[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function - #15832

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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function#15832
lucylq merged 5 commits into
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Stack from ghstack (oldest at bottom):

#15623

Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.

I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).

The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.

The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the pad2d function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.

The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the pad2d function. The function uses a padding_ix function to calculate indices for the input tensor in, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the in tensor, leading to the crash.

The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the pad2d function. Specifically, it adds two ET_CHECK statements to verify that the indices calculated by padding_ix are within the valid range of the in tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height) and ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width). By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.

Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added ET_CHECK statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the pad2d function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the ET_CHECK statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.

NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).

Differential Revision: D80831697

@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
c26dcf4
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
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🔗 Helpful Links

🧪 See artifacts and rendered test results at hud.pytorch.org/pr/pytorch/executorch/15832

Note: Links to docs will display an error until the docs builds have been completed.

❌ 6 New Failures, 2 Unrelated Failures

As of commit e3ec533 with merge base b1e3e28 (image):

NEW FAILURES - The following jobs have failed:

FLAKY - The following job failed but was likely due to flakiness present on trunk:

BROKEN TRUNK - The following job failed but was present on the merge base:

👉 Rebase onto the `viable/strict` branch to avoid these failures

This comment was automatically generated by Dr. CI and updates every 15 minutes.

lucylq added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
306c14b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323425010
Pull Request resolved: #15832
@meta-clameta-claBot added the CLA Signed This label is managed by the Facebook bot. Authors need to sign the CLA before a PR can be reviewed. label Nov 14, 2025
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@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
9417316
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
266d71f
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323440692
CopilotAI reviewed Nov 17, 2025
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Pull Request Overview

This PR adds bounds checking to prevent out-of-bounds memory access in the pad1d, pad2d, and pad3d utility functions. The fix addresses a "wild-addr-read" crash by verifying that computed indices from the padding functions are within valid bounds before accessing the input tensor.

  • Adds ET_CHECK assertions to validate that computed indices are within the input tensor dimensions
  • Refactors index calculation to compute padding indices once before validation
  • Applies the fix consistently across all three padding dimension functions (1D, 2D, and 3D)

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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h Outdated
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
86b8945
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
1a78911
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323807151
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
406914b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
5fbf4cf
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323816192
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
CopilotAI reviewed Nov 17, 2025
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Pull Request Overview

Copilot reviewed 1 out of 1 changed files in this pull request and generated 5 comments.

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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h Outdated
Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h Outdated
Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h Outdated
Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h Outdated
Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h Outdated
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
e3ec533
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
befb5b7
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323827123
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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@lucylq
lucylq merged commit 07a093b into gh/lucylq/128/baseNov 18, 2025
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lucylq deleted the gh/lucylq/128/head branch November 18, 2025 01:52
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@pytorchbot@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (#15865)
3e9d22c
This PR was created by the merge bot to help merge the original PR into
the main branch.
ghstack PR number: #15832 by
@lucylq
^ Please use this as the source of truth for the PR details, comments,
and reviews
ghstack PR base:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/base
ghstack PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/head
Merge bot PR base: https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/main
Merge bot PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/orig
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@diff-train-skip-merge
Co-authored-by: lucylq <lfq@meta.com>
jirioc pushed a commit to nxp-upstream/executorch that referenced this pull request Dec 19, 2025
@pytorchbot@lucylq@jirioc
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (pytorch#15865)
1cbd8c5
This PR was created by the merge bot to help merge the original PR into
the main branch.
ghstack PR number: pytorch#15832 by
@lucylq
^ Please use this as the source of truth for the PR details, comments,
and reviews
ghstack PR base:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/base
ghstack PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/head
Merge bot PR base: https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/main
Merge bot PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/orig
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@diff-train-skip-merge
Co-authored-by: lucylq <lfq@meta.com>
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function - #15832
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function#15832
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Stack from ghstack (oldest at bottom):
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the pad2d function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the pad2d function. The function uses a padding_ix function to calculate indices for the input tensor in, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the in tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the pad2d function. Specifically, it adds two ET_CHECK statements to verify that the indices calculated by padding_ix are within the valid range of the in tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height) and ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width). By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added ET_CHECK statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the pad2d function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the ET_CHECK statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.

Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the

correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.

Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to

comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: D80831697
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
c26dcf4
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
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🔗 Helpful Links
🧪 See artifacts and rendered test results at hud.pytorch.org/pr/pytorch/executorch/15832
Note: Links to docs will display an error until the docs builds have been completed.
❌ 6 New Failures, 2 Unrelated Failures
As of commit e3ec533 with merge base b1e3e28 (image):
NEW FAILURES - The following jobs have failed:
FLAKY - The following job failed but was likely due to flakiness present on trunk:
BROKEN TRUNK - The following job failed but was present on the merge base:
👉 Rebase onto the `viable/strict` branch to avoid these failures
This comment was automatically generated by Dr. CI and updates every 15 minutes.
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
306c14b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323425010
Pull Request resolved: #15832
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@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
9417316
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
266d71f
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323440692
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Pull Request Overview
This PR adds bounds checking to prevent out-of-bounds memory access in the pad1d, pad2d, and pad3d utility functions. The fix addresses a "wild-addr-read" crash by verifying that computed indices from the padding functions are within valid bounds before accessing the input tensor.
  • Adds ET_CHECK assertions to validate that computed indices are within the input tensor dimensions
  • Refactors index calculation to compute padding indices once before validation
  • Applies the fix consistently across all three padding dimension functions (1D, 2D, and 3D)
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
86b8945
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
1a78911
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323807151
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
406914b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
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Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
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@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
5fbf4cf
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323816192
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
e3ec533
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
befb5b7
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323827123
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (#15865)
3e9d22c
This PR was created by the merge bot to help merge the original PR into
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ghstack PR number: #15832 by
@lucylq
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ghstack PR base:
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ghstack PR head:
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Merge bot PR base: https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/main
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https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/orig
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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@pytorchbot@lucylq@jirioc
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (pytorch#15865)
1cbd8c5
This PR was created by the merge bot to help merge the original PR into
the main branch.
ghstack PR number: pytorch#15832 by
@lucylq
^ Please use this as the source of truth for the PR details, comments,
and reviews
ghstack PR base:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/base
ghstack PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/head
Merge bot PR base: https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/main
Merge bot PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/orig
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function - #15832
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Stack from ghstack (oldest at bottom):
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the pad2d function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the pad2d function. The function uses a padding_ix function to calculate indices for the input tensor in, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the in tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the pad2d function. Specifically, it adds two ET_CHECK statements to verify that the indices calculated by padding_ix are within the valid range of the in tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height) and ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width). By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added ET_CHECK statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the pad2d function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the ET_CHECK statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.

Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the

correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.

Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to

comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: D80831697
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
c26dcf4
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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🧪 See artifacts and rendered test results at hud.pytorch.org/pr/pytorch/executorch/15832
Note: Links to docs will display an error until the docs builds have been completed.
❌ 6 New Failures, 2 Unrelated Failures
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NEW FAILURES - The following jobs have failed:
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👉 Rebase onto the `viable/strict` branch to avoid these failures
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lucylq added a commit
that referenced
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Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
306c14b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323425010
Pull Request resolved: #15832
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@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
9417316
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
266d71f
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323440692
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Pull Request Overview
This PR adds bounds checking to prevent out-of-bounds memory access in the pad1d, pad2d, and pad3d utility functions. The fix addresses a "wild-addr-read" crash by verifying that computed indices from the padding functions are within valid bounds before accessing the input tensor.
  • Adds ET_CHECK assertions to validate that computed indices are within the input tensor dimensions
  • Refactors index calculation to compute padding indices once before validation
  • Applies the fix consistently across all three padding dimension functions (1D, 2D, and 3D)
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
86b8945
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
1a78911
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323807151
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
406914b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
5fbf4cf
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323816192
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
e3ec533
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
befb5b7
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323827123
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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@pytorchbot@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (#15865)
3e9d22c
This PR was created by the merge bot to help merge the original PR into
the main branch.
ghstack PR number: #15832 by
@lucylq
^ Please use this as the source of truth for the PR details, comments,
and reviews
ghstack PR base:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/base
ghstack PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/head
Merge bot PR base: https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/main
Merge bot PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/orig
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@diff-train-skip-merge
Co-authored-by: lucylq <lfq@meta.com>
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@pytorchbot@lucylq@jirioc
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (pytorch#15865)
1cbd8c5
This PR was created by the merge bot to help merge the original PR into
the main branch.
ghstack PR number: pytorch#15832 by
@lucylq
^ Please use this as the source of truth for the PR details, comments,
and reviews
ghstack PR base:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/base
ghstack PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/head
Merge bot PR base: https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/main
Merge bot PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/orig
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@diff-train-skip-merge
Co-authored-by: lucylq <lfq@meta.com>
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function - #15832
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function#15832
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Stack from ghstack (oldest at bottom):
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the pad2d function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the pad2d function. The function uses a padding_ix function to calculate indices for the input tensor in, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the in tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the pad2d function. Specifically, it adds two ET_CHECK statements to verify that the indices calculated by padding_ix are within the valid range of the in tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height) and ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width). By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added ET_CHECK statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the pad2d function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the ET_CHECK statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.

Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the

correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.

Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to

comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: D80831697
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
c26dcf4
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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🔗 Helpful Links
🧪 See artifacts and rendered test results at hud.pytorch.org/pr/pytorch/executorch/15832
Note: Links to docs will display an error until the docs builds have been completed.
❌ 6 New Failures, 2 Unrelated Failures
As of commit e3ec533 with merge base b1e3e28 (image):
NEW FAILURES - The following jobs have failed:
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BROKEN TRUNK - The following job failed but was present on the merge base:
👉 Rebase onto the `viable/strict` branch to avoid these failures
This comment was automatically generated by Dr. CI and updates every 15 minutes.
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
306c14b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323425010
Pull Request resolved: #15832
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@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
9417316
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
266d71f
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323440692
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Pull Request Overview
This PR adds bounds checking to prevent out-of-bounds memory access in the pad1d, pad2d, and pad3d utility functions. The fix addresses a "wild-addr-read" crash by verifying that computed indices from the padding functions are within valid bounds before accessing the input tensor.
  • Adds ET_CHECK assertions to validate that computed indices are within the input tensor dimensions
  • Refactors index calculation to compute padding indices once before validation
  • Applies the fix consistently across all three padding dimension functions (1D, 2D, and 3D)
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
86b8945
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
1a78911
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323807151
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
406914b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
5fbf4cf
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323816192
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
e3ec533
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
befb5b7
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323827123
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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@lucylq
lucylq
merged commit 07a093b
into
gh/lucylq/128/baseNov 18, 2025

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gh/lucylq/128/head

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mentioned this pull request
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Nov 18, 2025
@pytorchbot@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (#15865)
3e9d22c
This PR was created by the merge bot to help merge the original PR into
the main branch.
ghstack PR number: #15832 by
@lucylq
^ Please use this as the source of truth for the PR details, comments,
and reviews
ghstack PR base:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/base
ghstack PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/head
Merge bot PR base: https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/main
Merge bot PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/orig
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@diff-train-skip-merge
Co-authored-by: lucylq <lfq@meta.com>
jirioc pushed a commit
to nxp-upstream/executorch
that referenced
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Dec 19, 2025
@pytorchbot@lucylq@jirioc
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (pytorch#15865)
1cbd8c5
This PR was created by the merge bot to help merge the original PR into
the main branch.
ghstack PR number: pytorch#15832 by
@lucylq
^ Please use this as the source of truth for the PR details, comments,
and reviews
ghstack PR base:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/base
ghstack PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/head
Merge bot PR base: https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/main
Merge bot PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/orig
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@diff-train-skip-merge
Co-authored-by: lucylq <lfq@meta.com>
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function - #15832
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function#15832
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Stack from ghstack (oldest at bottom):
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the pad2d function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the pad2d function. The function uses a padding_ix function to calculate indices for the input tensor in, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the in tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the pad2d function. Specifically, it adds two ET_CHECK statements to verify that the indices calculated by padding_ix are within the valid range of the in tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height) and ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width). By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added ET_CHECK statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the pad2d function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the ET_CHECK statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.

Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the

correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.

Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to

comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: D80831697
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
c26dcf4
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
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🔗 Helpful Links
🧪 See artifacts and rendered test results at hud.pytorch.org/pr/pytorch/executorch/15832
Note: Links to docs will display an error until the docs builds have been completed.
❌ 6 New Failures, 2 Unrelated Failures
As of commit e3ec533 with merge base b1e3e28 (image):
NEW FAILURES - The following jobs have failed:
FLAKY - The following job failed but was likely due to flakiness present on trunk:
BROKEN TRUNK - The following job failed but was present on the merge base:
👉 Rebase onto the `viable/strict` branch to avoid these failures
This comment was automatically generated by Dr. CI and updates every 15 minutes.
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
306c14b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323425010
Pull Request resolved: #15832
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This PR needs a release notes: label
If your change should be included in the release notes (i.e. would users of this library care about this change?), please use a label starting with release notes:. This helps us keep track and include your important work in the next release notes.
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@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
9417316
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
266d71f
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323440692
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Pull Request Overview
This PR adds bounds checking to prevent out-of-bounds memory access in the pad1d, pad2d, and pad3d utility functions. The fix addresses a "wild-addr-read" crash by verifying that computed indices from the padding functions are within valid bounds before accessing the input tensor.
  • Adds ET_CHECK assertions to validate that computed indices are within the input tensor dimensions
  • Refactors index calculation to compute padding indices once before validation
  • Applies the fix consistently across all three padding dimension functions (1D, 2D, and 3D)
💡 Add Copilot custom instructions for smarter, more guided reviews. Learn how to get started.
Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
86b8945
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
1a78911
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323807151
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
406914b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
5fbf4cf
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323816192
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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Pull Request Overview
Copilot reviewed 1 out of 1 changed files in this pull request and generated 5 comments.
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
e3ec533
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
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Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
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@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
befb5b7
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323827123
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (#15865)
3e9d22c
This PR was created by the merge bot to help merge the original PR into
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ghstack PR number: #15832 by
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ghstack PR base:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/base
ghstack PR head:
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Merge bot PR base: https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/main
Merge bot PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/orig
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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Co-authored-by: lucylq <lfq@meta.com>
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (pytorch#15865)
1cbd8c5
This PR was created by the merge bot to help merge the original PR into
the main branch.
ghstack PR number: pytorch#15832 by
@lucylq
^ Please use this as the source of truth for the PR details, comments,
and reviews
ghstack PR base:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/base
ghstack PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/head
Merge bot PR base: https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/main
Merge bot PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/orig
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function - #15832
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function#15832
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Stack from ghstack (oldest at bottom):
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the pad2d function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the pad2d function. The function uses a padding_ix function to calculate indices for the input tensor in, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the in tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the pad2d function. Specifically, it adds two ET_CHECK statements to verify that the indices calculated by padding_ix are within the valid range of the in tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height) and ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width). By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added ET_CHECK statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the pad2d function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the ET_CHECK statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.

Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the

correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.

Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to

comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: D80831697
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
c26dcf4
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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🔗 Helpful Links
🧪 See artifacts and rendered test results at hud.pytorch.org/pr/pytorch/executorch/15832
Note: Links to docs will display an error until the docs builds have been completed.
❌ 6 New Failures, 2 Unrelated Failures
As of commit e3ec533 with merge base b1e3e28 (image):
NEW FAILURES - The following jobs have failed:
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👉 Rebase onto the `viable/strict` branch to avoid these failures
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lucylq added a commit
that referenced
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Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
306c14b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323425010
Pull Request resolved: #15832
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@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
9417316
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
266d71f
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323440692
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Pull Request Overview
This PR adds bounds checking to prevent out-of-bounds memory access in the pad1d, pad2d, and pad3d utility functions. The fix addresses a "wild-addr-read" crash by verifying that computed indices from the padding functions are within valid bounds before accessing the input tensor.
  • Adds ET_CHECK assertions to validate that computed indices are within the input tensor dimensions
  • Refactors index calculation to compute padding indices once before validation
  • Applies the fix consistently across all three padding dimension functions (1D, 2D, and 3D)
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
86b8945
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
1a78911
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323807151
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
406914b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
5fbf4cf
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323816192
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
e3ec533
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
befb5b7
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323827123
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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@pytorchbot@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (#15865)
3e9d22c
This PR was created by the merge bot to help merge the original PR into
the main branch.
ghstack PR number: #15832 by
@lucylq
^ Please use this as the source of truth for the PR details, comments,
and reviews
ghstack PR base:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/base
ghstack PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/head
Merge bot PR base: https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/main
Merge bot PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/orig
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@diff-train-skip-merge
Co-authored-by: lucylq <lfq@meta.com>
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@pytorchbot@lucylq@jirioc
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (pytorch#15865)
1cbd8c5
This PR was created by the merge bot to help merge the original PR into
the main branch.
ghstack PR number: pytorch#15832 by
@lucylq
^ Please use this as the source of truth for the PR details, comments,
and reviews
ghstack PR base:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/base
ghstack PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/head
Merge bot PR base: https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/main
Merge bot PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/orig
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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Co-authored-by: lucylq <lfq@meta.com>
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function - #15832
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function#15832
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Stack from ghstack (oldest at bottom):
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the pad2d function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the pad2d function. The function uses a padding_ix function to calculate indices for the input tensor in, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the in tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the pad2d function. Specifically, it adds two ET_CHECK statements to verify that the indices calculated by padding_ix are within the valid range of the in tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height) and ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width). By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added ET_CHECK statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the pad2d function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the ET_CHECK statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.

Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the

correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.

Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to

comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: D80831697
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
c26dcf4
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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🔗 Helpful Links
🧪 See artifacts and rendered test results at hud.pytorch.org/pr/pytorch/executorch/15832
Note: Links to docs will display an error until the docs builds have been completed.
❌ 6 New Failures, 2 Unrelated Failures
As of commit e3ec533 with merge base b1e3e28 (image):
NEW FAILURES - The following jobs have failed:
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👉 Rebase onto the `viable/strict` branch to avoid these failures
This comment was automatically generated by Dr. CI and updates every 15 minutes.
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
306c14b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323425010
Pull Request resolved: #15832
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@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
9417316
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
266d71f
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323440692
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Pull Request Overview
This PR adds bounds checking to prevent out-of-bounds memory access in the pad1d, pad2d, and pad3d utility functions. The fix addresses a "wild-addr-read" crash by verifying that computed indices from the padding functions are within valid bounds before accessing the input tensor.
  • Adds ET_CHECK assertions to validate that computed indices are within the input tensor dimensions
  • Refactors index calculation to compute padding indices once before validation
  • Applies the fix consistently across all three padding dimension functions (1D, 2D, and 3D)
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
86b8945
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
1a78911
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323807151
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
406914b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
5fbf4cf
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323816192
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
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@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
e3ec533
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
befb5b7
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323827123
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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@pytorchbot@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (#15865)
3e9d22c
This PR was created by the merge bot to help merge the original PR into
the main branch.
ghstack PR number: #15832 by
@lucylq
^ Please use this as the source of truth for the PR details, comments,
and reviews
ghstack PR base:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/base
ghstack PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/head
Merge bot PR base: https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/main
Merge bot PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/orig
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@diff-train-skip-merge
Co-authored-by: lucylq <lfq@meta.com>
jirioc pushed a commit
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Dec 19, 2025
@pytorchbot@lucylq@jirioc
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (pytorch#15865)
1cbd8c5
This PR was created by the merge bot to help merge the original PR into
the main branch.
ghstack PR number: pytorch#15832 by
@lucylq
^ Please use this as the source of truth for the PR details, comments,
and reviews
ghstack PR base:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/base
ghstack PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/head
Merge bot PR base: https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/main
Merge bot PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/orig
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@diff-train-skip-merge
Co-authored-by: lucylq <lfq@meta.com>
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function - #15832
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[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function#15832
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Stack from ghstack (oldest at bottom):
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the pad2d function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the pad2d function. The function uses a padding_ix function to calculate indices for the input tensor in, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the in tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the pad2d function. Specifically, it adds two ET_CHECK statements to verify that the indices calculated by padding_ix are within the valid range of the in tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height) and ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width). By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added ET_CHECK statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the pad2d function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the ET_CHECK statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.

Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the

correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.

Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to

comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: D80831697
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
c26dcf4
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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🔗 Helpful Links
🧪 See artifacts and rendered test results at hud.pytorch.org/pr/pytorch/executorch/15832
Note: Links to docs will display an error until the docs builds have been completed.
❌ 6 New Failures, 2 Unrelated Failures
As of commit e3ec533 with merge base b1e3e28 (image):
NEW FAILURES - The following jobs have failed:
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BROKEN TRUNK - The following job failed but was present on the merge base:
👉 Rebase onto the `viable/strict` branch to avoid these failures
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that referenced
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Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
306c14b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323425010
Pull Request resolved: #15832
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@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
9417316
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 14, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
266d71f
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
ghstack-source-id: 323440692
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Pull Request Overview
This PR adds bounds checking to prevent out-of-bounds memory access in the pad1d, pad2d, and pad3d utility functions. The fix addresses a "wild-addr-read" crash by verifying that computed indices from the padding functions are within valid bounds before accessing the input tensor.
  • Adds ET_CHECK assertions to validate that computed indices are within the input tensor dimensions
  • Refactors index calculation to compute padding indices once before validation
  • Applies the fix consistently across all three padding dimension functions (1D, 2D, and 3D)
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
86b8945
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
1a78911
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323807151
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
406914b
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
5fbf4cf
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323816192
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

