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[finding] SCIM forces the better-auth admin plugin on (pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling #13816

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[finding] SCIM forces the better-auth admin plugin on (pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling#13816
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domain:specpm:dispatchedpriority:p1High: required for production / M2security

Description

@huangyiirene
huangyiirene
opened on Aug 31, 2026

Split out of #13439 by the maintainer's ruling (2026-08-31, director batch #19; the approved recommendation for #13439 was A for the three keys, with the admin amplification split to its own card). #13439 now carries only the three-key half — declare scim / sso / ssoDomainVerification, explicit config outranks env. This card records the amplification half so it does not evaporate with that fix.

The mechanism

packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-manager.ts:

  • :2426 — const scimEffective = scimFromEnv ?? (pluginConfig as any).scim ?? false;
  • :2439 — admin: pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective,
  • :5064 — the advertised-feature surface mirrors the same resolution.

Any deployment where SCIM ends up enabled — including via OS_SCIM_ENABLED alone — gets better-auth's admin plugin mounted as a side effect: impersonate-user, set-user-password, ban-user. A deployment that never asked for the admin surface has the same non-existent means of declining it that #13439 documented for scim itself. This is a larger permission surface than the three keys.

Why it was split rather than ridden on #13439

The coupling is NOT an accident. The comment block above :2426 records it explicitly: SCIM's active:false deprovisioning path runs through the admin plugin (ban), and org-scoped tokens need the organization plugin — see ADR-0071. So "declare admin tri-state and let a host decline it while SCIM is on" is not a config-reading fix: declining admin under SCIM plausibly breaks SCIM deprovisioning semantics. Deciding it needs an ADR-0071 revisit, which would have widened the p1 fix that objectstack-ai/cloud#1451 is parked on.

The question this card carries

Should a host be able to decline the admin surface in a SCIM-enabled deployment — and if so, what happens to SCIM's active:false → ban path? Candidate shapes, neither costed:

  1. scope the admin dependency internally to what SCIM actually needs (ban), instead of mounting the full admin action set;
  2. declare admin tri-state with a documented conflict refusal at construction time when SCIM is on and admin is explicitly false — a loud conflict instead of silent forcing.

Refs: #13439 (ruled sibling), ADR-0071, objectstack-ai/cloud#1451, objectstack-ai/cloud#1265.

⛔ Filed unassigned — recording only, for the finding box to grade.

