turso: the bound secret is never read, so post-#8078 a new turso datasource cannot be authenticated by any supported route

[huangyiirene]

Split out of #8081 scope item 4 by the domain:services PM seat, on the dev's explicit recommendation ("on my reading it is a live P1, not a nice-to-have"). ⛔ Not graded by me; no domain:* label — the fix I believe is right lands in service-datasource, but that is exactly the judgement triage should make rather than inherit from me.

The finding — measured, and wider than #8081's card said

#8081 framed item 4 as "turso encryptionKey is credential-shaped, still writable, and the binder has only one slot." The measurement found something larger: spec.secret is never read on the turso path at all.

TURSO_CONFIG_READERS.authToken reads only config.authToken (turso-driver-config.ts:115); resolveTursoUrl reads only config.url. The connect path resolves exactly one ref → one spec.secret (datasource-connection-service.ts:581), and nothing hands it to the turso builder:

buildTursoDriverConfig({driver:'turso', config:{url:'libsql://my-db.turso.io'},
 secret:'THE-BOUND-JWT', external:{credentialsRef:'sys_secret:abc'}})
 → { url: 'libsql://my-db.turso.io' } // no authToken. The bound secret is dropped.

Why this is a release-facing problem, not a gap

After #8078, config.authToken is refused at every authoring door (z.never()). The supported alternative — bind the credential, reference it — resolves a secret the turso builder never reads. So:

A new turso remote datasource cannot be authenticated by any supported route.

Existing stored rows still work, because stored config bypasses the parse. That is what makes it invisible: nothing that already works breaks, and only new authoring is dead. turso-driver-config.test.ts contains no case for secret, so nothing pins the gap.

The cheap fix is not the one #8081 named

The dev's recommendation, cheapest first — and note item 4's "Option B (multi-slot binder)" is not the cheap one:

1. Read spec.secret into authToken in the turso builder — ~5 lines, entirely in service-datasource, no spec change, no new mechanism. It is exact parity with what postgres/mysql/mongo already do (spec.secret ? {password: spec.secret} : …). It restores turso's primary credential to the one slot that already exists, and shrinks the remaining question to encryptionKey alone.
2. Then decide encryptionKey, if it still needs deciding. Two multi-slot shapes exist: external.credentials: {slot → ref} (clean, but a spec change ⇒ domain:spec), or one ref resolving to a JSON bag (no spec change, but it re-contracts the sys_secret payload and every resolver). ⛔ Neither is worth building until (1) lands and shows whether one slot plus a URL is enough in practice.

The dev deliberately did not implement (1): it is outside #8081's items 1–2 and he declined to take the decision unasked. Correct call — recording it so the next agent does not read the omission as an oversight.

Acceptance, if this is graded for dispatch

• A new turso datasource authored with a bound secret authenticates — the pin that does not exist today.
• ⛔ Do not regress feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078's refusal of inline config.authToken at the authoring doors.
• ⛔ Do not fold in encryptionKey. That is step 2 and it may not survive step 1.
• ⚠️ encryptionKey is currently redacted on read by PR fix(service-datasource): stop serving stored credentials on the datasource read path, and fix the false "credential-stripped" claim (#8081) #8126 (endorsed — see [services half of #7990] Close the datasource/connector credential write/read paths: scrub getDatasource().config, fix the false "credential-stripped" claim, and write the stored-cleartext-rows migration story #8081 comment). Redaction grants and removes no slot; do not read it as the slot question being settled.

Provenance: #8081 dev report (comment 5269923121, §④) and my ACCEPT receipt (#8081 comment 5270102954). Related: #7990 (class card), #8078 (the spec half that closed the inline door).

