config: Enable jh7100 SoC by mcd500 · Pull Request #6 · esmil/linux

mcd500 · 2021-05-17T09:51:50Z

Signed-off-by: Akira Tsukamoto akira.tsukamoto@gmail.com

mcd500 · 2021-05-17T09:51:58Z

I rebased the patch on top of starlight branch after contents have changed from 5.12.y to 5.13.y.
This patch is to be meant for upstream by adding minimum changes to riscv/defconfig which only with enabling jh71x0 soc.

mcd500 · 2021-05-17T09:54:19Z

I will rebase it every time when the contents of the starlight branch rebases to new the kernel version.
The original PR was #2

[ Upstream commit bbd6f0a ] In bnxt_rx_pkt(), the RX buffers are expected to complete in order. If the RX consumer index indicates an out of order buffer completion, it means we are hitting a hardware bug and the driver will abort all remaining RX packets and reset the RX ring. The RX consumer index that we pass to bnxt_discard_rx() is not correct. We should be passing the current index (tmp_raw_cons) instead of the old index (raw_cons). This bug can cause us to be at the wrong index when trying to abort the next RX packet. It can crash like this: #0 [ffff9bbcdf5c39a8] machine_kexec at ffffffff9b05e007 esmil#1 [ffff9bbcdf5c3a00] __crash_kexec at ffffffff9b111232 esmil#2 [ffff9bbcdf5c3ad0] panic at ffffffff9b07d61e esmil#3 [ffff9bbcdf5c3b50] oops_end at ffffffff9b030978 esmil#4 [ffff9bbcdf5c3b78] no_context at ffffffff9b06aaf0 esmil#5 [ffff9bbcdf5c3bd8] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff9b06ae2e esmil#6 [ffff9bbcdf5c3c28] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff9b06af24 esmil#7 [ffff9bbcdf5c3c38] __do_page_fault at ffffffff9b06b67e esmil#8 [ffff9bbcdf5c3cb0] do_page_fault at ffffffff9b06bb12 esmil#9 [ffff9bbcdf5c3ce0] page_fault at ffffffff9bc015c5 [exception RIP: bnxt_rx_pkt+237] RIP: ffffffffc0259cdd RSP: ffff9bbcdf5c3d98 RFLAGS: 00010213 RAX: 000000005dd8097f RBX: ffff9ba4cb11b7e0 RCX: ffffa923cf6e9000 RDX: 0000000000000fff RSI: 0000000000000627 RDI: 0000000000001000 RBP: ffff9bbcdf5c3e60 R8: 0000000000420003 R9: 000000000000020d R10: ffffa923cf6ec138 R11: ffff9bbcdf5c3e83 R12: ffff9ba4d6f928c0 R13: ffff9ba4cac28080 R14: ffff9ba4cb11b7f0 R15: ffff9ba4d5a30000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 Fixes: a1b0e4e ("bnxt_en: Improve RX consumer index validity check.") Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

mcd500 · 2021-05-19T14:02:08Z

Main reason I started to make the minimum changes on defconfig was for adding jh7100 enablement for the upstream defconfig. I remember the upstream maintainer hated to have different defconfig file for each different board when new products show up in the market and end up having huge number of files under arch/arm/configs, so having arch/riscv/configs/defconfig only touching hw enablement.

stffrdhrn · 2021-05-20T23:34:40Z

Hi @mcd500 -san, Can you use starlight_defconfig? As mentioned in the readme? https://github.com/esmil/linux/blob/starlight/README.md

stffrdhrn · 2021-05-21T00:49:59Z

Hi @mcd500 -san, Can you use starlight_defconfig? As mentioned in the readme? https://github.com/esmil/linux/blob/starlight/README.md

Nevermind, I see you said the upstream maintainer just wants one defconfig. I don't agree with that so much, but ok.

mcd500 · 2021-05-22T12:40:26Z

@stffrdhrn This is the discussion in the past.

Akira Tsukamoto: 10 days ago

@Esmil I tried both your starlight_defconfig and my additions on the original defconfig on the fedora rootfs and perfectly working fine. No Ethernet link down, hartbeat LED is blinking, reboot is working fine. Only difference is loading extra firmwares from your starlight_defconfig is not in my defconfig. The size of kernels from starlight_defconfig is about 1MiB smaller than revised defconfig so starlight_defconfig is definitely the first choice for the BeagleV developer’s.

Esmil: 10 days ago

That's good to hear. Thank you for testing it!

mcd500 · 2021-05-22T12:42:29Z

@stffrdhrn The upstream kernel under arch/arm64/configs end up having only one file, defconfig. So what can we do...

mcd500 · 2021-05-24T09:12:56Z

Rebased it on top of starlight after moving to 5.13.rc3.

