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Security: JeanExtreme002/Picklock

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting a Vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability. Use one of the channels below instead so the impact can be assessed and a fix prepared before details become public.

  • Preferred: open a private security advisory on GitHub. This creates a private thread visible only to the maintainers and the reporter, supports CVE assignment, and lets us coordinate a disclosure timeline.
  • Alternative: email contact@jeanloui.dev with subject [Picklock security].

When reporting, please include:

  • Affected version(s) — the output of picklock --version covers Picklock, PyMemoryEditor, Python and the platform.
  • The exact command line or shell session that triggers it.
  • A minimal reproducer, and the impact you observed.
  • Any prerequisites (privileges, ptrace_scope, target process attributes).

Scope

Picklock is a client. It parses commands, formats results, and calls PyMemoryEditor, which performs every read, write and scan through OS-level APIs. Vulnerabilities in the memory operations themselves therefore belong to PyMemoryEditor — see its security policy — while everything between the keyboard and that call belongs here.

That Picklock needs elevated privileges, a debugger entitlement or a relaxed ptrace_scope to attach to a process is documented in the README; those requirements are not defects.

In scope:

  • Command injection or unintended code execution from anything Picklock parses: a command line, an address expression, a source script, a pointer-path file loaded with ptrload.
  • A command writing to an address other than the one it reported, or reporting a write that did not happen (and the reverse).
  • Path traversal or unintended file writes from ptrsave and friends.
  • Leaking target memory contents into a place the user did not ask for — history files, logs, error messages.
  • Crashes in the shell that leave a target process attached, modified or in a more permissive state than it started.

Out of scope:

  • Using Picklock against a target you are not authorized to inspect. That is a misuse question, not a defect.
  • Anti-cheat evasion or cheating-detection bypass requests.
  • Picklock being able to read and write another process's memory at all — that is the entire purpose of the tool, and the OS is what gates it.
  • Bugs in PyMemoryEditor's platform backends. Report those upstream; if you are unsure which side a bug is on, report it here and it will be routed.

Supported versions

Fixes land on the latest release. Picklock follows the version of PyMemoryEditor it depends on rather than pinning to an old one, so please reproduce on the current release of both before reporting.

There aren't any published security advisories

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var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '
Overview · JeanExtreme002/Picklock · GitHub
Skip to content
Security: JeanExtreme002/Picklock
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a Vulnerability
Please do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability. Use one
of the channels below instead so the impact can be assessed and a fix
prepared before details become public.
  • Preferred: open a private security advisory on GitHub. This creates a
private thread visible only to the maintainers and the reporter, supports
CVE assignment, and lets us coordinate a disclosure timeline.
  • Alternative: email contact@jeanloui.dev with subject
[Picklock security].
When reporting, please include:
  • Affected version(s) — the output of picklock --version covers Picklock,
PyMemoryEditor, Python and the platform.
  • The exact command line or shell session that triggers it.
  • A minimal reproducer, and the impact you observed.
  • Any prerequisites (privileges, ptrace_scope, target process attributes).
Scope
Picklock is a client. It parses commands, formats results, and calls
PyMemoryEditor, which performs every read, write and scan through OS-level
APIs. Vulnerabilities in the memory operations themselves therefore belong to
PyMemoryEditor — see its security policy — while everything
between the keyboard and that call belongs here.
That Picklock needs elevated privileges, a debugger entitlement or a relaxed
ptrace_scope to attach to a process is documented in the README; those
requirements are not defects.
In scope:
  • Command injection or unintended code execution from anything Picklock parses:
a command line, an address expression, a source script, a pointer-path
file loaded with ptrload.
  • A command writing to an address other than the one it reported, or reporting
a write that did not happen (and the reverse).
  • Path traversal or unintended file writes from ptrsave and friends.
  • Leaking target memory contents into a place the user did not ask for —
history files, logs, error messages.
  • Crashes in the shell that leave a target process attached, modified or in a
more permissive state than it started.
Out of scope:
  • Using Picklock against a target you are not authorized to inspect. That is a
misuse question, not a defect.
  • Anti-cheat evasion or cheating-detection bypass requests.
  • Picklock being able to read and write another process's memory at all —
that is the entire purpose of the tool, and the OS is what gates it.
  • Bugs in PyMemoryEditor's platform backends. Report those upstream;
if you are unsure which side a bug is on, report it here and it will be
routed.
Supported versions
Fixes land on the latest release. Picklock follows the version of
PyMemoryEditor it depends on rather than pinning to an old one, so please
reproduce on the current release of both before reporting.
 There aren't any published security advisories