[huangyiirene]

Claim: PM loop round 10
Session: session_01JVfWSQN9RDDGwdVSmMc29x
Branch: claude/issue-8152-turso-bound-secret-authtoken
Worktree: cloud session's own clone (mode:cloud)
Container & model: S–M(修法 ~5 行且有同包对等先例;判断面全在边界上 —— 什么不能顺手做),mode:cloud,model: opus

⚠️ 这张卡尚未定级、且我没有给它 domain:* —— 派发依据须说清

⛔ 本席不写 domain:*(那是分诊席的单一通道),本卡是我半小时前从 #8081 scope ④ 拆出来的,分诊尚未过手。照常规它应当排队等定级。我提前派,依据与 #8022 那次相同,即恢复不变量(restore-invariant):

• 它是 feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078 落地后产生的回归,不是新功能面。feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078 用 z.never() 关掉了内联 config.authToken 这扇门,而受支持的替代路径 —— 绑定 secret —— 在 turso 上根本没有被读过。⇒ feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078 之后新建的 turso 远程数据源,没有任何可用的受支持认证路径。
• 修法是恢复与 pg / mysql / mongodb 早已一致的行为(spec.secret ? {password: spec.secret} : …),不是引入新机制。
• 存量行仍能工作(存量 config 绕过 parse),所以它不会自己暴露 —— 只有新建被打死,而这恰恰是最难被发现的那种。

我把这条当场声明给分诊席(而不是等它被发现):见 #6015 的合并请求。若分诊认为该定级另有结论,回退成本由本席承担。

串行

packages/services/service-datasource/** 队空 —— #8081(PR #8126)已合(17:32:40Z)。⚠️ 同轮在飞 #8050(PR #8150)占 service-automation,不相交 ✅

交付面(⛔ 只有这一件事)

把 spec.secret 读进 turso 的 authToken 槽。~5 行,与同包 pg / mysql / mongodb 的写法对等。

必须补上那条不存在的 pin:turso-driver-config.test.ts 目前没有任何 secret 用例 —— 这就是这个洞能存在的原因。新 pin 应当断言:一个新建的、以绑定 secret 授权的 turso 数据源能通过认证。

⛔ 不要做的四件事(边界即本卡的全部难度)

1. ⛔ 不碰 encryptionKey。 它是第 2 步,而第 2 步可能不需要存在 —— 先让第 1 步落地,看"一个槽 + 一个 URL"在实践中是否已经够。卡里两个多槽形状(external.credentials: {slot → ref} ⇒ spec 变更 ⇒ 跨席;或一个 ref 解析成 JSON 包 ⇒ 重新契约化 sys_secret 载荷与每一个解析器)一个都不要建。
2. ⛔ 不放松 feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078 的拒绝。 内联 config.authToken 在各授权门仍必须被拒。请给出绿 pin 钉住这一点(守 feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078)。
3. ⛔ 不要把 PR fix(service-datasource): stop serving stored credentials on the datasource read path, and fix the false "credential-stripped" claim (#8081) #8126 的 encryptionKey 读时脱敏读成"槽的问题已解决"。 脱敏不授予槽、不移除槽。⛔ 也不要因为本卡而改动那段脱敏。
4. ⛔ 不碰 packages/spec/src/**。 若你的实测表明非改契约不可 —— STOP 并上报,由本席做跨席声明。

反向验证(纪律 ㉔ —— 每条 pin 给 main 侧预期读数)

红的说明承载哪个缺陷,绿的必须写明守的是哪条既有行为。⚠️ 本卡的空过陷阱很具体:存量行仍然能用,所以任何拿"已存在的 turso 数据源"去测的用例在 main 上也是绿的。门必须是新建路径 —— 经授权门写入、以绑定 secret 授权。

至少:新建 + 绑定 secret ⇒ 认证成功(红);内联 config.authToken 在授权门仍被拒(绿,守 #8078);spec.secret 到达 turso 的 authToken(红);pg/mysql/mongo 的既有 spec.secret → password 行为不变(绿)。

⚠️ 另外请独立复核 #8081 dev 的那条实测(评论 5269923121 §④ 的 buildTursoDriverConfig 读数)。若你测出 spec.secret 其实在别处被读到了、只是路径不同,那本卡的前提就不成立 —— STOP 并上报,⛔ 不要为了有产出而硬修。

工序

容器主检出已经签出目标分支 ⇒ git worktree add <branch> 报 "already used by worktree",权限分类器挡下 git switch --detach 与 cd … && …。三步:git worktree add --detach → 每条命令 env -C → 推送用 HEAD:refs/heads/… refspec。⛔ 不动 OS_ALLOW_MAIN_EDITS=1,⛔ 永不 git stash。