ASan reported a memory leak caused by info_linear not being deallocated. The info_linear was allocated during in perf_event__synthesize_one_bpf_prog(). This patch adds the corresponding free() when bpf_prog_info_node is freed in perf_env__purge_bpf(). $ sudo ./perf record -- sleep 5 [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.025 MB perf.data (8 samples) ] ================================================================= ==297735==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 7688 byte(s) in 19 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4f420f in malloc (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x4f420f) #1 0xc06a74 in bpf_program__get_prog_info_linear /home/user/linux/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c:11113:16 #2 0xb426fe in perf_event__synthesize_one_bpf_prog /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c:191:16 #3 0xb42008 in perf_event__synthesize_bpf_events /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c:410:9 #4 0x594596 in record__synthesize /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1490:8 #5 0x58c9ac in __cmd_record /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1798:8 #6 0x58990b in cmd_record /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:2901:8 #7 0x7b2a20 in run_builtin /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313:11 #8 0x7b12ff in handle_internal_command /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365:8 #9 0x7b2583 in run_argv /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409:2 #10 0x7b0d79 in main /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539:3 #11 0x7fa357ef6b74 in __libc_start_main /usr/src/debug/glibc-2.33-8.fc34.x86_64/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:332:16 Signed-off-by: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com> Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210602224024.300485-1-rickyman7@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit dfbb340 ] If CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP && CONFIG_MTD (at least; there might be other combinations), lockdep complains circular locking dependency at __loop_clr_fd(), for major_names_lock serves as a locking dependency aggregating hub across multiple block modules. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0+ #757 Tainted: G E ------------------------------------------------------ systemd-udevd/7568 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88800f334d48 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 but task is already holding lock: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x17/0x20 lo_open+0x23/0x50 [loop] blkdev_get_by_dev+0x199/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #5 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 bd_register_pending_holders+0x20/0x100 device_add_disk+0x1ae/0x390 loop_add+0x29c/0x2d0 [loop] blk_request_module+0x5a/0xb0 blkdev_get_no_open+0x27/0xa0 blkdev_get_by_dev+0x5f/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #4 (major_names_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 blkdev_show+0x19/0x80 devinfo_show+0x52/0x60 seq_read_iter+0x2d5/0x3e0 proc_reg_read_iter+0x41/0x80 vfs_read+0x2ac/0x330 ksys_read+0x6b/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #3 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 seq_read_iter+0x37/0x3e0 generic_file_splice_read+0xf3/0x170 splice_direct_to_actor+0x14e/0x350 do_splice_direct+0x84/0xd0 do_sendfile+0x263/0x430 __se_sys_sendfile64+0x96/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #2 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 lo_write_bvec+0x96/0x280 [loop] loop_process_work+0xa68/0xc10 [loop] process_one_work+0x293/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x280/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by systemd-udevd/7568: #0: ffff888012554128 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_put+0x4c/0x1d0 #1: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 7568 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G E 5.14.0+ #757 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 02/27/2020 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x79/0xbf print_circular_bug+0x5d6/0x5e0 ? stack_trace_save+0x42/0x60 ? save_trace+0x3d/0x2d0 check_noncircular+0x10b/0x120 validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xe/0x1a0 ? drain_workqueue+0x41/0x140 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 ? blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0xac/0xd0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x35/0x230 blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f0fd4c661f7 Code: 00 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 13 fc ff ff RSP: 002b:00007ffd1c9e9fd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f0fd46be6c8 RCX: 00007f0fd4c661f7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000055fff1eaf400 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f0fd46be6c8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000002f08 R15: 00007ffd1c9ea050 Commit 1c500ad ("loop: reduce the loop_ctl_mutex scope") is for breaking "loop_ctl_mutex => &lo->lo_mutex" dependency chain. But enabling a different block module results in forming circular locking dependency due to shared major_names_lock mutex. The simplest fix is to call probe function without holding major_names_lock [1], but Christoph Hellwig does not like such idea. Therefore, instead of holding major_names_lock in blkdev_show(), introduce a different lock for blkdev_show() in order to break "sb_writers#$N => &p->lock => major_names_lock" dependency chain. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2af8a5b-3c1b-204e-7f56-bea0b15848d6@i-love.sakura.ne.jp [1] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/18a02da2-0bf3-550e-b071-2b4ab13c49f0@i-love.sakura.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

System crash was seen when I/O was run against an NVMe target and aborts were occurring. Crash stack is: -- relevant crash stack -- BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 : #6 [ffffae1f8666bdd0] page_fault at ffffffffa740122e [exception RIP: qla_nvme_abort_work+339] RIP: ffffffffc0f592e3 RSP: ffffae1f8666be80 RFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9b581fc8af80 RCX: ffffffffc0f83bd0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff9b5839c6c7c8 RDI: 0000000008000000 RBP: ffff9b6832f85000 R8: ffffffffc0f68160 R9: ffffffffc0f70652 R10: ffffae1f862ffdc8 R11: 0000000000000300 R12: 000000000000010d R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9b5839cea000 R15: 0ffff9b583fab170 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffae1f8666be98] process_one_work at ffffffffa6aba184 #8 [ffffae1f8666bed8] worker_thread at ffffffffa6aba39d #9 [ffffae1f8666bf10] kthread at ffffffffa6ac06ed The crash was due to a stale SRB structure access after it was aborted. Fix the issue by removing stale access. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210908164622.19240-5-njavali@marvell.com Fixes: 2cabf10 ("scsi: qla2xxx: Fix hang on NVMe command timeouts") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Arun Easi <aeasi@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>