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var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Overview · JeanExtreme002/Picklock · GitHub
Skip to content
Security: JeanExtreme002/Picklock
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a Vulnerability
Please do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability. Use one
of the channels below instead so the impact can be assessed and a fix
prepared before details become public.
  • Preferred: open a private security advisory on GitHub. This creates a
private thread visible only to the maintainers and the reporter, supports
CVE assignment, and lets us coordinate a disclosure timeline.
  • Alternative: email contact@jeanloui.dev with subject
[Picklock security].
When reporting, please include:
  • Affected version(s) — the output of picklock --version covers Picklock,
PyMemoryEditor, Python and the platform.
  • The exact command line or shell session that triggers it.
  • A minimal reproducer, and the impact you observed.
  • Any prerequisites (privileges, ptrace_scope, target process attributes).
Scope
Picklock is a client. It parses commands, formats results, and calls
PyMemoryEditor, which performs every read, write and scan through OS-level
APIs. Vulnerabilities in the memory operations themselves therefore belong to
PyMemoryEditor — see its security policy — while everything
between the keyboard and that call belongs here.
That Picklock needs elevated privileges, a debugger entitlement or a relaxed
ptrace_scope to attach to a process is documented in the README; those
requirements are not defects.
In scope:
  • Command injection or unintended code execution from anything Picklock parses:
a command line, an address expression, a source script, a pointer-path
file loaded with ptrload.
  • A command writing to an address other than the one it reported, or reporting
a write that did not happen (and the reverse).
  • Path traversal or unintended file writes from ptrsave and friends.
  • Leaking target memory contents into a place the user did not ask for —
history files, logs, error messages.
  • Crashes in the shell that leave a target process attached, modified or in a
more permissive state than it started.
Out of scope:
  • Using Picklock against a target you are not authorized to inspect. That is a
misuse question, not a defect.
  • Anti-cheat evasion or cheating-detection bypass requests.
  • Picklock being able to read and write another process's memory at all —
that is the entire purpose of the tool, and the OS is what gates it.
  • Bugs in PyMemoryEditor's platform backends. Report those upstream;
if you are unsure which side a bug is on, report it here and it will be
routed.
Supported versions
Fixes land on the latest release. Picklock follows the version of
PyMemoryEditor it depends on rather than pinning to an old one, so please
reproduce on the current release of both before reporting.
 There aren't any published security advisories


