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the orginal formula will caused rdma fifo threshold config overflow and no one could come out a solution for all SoC, set threshold to 70% of max fifo size to make sure it will not overflow, and 70% is a empirical vlaue Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Niu <yongqiang.niu@mediatek.com>
The cursor plane should use the current plane state in atomic_async_update because it would not be the new plane state in the global atomic state since _swap_state happened when those hook are run. Fix cursor plane issue by below modification: 1. Remove plane_helper_funcs->atomic_update(plane, state) in mtk_drm_crtc_async_update. 2. Add mtk_drm_update_new_state in to mtk_plane_atomic_async_update to update the cursor plane by current plane state hook and update others plane by the new_state. Fixes: 37418bf ("drm: Use state helper instead of the plane state pointer") Signed-off-by: jason-jh.lin <jason-jh.lin@mediatek.com> Tested-by: Enric Balletbo i Serra <enric.balletbo@collabora.com>
frank-w pushed a commit
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May 23, 2022
…sted The current EOI handler for LEVEL triggered interrupts calls clk_enable(), register IO, clk_disable(). The clock manipulation requires locking which happens with IRQs disabled in clk_enable_lock(). Instead of turning the clock on and off all the time, enable the clock in case LEVEL interrupt is requested and keep the clock enabled until all LEVEL interrupts are freed. The LEVEL interrupts are an exception on this platform and seldom used, so this does not affect the common case. This simplifies the LEVEL interrupt handling considerably and also fixes the following splat found when using preempt-rt: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:2040 __rt_mutex_trylock+0x37/0x62 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.109-rt65-stable-standard-00068-g6a5afc4b1217 #85 Hardware name: STM32 (Device Tree Support) [<c010a45d>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010766f>] (show_stack+0xb/0xc) [<c010766f>] (show_stack) from [<c06353ab>] (dump_stack+0x6f/0x84) [<c06353ab>] (dump_stack) from [<c01145e3>] (__warn+0x7f/0xa4) [<c01145e3>] (__warn) from [<c063386f>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x3b/0x74) [<c063386f>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c063b43d>] (__rt_mutex_trylock+0x37/0x62) [<c063b43d>] (__rt_mutex_trylock) from [<c063c053>] (rt_spin_trylock+0x7/0x16) [<c063c053>] (rt_spin_trylock) from [<c036a2f3>] (clk_enable_lock+0xb/0x80) [<c036a2f3>] (clk_enable_lock) from [<c036ba69>] (clk_core_enable_lock+0x9/0x18) [<c036ba69>] (clk_core_enable_lock) from [<c034e9f3>] (stm32_gpio_get+0x11/0x24) [<c034e9f3>] (stm32_gpio_get) from [<c034ef43>] (stm32_gpio_irq_trigger+0x1f/0x48) [<c034ef43>] (stm32_gpio_irq_trigger) from [<c014aa53>] (handle_fasteoi_irq+0x71/0xa8) [<c014aa53>] (handle_fasteoi_irq) from [<c0147111>] (generic_handle_irq+0x19/0x22) [<c0147111>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<c014752d>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x55/0x64) [<c014752d>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c0346f13>] (gic_handle_irq+0x53/0x64) [<c0346f13>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<c0100ba5>] (__irq_svc+0x65/0xc0) Exception stack(0xc0e01f18 to 0xc0e01f60) 1f00: 0000300c 00000000 1f20: 0000300c c010ff01 00000000 00000000 c0e00000 c0e07714 00000001 c0e01f78 1f40: c0e07758 00000000 ef7cd0ff c0e01f68 c010554b c0105542 40000033 ffffffff [<c0100ba5>] (__irq_svc) from [<c0105542>] (arch_cpu_idle+0xc/0x1e) [<c0105542>] (arch_cpu_idle) from [<c063be95>] (default_idle_call+0x21/0x3c) [<c063be95>] (default_idle_call) from [<c01324f7>] (do_idle+0xe3/0x1e4) [<c01324f7>] (do_idle) from [<c01327b3>] (cpu_startup_entry+0x13/0x14) [<c01327b3>] (cpu_startup_entry) from [<c0a00c13>] (start_kernel+0x397/0x3d4) [<c0a00c13>] (start_kernel) from [<00000000>] (0x0) ---[ end trace 0000000000000002 ]--- Power consumption measured on STM32MP157C DHCOM SoM is not increased or is below noise threshold. Fixes: 47beed5 ("pinctrl: stm32: Add level interrupt support to gpio irq chip") Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de> Cc: Alexandre Torgue <alexandre.torgue@foss.st.com> Cc: Fabien Dessenne <fabien.dessenne@foss.st.com> Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: linux-stm32@st-md-mailman.stormreply.com Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org To: linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Fabien Dessenne <fabien.dessenne@foss.st.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220421140827.214088-1-marex@denx.de Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
frank-w pushed a commit
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May 25, 2022
…sted [ Upstream commit 05d8af4 ] The current EOI handler for LEVEL triggered interrupts calls clk_enable(), register IO, clk_disable(). The clock manipulation requires locking which happens with IRQs disabled in clk_enable_lock(). Instead of turning the clock on and off all the time, enable the clock in case LEVEL interrupt is requested and keep the clock enabled until all LEVEL interrupts are freed. The LEVEL interrupts are an exception on this platform and seldom used, so this does not affect the common case. This simplifies the LEVEL interrupt handling considerably and also fixes the following splat found when using preempt-rt: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:2040 __rt_mutex_trylock+0x37/0x62 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.109-rt65-stable-standard-00068-g6a5afc4b1217 #85 Hardware name: STM32 (Device Tree