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[finding] SCIM forces the better-auth `admin` plugin on (`pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective`) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling · Issue #13816 · objectstack-ai/objectstack · GitHub
    Skip to content
    [finding] SCIM forces the better-auth admin plugin on (pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling #13816
    Open
    Task
    Open
    [finding] SCIM forces the better-auth admin plugin on (pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling#13816
    Task
    Assignees
    os-support-ai
    Labels
    domain:specpm:dispatchedpriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
    Description
    @huangyiirene
    huangyiirene
    opened on Aug 31, 2026
    Split out of #13439 by the maintainer's ruling (2026-08-31, director batch #19; the approved recommendation for #13439 was A for the three keys, with the admin amplification split to its own card). #13439 now carries only the three-key half — declare scim / sso / ssoDomainVerification, explicit config outranks env. This card records the amplification half so it does not evaporate with that fix.
    The mechanism
    packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-manager.ts:
    • :2426 — const scimEffective = scimFromEnv ?? (pluginConfig as any).scim ?? false;
    • :2439 — admin: pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective,
    • :5064 — the advertised-feature surface mirrors the same resolution.
    Any deployment where SCIM ends up enabled — including via OS_SCIM_ENABLED alone — gets better-auth's admin plugin mounted as a side effect: impersonate-user, set-user-password, ban-user. A deployment that never asked for the admin surface has the same non-existent means of declining it that #13439 documented for scim itself. This is a larger permission surface than the three keys.
    Why it was split rather than ridden on #13439
    The coupling is NOT an accident. The comment block above :2426 records it explicitly: SCIM's active:false deprovisioning path runs through the admin plugin (ban), and org-scoped tokens need the organization plugin — see ADR-0071. So "declare admin tri-state and let a host decline it while SCIM is on" is not a config-reading fix: declining admin under SCIM plausibly breaks SCIM deprovisioning semantics. Deciding it needs an ADR-0071 revisit, which would have widened the p1 fix that objectstack-ai/cloud#1451 is parked on.
    The question this card carries
    Should a host be able to decline the admin surface in a SCIM-enabled deployment — and if so, what happens to SCIM's active:false → ban path? Candidate shapes, neither costed:
    1. scope the admin dependency internally to what SCIM actually needs (ban), instead of mounting the full admin action set;
    2. declare admin tri-state with a documented conflict refusal at construction time when SCIM is on and admin is explicitly false — a loud conflict instead of silent forcing.
    Refs: #13439 (ruled sibling), ADR-0071, objectstack-ai/cloud#1451, objectstack-ai/cloud#1265.
    ⛔ Filed unassigned — recording only, for the finding box to grade.
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[finding] SCIM forces the better-auth `admin` plugin on (`pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective`) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling · Issue #13816 · objectstack-ai/objectstack · GitHub
      Skip to content
      [finding] SCIM forces the better-auth admin plugin on (pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling #13816
      Open
      Task
      Open
      [finding] SCIM forces the better-auth admin plugin on (pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling#13816
      Task
      Assignees
      os-support-ai
      Labels
      domain:specpm:dispatchedpriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
      Description
      @huangyiirene
      huangyiirene
      opened on Aug 31, 2026
      Split out of #13439 by the maintainer's ruling (2026-08-31, director batch #19; the approved recommendation for #13439 was A for the three keys, with the admin amplification split to its own card). #13439 now carries only the three-key half — declare scim / sso / ssoDomainVerification, explicit config outranks env. This card records the amplification half so it does not evaporate with that fix.
      The mechanism
      packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-manager.ts:
      • :2426 — const scimEffective = scimFromEnv ?? (pluginConfig as any).scim ?? false;
      • :2439 — admin: pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective,
      • :5064 — the advertised-feature surface mirrors the same resolution.
      Any deployment where SCIM ends up enabled — including via OS_SCIM_ENABLED alone — gets better-auth's admin plugin mounted as a side effect: impersonate-user, set-user-password, ban-user. A deployment that never asked for the admin surface has the same non-existent means of declining it that #13439 documented for scim itself. This is a larger permission surface than the three keys.