As a full union is always sent, ensure all bytes of the union are initialized with memset to avoid msan warnings of use of uninitialized memory. An example warning from the daemon test: Uninitialized bytes in __interceptor_write at offset 71 inside [0x7ffd98da6280, 72) ==11602==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value #0 0x5597edccdbe4 in ion tools/lib/perf/lib.c:18:6 #1 0x5597edccdbe4 in writen tools/lib/perf/lib.c:47:9 #2 0x5597ed221d30 in send_cmd tools/perf/builtin-daemon.c:1376:22 #3 0x5597ed21b48c in cmd_daemon tools/perf/builtin-daemon.c #4 0x5597ed1d6b67 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:313:11 #5 0x5597ed1d6036 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:365:8 #6 0x5597ed1d6036 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:409:2 #7 0x5597ed1d6036 in main tools/perf/perf.c:539:3 SUMMARY: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value tools/lib/perf/lib.c:18:6 in ion Exiting Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210617055554.1917997-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Host crashes when pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root() is called for VFs with virtual buses. The virtual buses added to SR-IOV have bus->self set to NULL and host crashes due to this. PID: 4481 TASK: ffff89c6941b0000 CPU: 53 COMMAND: "bash" ... #3 [ffff9a9481713808] oops_end at ffffffffb9025cd6 #4 [ffff9a9481713828] page_fault_oops at ffffffffb906e417 #5 [ffff9a9481713888] exc_page_fault at ffffffffb9a0ad14 #6 [ffff9a94817138b0] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffffb9c00ace [exception RIP: pcie_capability_read_dword+28] RIP: ffffffffb952fd5c RSP: ffff9a9481713960 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff89c6b1096000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff9a9481713990 RSI: 0000000000000024 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000080 R8: 0000000000000008 R9: ffff89c64341a2f8 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff89c648bab000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff89c648bab0c8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff9a9481713988] pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root at ffffffffb95359a6 #8 [ffff9a94817139c0] bnxt_qplib_determine_atomics at ffffffffc08c1a33 [bnxt_re] #9 [ffff9a94817139d0] bnxt_re_dev_init at ffffffffc08ba2d1 [bnxt_re] Per PCIe r5.0, sec 9.3.5.10, the AtomicOp Requester Enable bit in Device Control 2 is reserved for VFs. The PF value applies to all associated VFs. Return -EINVAL if pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root() is called for a VF. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1631354585-16597-1-git-send-email-selvin.xavier@broadcom.com Fixes: 35f5ace ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Enable global atomic ops if platform supports") Fixes: 430a236 ("PCI: Add pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root()") Signed-off-by: Selvin Xavier <selvin.xavier@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@broadcom.com>

Patch series "Solve silent data loss caused by poisoned page cache (shmem/tmpfs)", v5. When discussing the patch that splits page cache THP in order to offline the poisoned page, Noaya mentioned there is a bigger problem [1] that prevents this from working since the page cache page will be truncated if uncorrectable errors happen. By looking this deeper it turns out this approach (truncating poisoned page) may incur silent data loss for all non-readonly filesystems if the page is dirty. It may be worse for in-memory filesystem, e.g. shmem/tmpfs since the data blocks are actually gone. To solve this problem we could keep the poisoned dirty page in page cache then notify the users on any later access, e.g. page fault, read/write, etc. The clean page could be truncated as is since they can be reread from disk later on. The consequence is the filesystems may find poisoned page and manipulate it as healthy page since all the filesystems actually don't check if the page is poisoned or not in all the relevant paths except page fault. In general, we need make the filesystems be aware of poisoned page before we could keep the poisoned page in page cache in order to solve the data loss problem. To make filesystems be aware of poisoned page we should consider: - The page should be not written back: clearing dirty flag could prevent from writeback. - The page should not be dropped (it shows as a clean page) by drop caches or other callers: the refcount pin from hwpoison could prevent from invalidating (called by cache drop, inode cache shrinking, etc), but it doesn't avoid invalidation in DIO path. - The page should be able to get truncated/hole punched/unlinked: it works as it is. - Notify users when the page is accessed, e.g. read/write, page fault and other paths (compression, encryption, etc). The scope of the last one is huge since almost all filesystems need do it once a page is returned from page cache lookup. There are a couple of options to do it: 1. Check hwpoison flag for every path, the most straightforward way. 2. Return NULL for poisoned page from page cache lookup, the most callsites check if NULL is returned, this should have least work I think. But the error handling in filesystems just return -ENOMEM, the error code will incur confusion to the users obviously. 3. To improve #2, we could return error pointer, e.g. ERR_PTR(-EIO), but this will involve significant amount of code change as well since all the paths need check if the pointer is ERR or not just like option #1. I did prototypes for both #1 and #3, but it seems #3 may require more changes than #1. For #3 ERR_PTR will be returned so all the callers need to check the return value otherwise invalid pointer may be dereferenced, but not all callers really care about the content of the page, for example, partial truncate which just sets the truncated range in one page to 0. So for such paths it needs additional modification if ERR_PTR is returned. And if the callers have their own way to handle the problematic pages we need to add a new FGP flag to tell FGP functions to return the pointer to the page. It may happen very rarely, but once it happens the consequence (data corruption) could be very bad and it is very hard to debug. It seems this problem had been slightly discussed before, but seems no action was taken at that time. [2] As the aforementioned investigation, it needs huge amount of work to solve the potential data loss for all filesystems. But it is much easier for in-memory filesystems and such filesystems actually suffer more than others since even the data blocks are gone due to truncating. So this patchset starts from shmem/tmpfs by taking option #1. TODO: * The unpoison has been broken since commit 0ed950d ("mm,hwpoison: make get_hwpoison_page() call get_any_page()"), and this patch series make refcount check for unpoisoning shmem page fail. * Expand to other filesystems. But I haven't heard feedback from filesystem developers yet. Patch breakdown: Patch #1: cleanup, depended by patch #2 Patch #2: fix THP with hwpoisoned subpage(s) PMD map bug Patch #3: coding style cleanup Patch #4: refactor and preparation. Patch #5: keep the poisoned page in page cache and handle such case for all the paths. Patch #6: the previous patches unblock page cache THP split, so this patch add page cache THP split support. This patch (of 4): A minor cleanup to the indent. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211020210755.23964-1-shy828301@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211020210755.23964-4-shy828301@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