Support) [<c010a45d>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010766f>] (show_stack+0xb/0xc) [<c010766f>] (show_stack) from [<c06353ab>] (dump_stack+0x6f/0x84) [<c06353ab>] (dump_stack) from [<c01145e3>] (__warn+0x7f/0xa4) [<c01145e3>] (__warn) from [<c063386f>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x3b/0x74) [<c063386f>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c063b43d>] (__rt_mutex_trylock+0x37/0x62) [<c063b43d>] (__rt_mutex_trylock) from [<c063c053>] (rt_spin_trylock+0x7/0x16) [<c063c053>] (rt_spin_trylock) from [<c036a2f3>] (clk_enable_lock+0xb/0x80) [<c036a2f3>] (clk_enable_lock) from [<c036ba69>] (clk_core_enable_lock+0x9/0x18) [<c036ba69>] (clk_core_enable_lock) from [<c034e9f3>] (stm32_gpio_get+0x11/0x24) [<c034e9f3>] (stm32_gpio_get) from [<c034ef43>] (stm32_gpio_irq_trigger+0x1f/0x48) [<c034ef43>] (stm32_gpio_irq_trigger) from [<c014aa53>] (handle_fasteoi_irq+0x71/0xa8) [<c014aa53>] (handle_fasteoi_irq) from [<c0147111>] (generic_handle_irq+0x19/0x22) [<c0147111>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<c014752d>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x55/0x64) [<c014752d>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c0346f13>] (gic_handle_irq+0x53/0x64) [<c0346f13>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<c0100ba5>] (__irq_svc+0x65/0xc0) Exception stack(0xc0e01f18 to 0xc0e01f60) 1f00: 0000300c 00000000 1f20: 0000300c c010ff01 00000000 00000000 c0e00000 c0e07714 00000001 c0e01f78 1f40: c0e07758 00000000 ef7cd0ff c0e01f68 c010554b c0105542 40000033 ffffffff [<c0100ba5>] (__irq_svc) from [<c0105542>] (arch_cpu_idle+0xc/0x1e) [<c0105542>] (arch_cpu_idle) from [<c063be95>] (default_idle_call+0x21/0x3c) [<c063be95>] (default_idle_call) from [<c01324f7>] (do_idle+0xe3/0x1e4) [<c01324f7>] (do_idle) from [<c01327b3>] (cpu_startup_entry+0x13/0x14) [<c01327b3>] (cpu_startup_entry) from [<c0a00c13>] (start_kernel+0x397/0x3d4) [<c0a00c13>] (start_kernel) from [<00000000>] (0x0) ---[ end trace 0000000000000002 ]--- Power consumption measured on STM32MP157C DHCOM SoM is not increased or is below noise threshold. Fixes: 47beed5 ("pinctrl: stm32: Add level interrupt support to gpio irq chip") Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de> Cc: Alexandre Torgue <alexandre.torgue@foss.st.com> Cc: Fabien Dessenne <fabien.dessenne@foss.st.com> Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: linux-stm32@st-md-mailman.stormreply.com Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org To: linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Fabien Dessenne <fabien.dessenne@foss.st.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220421140827.214088-1-marex@denx.de Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
frank-w pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 25, 2022
…sted [ Upstream commit 05d8af4 ] The current EOI handler for LEVEL triggered interrupts calls clk_enable(), register IO, clk_disable(). The clock manipulation requires locking which happens with IRQs disabled in clk_enable_lock(). Instead of turning the clock on and off all the time, enable the clock in case LEVEL interrupt is requested and keep the clock enabled until all LEVEL interrupts are freed. The LEVEL interrupts are an exception on this platform and seldom used, so this does not affect the common case. This simplifies the LEVEL interrupt handling considerably and also fixes the following splat found when using preempt-rt: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:2040 __rt_mutex_trylock+0x37/0x62 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.109-rt65-stable-standard-00068-g6a5afc4b1217 #85 Hardware name: STM32 (Device Tree Support) [<c010a45d>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010766f>] (show_stack+0xb/0xc) [<c010766f>] (show_stack) from [<c06353ab>] (dump_stack+0x6f/0x84) [<c06353ab>] (dump_stack) from [<c01145e3>] (__warn+0x7f/0xa4) [<c01145e3>] (__warn) from [<c063386f>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x3b/0x74) [<c063386f>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c063b43d>] (__rt_mutex_trylock+0x37/0x62) [<c063b43d>] (__rt_mutex_trylock) from [<c063c053>] (rt_spin_trylock+0x7/0x16) [<c063c053>] (rt_spin_trylock) from [<c036a2f3>] (clk_enable_lock+0xb/0x80) [<c036a2f3>] (clk_enable_lock) from [<c036ba69>] (clk_core_enable_lock+0x9/0x18) [<c036ba69>] (clk_core_enable_lock) from [<c034e9f3>] (stm32_gpio_get+0x11/0x24) [<c034e9f3>] (stm32_gpio_get) from [<c034ef43>] (stm32_gpio_irq_trigger+0x1f/0x48) [<c034ef43>] (stm32_gpio_irq_trigger) from [<c014aa53>] (handle_fasteoi_irq+0x71/0xa8) [<c014aa53>] (handle_fasteoi_irq) from [<c0147111>] (generic_handle_irq+0x19/0x22) [<c0147111>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<c014752d>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x55/0x64) [<c014752d>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c0346f13>] (gic_handle_irq+0x53/0x64) [<c0346f13>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<c0100ba5>] (__irq_svc+0x65/0xc0) Exception stack(0xc0e01f18 to 0xc0e01f60) 1f00: 0000300c 00000000 1f20: 0000300c c010ff01 00000000 00000000 c0e00000 c0e07714 00000001 c0e01f78 1f40: c0e07758 00000000 ef7cd0ff c0e01f68 c010554b c0105542 40000033 ffffffff [<c0100ba5>] (__irq_svc) from [<c0105542>] (arch_cpu_idle+0xc/0x1e) [<c0105542>] (arch_cpu_idle) from [<c063be95>] (default_idle_call+0x21/0x3c) [<c063be95>] (default_idle_call) from [<c01324f7>] (do_idle+0xe3/0x1e4) [<c01324f7>] (do_idle) from [<c01327b3>] (cpu_startup_entry+0x13/0x14) [<c01327b3>] (cpu_startup_entry) from [<c0a00c13>] (start_kernel+0x397/0x3d4) [<c0a00c13>] (start_kernel) from [<00000000>] (0x0) ---[ end trace 0000000000000002 ]--- Power consumption measured on STM32MP157C DHCOM SoM is not increased or is below noise threshold. Fixes: 47beed5 ("pinctrl: stm32: Add level interrupt support to gpio irq chip") Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de> Cc: Alexandre Torgue <alexandre.torgue@foss.st.com> Cc: Fabien Dessenne <fabien.dessenne@foss.st.com> Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: linux-stm32@st-md-mailman.stormreply.com Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org To: linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Fabien Dessenne <fabien.dessenne@foss.st.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220421140827.214088-1-marex@denx.de Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
