[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function - #15623

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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function#15623
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@lucylqlucylq commented Nov 5, 2025•
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Stack from ghstack (oldest at bottom):

Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.

I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this index is valid/within bounds of the input tensor.

The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the pad2d function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.

The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the pad2d function. The function uses a padding_ix function to calculate indices for the input tensor in, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the in tensor, leading to the crash.

The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the pad2d function. Specifically, it adds two ET_CHECK statements to verify that the indices calculated by padding_ix are within the valid range of the in tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height) and ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width). By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.

Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added ET_CHECK statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the pad2d function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the ET_CHECK statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.

NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).

Differential Revision: D80831697

@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
5cab9ec
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 5, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
9f189e7
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 321204862
Pull Request resolved: #15623
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🧪 See artifacts and rendered test results at hud.pytorch.org/pr/pytorch/executorch/15623

Note: Links to docs will display an error until the docs builds have been completed.

✅ You can merge normally! (7 Unrelated Failures)

As of commit 5cab9ec with merge base 993254c (image):

FLAKY - The following jobs failed but were likely due to flakiness present on trunk:

BROKEN TRUNK - The following jobs failed but were present on the merge base:

👉 Rebase onto the `viable/strict` branch to avoid these failures

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lucylq added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
c26dcf4
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
@lucylqlucylq mentioned this pull request Nov 14, 2025
Merged
lucylq added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
306c14b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323425010
Pull Request resolved: #15832
lucylq added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
9417316
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
42ed837
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
86b8945
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
877b7cc
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
406914b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
ddd4dac
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
e3ec533
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 18, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (#15832)
07a093b
Stack from [ghstack](https://github.com/ezyang/ghstack) (oldest at
bottom):
* __->__ #15832#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded
regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input
tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is
valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function,
which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically
indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or
uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d`
function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices
for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds
checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the
program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in`
tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d`
function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that
the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the
`in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code:
`ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By
adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt
to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read"
crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when
validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The
added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead,
particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers
should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the
patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences.
Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input
tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles
different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK`
statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered,
and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not
guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing
tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not
respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@lucylqlucylq closed this Dec 8, 2025
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function - #15623
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Stack from ghstack (oldest at bottom):
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).

The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this index is valid/within bounds of the input tensor.
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the pad2d function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the pad2d function. The function uses a padding_ix function to calculate indices for the input tensor in, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the in tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the pad2d function. Specifically, it adds two ET_CHECK statements to verify that the indices calculated by padding_ix are within the valid range of the in tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height) and ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width). By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added ET_CHECK statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the pad2d function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the ET_CHECK statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.

Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the

correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.

Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to

comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: D80831697
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
5cab9ec
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 5, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
9f189e7
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 321204862
Pull Request resolved: #15623
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🔗 Helpful Links
🧪 See artifacts and rendered test results at hud.pytorch.org/pr/pytorch/executorch/15623
Note: Links to docs will display an error until the docs builds have been completed.
✅ You can merge normally! (7 Unrelated Failures)
As of commit 5cab9ec with merge base 993254c (image):
FLAKY - The following jobs failed but were likely due to flakiness present on trunk:
BROKEN TRUNK - The following jobs failed but were present on the merge base:
👉 Rebase onto the `viable/strict` branch to avoid these failures
This comment was automatically generated by Dr. CI and updates every 15 minutes.
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lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
c26dcf4
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
@lucylqlucylq
mentioned this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
 Merged

lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
306c14b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323425010
Pull Request resolved: #15832
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
9417316
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
42ed837
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
86b8945
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
877b7cc
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
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Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
406914b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
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Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
ddd4dac
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
e3ec533
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 18, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (#15832)
07a093b
Stack from [ghstack](https://github.com/ezyang/ghstack) (oldest at
bottom):
* __->__ #15832#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded
regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input
tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is
valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function,
which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically
indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or
uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d`
function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices
for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds
checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the
program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in`
tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d`
function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that
the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the
`in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code:
`ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By
adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt
to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read"
crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when
validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The
added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead,
particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers
should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the
patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences.
Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input
tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles
different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK`
statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered,
and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not
guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing
tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not
respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@lucylqlucylq
closed this
Dec 8, 2025
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Stack from ghstack (oldest at bottom):
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).

The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this index is valid/within bounds of the input tensor.
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the pad2d function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the pad2d function. The function uses a padding_ix function to calculate indices for the input tensor in, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the in tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the pad2d function. Specifically, it adds two ET_CHECK statements to verify that the indices calculated by padding_ix are within the valid range of the in tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height) and ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width). By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added ET_CHECK statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the pad2d function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the ET_CHECK statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.

Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the

correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.

Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to

comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: D80831697
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
5cab9ec
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 5, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
9f189e7
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 321204862
Pull Request resolved: #15623
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🧪 See artifacts and rendered test results at hud.pytorch.org/pr/pytorch/executorch/15623
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👉 Rebase onto the `viable/strict` branch to avoid these failures
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lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
c26dcf4
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
@lucylqlucylq
mentioned this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
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lucylq added a commit
that referenced
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Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
306c14b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323425010
Pull Request resolved: #15832
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
9417316
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
42ed837
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
86b8945
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
877b7cc
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
406914b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
ddd4dac
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
e3ec533
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 18, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (#15832)
07a093b
Stack from [ghstack](https://github.com/ezyang/ghstack) (oldest at
bottom):
* __->__ #15832#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded
regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input
tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is
valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function,
which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically
indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or
uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d`
function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices
for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds
checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the
program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in`
tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d`
function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that
the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the
`in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code:
`ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By
adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt
to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read"
crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when
validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The
added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead,
particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers
should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the
patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences.
Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input
tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles
different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK`
statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered,
and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not
guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing
tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not
respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@lucylqlucylq
closed this
Dec 8, 2025
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function - #15623
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Stack from ghstack (oldest at bottom):
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).

The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this index is valid/within bounds of the input tensor.
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the pad2d function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the pad2d function. The function uses a padding_ix function to calculate indices for the input tensor in, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the in tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the pad2d function. Specifically, it adds two ET_CHECK statements to verify that the indices calculated by padding_ix are within the valid range of the in tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height) and ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width). By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added ET_CHECK statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the pad2d function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the ET_CHECK statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.

Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the

correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.

Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to

comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: D80831697
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
5cab9ec
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 5, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
9f189e7
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
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Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 321204862
Pull Request resolved: #15623
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lucylq added a commit
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Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
c26dcf4
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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lucylq added a commit
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Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
306c14b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323425010
Pull Request resolved: #15832
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
9417316
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
42ed837
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
86b8945
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
877b7cc
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
406914b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
ddd4dac
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
e3ec533
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 18, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (#15832)
07a093b
Stack from [ghstack](https://github.com/ezyang/ghstack) (oldest at
bottom):
* __->__ #15832#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded
regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input
tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is
valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function,
which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically
indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or
uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d`
function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices
for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds
checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the
program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in`
tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d`
function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that
the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the
`in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code:
`ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By
adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt
to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read"
crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when
validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The
added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead,
particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers
should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the
patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences.
Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input
tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles
different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK`
statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered,
and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not
guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing
tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not
respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@lucylqlucylq
closed this
Dec 8, 2025
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
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} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function - #15623
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function#15623
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Stack from ghstack (oldest at bottom):
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).

The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this index is valid/within bounds of the input tensor.
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the pad2d function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the pad2d function. The function uses a padding_ix function to calculate indices for the input tensor in, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the in tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the pad2d function. Specifically, it adds two ET_CHECK statements to verify that the indices calculated by padding_ix are within the valid range of the in tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height) and ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width). By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added ET_CHECK statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the pad2d function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the ET_CHECK statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.

Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the

correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.

Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to

comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: D80831697
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
5cab9ec
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 5, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
9f189e7
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 321204862
Pull Request resolved: #15623
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🔗 Helpful Links
🧪 See artifacts and rendered test results at hud.pytorch.org/pr/pytorch/executorch/15623
Note: Links to docs will display an error until the docs builds have been completed.
✅ You can merge normally! (7 Unrelated Failures)
As of commit 5cab9ec with merge base 993254c (image):
FLAKY - The following jobs failed but were likely due to flakiness present on trunk:
BROKEN TRUNK - The following jobs failed but were present on the merge base:
👉 Rebase onto the `viable/strict` branch to avoid these failures
This comment was automatically generated by Dr. CI and updates every 15 minutes.
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This PR needs a release notes: label
If your change should be included in the release notes (i.e. would users of this library care about this change?), please use a label starting with release notes:. This helps us keep track and include your important work in the next release notes.
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lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
c26dcf4
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
@lucylqlucylq
mentioned this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
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lucylq added a commit
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Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
306c14b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323425010
Pull Request resolved: #15832
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
9417316
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
42ed837
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
86b8945
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
877b7cc
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
406914b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
ddd4dac
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
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Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
e3ec533
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 18, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (#15832)
07a093b
Stack from [ghstack](https://github.com/ezyang/ghstack) (oldest at
bottom):
* __->__ #15832#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded
regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input
tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is
valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function,
which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically
indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or
uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d`
function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices
for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds
checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the
program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in`
tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d`
function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that
the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the
`in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code:
`ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By
adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt
to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read"
crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when
validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The
added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead,
particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers
should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the
patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences.
Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input
tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles
different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK`
statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered,
and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not
guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing
tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not
respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@lucylqlucylq
closed this
Dec 8, 2025
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function - #15623
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Stack from ghstack (oldest at bottom):
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).

The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this index is valid/within bounds of the input tensor.
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the pad2d function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the pad2d function. The function uses a padding_ix function to calculate indices for the input tensor in, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the in tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the pad2d function. Specifically, it adds two ET_CHECK statements to verify that the indices calculated by padding_ix are within the valid range of the in tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height) and ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width). By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added ET_CHECK statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the pad2d function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the ET_CHECK statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.

Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the

correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.

Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to

comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: D80831697
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
5cab9ec
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 5, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
9f189e7
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 321204862
Pull Request resolved: #15623
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🧪 See artifacts and rendered test results at hud.pytorch.org/pr/pytorch/executorch/15623
Note: Links to docs will display an error until the docs builds have been completed.
✅ You can merge normally! (7 Unrelated Failures)
As of commit 5cab9ec with merge base 993254c (image):
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👉 Rebase onto the `viable/strict` branch to avoid these failures
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lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
c26dcf4
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
@lucylqlucylq
mentioned this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
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lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
306c14b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323425010
Pull Request resolved: #15832
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
9417316
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
42ed837
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
86b8945
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
877b7cc
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
406914b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
ddd4dac
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
e3ec533
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 18, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (#15832)
07a093b
Stack from [ghstack](https://github.com/ezyang/ghstack) (oldest at
bottom):
* __->__ #15832#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded
regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input
tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is
valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function,
which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically
indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or
uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d`
function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices
for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds
checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the
program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in`
tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d`
function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that
the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the
`in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code:
`ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By
adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt
to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read"
crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when
validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The
added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead,
particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers
should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the
patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences.
Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input
tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles
different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK`
statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered,
and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not
guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing
tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not
respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@lucylqlucylq
closed this
Dec 8, 2025
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function - #15623
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Nov 5, 2025•

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Stack from ghstack (oldest at bottom):
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).

The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this index is valid/within bounds of the input tensor.
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the pad2d function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the pad2d function. The function uses a padding_ix function to calculate indices for the input tensor in, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the in tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the pad2d function. Specifically, it adds two ET_CHECK statements to verify that the indices calculated by padding_ix are within the valid range of the in tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height) and ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width). By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added ET_CHECK statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the pad2d function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the ET_CHECK statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.

Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the

correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.

Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to

comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: D80831697
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
5cab9ec
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 5, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
9f189e7
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 321204862
Pull Request resolved: #15623
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🧪 See artifacts and rendered test results at hud.pytorch.org/pr/pytorch/executorch/15623
Note: Links to docs will display an error until the docs builds have been completed.
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As of commit 5cab9ec with merge base 993254c (image):
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👉 Rebase onto the `viable/strict` branch to avoid these failures
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lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
c26dcf4
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
@lucylqlucylq
mentioned this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
 Merged

lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
306c14b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323425010
Pull Request resolved: #15832
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
9417316
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
42ed837
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
86b8945
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
877b7cc
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
406914b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
ddd4dac
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
e3ec533
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 18, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (#15832)
07a093b
Stack from [ghstack](https://github.com/ezyang/ghstack) (oldest at
bottom):
* __->__ #15832#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded
regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input
tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is
valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function,
which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically
indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or
uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d`
function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices
for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds
checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the
program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in`
tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d`
function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that
the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the
`in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code:
`ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By
adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt
to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read"
crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when
validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The
added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead,
particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers
should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the
patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences.
Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input
tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles
different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK`
statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered,
and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not
guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing
tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not
respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@lucylqlucylq
closed this
Dec 8, 2025
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function - #15623
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Stack from ghstack (oldest at bottom):
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).

The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this index is valid/within bounds of the input tensor.
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the pad2d function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the pad2d function. The function uses a padding_ix function to calculate indices for the input tensor in, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the in tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the pad2d function. Specifically, it adds two ET_CHECK statements to verify that the indices calculated by padding_ix are within the valid range of the in tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height) and ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width). By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added ET_CHECK statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the pad2d function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the ET_CHECK statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.

Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the

correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.

Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to

comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: D80831697
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
5cab9ec
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
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Nov 5, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
9f189e7
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 321204862
Pull Request resolved: #15623
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lucylq added a commit
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Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
c26dcf4
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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lucylq added a commit
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Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
306c14b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323425010
Pull Request resolved: #15832
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
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Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
9417316
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
42ed837
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
86b8945
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
877b7cc
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
406914b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update base for Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pa…
ddd4dac
…d2d function"
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
e3ec533
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 18, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (#15832)
07a093b
Stack from [ghstack](https://github.com/ezyang/ghstack) (oldest at
bottom):
* __->__ #15832#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded
regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input
tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is
valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function,
which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically
indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or
uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d`
function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices
for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds
checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the
program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in`
tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d`
function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that
the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the
`in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code:
`ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By
adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt
to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read"
crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when
validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The
added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead,
particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers
should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the
patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences.
Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input
tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles
different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK`
statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered,
and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not
guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing
tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not
respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@lucylqlucylq
closed this
Dec 8, 2025
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@manuelcandalesmanuelcandalesmanuelcandales approved these changes
@JacobSzwejbkaJacobSzwejbkaAwaiting requested review from JacobSzwejbka

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