      Why it was split rather than ridden on #13439
      The coupling is NOT an accident. The comment block above :2426 records it explicitly: SCIM's active:false deprovisioning path runs through the admin plugin (ban), and org-scoped tokens need the organization plugin — see ADR-0071. So "declare admin tri-state and let a host decline it while SCIM is on" is not a config-reading fix: declining admin under SCIM plausibly breaks SCIM deprovisioning semantics. Deciding it needs an ADR-0071 revisit, which would have widened the p1 fix that objectstack-ai/cloud#1451 is parked on.
      The question this card carries
      Should a host be able to decline the admin surface in a SCIM-enabled deployment — and if so, what happens to SCIM's active:false → ban path? Candidate shapes, neither costed:
      1. scope the admin dependency internally to what SCIM actually needs (ban), instead of mounting the full admin action set;
      2. declare admin tri-state with a documented conflict refusal at construction time when SCIM is on and admin is explicitly false — a loud conflict instead of silent forcing.
      Refs: #13439 (ruled sibling), ADR-0071, objectstack-ai/cloud#1451, objectstack-ai/cloud#1265.
      ⛔ Filed unassigned — recording only, for the finding box to grade.
      Metadata
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        No branches or pull requests
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(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
[finding] SCIM forces the better-auth `admin` plugin on (`pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective`) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling · Issue #13816 · objectstack-ai/objectstack · GitHub
        Skip to content
        [finding] SCIM forces the better-auth admin plugin on (pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling #13816
        Open
        Task
        Open
        [finding] SCIM forces the better-auth admin plugin on (pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling#13816
        Task
        Assignees
        os-support-ai
        Labels
        domain:specpm:dispatchedpriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
        Description
        @huangyiirene
        huangyiirene
        opened on Aug 31, 2026
        Split out of #13439 by the maintainer's ruling (2026-08-31, director batch #19; the approved recommendation for #13439 was A for the three keys, with the admin amplification split to its own card). #13439 now carries only the three-key half — declare scim / sso / ssoDomainVerification, explicit config outranks env. This card records the amplification half so it does not evaporate with that fix.
        The mechanism
        packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-manager.ts:
        • :2426 — const scimEffective = scimFromEnv ?? (pluginConfig as any).scim ?? false;
        • :2439 — admin: pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective,
        • :5064 — the advertised-feature surface mirrors the same resolution.
        Any deployment where SCIM ends up enabled — including via OS_SCIM_ENABLED alone — gets better-auth's admin plugin mounted as a side effect: impersonate-user, set-user-password, ban-user. A deployment that never asked for the admin surface has the same non-existent means of declining it that #13439 documented for scim itself. This is a larger permission surface than the three keys.
        Why it was split rather than ridden on #13439
        The coupling is NOT an accident. The comment block above :2426 records it explicitly: SCIM's active:false deprovisioning path runs through the admin plugin (ban), and org-scoped tokens need the organization plugin — see ADR-0071. So "declare admin tri-state and let a host decline it while SCIM is on" is not a config-reading fix: declining admin under SCIM plausibly breaks SCIM deprovisioning semantics. Deciding it needs an ADR-0071 revisit, which would have widened the p1 fix that objectstack-ai/cloud#1451 is parked on.
        The question this card carries
        Should a host be able to decline the admin surface in a SCIM-enabled deployment — and if so, what happens to SCIM's active:false → ban path? Candidate shapes, neither costed:
        1. scope the admin dependency internally to what SCIM actually needs (ban), instead of mounting the full admin action set;
        2. declare admin tri-state with a documented conflict refusal at construction time when SCIM is on and admin is explicitly false — a loud conflict instead of silent forcing.
        Refs: #13439 (ruled sibling), ADR-0071, objectstack-ai/cloud#1451, objectstack-ai/cloud#1265.
        ⛔ Filed unassigned — recording only, for the finding box to grade.
        Metadata
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          None yet
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          No branches or pull requests
          Issue actions
          