BtbN pushed a commit
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that referenced
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Jul 5, 2024
[ Upstream commit 8ecf3c1 ] Recent additions in BPF like cpu v4 instructions, test_bpf module exhibits the following failures: test_bpf: frank-w#82 ALU_MOVSX | BPF_B jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: frank-w#83 ALU_MOVSX | BPF_H jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: frank-w#84 ALU64_MOVSX | BPF_B jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: frank-w#85 ALU64_MOVSX | BPF_H jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: frank-w#86 ALU64_MOVSX | BPF_W jited:1 ret 2 != 1 (0x2 != 0x1)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: frank-w#165 ALU_SDIV_X: -6 / 2 = -3 jited:1 ret 2147483645 != -3 (0x7ffffffd != 0xfffffffd)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: frank-w#166 ALU_SDIV_K: -6 / 2 = -3 jited:1 ret 2147483645 != -3 (0x7ffffffd != 0xfffffffd)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: frank-w#169 ALU_SMOD_X: -7 % 2 = -1 jited:1 ret 1 != -1 (0x1 != 0xffffffff)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: frank-w#170 ALU_SMOD_K: -7 % 2 = -1 jited:1 ret 1 != -1 (0x1 != 0xffffffff)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: frank-w#172 ALU64_SMOD_K: -7 % 2 = -1 jited:1 ret 1 != -1 (0x1 != 0xffffffff)FAIL (1 times) test_bpf: #313 BSWAP 16: 0x0123456789abcdef -> 0xefcd eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported jited:0 301 PASS test_bpf: #314 BSWAP 32: 0x0123456789abcdef -> 0xefcdab89 eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported jited:0 555 PASS test_bpf: #315 BSWAP 64: 0x0123456789abcdef -> 0x67452301 eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported jited:0 268 PASS test_bpf: #316 BSWAP 64: 0x0123456789abcdef >> 32 -> 0xefcdab89 eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported jited:0 269 PASS test_bpf: #317 BSWAP 16: 0xfedcba9876543210 -> 0x1032 eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported jited:0 460 PASS test_bpf: #318 BSWAP 32: 0xfedcba9876543210 -> 0x10325476 eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported jited:0 320 PASS test_bpf: #319 BSWAP 64: 0xfedcba9876543210 -> 0x98badcfe eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported jited:0 222 PASS test_bpf: #320 BSWAP 64: 0xfedcba9876543210 >> 32 -> 0x10325476 eBPF filter opcode 00d7 (@2) unsupported jited:0 273 PASS test_bpf: #344 BPF_LDX_MEMSX | BPF_B eBPF filter opcode 0091 (@5) unsupported jited:0 432 PASS test_bpf: #345 BPF_LDX_MEMSX | BPF_H eBPF filter opcode 0089 (@5) unsupported jited:0 381 PASS test_bpf: #346 BPF_LDX_MEMSX | BPF_W eBPF filter opcode 0081 (@5) unsupported jited:0 505 PASS test_bpf: #490 JMP32_JA: Unconditional jump: if (true) return 1 eBPF filter opcode 0006 (@1) unsupported jited:0 261 PASS test_bpf: Summary: 1040 PASSED, 10 FAILED, [924/1038 JIT'ed] Fix them by adding missing processing. Fixes: daabb2b ("bpf/tests: add tests for cpuv4 instructions") Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/91de862dda99d170697eb79ffb478678af7e0b27.1709652689.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
frank-w pushed a commit
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Jul 17, 2024
Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-* results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as shown below. kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 #85 Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries NIP: c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8 REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.10.0-rc3) MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 2828220f XER: 0000000 CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0 [ ... GPRs omitted ... ] NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0 LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 Call Trace: usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable) __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120 check_heap_object+0x218/0x240 __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4 dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4 full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110 vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0 ksys_read+0x84/0x144 system_call_exception+0x124/0x330 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34 Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0") requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access. Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the entire object. Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anjali K <anjalik@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240614173844.746818-1-anjalik@linux.ibm.com
BtbN pushed a commit
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that referenced
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Jul 29, 2024
