge fix,
  but an additional restriction for safety.
• Added sourcemaps to dist/ builds.

Changed

• Stop resolving numbers with underscores as numeric scalars, #​627.
• Switched dev toolchains to Vite / neostandard.
• Updated demo.
• Reorganized tests.
• dist/ files are no longer kept in the repository.

Fixed

• Fix parsing of properties on the first implicit block mapping key, #​62.
• Fix trailing whitespace handling when folding flow scalar lines, #​307.
• Reject top-level block scalars without content indentation, #​280.
• Ensure numbers survive round-trip, #​737.
• Fix test coverage for issue #​221.
• Fix flow scalar trailing whitespace folding, #​307.
• Fix digits in YAML named tag handles.

Security

• Fix potential DoS via quadratic complexity in merge - deduplicate repeated
  elements (makes sense for malformed files > 10K).

---

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
js-yaml	4.1.1 → 4.3.1

---

JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases

CVE-2026-53550 / GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

More information

Details

Summary

A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in js-yaml merge-key processing (<<) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence.
This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service.

Details

The issue is in merge handling inside lib/loader.js:

• storeMappingPair(...) iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is tag:yaml.org,2002:merge.
• For each element, it calls mergeMappings(...).
• mergeMappings(...) computes Object.keys(source) and performs _hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key) checks for each key.

When input is of the form:

a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0}
b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]}
all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time.
Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows.
Relevant code path:
lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge')
lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...)

Root cause

File: lib/loader.js
Function: storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode,
valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos)
Lines: ~359-366

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}

When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element
is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does

sourceKeys = Object.keys(source);
for (index = 0; index < sourceKeys.length; index += 1) {
key = sourceKeys[index];
if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) {
setProperty(destination, key, source[key]);
overridableKeys[key] = true;
}
}

Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object
via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same
reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs:

• one Object.keys(source) call (O(K))
• K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination

Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final
object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge.

YAML semantics for <<: are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources,
so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off.

PoC

Environment:
js-yaml version: 4.1.1
Node.js: v24.5.0
Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently)
Reproduction script:
Create many keys in one anchored map (&a).
Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...].
Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a).
Observed repeated runs (same machine):
K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms
K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms
K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms
K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms
K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms
Control (single merge, similar key counts):
K=2000: ~1–2 ms
K=4000: ~3 ms
K=8000: ~5 ms
Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation.

Impact

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity).
Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability.

Suggested fix:

Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of
the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics:

dedupe in storeMappingPair:

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
var seen = new Set();
for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
var src = valueNode[index];
if (seen.has(src)) continue; // idempotent; skip redundant alias
seen.add(src);
mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys);
}
} else {
mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
}
}

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53550
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

js-yaml: YAML merge-key chains can force quadratic CPU consumption

CVE-2026-59869 / GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m

More information

Details

Impact

js-yaml can spend quadratic CPU time parsing a document whose size grows only linearly. The issue is triggered by a chain of mappings where each mapping merges the previous one:

a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }a1: &a1 { <<: *a0, k1: 1 }a2: &a2 { <<: *a1, k2: 2 }a3: &a3 { <<: *a2, k3: 3 }
...
b: *aN

For each new mapping, the loader has to enumerate the keys inherited from the previous mapping. With N chained mappings, this results in roughly 1 + 2 + ... + N merged-key visits, i.e., O(N^2) work for O(N) input size.

PoC

From N = 4000 delay become > 1s (doc size < 100K)

import{performance}from'node:perf_hooks'import{Buffer}from'node:buffer'import{load,YAML11_SCHEMA}from'js-yaml'constn=Number(process.argv[2]||4000)functionmakeMergeChain(count){constlines=['a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }']for(leti=1;i<count;i++){lines.push(`a${i}: &a${i} { <<: *a${i-1}, k${i}: ${i} }`)}lines.push(`b: *a${count-1}`)return`${lines.join('\n')}\n`}constsource=makeMergeChain(n)console.log(source.split('\n').slice(0,8).join('\n'))console.log('...')console.log(source.split('\n').slice(-4).join('\n'))console.log()console.log(`N: ${n}`)console.log(`YAML size: ${Buffer.byteLength(source)} bytes`)conststarted=performance.now()constresult=load(source,{schema: YAML11_SCHEMA})constelapsed=performance.now()-startedconsole.log(`parse time: ${elapsed.toFixed(1)} ms`)console.log(`top-level keys: ${Object.keys(result).length}`)console.log(`b keys: ${Object.keys(result.b).length}`)

Patches

Fix released. The most robust protection is to limit the total number of merged keys per parse call. This should close all past and future edge cases with merge. The default 10K-key limit should be okay in most cases.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59869
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/24f13e79ee1343a7e30bd6f6c9d9cdbf0ac9b2b7
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/59423c6f8cdc78742ac00e25a4dd39ef16b702e4
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/3.15.0
• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/4.3.0
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

JS-YAML: Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (3.x and 4.x) — CVE-2026-59870 fix not backported

GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

More information

Details

Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x)

Summary

resolveYamlOmap() enforces key uniqueness for !!omap sequences with a linear
scan (objectKeys.indexOf(...)) inside the per-element loop, making resolution
O(n²) in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore
consumes disproportionate CPU inside yaml.load(), giving a denial of service
against any consumer that parses untrusted YAML.