It is generally unsafe to call put_device() with dpm_list_mtx held, because the given device's release routine may carry out an action depending on that lock which then may deadlock, so modify the system-wide suspend and resume of devices to always drop dpm_list_mtx before calling put_device() (and adjust white space somewhat while at it). For instance, this prevents the following splat from showing up in the kernel log after a system resume in certain configurations: [ 3290.969514] ====================================================== [ 3290.969517] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 3290.969519] 5.15.0+ #2420 Tainted: G S [ 3290.969523] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 3290.969525] systemd-sleep/4553 is trying to acquire lock: [ 3290.969529] ffff888117ab1138 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4a0 [ 3290.969554] but task is already holding lock: [ 3290.969556] ffffffff8280fca8 (dpm_list_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpm_resume+0x12e/0x3e0 [ 3290.969571] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 3290.969573] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 3290.969575] -> #3 (dpm_list_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 3290.969583] __mutex_lock+0x9d/0xa30 [ 3290.969591] device_pm_add+0x2e/0xe0 [ 3290.969597] device_add+0x4d5/0x8f0 [ 3290.969605] hci_conn_add_sysfs+0x43/0xb0 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969689] hci_conn_complete_evt.isra.71+0x124/0x750 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969747] hci_event_packet+0xd6c/0x28a0 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969798] hci_rx_work+0x213/0x640 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969842] process_one_work+0x2aa/0x650 [ 3290.969851] worker_thread+0x39/0x400 [ 3290.969859] kthread+0x142/0x170 [ 3290.969865] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 3290.969872] -> #2 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 3290.969881] __mutex_lock+0x9d/0xa30 [ 3290.969887] hci_event_packet+0xba/0x28a0 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969935] hci_rx_work+0x213/0x640 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969978] process_one_work+0x2aa/0x650 [ 3290.969985] worker_thread+0x39/0x400 [ 3290.969993] kthread+0x142/0x170 [ 3290.969999] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 3290.970004] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 3290.970013] process_one_work+0x27d/0x650 [ 3290.970020] worker_thread+0x39/0x400 [ 3290.970028] kthread+0x142/0x170 [ 3290.970033] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 3290.970038] -> #0 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 3290.970047] __lock_acquire+0x15cb/0x1b50 [ 3290.970054] lock_acquire+0x26c/0x300 [ 3290.970059] flush_workqueue+0xae/0x4a0 [ 3290.970066] drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x130 [ 3290.970073] destroy_workqueue+0x34/0x1f0 [ 3290.970081] hci_release_dev+0x49/0x180 [bluetooth] [ 3290.970130] bt_host_release+0x1d/0x30 [bluetooth] [ 3290.970195] device_release+0x33/0x90 [ 3290.970201] kobject_release+0x63/0x160 [ 3290.970211] dpm_resume+0x164/0x3e0 [ 3290.970215] dpm_resume_end+0xd/0x20 [ 3290.970220] suspend_devices_and_enter+0x1a4/0xba0 [ 3290.970229] pm_suspend+0x26b/0x310 [ 3290.970236] state_store+0x42/0x90 [ 3290.970243] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x135/0x1b0 [ 3290.970251] new_sync_write+0x125/0x1c0 [ 3290.970257] vfs_write+0x360/0x3c0 [ 3290.970263] ksys_write+0xa7/0xe0 [ 3290.970269] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [ 3290.970276] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3290.970284] other info that might help us debug this: [ 3290.970285] Chain exists of: (wq_completion)hci0#2 --> &hdev->lock --> dpm_list_mtx [ 3290.970297] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 3290.970299] CPU0 CPU1 [ 3290.970300] ---- ---- [ 3290.970302] lock(dpm_list_mtx); [ 3290.970306] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 3290.970310] lock(dpm_list_mtx); [ 3290.970314] lock((wq_completion)hci0#2); [ 3290.970319] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 3290.970321] 7 locks held by systemd-sleep/4553: [ 3290.970325] #0: ffff888103bcd448 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0xa7/0xe0 [ 3290.970341] #1: ffff888115a14488 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x103/0x1b0 [ 3290.970355] #2: ffff888100f719e0 (kn->active#233){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10c/0x1b0 [ 3290.970369] #3: ffffffff82661048 (autosleep_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: state_store+0x12/0x90 [ 3290.970384] #4: ffffffff82658ac8 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pm_suspend+0x9f/0x310 [ 3290.970399] #5: ffffffff827f2a48 (acpi_scan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: acpi_suspend_begin+0x4c/0x80 [ 3290.970416] #6: ffffffff8280fca8 (dpm_list_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpm_resume+0x12e/0x3e0 [ 3290.970428] stack backtrace: [ 3290.970431] CPU: 3 PID: 4553 Comm: systemd-sleep Tainted: G S 5.15.0+ #2420 [ 3290.970438] Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 13 9380/0RYJWW, BIOS 1.5.0 06/03/2019 [ 3290.970441] Call Trace: [ 3290.970446] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x57 [ 3290.970454] check_noncircular+0x105/0x120 [ 3290.970468] ? __lock_acquire+0x15cb/0x1b50 [ 3290.970474] __lock_acquire+0x15cb/0x1b50 [ 3290.970487] lock_acquire+0x26c/0x300 [ 3290.970493] ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4a0 [ 3290.970503] ? __raw_spin_lock_init+0x3b/0x60 [ 3290.970510] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x58/0x240 [ 3290.970519] flush_workqueue+0xae/0x4a0 [ 3290.970526] ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4a0 [ 3290.970544] ? drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x130 [ 3290.970552] drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x130 [ 3290.970561] destroy_workqueue+0x34/0x1f0 [ 3290.970572] hci_release_dev+0x49/0x180 [bluetooth] [ 3290.970624] bt_host_release+0x1d/0x30 [bluetooth] [ 3290.970687] device_release+0x33/0x90 [ 3290.970695] kobject_release+0x63/0x160 [ 3290.970705] dpm_resume+0x164/0x3e0 [ 3290.970710] ? dpm_resume_early+0x251/0x3b0 [ 3290.970718] dpm_resume_end+0xd/0x20 [ 3290.970723] suspend_devices_and_enter+0x1a4/0xba0 [ 3290.970737] pm_suspend+0x26b/0x310 [ 3290.970746] state_store+0x42/0x90 [ 3290.970755] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x135/0x1b0 [ 3290.970764] new_sync_write+0x125/0x1c0 [ 3290.970777] vfs_write+0x360/0x3c0 [ 3290.970785] ksys_write+0xa7/0xe0 [ 3290.970794] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [ 3290.970803] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3290.970811] RIP: 0033:0x7f41b1328164 [ 3290.970819] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 8b 05 4a d2 2c 00 48 63 ff 85 c0 75 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 f3 c3 66 90 55 53 48 89 d5 48 89 f3 48 83 [ 3290.970824] RSP: 002b:00007ffe6ae21b28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 3290.970831] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f41b1328164 [ 3290.970836] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000055965e651070 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 3290.970839] RBP: 000055965e651070 R08: 000055965e64f390 R09: 00007f41b1e3d1c0 [ 3290.970843] R10: 000000000000000a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004 [ 3290.970846] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000055965e64f2b0 R15: 0000000000000004 Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