Comment threadkernels/portable/cpu/util/padding_util.h
Outdated

@lucylq
Update on "[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function"
e3ec533
#15623
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
[ghstack-poisoned]
lucylq added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 17, 2025
@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function
befb5b7
Pull Request resolved: #15832
Add checks for pad1d and pad3d, as well as pad2d.
I think what happens is, we 'broadcast' the input tensor into the padded regions, depending on the pad algorithm (replication, reflection).
The pad algorithm takes an output tensor index, and returns an input tensor index. We need to check that this input tensor index is valid/within bounds.
---
The crash is a "wild-addr-read" that occurs in the `pad2d` function, which is part of the Executorch library. This type of crash typically indicates that the program is attempting to read from an invalid or uninitialized memory address.
The root cause of the crash is an out-of-bounds access in the `pad2d` function. The function uses a `padding_ix` function to calculate indices for the input tensor `in`, but it does not perform sufficient bounds checking to ensure that these indices are valid. As a result, the program may attempt to read from memory outside the bounds of the `in` tensor, leading to the crash.
The patch fixes the crash by adding bounds checking to the `pad2d` function. Specifically, it adds two `ET_CHECK` statements to verify that the indices calculated by `padding_ix` are within the valid range of the `in` tensor. The checks are performed using the following code: `ET_CHECK(in_h_idx < in_height)` and `ET_CHECK(in_w_idx < in_width)`. By adding these checks, the patch ensures that the program will not attempt to read from invalid memory addresses, preventing the "wild-addr-read" crash.
Other considerations that reviewers should take into account when validating the patch include the potential impact on performance. The added `ET_CHECK` statements may introduce a small performance overhead, particularly if the `pad2d` function is called frequently. Reviewers should verify that the performance impact is acceptable and that the patch does not introduce any other unintended consequences. Additionally, reviewers should test the patch with a variety of input tensors and padding configurations to ensure that it correctly handles different edge cases. They should also verify that the `ET_CHECK` statements are triggered correctly when invalid indices are encountered, and that the program behaves as expected in these cases.
NOTE: This diff is entirely auto-generated by LLM-based patch generator.
Reviewer should carefully examine this diff as Lionhead does not guarrantee the
correctnesss of the patch beyond fixing the crash and passing existing tests.
Please commandeer this diff and revise as needed. Our bot does not respond to
comments or revision requests (yet).
ghstack-source-id: 323827123
Differential Revision: [D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
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@lucylq
lucylq
merged commit 07a093b
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gh/lucylq/128/baseNov 18, 2025

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@pytorchbot@lucylq
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (#15865)
3e9d22c
This PR was created by the merge bot to help merge the original PR into
the main branch.
ghstack PR number: #15832 by
@lucylq
^ Please use this as the source of truth for the PR details, comments,
and reviews
ghstack PR base:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/base
ghstack PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/head
Merge bot PR base: https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/main
Merge bot PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/orig
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@diff-train-skip-merge
Co-authored-by: lucylq <lfq@meta.com>
jirioc pushed a commit
to nxp-upstream/executorch
that referenced
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Dec 19, 2025
@pytorchbot@lucylq@jirioc
[llm_patch] Fix out-of-bounds access in pad2d function (pytorch#15865)
1cbd8c5
This PR was created by the merge bot to help merge the original PR into
the main branch.
ghstack PR number: pytorch#15832 by
@lucylq
^ Please use this as the source of truth for the PR details, comments,
and reviews
ghstack PR base:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/base
ghstack PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/head
Merge bot PR base: https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/main
Merge bot PR head:
https://github.com/pytorch/executorch/tree/gh/lucylq/128/orig
Differential Revision:
[D80831697](https://our.internmc.facebook.com/intern/diff/D80831697/)
@diff-train-skip-merge
Co-authored-by: lucylq <lfq@meta.com>
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