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Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);
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highlight(document.body);
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mutations.forEach(function(m) {
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observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });
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} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Overview · JeanExtreme002/Picklock · GitHub
Skip to content
Security: JeanExtreme002/Picklock
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a Vulnerability
Please do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability. Use one
of the channels below instead so the impact can be assessed and a fix
prepared before details become public.
  • Preferred: open a private security advisory on GitHub. This creates a
private thread visible only to the maintainers and the reporter, supports
CVE assignment, and lets us coordinate a disclosure timeline.
  • Alternative: email contact@jeanloui.dev with subject
[Picklock security].
When reporting, please include:
  • Affected version(s) — the output of picklock --version covers Picklock,
PyMemoryEditor, Python and the platform.
  • The exact command line or shell session that triggers it.
  • A minimal reproducer, and the impact you observed.
  • Any prerequisites (privileges, ptrace_scope, target process attributes).
Scope
Picklock is a client. It parses commands, formats results, and calls
PyMemoryEditor, which performs every read, write and scan through OS-level
APIs. Vulnerabilities in the memory operations themselves therefore belong to
PyMemoryEditor — see its security policy — while everything
between the keyboard and that call belongs here.
That Picklock needs elevated privileges, a debugger entitlement or a relaxed
ptrace_scope to attach to a process is documented in the README; those
requirements are not defects.
In scope:
  • Command injection or unintended code execution from anything Picklock parses:
a command line, an address expression, a source script, a pointer-path
file loaded with ptrload.
  • A command writing to an address other than the one it reported, or reporting
a write that did not happen (and the reverse).
  • Path traversal or unintended file writes from ptrsave and friends.
  • Leaking target memory contents into a place the user did not ask for —
history files, logs, error messages.
  • Crashes in the shell that leave a target process attached, modified or in a
more permissive state than it started.
Out of scope:
  • Using Picklock against a target you are not authorized to inspect. That is a
misuse question, not a defect.
  • Anti-cheat evasion or cheating-detection bypass requests.
  • Picklock being able to read and write another process's memory at all —
that is the entire purpose of the tool, and the OS is what gates it.
  • Bugs in PyMemoryEditor's platform backends. Report those upstream;
if you are unsure which side a bug is on, report it here and it will be
routed.
Supported versions
Fixes land on the latest release. Picklock follows the version of
PyMemoryEditor it depends on rather than pinning to an old one, so please
reproduce on the current release of both before reporting.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page
(function() {
var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',
'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',
'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];
function cleanUrl(url) {
try {
var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);
var changed = false;
trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {
if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {
u.searchParams.delete(p);
changed = true;
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document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {
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(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
Overview · JeanExtreme002/Picklock · GitHub
Skip to content
Security: JeanExtreme002/Picklock
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a Vulnerability
Please do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability. Use one
of the channels below instead so the impact can be assessed and a fix
prepared before details become public.
  • Preferred: open a private security advisory on GitHub. This creates a
private thread visible only to the maintainers and the reporter, supports
CVE assignment, and lets us coordinate a disclosure timeline.
  • Alternative: email contact@jeanloui.dev with subject
[Picklock security].
When reporting, please include:
  • Affected version(s) — the output of picklock --version covers Picklock,
PyMemoryEditor, Python and the platform.
  • The exact command line or shell session that triggers it.
  • A minimal reproducer, and the impact you observed.
  • Any prerequisites (privileges, ptrace_scope, target process attributes).
Scope
Picklock is a client. It parses commands, formats results, and calls
PyMemoryEditor, which performs every read, write and scan through OS-level
APIs. Vulnerabilities in the memory operations themselves therefore belong to
PyMemoryEditor — see its security policy — while everything
between the keyboard and that call belongs here.
That Picklock needs elevated privileges, a debugger entitlement or a relaxed
ptrace_scope to attach to a process is documented in the README; those
requirements are not defects.
In scope:
  • Command injection or unintended code execution from anything Picklock parses:
a command line, an address expression, a source script, a pointer-path
file loaded with ptrload.
  • A command writing to an address other than the one it reported, or reporting
a write that did not happen (and the reverse).
  • Path traversal or unintended file writes from ptrsave and friends.