The exit function fixes a memory leak with the src field as detected by leak sanitizer. An example of which is: Indirect leak of 25133184 byte(s) in 207 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f199ecfe987 in __interceptor_calloc libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x55defe638224 in annotated_source__alloc_histograms util/annotate.c:803 #2 0x55defe6397e4 in symbol__hists util/annotate.c:952 #3 0x55defe639908 in symbol__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:968 #4 0x55defe63aa29 in hist_entry__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:1119 #5 0x55defe499a79 in hist_iter__report_callback tools/perf/builtin-report.c:182 #6 0x55defe7a859d in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1236 #7 0x55defe49aa63 in process_sample_event tools/perf/builtin-report.c:315 #8 0x55defe731bc8 in evlist__deliver_sample util/session.c:1473 #9 0x55defe731e38 in machines__deliver_event util/session.c:1510 #10 0x55defe732a23 in perf_session__deliver_event util/session.c:1590 #11 0x55defe72951e in ordered_events__deliver_event util/session.c:183 #12 0x55defe740082 in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:244 #13 0x55defe7407cb in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:323 #14 0x55defe740a61 in ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:341 #15 0x55defe73837f in __perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2390 #16 0x55defe7385ff in perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2420 ... Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Martin Liška <mliska@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211112035124.94327-3-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