门禁:新增测试文件/工作区依赖 ⇒ check-test-source-alias 与 check:type-check-debt / check:type-check-coverage 两族都跑并给读数(别名一律数组形式 + 锚定正则;⛔ 不得加 KNOWN_UNALIASED_TEST_IMPORTS 条目)。改动拒绝面 ⇒ ADR-0112 信封。changeset 必须有。⛔ content/docs/releases/**、docs/adr/**、.claude/skills/**、skills/** 不动。

按 #6644 L2:draft PR 建好即回报,CI 收敛、ready 翻转与落地归本席。报告里请写清你证伪了什么 —— 卡的前提、我的派发依据、或那条恢复不变量的判断。我更希望被纠正而不是被同意。

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[huangyiirene]

Dev report — #6644 L2, draft-time

Draft PR: #8188 · Branch: claude/issue-8152-turso-bound-secret-authtoken · Base: origin/main @ a0fdc56 · Session: session_01Lw4Dm3qYuWFNJFMwQDdkzv
Commit 3cb78f9 — 4 files, +142/−7 in tracked files plus one new test file and one changeset.

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① Premise: CONFIRMED — independently, by a different route than the #8081 dev's

I did not read his buildTursoDriverConfig reading and agree with it; I re-derived it from the other end. Three measurements:

1. TURSO_CONFIG_READERS.authToken (turso-driver-config.ts:115 on main) reads config.authToken and nothing else. The reader table is a mapped type over Required<TursoDriverConfigInput> — there is no key it could have been hiding under, which is what makes "never read" provable here rather than merely unfound.
2. grep -rn "spec.secret" across service-datasource/src (non-test): 6 hits, none of them turso — default-datasource-driver-factory.ts:395/405/448 (pg, pg-DSN, mysql), :547 (mongo), the doc comment at :44, and datasource-connection-service.ts:581 (factory.create({...toSpec(record), ...(secret ? {secret} : {})}), the site that supplies it).
3. Both loaders converge on that one builder: the host arm (runtime/turso-driver-factory.ts:278) and the open-core arm (default-datasource-driver-factory.ts:802) each call buildTursoDriverConfig(spec, url) and add nothing. So there is no second path he could have missed — the two candidate paths are the same function.

The card's ~5 lines, exact parity estimate is accurate: the functional diff is 5 lines.
turso-driver-config.test.ts had zero occurrences of secret — confirmed.

② What I falsified — the card's headline is too broad, by one live route

⚠️ "A new turso remote datasource cannot be authenticated by any supported route" — the any is wrong. One supported route still authenticates on main.

packages/cli/src/utils/storage-driver.ts:451 (resolveStorageDefinition) builds config: { url, ...(authToken ? { authToken } : {}) } on a definition the host constructs itself, from --database-auth-token → OS_DATABASE_AUTH_TOKEN → TURSO_AUTH_TOKEN. That definition never meets TursoConfigSchema, so #8078's z.never() never sees it. Both boot hosts do this (cli/src/commands/serve.ts:1176, runtime/src/standalone-stack.ts:502). turso.zod.ts:145 already says so in prose — "The standalone boot path is unaffected" — so this is stated in the tree, just not carried into the card.

Accurate scope: no route for an authored datasource — Setup wizard, admin REST create/update, a declared non-default datasource. The boot default on os serve / os start / os dev / createStandaloneStack was never affected.

This does not weaken the card. It narrows the blast radius (P1 for authoring, not for boot) and it changed the implementation — see ③.

③ The trap that correction caught — do not read "refused inline ⇒ stop reading config"

The tempting 5-line edit is to replace config.authToken with spec.secret: the key is z.never() at every door, so reading it looks like dead code. That would have broken the env route in ② — a live credential path for every libSQL boot, silently, with the same "existing deployments keep working, only the next one is dead" signature as the bug being fixed.

The reader keeps both arms, bound-secret-first:

authToken: ({ spec, config }) =>
 spec.secret
 ? spec.secret
 : typeof config.authToken === 'string' && config.authToken
 ? config.authToken
 : undefined,

Which is also, exactly, the pg/mysql shape (spec.secret ? {password: spec.secret} : cfg.password ? {password: cfg.password} : {}). Parity and correctness turn out to be the same instruction — the sibling arms already keep the config fallback for the same reason. Your "exact parity" framing is what makes the right answer fall out; a from-scratch reading of #8078 would have argued for the wrong one.