[ Upstream commit 1a14150 ] Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-* results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as shown below. kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [frank-w#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 frank-w#85 Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries NIP: c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8 REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.10.0-rc3) MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 2828220f XER: 0000000 CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0 [ ... GPRs omitted ... ] NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0 LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 Call Trace: usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable) __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120 check_heap_object+0x218/0x240 __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4 dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4 full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110 vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0 ksys_read+0x84/0x144 system_call_exception+0x124/0x330 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34 Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0") requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access. Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the entire object. Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anjali K <anjalik@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240614173844.746818-1-anjalik@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
frank-w pushed a commit
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this pull request
Aug 11, 2024
[ Upstream commit 1a14150 ] Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-* results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as shown below. kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 #85 Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries NIP: c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8 REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.10.0-rc3) MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 2828220f XER: 0000000 CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0 [ ... GPRs omitted ... ] NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0 LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 Call Trace: usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable) __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120 check_heap_object+0x218/0x240 __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4 dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4 full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110 vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0 ksys_read+0x84/0x144 system_call_exception+0x124/0x330 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34 Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0") requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access. Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the entire object. Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anjali K <anjalik@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240614173844.746818-1-anjalik@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
frank-w pushed a commit
that referenced
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Aug 11, 2024
[ Upstream commit 1a14150 ] Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-* results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as shown below. kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 #85 Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries NIP: c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8 REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.10.0-rc3) MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 2828220f XER: 0000000 CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0 [ ... GPRs omitted ... ] NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0 LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 Call Trace: usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable) __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120 check_heap_object+0x218/0x240 __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4 dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4 full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110 vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0 ksys_read+0x84/0x144 system_call_exception+0x124/0x330 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34 Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0") requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access. Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the entire object. Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anjali K <anjalik@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240614173844.746818-1-anjalik@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
frank-w pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 11, 2024