  • Leaking target memory contents into a place the user did not ask for —
history files, logs, error messages.
  • Crashes in the shell that leave a target process attached, modified or in a
more permissive state than it started.
Out of scope:
  • Using Picklock against a target you are not authorized to inspect. That is a
misuse question, not a defect.
  • Anti-cheat evasion or cheating-detection bypass requests.
  • Picklock being able to read and write another process's memory at all —
that is the entire purpose of the tool, and the OS is what gates it.
  • Bugs in PyMemoryEditor's platform backends. Report those upstream;
if you are unsure which side a bug is on, report it here and it will be
routed.
Supported versions
Fixes land on the latest release. Picklock follows the version of
PyMemoryEditor it depends on rather than pinning to an old one, so please
reproduce on the current release of both before reporting.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube
(function() {
function tryTheater() {
var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label="Theater mode"], ytd-player #player button[title="Theater mode"]');
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(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Overview · JeanExtreme002/Picklock · GitHub
Skip to content
Security: JeanExtreme002/Picklock
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a Vulnerability
Please do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability. Use one
of the channels below instead so the impact can be assessed and a fix
prepared before details become public.
  • Preferred: open a private security advisory on GitHub. This creates a
private thread visible only to the maintainers and the reporter, supports
CVE assignment, and lets us coordinate a disclosure timeline.
  • Alternative: email contact@jeanloui.dev with subject
[Picklock security].
When reporting, please include:
  • Affected version(s) — the output of picklock --version covers Picklock,
PyMemoryEditor, Python and the platform.
  • The exact command line or shell session that triggers it.
  • A minimal reproducer, and the impact you observed.
  • Any prerequisites (privileges, ptrace_scope, target process attributes).
Scope
Picklock is a client. It parses commands, formats results, and calls
PyMemoryEditor, which performs every read, write and scan through OS-level
APIs. Vulnerabilities in the memory operations themselves therefore belong to
PyMemoryEditor — see its security policy — while everything
between the keyboard and that call belongs here.
That Picklock needs elevated privileges, a debugger entitlement or a relaxed
ptrace_scope to attach to a process is documented in the README; those
requirements are not defects.
In scope:
  • Command injection or unintended code execution from anything Picklock parses:
a command line, an address expression, a source script, a pointer-path
file loaded with ptrload.
  • A command writing to an address other than the one it reported, or reporting
a write that did not happen (and the reverse).
  • Path traversal or unintended file writes from ptrsave and friends.
  • Leaking target memory contents into a place the user did not ask for —
history files, logs, error messages.
  • Crashes in the shell that leave a target process attached, modified or in a
more permissive state than it started.
Out of scope:
  • Using Picklock against a target you are not authorized to inspect. That is a
misuse question, not a defect.
  • Anti-cheat evasion or cheating-detection bypass requests.
  • Picklock being able to read and write another process's memory at all —
that is the entire purpose of the tool, and the OS is what gates it.
  • Bugs in PyMemoryEditor's platform backends. Report those upstream;
if you are unsure which side a bug is on, report it here and it will be
routed.
Supported versions
Fixes land on the latest release. Picklock follows the version of
PyMemoryEditor it depends on rather than pinning to an old one, so please
reproduce on the current release of both before reporting.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content
(function() {
function unstick() {
document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role="banner"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*="position: fixed"], [style*="position:sticky"]').forEach(function(el) {
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})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Overview · JeanExtreme002/Picklock · GitHub
Skip to content
Security: JeanExtreme002/Picklock
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a Vulnerability
Please do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability. Use one
of the channels below instead so the impact can be assessed and a fix
prepared before details become public.
  • Preferred: open a private security advisory on GitHub. This creates a
private thread visible only to the maintainers and the reporter, supports
CVE assignment, and lets us coordinate a disclosure timeline.
  • Alternative: email contact@jeanloui.dev with subject
[Picklock security].
When reporting, please include:
  • Affected version(s) — the output of picklock --version covers Picklock,
PyMemoryEditor, Python and the platform.
  • The exact command line or shell session that triggers it.
  • A minimal reproducer, and the impact you observed.
  • Any prerequisites (privileges, ptrace_scope, target process attributes).
Scope
Picklock is a client. It parses commands, formats results, and calls
PyMemoryEditor, which performs every read, write and scan through OS-level
APIs. Vulnerabilities in the memory operations themselves therefore belong to
PyMemoryEditor — see its security policy — while everything
between the keyboard and that call belongs here.
That Picklock needs elevated privileges, a debugger entitlement or a relaxed
ptrace_scope to attach to a process is documented in the README; those