commit e6e22e6 upstream. System crash was seen when I/O was run against an NVMe target and aborts were occurring. Crash stack is: -- relevant crash stack -- BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 : #6 [ffffae1f8666bdd0] page_fault at ffffffffa740122e [exception RIP: qla_nvme_abort_work+339] RIP: ffffffffc0f592e3 RSP: ffffae1f8666be80 RFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9b581fc8af80 RCX: ffffffffc0f83bd0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff9b5839c6c7c8 RDI: 0000000008000000 RBP: ffff9b6832f85000 R8: ffffffffc0f68160 R9: ffffffffc0f70652 R10: ffffae1f862ffdc8 R11: 0000000000000300 R12: 000000000000010d R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9b5839cea000 R15: 0ffff9b583fab170 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffae1f8666be98] process_one_work at ffffffffa6aba184 #8 [ffffae1f8666bed8] worker_thread at ffffffffa6aba39d #9 [ffffae1f8666bf10] kthread at ffffffffa6ac06ed The crash was due to a stale SRB structure access after it was aborted. Fix the issue by removing stale access. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210908164622.19240-5-njavali@marvell.com Fixes: 2cabf10 ("scsi: qla2xxx: Fix hang on NVMe command timeouts") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Arun Easi <aeasi@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 5ec0a6f ] Host crashes when pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root() is called for VFs with virtual buses. The virtual buses added to SR-IOV have bus->self set to NULL and host crashes due to this. PID: 4481 TASK: ffff89c6941b0000 CPU: 53 COMMAND: "bash" ... #3 [ffff9a9481713808] oops_end at ffffffffb9025cd6 #4 [ffff9a9481713828] page_fault_oops at ffffffffb906e417 #5 [ffff9a9481713888] exc_page_fault at ffffffffb9a0ad14 #6 [ffff9a94817138b0] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffffb9c00ace [exception RIP: pcie_capability_read_dword+28] RIP: ffffffffb952fd5c RSP: ffff9a9481713960 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff89c6b1096000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff9a9481713990 RSI: 0000000000000024 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000080 R8: 0000000000000008 R9: ffff89c64341a2f8 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff89c648bab000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff89c648bab0c8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff9a9481713988] pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root at ffffffffb95359a6 #8 [ffff9a94817139c0] bnxt_qplib_determine_atomics at ffffffffc08c1a33 [bnxt_re] #9 [ffff9a94817139d0] bnxt_re_dev_init at ffffffffc08ba2d1 [bnxt_re] Per PCIe r5.0, sec 9.3.5.10, the AtomicOp Requester Enable bit in Device Control 2 is reserved for VFs. The PF value applies to all associated VFs. Return -EINVAL if pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root() is called for a VF. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1631354585-16597-1-git-send-email-selvin.xavier@broadcom.com Fixes: 35f5ace ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Enable global atomic ops if platform supports") Fixes: 430a236 ("PCI: Add pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root()") Signed-off-by: Selvin Xavier <selvin.xavier@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 2aa3660 upstream. It is generally unsafe to call put_device() with dpm_list_mtx held, because the given device's release routine may carry out an action depending on that lock which then may deadlock, so modify the system-wide suspend and resume of devices to always drop dpm_list_mtx before calling put_device() (and adjust white space somewhat while at it). For instance, this prevents the following splat from showing up in the kernel log after a system resume in certain configurations: [ 3290.969514] ====================================================== [ 3290.969517] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 3290.969519] 5.15.0+ #2420 Tainted: G S [ 3290.969523] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 3290.969525] systemd-sleep/4553 is trying to acquire lock: [ 3290.969529] ffff888117ab1138 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4a0 [ 3290.969554] but task is already holding lock: [ 3290.969556] ffffffff8280fca8 (dpm_list_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpm_resume+0x12e/0x3e0 [ 3290.969571] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 3290.969573] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 3290.969575] -> #3 (dpm_list_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 3290.969583] __mutex_lock+0x9d/0xa30 [ 3290.969591] device_pm_add+0x2e/0xe0 [ 3290.969597] device_add+0x4d5/0x8f0 [ 3290.969605] hci_conn_add_sysfs+0x43/0xb0 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969689] hci_conn_complete_evt.isra.71+0x124/0x750 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969747] hci_event_packet+0xd6c/0x28a0 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969798] hci_rx_work+0x213/0x640 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969842] process_one_work+0x2aa/0x650 [ 3290.969851] worker_thread+0x39/0x400 [ 3290.969859] kthread+0x142/0x170 [ 3290.969865] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 3290.969872] -> #2 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 3290.969881] __mutex_lock+0x9d/0xa30 [ 3290.969887] hci_event_packet+0xba/0x28a0 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969935] hci_rx_work+0x213/0x640 [bluetooth] [ 3290.969978] process_one_work+0x2aa/0x650 [ 3290.969985] worker_thread+0x39/0x400 [ 3290.969993] kthread+0x142/0x170 [ 3290.969999] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 3290.970004] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 3290.970013] process_one_work+0x27d/0x650 [ 3290.970020] worker_thread+0x39/0x400 [ 3290.970028] kthread+0x142/0x170 [ 3290.970033] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 3290.970038] -> #0 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 3290.970047] __lock_acquire+0x15cb/0x1b50 [ 3290.970054] lock_acquire+0x26c/0x300 [ 3290.970059] flush_workqueue+0xae/0x4a0 [ 3290.970066] drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x130 [ 3290.970073] destroy_workqueue+0x34/0x1f0 [ 3290.970081] hci_release_dev+0x49/0x180 [bluetooth] [ 3290.970130] bt_host_release+0x1d/0x30 [bluetooth] [ 3290.970195] device_release+0x33/0x90 [ 3290.970201] kobject_release+0x63/0x160 [ 3290.970211] dpm_resume+0x164/0x3e0 [ 3290.970215] dpm_resume_end+0xd/0x20 [ 3290.970220] suspend_devices_and_enter+0x1a4/0xba0 [ 3290.970229] pm_suspend+0x26b/0x310 [ 3290.970236] state_store+0x42/0x90 [ 3290.970243] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x135/0x1b0 [ 3290.970251] new_sync_write+0x125/0x1c0 [ 3290.970257] vfs_write+0x360/0x3c0 [ 3290.970263] ksys_write+0xa7/0xe0 [ 3290.970269] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [ 3290.970276] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3290.970284] other info that might help us debug this: [ 3290.970285] Chain exists of: (wq_completion)hci0#2 --> &hdev->lock --> dpm_list_mtx [ 3290.970297] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 3290.970299] CPU0 CPU1 [ 3290.970300] ---- ---- [ 3290.970302] lock(dpm_list_mtx); [ 3290.970306] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 3290.970310] lock(dpm_list_mtx); [ 3290.970314] lock((wq_completion)hci0#2); [ 3290.970319] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 3290.970321] 7 locks held by systemd-sleep/4553: [ 3290.970325] #0: ffff888103bcd448 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0xa7/0xe0 [ 3290.970341] #1: ffff888115a14488 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x103/0x1b0 [ 3290.970355] #2: ffff888100f719e0 (kn->active#233){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10c/0x1b0 [ 3290.970369] #3: ffffffff82661048 (autosleep_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: state_store+0x12/0x90 [ 3290.970384] #4: ffffffff82658ac8 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pm_suspend+0x9f/0x310 [ 3290.970399] #5: ffffffff827f2a48 (acpi_scan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: acpi_suspend_begin+0x4c/0x80 [ 3290.970416] #6: ffffffff8280fca8 (dpm_list_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpm_resume+0x12e/0x3e0 [ 3290.970428] stack backtrace: [ 3290.970431] CPU: 3 PID: 4553 Comm: systemd-sleep Tainted: G S 5.15.0+ #2420 [ 3290.970438] Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 13 9380/0RYJWW, BIOS 1.5.0 06/03/2019 [ 3290.970441] Call Trace: [ 3290.970446] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x57 [ 3290.970454] check_noncircular+0x105/0x120 [ 3290.970468] ? __lock_acquire+0x15cb/0x1b50 [ 3290.970474] __lock_acquire+0x15cb/0x1b50 [ 3290.970487] lock_acquire+0x26c/0x300 [ 3290.970493] ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4a0 [ 3290.970503] ? __raw_spin_lock_init+0x3b/0x60 [ 3290.970510] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x58/0x240 [ 3290.970519] flush_workqueue+0xae/0x4a0 [ 3290.970526] ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4a0 [ 3290.970544] ? drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x130 [ 3290.970552] drain_workqueue+0xa1/0x130 [ 3290.970561] destroy_workqueue+0x34/0x1f0 [ 3290.970572] hci_release_dev+0x49/0x180 [bluetooth] [ 3290.970624] bt_host_release+0x1d/0x30 [bluetooth] [ 3290.970687] device_release+0x33/0x90 [ 3290.970695] kobject_release+0x63/0x160 [ 3290.970705] dpm_resume+0x164/0x3e0 [ 3290.970710] ? dpm_resume_early+0x251/0x3b0 [ 3290.970718] dpm_resume_end+0xd/0x20 [ 3290.970723] suspend_devices_and_enter+0x1a4/0xba0 [ 3290.970737] pm_suspend+0x26b/0x310 [ 3290.970746] state_store+0x42/0x90 [ 3290.970755] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x135/0x1b0 [ 3290.970764] new_sync_write+0x125/0x1c0 [ 3290.970777] vfs_write+0x360/0x3c0 [ 3290.970785] ksys_write+0xa7/0xe0 [ 3290.970794] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [ 3290.970803] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3290.970811] RIP: 0033:0x7f41b1328164 [ 3290.970819] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 8b 05 4a d2 2c 00 48 63 ff 85 c0 75 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 f3 c3 66 90 55 53 48 89 d5 48 89 f3 48 83 [ 3290.970824] RSP: 002b:00007ffe6ae21b28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 3290.970831] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f41b1328164 [ 3290.970836] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000055965e651070 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 3290.970839] RBP: 000055965e651070 R08: 000055965e64f390 R09: 00007f41b1e3d1c0 [ 3290.970843] R10: 000000000000000a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004 [ 3290.970846] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000055965e64f2b0 R15: 0000000000000004 Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