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} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
[finding] SCIM forces the better-auth `admin` plugin on (`pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective`) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling · Issue #13816 · objectstack-ai/objectstack · GitHub
          Skip to content
          [finding] SCIM forces the better-auth admin plugin on (pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling #13816
          Open
          Task
          Open
          [finding] SCIM forces the better-auth admin plugin on (pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling#13816
          Task
          Assignees
          os-support-ai
          Labels
          domain:specpm:dispatchedpriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
          Description
          @huangyiirene
          huangyiirene
          opened on Aug 31, 2026
          Split out of #13439 by the maintainer's ruling (2026-08-31, director batch #19; the approved recommendation for #13439 was A for the three keys, with the admin amplification split to its own card). #13439 now carries only the three-key half — declare scim / sso / ssoDomainVerification, explicit config outranks env. This card records the amplification half so it does not evaporate with that fix.
          The mechanism
          packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-manager.ts:
          • :2426 — const scimEffective = scimFromEnv ?? (pluginConfig as any).scim ?? false;
          • :2439 — admin: pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective,
          • :5064 — the advertised-feature surface mirrors the same resolution.
          Any deployment where SCIM ends up enabled — including via OS_SCIM_ENABLED alone — gets better-auth's admin plugin mounted as a side effect: impersonate-user, set-user-password, ban-user. A deployment that never asked for the admin surface has the same non-existent means of declining it that #13439 documented for scim itself. This is a larger permission surface than the three keys.
          Why it was split rather than ridden on #13439
          The coupling is NOT an accident. The comment block above :2426 records it explicitly: SCIM's active:false deprovisioning path runs through the admin plugin (ban), and org-scoped tokens need the organization plugin — see ADR-0071. So "declare admin tri-state and let a host decline it while SCIM is on" is not a config-reading fix: declining admin under SCIM plausibly breaks SCIM deprovisioning semantics. Deciding it needs an ADR-0071 revisit, which would have widened the p1 fix that objectstack-ai/cloud#1451 is parked on.
          The question this card carries
          Should a host be able to decline the admin surface in a SCIM-enabled deployment — and if so, what happens to SCIM's active:false → ban path? Candidate shapes, neither costed:
          1. scope the admin dependency internally to what SCIM actually needs (ban), instead of mounting the full admin action set;
          2. declare admin tri-state with a documented conflict refusal at construction time when SCIM is on and admin is explicitly false — a loud conflict instead of silent forcing.
          Refs: #13439 (ruled sibling), ADR-0071, objectstack-ai/cloud#1451, objectstack-ai/cloud#1265.
          ⛔ Filed unassigned — recording only, for the finding box to grade.
          Metadata
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(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
[finding] SCIM forces the better-auth `admin` plugin on (`pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective`) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling · Issue #13816 · objectstack-ai/objectstack · GitHub
            Skip to content
            [finding] SCIM forces the better-auth admin plugin on (pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling #13816
            Open
            Task
            Open
            [finding] SCIM forces the better-auth admin plugin on (pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling#13816
            Task
            Assignees
            os-support-ai
            Labels
            domain:specpm:dispatchedpriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
            Description
            @huangyiirene
            huangyiirene
            opened on Aug 31, 2026
            Split out of #13439 by the maintainer's ruling (2026-08-31, director batch #19; the approved recommendation for #13439 was A for the three keys, with the admin amplification split to its own card). #13439 now carries only the three-key half — declare scim / sso / ssoDomainVerification, explicit config outranks env. This card records the amplification half so it does not evaporate with that fix.
            The mechanism
            packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-manager.ts:
            • :2426 — const scimEffective = scimFromEnv ?? (pluginConfig as any).scim ?? false;
            • :2439 — admin: pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective,
            • :5064 — the advertised-feature surface mirrors the same resolution.
            Any deployment where SCIM ends up enabled — including via OS_SCIM_ENABLED alone — gets better-auth's admin plugin mounted as a side effect: impersonate-user, set-user-password, ban-user. A deployment that never asked for the admin surface has the same non-existent means of declining it that #13439 documented for scim itself. This is a larger permission surface than the three keys.
            Why it was split rather than ridden on #13439
            The coupling is NOT an accident. The comment block above :2426 records it explicitly: SCIM's active:false deprovisioning path runs through the admin plugin (ban), and org-scoped tokens need the organization plugin — see ADR-0071. So "declare admin tri-state and let a host decline it while SCIM is on" is not a config-reading fix: declining admin under SCIM plausibly breaks SCIM deprovisioning semantics. Deciding it needs an ADR-0071 revisit, which would have widened the p1 fix that objectstack-ai/cloud#1451 is parked on.
            The question this card carries
            Should a host be able to decline the admin surface in a SCIM-enabled deployment — and if so, what happens to SCIM's active:false → ban path? Candidate shapes, neither costed:
            1. scope the admin dependency internally to what SCIM actually needs (ban), instead of mounting the full admin action set;
            2. declare admin tri-state with a documented conflict refusal at construction time when SCIM is on and admin is explicitly false — a loud conflict instead of silent forcing.
            Refs: #13439 (ruled sibling), ADR-0071, objectstack-ai/cloud#1451, objectstack-ai/cloud#1265.
            ⛔ Filed unassigned — recording only, for the finding box to grade.
            Metadata
            Metadata
            Assignees
            Labels
            domain:specpm:dispatchedpriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
            Type