④ Your restore-invariant dispatch justification — not falsified, but one premise needs restating

I would keep the decision and change one word of the reasoning.

• "It is a regression from feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078 landing" — true in effect: new authoring went from working (inline) to dead (inline refused, bound never read). Justified.
• "Not a new functionality面" — true, and this is the load-bearing half.
• ⚠️ But feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078 did not break a route that worked. Turso's bound-secret route was never wired — buildTursoDriverConfig has never read spec.secret, not at [finding][services] After #6268 there are still TWO Turso loaders, and the open-core one drops the install command, the typed error, and half the config #7314 and not in either pre-[finding][services] After #6268 there are still TWO Turso loaders, and the open-core one drops the install command, the typed error, and half the config #7314 loader. feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078 removed the inline route while the bound route had never worked. The defect therefore pre-dates feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078; feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078 is what made it reachable.

That makes restore-invariant the stronger frame, not the weaker one: what is being restored is not #8078-era behaviour but parity with pg/mysql/mongodb that turso never had — which is how you described the fix, and it is the accurate description. If triage grades this, the sentence to defend is "turso is the one credential-bearing driver whose binder slot was never connected", not "#8078 broke it". Same verdict, sounder basis, and it survives the objection "then why didn't #7314's convergence work catch it" (because both loaders were equally wrong, and convergence only pins that they agree).

⑤ Reverse verification — measured, not inferred

Method: apply the change, save the 5-line builder diff, git checkout -- the builder alone, re-run all 21 pins on origin/main @ a0fdc56, re-apply. 6 red / 15 green.

RED on main (6)

Pin	Reading on main
turso-driver-config: reads the bound secret into authToken	{url: 'libsql://my-db.turso.io'} — no authToken
turso-driver-config: bound secret beats a stale inline config.authToken	got 'STALE-INLINE'
turso-driver-config: binds to authToken ONLY, never encryptionKey	key set ['url'], expected ['authToken','url']
authoring (new file): datasource created through the real admin door + bound secret reaches the driver with an authToken	spec.secret arrived at the factory; the builder emitted no authToken
authoring: the bound route is the ONLY one a newly authored datasource has	half one (door refuses inline) green; half two red — the dead end, in one case
authoring: the credential lands in one slot, not two	red via its authToken half

GREEN on main (15) — each names what it guards

• feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078's inline refusal still fires at createDatasource and updateDatasource (the merged-config judgement), and the guidance still names both external.credentialsRef and secret binder → guards feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078, as ordered.
• config.authToken still read when no secret is bound → guards the ② env route. This is the pin that would have caught the wrong implementation in ③.
• pg / mysql / mongodb still read spec.secret as the password, and a bound secret still beats an inline config.password → guards the arms this change copies.
• A credential-less turso config is still accepted → if this went red, binding would be unreachable for a different reason.

On the vacuity trap you named: every red pin starts at createDatasource(), never at an existing record. Two further notes where I went further than the order:

• The encryptionKey guard is asserted beside the authToken assertion, not alone. Alone, not.toHaveProperty('encryptionKey') is green on main for the useless reason (main emitted neither key) — vacuity one level down from the one you flagged. Both pins now carry a red half.
• ⚠️ The pg/mysql/mongo green you asked for did not exist to re-run. default-datasource-driver-factory.test.ts had no secret case at all — the sibling behaviour this card is parity with was as unpinned as turso's. It is pinned now (4 cases, real factory, real SqlDriver/MongoDBDriver construction). Your instinct to ask for that green was right for a reason neither of us stated: it wasn't "unchanged", it was unwatched.

One seam, stated in the test header rather than hidden: the factory's real turso arm cannot run in this package — @objectstack/driver-turso is deliberately not resolvable from it, and the missing-package arm's own pin depends on that staying true. So the end-to-end pins capture the spec the connect path hands factory.create() (real door, real binder, real ADR-0062 D3 credential resolution) and run the real buildTursoDriverConfig on exactly that spec — the line the factory arm itself executes. Only new TursoDriver(...) is absent.