requirements are not defects.
In scope:
  • Command injection or unintended code execution from anything Picklock parses:
a command line, an address expression, a source script, a pointer-path
file loaded with ptrload.
  • A command writing to an address other than the one it reported, or reporting
a write that did not happen (and the reverse).
  • Path traversal or unintended file writes from ptrsave and friends.
  • Leaking target memory contents into a place the user did not ask for —
history files, logs, error messages.
  • Crashes in the shell that leave a target process attached, modified or in a
more permissive state than it started.
Out of scope:
  • Using Picklock against a target you are not authorized to inspect. That is a
misuse question, not a defect.
  • Anti-cheat evasion or cheating-detection bypass requests.
  • Picklock being able to read and write another process's memory at all —
that is the entire purpose of the tool, and the OS is what gates it.
  • Bugs in PyMemoryEditor's platform backends. Report those upstream;
if you are unsure which side a bug is on, report it here and it will be
routed.
Supported versions
Fixes land on the latest release. Picklock follows the version of
PyMemoryEditor it depends on rather than pinning to an old one, so please
reproduce on the current release of both before reporting.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
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var enabled = true;
function applyDarkMode() {
if (!enabled) return;
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.highlight, .highlight *,
pre code, pre code * {
filter: none !important;
}
/* Fix common UI elements */
.modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {
filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;
background: #2d2d44 !important;
border-color: #444 !important;
}
/* Scrollbars */
::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }
::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }
::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }
/* Selection */
::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }
::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }
';
}
function removeDarkMode() {
var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');
if (style) style.remove();
}
// Toggle with Alt+Shift+D
document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {
if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {
e.preventDefault();
enabled = !enabled;
if (enabled) {
applyDarkMode();
console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');
} else {
removeDarkMode();
console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');
}
}
});
// Apply on load
applyDarkMode();
// Re-apply on dynamic content
var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {
if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {
applyDarkMode();
}
});
observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });
console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();
Overview · JeanExtreme002/Picklock · GitHub
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Security: JeanExtreme002/Picklock
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a Vulnerability
Please do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability. Use one
of the channels below instead so the impact can be assessed and a fix
prepared before details become public.
  • Preferred: open a private security advisory on GitHub. This creates a
private thread visible only to the maintainers and the reporter, supports
CVE assignment, and lets us coordinate a disclosure timeline.
  • Alternative: email contact@jeanloui.dev with subject
[Picklock security].
When reporting, please include:
  • Affected version(s) — the output of picklock --version covers Picklock,
PyMemoryEditor, Python and the platform.
  • The exact command line or shell session that triggers it.
  • A minimal reproducer, and the impact you observed.
  • Any prerequisites (privileges, ptrace_scope, target process attributes).
Scope
Picklock is a client. It parses commands, formats results, and calls
PyMemoryEditor, which performs every read, write and scan through OS-level
APIs. Vulnerabilities in the memory operations themselves therefore belong to
PyMemoryEditor — see its security policy — while everything
between the keyboard and that call belongs here.
That Picklock needs elevated privileges, a debugger entitlement or a relaxed
ptrace_scope to attach to a process is documented in the README; those
requirements are not defects.
In scope:
  • Command injection or unintended code execution from anything Picklock parses:
a command line, an address expression, a source script, a pointer-path
file loaded with ptrload.
  • A command writing to an address other than the one it reported, or reporting
a write that did not happen (and the reverse).
  • Path traversal or unintended file writes from ptrsave and friends.
  • Leaking target memory contents into a place the user did not ask for —
history files, logs, error messages.
  • Crashes in the shell that leave a target process attached, modified or in a
more permissive state than it started.
Out of scope:
  • Using Picklock against a target you are not authorized to inspect. That is a
misuse question, not a defect.
  • Anti-cheat evasion or cheating-detection bypass requests.
  • Picklock being able to read and write another process's memory at all —
that is the entire purpose of the tool, and the OS is what gates it.
  • Bugs in PyMemoryEditor's platform backends. Report those upstream;
if you are unsure which side a bug is on, report it here and it will be
routed.
Supported versions
Fixes land on the latest release. Picklock follows the version of
PyMemoryEditor it depends on rather than pinning to an old one, so please
reproduce on the current release of both before reporting.
 There aren't any published security advisories