To clear a user buffer we cannot simply use memset, we have to use clear_user(). With a virtio-mem device that registers a vmcore_cb and has some logically unplugged memory inside an added Linux memory block, I can easily trigger a BUG by copying the vmcore via "cp": systemd[1]: Starting Kdump Vmcore Save Service... kdump[420]: Kdump is using the default log level(3). kdump[453]: saving to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/ kdump[458]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/ kdump[465]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt complete kdump[467]: saving vmcore BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f2374e01000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation PGD 7a523067 P4D 7a523067 PUD 7a528067 PMD 7a525067 PTE 800000007048f867 Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 468 Comm: cp Not tainted 5.15.0+ #6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.14.0-27-g64f37cc530f1-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:read_from_oldmem.part.0.cold+0x1d/0x86 Code: ff ff ff e8 05 ff fe ff e9 b9 e9 7f ff 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 38 3b 60 82 e8 f1 fe fe ff 83 fd 08 72 3c 49 8d 7d 08 4c 89 e9 89 e8 <49> c7 45 00 00 00 00 00 49 c7 44 05 f8 00 00 00 00 48 83 e7 f81 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000073be08 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 00000000002fd000 RCX: 00007f2374e01000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: 00007f2374e01008 RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000073bc50 R10: ffffc9000073bc48 R11: ffffffff829461a8 R12: 000000000000f000 R13: 00007f2374e01000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807bd421e8 FS: 00007f2374e12140(0000) GS:ffff88807f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f2374e01000 CR3: 000000007a4aa000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0 Call Trace: read_vmcore+0x236/0x2c0 proc_reg_read+0x55/0xa0 vfs_read+0x95/0x190 ksys_read+0x4f/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Some x86-64 CPUs have a CPU feature called "Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP)", which is used to detect wrong access from the kernel to user buffers like this: SMAP triggers a permissions violation on wrong access. In the x86-64 variant of clear_user(), SMAP is properly handled via clac()+stac(). To fix, properly use clear_user() when we're dealing with a user buffer. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211112092750.6921-1-david@redhat.com Fixes: 997c136 ("fs/proc/vmcore.c: add hook to read_from_oldmem() to check for non-ram pages") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