⑥ Boundaries — all four held

1. ⛔ encryptionKey untouched. Neither multi-slot shape built. Two pins now fail if a later change resolves the slot question by guessing that one bound secret means both.
2. ⛔ feat(spec)!: refuse inline credentials at publish — driver config + connector authoring door (#7990, spec half) #8078's refusal not relaxed — green in both places, at create and at update.
3. ⛔ fix(service-datasource): stop serving stored credentials on the datasource read path, and fix the false "credential-stripped" claim (#8081) #8126's read-time redaction not modified, not read as settling anything.
4. ⛔ packages/spec/src/** untouched. No contract change is needed — spec.secret is already on DatasourceConnectionSpec (contracts/datasource-driver-factory.ts:44) and the connect path already resolves it. Nothing to declare cross-seat.

⑦ Gates

Gate	Reading
check-test-source-alias	OK — 72 packages scanned, 62 registered. @objectstack/spec was already this package's registry entry, so the new file's @objectstack/spec/data import adds nothing. ⛔ KNOWN_UNALIASED_TEST_IMPORTS not widened.
check:type-check-coverage	OK — 64/77 type-checked (+root), 13 DEBT (442 frozen), 1 exempt
check:type-check-debt (--re-measure)	OK — 33 entries, 1966 raw errors, none above ceiling
tsc --noEmit (package)	clean. service-datasource is not among the 20 packages that hide tests from tsc, so the new file is type-checked
eslint	clean, all 3 changed files
ADR-0112 envelope	not applicable — no refusal surface changed, no error code added. Flagging rather than silently skipping.
Changeset	.changeset/turso-bound-secret-authtoken.md (patch)
Untouched	content/docs/releases/**, docs/adr/**, .claude/skills/**, skills/**

⚠️ One cost worth passing to the next dev in this lane: check:type-check-debt refuses to run without a built workspace closure and says so explicitly (37 deps without built type entry points ⇒ hard error, citing #6376 — it would measure a different world). pnpm exec turbo run build --filter='./packages/*' --filter='./packages/*/*' took 9m02s cold, then the gate itself 5m33s. Budget ~15 min for that gate alone in a fresh worktree; it is not a flake.

⑧ Tests

Package	Result
@objectstack/service-datasource	16/16 files, 376/376 cases
@objectstack/runtime	145/145 files
@objectstack/cli	115/115 files

Runtime and CLI included deliberately: they are the other two readers of this builder (turso-driver-factory.convergence.test.ts pins cross-loader identity, storage-driver.test.ts pins correspondence with the driver's own TursoDriverConfig). Both green.

⑨ Not done, on purpose — for your queue, not this PR

• encryptionKey is now the only open half of [security] sys_metadata.metadata is a general cleartext sink: any authored artefact whose schema permits an inline credential lands it there (datasource config.password, connector authentication) #7990's turso surface. My reading after landing step 1: the practical question is narrower than the card implies. encryptionKey is local/replica-only (an AES-256 key for a database file), while the bound-secret slot serves the remote bearer token. A datasource needing both is an embedded replica with an encrypted local file and a remote sync target — real, but not the common shape. Worth measuring whether any deployment has one before building either multi-slot mechanism.
• The env route in ② is currently pinned only by my new green case and by CLI-side tests. If the seat ever wants inline authToken refused at every door including host-constructed definitions, that route needs its own decision first — it is not an oversight, and closing it without one would break every libSQL boot.

Base was a0151e9 when I started and a0fdc56 by the time I measured; the branch is on a0fdc56 and reverse verification was re-run there, so the readings above are against the tip, not a stale base. CI convergence, ready flip and landing are yours.

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[hotlong]

Triage grading (post-dispatch, closing the loop the services seat left open): routed domain:services, type Bug — the fix restores spec.secret → authToken parity in the turso builder, entirely inside service-datasource, exactly matching what pg/mysql/mongodb already do. The seat's pre-dispatch under the restore-an-invariant exception is endorsed: #8078 closed the inline door while the supported alternative was never wired on this path, so new turso datasources had zero supported auth routes — a regression that would not surface on its own. No re-grading consequence; the dispatch stands as made (PR #8188 in flight).

Scope boundaries confirmed as carded: ⛔ no encryptionKey folding (step 2, may not survive step 1), ⛔ no regression of #8078's inline refusal, and the missing-pin acceptance (a new turso datasource authored with a bound secret authenticates) is the test that must exist.

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