[ Upstream commit 1a14150 ] Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-* results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as shown below. kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 #85 Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries NIP: c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8 REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.10.0-rc3) MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 2828220f XER: 0000000 CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0 [ ... GPRs omitted ... ] NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0 LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 Call Trace: usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable) __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120 check_heap_object+0x218/0x240 __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4 dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4 full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110 vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0 ksys_read+0x84/0x144 system_call_exception+0x124/0x330 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34 Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0") requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access. Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the entire object. Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anjali K <anjalik@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240614173844.746818-1-anjalik@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
frank-w pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 11, 2024
[ Upstream commit 1a14150 ] Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-* results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as shown below. kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 #85 Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries NIP: c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8 REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.10.0-rc3) MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 2828220f XER: 0000000 CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0 [ ... GPRs omitted ... ] NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0 LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 Call Trace: usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable) __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120 check_heap_object+0x218/0x240 __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4 dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4 full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110 vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0 ksys_read+0x84/0x144 system_call_exception+0x124/0x330 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34 Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0") requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access. Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the entire object. Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anjali K <anjalik@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240614173844.746818-1-anjalik@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
frank-w pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 11, 2024
[ Upstream commit 1a14150 ] Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-* results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as shown below. kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 #85 Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries NIP: c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8 REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.10.0-rc3) MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 2828220f XER: 0000000 CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0 [ ... GPRs omitted ... ] NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0 LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 Call Trace: usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable) __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120 check_heap_object+0x218/0x240 __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4 dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4 full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110 vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0 ksys_read+0x84/0x144 system_call_exception+0x124/0x330 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34 Commit 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0") requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access. Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the entire object. Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anjali K <anjalik@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240614173844.746818-1-anjalik@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
frank-w pushed a commit
that referenced
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Dec 26, 2024
[ Upstream commit 7b0033d ] In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following stack trace: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty #85 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0 ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0 ? die_addr+0x54/0x90 ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390 f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110 f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0 f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0 __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0 f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0 vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0 x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from different f2fs shutdown paths: [CPU0] [CPU1] ---------------------- ----------------------- f2fs_stop_gc_thread f2fs_stop_gc_thread gc_th = sbi->gc_thread gc_th = sbi->gc_thread kfree(gc_th) sbi->gc_thread = NULL < gc_th != NULL > kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF The commit c7f114d ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but it fails to prevent all race conditions. Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown(). Fixes: 7950e9a ("f2fs: stop gc/discard thread after fs shutdown") Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Patches to fix 4k HDMI display detection and mouse cursor.