!!omap is registered in the default schema
(lib/schema/default.js → require('../type/omap')), so a plain
yaml.load(untrustedInput) with no options is affected — no custom schema or
non-default configuration is required.

This is the same weakness as CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm, which was
fixed in the 5.x line in 5.2.1. That fix was never backported: both currently
maintained legacy lines still carry the original implementation.

Affected versions

Line	Latest tested	Status
3.x	3.15.0	Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:29
4.x	4.3.0	Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:30
5.x	5.2.2	Not affected — fixed in 5.2.1 (uses a Set)

Both figures are the newest release of each line at the time of writing, so
this is not a "you are on an old version" issue.

Details

lib/type/omap.js (js-yaml 4.3.0):

if(objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)===-1)objectKeys.push(pairKey)elsereturnfalse

objectKeys grows by one element per entry, and Array.prototype.indexOf is a
linear scan, so resolving an n-entry !!omap performs roughly
1 + 2 + … + n comparisons — quadratic in n. The work happens synchronously
inside yaml.load(), blocking the event loop for its whole duration.

The 5.x line already solves exactly this by tracking seen keys in a Set
(src/tag/sequence/omap.ts):

if(carrier.seen.has(key))return'duplicate key in ordered map'carrier.seen.add(key)

Proof of concept

// poc.js — node poc.jsconstyaml=require('js-yaml');constdoc=n=>'!!omap\n'+Array.from({length: n},(_,i)=>`- k${i}: ${i}`).join('\n')+'\n';for(constnof[10000,20000,40000,80000]){constd=doc(n),t=Date.now();yaml.load(d);// default schema, no optionsconsole.log(`n=${n} bytes=${d.length} load=${Date.now()-t}ms`);}

Measured (node v20.20.2, default heap, no flags)

js-yaml 4.3.0

n=10000 bytes=137787 load=54ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=169ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=646ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2607ms

js-yaml 3.15.0

n=10000 bytes=137787 load=53ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=166ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=641ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2567ms

Runtime grows by a factor of ~4 for each doubling of n, which is the
signature of O(n²) (linear growth would be ~2×).

Scaling further: a 2.48 MB document with 150,000 entries blocked
yaml.load() for 10.8 seconds.

Impact

Any service that parses attacker-influenced YAML with js-yaml 3.x or 4.x can be
stalled with a small input. Because the loop is synchronous, a single request
blocks the Node.js event loop and stalls every other request in the process —
so the amplification is per-process, not just per-request.

Suggested severity: consistent with CVE-2026-59870 (the same weakness in
5.x), i.e. Availability-only impact, network attack vector, no privileges or
user interaction required.

Suggested fix

Mirror the 5.x fix — replace the linear scan with a Set:

// lib/type/omap.jsconstseen=newSet()// ...if(seen.has(pairKey))returnfalseseen.add(pairKey)

This preserves the existing duplicate-key rejection semantics exactly while
making resolution O(n). A maxOmapLength-style cap would also work, but the
Set matches what 5.x already ships and requires no new option.

References

• CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm — same weakness in 5.0.0–5.2.0, fixed in 5.2.1
• lib/type/omap.js (3.x, 4.x) — the affected resolver
• lib/schema/default.js — registers !!omap in the default schema

Discovery

Found by an automated static-analysis and executed-proof-of-concept scanner run
against js-yaml 4.2.0, then manually verified against 3.15.0 and 4.3.0 by
executing the proof of concept above. All timings in this report were measured
on the current releases of each line, not on the version originally scanned.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

nodeca/js-yaml (js-yaml)

v4.3.1

Compare Source

v4.3.0

Compare Source

v4.2.0

Compare Source

Added

• Added docs/safety.md with notes about processing untrusted YAML.
• Added maxDepth (100) loader option. Not a problem, but gives a better
  exception instead of RangeError on stack overflow.
• Added maxMergeSeqLength (20) loader option. Not a problem after merge fix,
  but an additional restriction for safety.
• Added sourcemaps to dist/ builds.

Changed

• Stop resolving numbers with underscores as numeric scalars, #​627.
• Switched dev toolchains to Vite / neostandard.
• Updated demo.
• Reorganized tests.
• dist/ files are no longer kept in the repository.

Fixed

• Fix parsing of properties on the first implicit block mapping key, #​62.
• Fix trailing whitespace handling when folding flow scalar lines, #​307.
• Reject top-level block scalars without content indentation, #​280.
• Ensure numbers survive round-trip, #​737.
• Fix test coverage for issue #​221.
• Fix flow scalar trailing whitespace folding, #​307.
• Fix digits in YAML named tag handles.

Security

• Fix potential DoS via quadratic complexity in merge - deduplicate repeated
  elements (makes sense for malformed files > 10K).

---

Configuration

📅 Schedule: (UTC)

• Branch creation
  • At any time (no schedule defined)
• Automerge
  • At any time (no schedule defined)

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

---

• If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

---

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• ✅ Version generation: 0.0.0-PR-97--968404f
• ✅ package.json update: Successful
• ✅ Format validation: Passed

The action is working correctly! 🎉

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✅ All tests passed successfully!

• Linting: ✅ Passed
• Unit tests: ✅ Passed
• Integration tests: ✅ Passed

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