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[finding] SCIM forces the better-auth `admin` plugin on (`pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective`) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling · Issue #13816 · objectstack-ai/objectstack · GitHub
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              [finding] SCIM forces the better-auth admin plugin on (pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling #13816
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              [finding] SCIM forces the better-auth admin plugin on (pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling#13816
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              os-support-ai
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              domain:specpm:dispatchedpriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
              Description
              @huangyiirene
              huangyiirene
              opened on Aug 31, 2026
              Split out of #13439 by the maintainer's ruling (2026-08-31, director batch #19; the approved recommendation for #13439 was A for the three keys, with the admin amplification split to its own card). #13439 now carries only the three-key half — declare scim / sso / ssoDomainVerification, explicit config outranks env. This card records the amplification half so it does not evaporate with that fix.
              The mechanism
              packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-manager.ts:
              • :2426 — const scimEffective = scimFromEnv ?? (pluginConfig as any).scim ?? false;
              • :2439 — admin: pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective,
              • :5064 — the advertised-feature surface mirrors the same resolution.
              Any deployment where SCIM ends up enabled — including via OS_SCIM_ENABLED alone — gets better-auth's admin plugin mounted as a side effect: impersonate-user, set-user-password, ban-user. A deployment that never asked for the admin surface has the same non-existent means of declining it that #13439 documented for scim itself. This is a larger permission surface than the three keys.
              Why it was split rather than ridden on #13439
              The coupling is NOT an accident. The comment block above :2426 records it explicitly: SCIM's active:false deprovisioning path runs through the admin plugin (ban), and org-scoped tokens need the organization plugin — see ADR-0071. So "declare admin tri-state and let a host decline it while SCIM is on" is not a config-reading fix: declining admin under SCIM plausibly breaks SCIM deprovisioning semantics. Deciding it needs an ADR-0071 revisit, which would have widened the p1 fix that objectstack-ai/cloud#1451 is parked on.
              The question this card carries
              Should a host be able to decline the admin surface in a SCIM-enabled deployment — and if so, what happens to SCIM's active:false → ban path? Candidate shapes, neither costed:
              1. scope the admin dependency internally to what SCIM actually needs (ban), instead of mounting the full admin action set;
              2. declare admin tri-state with a documented conflict refusal at construction time when SCIM is on and admin is explicitly false — a loud conflict instead of silent forcing.
              Refs: #13439 (ruled sibling), ADR-0071, objectstack-ai/cloud#1451, objectstack-ai/cloud#1265.
              ⛔ Filed unassigned — recording only, for the finding box to grade.
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[finding] SCIM forces the better-auth `admin` plugin on (`pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective`) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling · Issue #13816 · objectstack-ai/objectstack · GitHub
                Skip to content
                [finding] SCIM forces the better-auth admin plugin on (pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling #13816
                Open
                Task
                Open
                [finding] SCIM forces the better-auth admin plugin on (pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective) and a deployment has no declared way to decline it — split from #13439 by the 2026-08-31 ruling#13816
                Task
                Assignees
                os-support-ai
                Labels
                domain:specpm:dispatchedpriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
                Description
                @huangyiirene
                huangyiirene
                opened on Aug 31, 2026
                Split out of #13439 by the maintainer's ruling (2026-08-31, director batch #19; the approved recommendation for #13439 was A for the three keys, with the admin amplification split to its own card). #13439 now carries only the three-key half — declare scim / sso / ssoDomainVerification, explicit config outranks env. This card records the amplification half so it does not evaporate with that fix.
                The mechanism
                packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-manager.ts:
                • :2426 — const scimEffective = scimFromEnv ?? (pluginConfig as any).scim ?? false;
                • :2439 — admin: pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective,
                • :5064 — the advertised-feature surface mirrors the same resolution.
                Any deployment where SCIM ends up enabled — including via OS_SCIM_ENABLED alone — gets better-auth's admin plugin mounted as a side effect: impersonate-user, set-user-password, ban-user. A deployment that never asked for the admin surface has the same non-existent means of declining it that #13439 documented for scim itself. This is a larger permission surface than the three keys.
                Why it was split rather than ridden on #13439
                The coupling is NOT an accident. The comment block above :2426 records it explicitly: SCIM's active:false deprovisioning path runs through the admin plugin (ban), and org-scoped tokens need the organization plugin — see ADR-0071. So "declare admin tri-state and let a host decline it while SCIM is on" is not a config-reading fix: declining admin under SCIM plausibly breaks SCIM deprovisioning semantics. Deciding it needs an ADR-0071 revisit, which would have widened the p1 fix that objectstack-ai/cloud#1451 is parked on.
                The question this card carries
                Should a host be able to decline the admin surface in a SCIM-enabled deployment — and if so, what happens to SCIM's active:false → ban path? Candidate shapes, neither costed:
                1. scope the admin dependency internally to what SCIM actually needs (ban), instead of mounting the full admin action set;
                2. declare admin tri-state with a documented conflict refusal at construction time when SCIM is on and admin is explicitly false — a loud conflict instead of silent forcing.
                Refs: #13439 (ruled sibling), ADR-0071, objectstack-ai/cloud#1451, objectstack-ai/cloud#1265.
                ⛔ Filed unassigned — recording only, for the finding box to grade.
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                domain:specpm:dispatchedpriority:p1High: required for production / M2security
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