commit c1e6311 upstream. To clear a user buffer we cannot simply use memset, we have to use clear_user(). With a virtio-mem device that registers a vmcore_cb and has some logically unplugged memory inside an added Linux memory block, I can easily trigger a BUG by copying the vmcore via "cp": systemd[1]: Starting Kdump Vmcore Save Service... kdump[420]: Kdump is using the default log level(3). kdump[453]: saving to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/ kdump[458]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/ kdump[465]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt complete kdump[467]: saving vmcore BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f2374e01000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation PGD 7a523067 P4D 7a523067 PUD 7a528067 PMD 7a525067 PTE 800000007048f867 Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 468 Comm: cp Not tainted 5.15.0+ #6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.14.0-27-g64f37cc530f1-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:read_from_oldmem.part.0.cold+0x1d/0x86 Code: ff ff ff e8 05 ff fe ff e9 b9 e9 7f ff 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 38 3b 60 82 e8 f1 fe fe ff 83 fd 08 72 3c 49 8d 7d 08 4c 89 e9 89 e8 <49> c7 45 00 00 00 00 00 49 c7 44 05 f8 00 00 00 00 48 83 e7 f81 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000073be08 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 00000000002fd000 RCX: 00007f2374e01000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: 00007f2374e01008 RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000073bc50 R10: ffffc9000073bc48 R11: ffffffff829461a8 R12: 000000000000f000 R13: 00007f2374e01000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807bd421e8 FS: 00007f2374e12140(0000) GS:ffff88807f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f2374e01000 CR3: 000000007a4aa000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0 Call Trace: read_vmcore+0x236/0x2c0 proc_reg_read+0x55/0xa0 vfs_read+0x95/0x190 ksys_read+0x4f/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Some x86-64 CPUs have a CPU feature called "Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP)", which is used to detect wrong access from the kernel to user buffers like this: SMAP triggers a permissions violation on wrong access. In the x86-64 variant of clear_user(), SMAP is properly handled via clac()+stac(). To fix, properly use clear_user() when we're dealing with a user buffer. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211112092750.6921-1-david@redhat.com Fixes: 997c136 ("fs/proc/vmcore.c: add hook to read_from_oldmem() to check for non-ram pages") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The fixed commit attempts to close inject.output even if it was never opened e.g. $ perf record uname Linux [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.002 MB perf.data (7 samples) ] $ perf inject -i perf.data --vm-time-correlation=dry-run Segmentation fault (core dumped) $ gdb --quiet perf Reading symbols from perf... (gdb) r inject -i perf.data --vm-time-correlation=dry-run Starting program: /home/ahunter/bin/perf inject -i perf.data --vm-time-correlation=dry-run [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1". Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00007eff8afeef5b in _IO_new_fclose (fp=0x0) at iofclose.c:48 48 iofclose.c: No such file or directory. (gdb) bt #0 0x00007eff8afeef5b in _IO_new_fclose (fp=0x0) at iofclose.c:48 #1 0x0000557fc7b74f92 in perf_data__close (data=data@entry=0x7ffcdafa6578) at util/data.c:376 #2 0x0000557fc7a6b807 in cmd_inject (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at builtin-inject.c:1085 #3 0x0000557fc7ac4783 in run_builtin (p=0x557fc8074878 <commands+600>, argc=4, argv=0x7ffcdafb6a60) at perf.c:313 #4 0x0000557fc7a25d5c in handle_internal_command (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>) at perf.c:365 #5 run_argv (argcp=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at perf.c:409 #6 main (argc=4, argv=0x7ffcdafb6a60) at perf.c:539 (gdb) Fixes: 02e6246 ("perf inject: Close inject.output on exit") Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211213084829.114772-2-adrian.hunter@intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

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add minimal known-working defconfig from SDK starfive-tech/linux#19
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mcd500 changed the title ~~config: first attempt to enable jh7100~~config: Enable jh7100 SoCMay 19, 2021

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config: Enable jh7100 SoC - #6

config: Enable jh7100 SoC#6
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