odroid: Disable the exynos-mem block device on all ubuntu defconfigs by Gu1 · Pull Request #11 · hardkernel/linux

Gu1 · 2013-01-15T23:53:46Z

Also, fix permission on all odroid defconfigs (755 -> 644)

mdrjr · 2013-01-16T00:18:16Z

Won't merge this, it will break MFC support as well loading Mali DRM. Its pointless to disable today and re-enable next week. We shall wait for Samsung's own fix of it. So it won't break MFC and Mali.

odroid: Disable the exynos-mem block device on all ubuntu defconfigs

…d reasons commit 5cf02d0 upstream. We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack trace like this: PID: 2507 TASK: ffff88103691ab40 CPU: 14 COMMAND: "rpciod/14" #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9 #1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs] #2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f #3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8 #4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs] #5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs] #6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670 #7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271 #8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638 #9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f #10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e #11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f #12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad #13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942 #14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a #15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9 #16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b #17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808 #18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c #19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6 #20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7 #21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc] #22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc] #23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0 #24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96 #25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without a connected socket, so we deadlock. Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do allocations sometimes. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 1af36b2 upstream. Release the lock before mmc_signal_sdio_irq is called by mxs_mmc_irq_handler. Backtrace: [ 79.660000] ============================================= [ 79.660000] [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] [ 79.660000] 3.4.0-00009-g3e96082-dirty #11 Not tainted [ 79.660000] --------------------------------------------- [ 79.660000] swapper/0 is trying to acquire lock: [ 79.660000] (&(&host->lock)->rlock#2){-.....}, at: [<c026ea3c>] mxs_mmc_enable_sdio_irq+0x18/0xd4 [ 79.660000] [ 79.660000] but task is already holding lock: [ 79.660000] (&(&host->lock)->rlock#2){-.....}, at: [<c026f744>] mxs_mmc_irq_handler+0x1c/0xe8 [ 79.660000] [ 79.660000] other info that might help us debug this: [ 79.660000] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 79.660000] [ 79.660000] CPU0 [ 79.660000] ---- [ 79.660000] lock(&(&host->lock)->rlock#2); [ 79.660000] lock(&(&host->lock)->rlock#2); [ 79.660000] [ 79.660000] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 79.660000] [ 79.660000] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 79.660000] [ 79.660000] 1 lock held by swapper/0: [ 79.660000] #0: (&(&host->lock)->rlock#2){-.....}, at: [<c026f744>] mxs_mmc_irq_handler+0x1c/0xe8 [ 79.660000] [ 79.660000] stack backtrace: [ 79.660000] [<c0014bd0>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf4) from [<c005f9c0>] (__lock_acquire+0x1948/0x1d48) [ 79.660000] [<c005f9c0>] (__lock_acquire+0x1948/0x1d48) from [<c005fea0>] (lock_acquire+0xe0/0xf8) [ 79.660000] [<c005fea0>] (lock_acquire+0xe0/0xf8) from [<c03a8460>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x58) [ 79.660000] [<c03a8460>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x58) from [<c026ea3c>] (mxs_mmc_enable_sdio_irq+0x18/0xd4) [ 79.660000] [<c026ea3c>] (mxs_mmc_enable_sdio_irq+0x18/0xd4) from [<c026f7fc>] (mxs_mmc_irq_handler+0xd4/0xe8) [ 79.660000] [<c026f7fc>] (mxs_mmc_irq_handler+0xd4/0xe8) from [<c006bdd8>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x70/0x254) [ 79.660000] [<c006bdd8>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x70/0x254) from [<c006bff8>] (handle_irq_event+0x3c/0x5c) [ 79.660000] [<c006bff8>] (handle_irq_event+0x3c/0x5c) from [<c006e6d0>] (handle_level_irq+0x90/0x110) [ 79.660000] [<c006e6d0>] (handle_level_irq+0x90/0x110) from [<c006b930>] (generic_handle_irq+0x38/0x50) [ 79.660000] [<c006b930>] (generic_handle_irq+0x38/0x50) from [<c00102fc>] (handle_IRQ+0x30/0x84) [ 79.660000] [<c00102fc>] (handle_IRQ+0x30/0x84) from [<c000f058>] (__irq_svc+0x38/0x60) [ 79.660000] [<c000f058>] (__irq_svc+0x38/0x60) from [<c0010520>] (default_idle+0x2c/0x40) [ 79.660000] [<c0010520>] (default_idle+0x2c/0x40) from [<c0010a90>] (cpu_idle+0x64/0xcc) [ 79.660000] [<c0010a90>] (cpu_idle+0x64/0xcc) from [<c04ff858>] (start_kernel+0x244/0x2c8) [ 79.660000] BUG: spinlock lockup on CPU#0, swapper/0 [ 79.660000] lock: c398cb2c, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: swapper/0, .owner_cpu: 0 [ 79.660000] [<c0014bd0>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf4) from [<c01ddb1c>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0xf0/0x144) [ 79.660000] [<c01ddb1c>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0xf0/0x144) from [<c03a8468>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x58) [ 79.660000] [<c03a8468>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x58) from [<c026ea3c>] (mxs_mmc_enable_sdio_irq+0x18/0xd4) [ 79.660000] [<c026ea3c>] (mxs_mmc_enable_sdio_irq+0x18/0xd4) from [<c026f7fc>] (mxs_mmc_irq_handler+0xd4/0xe8) [ 79.660000] [<c026f7fc>] (mxs_mmc_irq_handler+0xd4/0xe8) from [<c006bdd8>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x70/0x254) [ 79.660000] [<c006bdd8>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x70/0x254) from [<c006bff8>] (handle_irq_event+0x3c/0x5c) [ 79.660000] [<c006bff8>] (handle_irq_event+0x3c/0x5c) from [<c006e6d0>] (handle_level_irq+0x90/0x110) [ 79.660000] [<c006e6d0>] (handle_level_irq+0x90/0x110) from [<c006b930>] (generic_handle_irq+0x38/0x50) [ 79.660000] [<c006b930>] (generic_handle_irq+0x38/0x50) from [<c00102fc>] (handle_IRQ+0x30/0x84) [ 79.660000] [<c00102fc>] (handle_IRQ+0x30/0x84) from [<c000f058>] (__irq_svc+0x38/0x60) [ 79.660000] [<c000f058>] (__irq_svc+0x38/0x60) from [<c0010520>] (default_idle+0x2c/0x40) [ 79.660000] [<c0010520>] (default_idle+0x2c/0x40) from [<c0010a90>] (cpu_idle+0x64/0xcc) [ 79.660000] [<c0010a90>] (cpu_idle+0x64/0xcc) from [<c04ff858>] (start_kernel+0x244/0x2c8) Signed-off-by: Lauri Hintsala <lauri.hintsala@bluegiga.com> Acked-by: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Chris Ball <cjb@laptop.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 4992185 upstream. Some mlme work structs are not cancelled on disassociation nor interface deletion, which leads to them running after the memory has been freed There is not a clean way to cancel these in the disassociation logic because they must be canceled outside of the ifmgd->mtx lock, so just cancel them in mgd_stop logic that tears down the station. This fixes the crashes we see in 3.7.9+. The crash stack trace itself isn't so helpful, but this warning gives more useful info: WARNING: at /home/greearb/git/linux-3.7.dev.y/lib/debugobjects.c:261 debug_print_object+0x7c/0x8d() ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: work_struct hint: ieee80211_sta_monitor_work+0x0/0x14 [mac80211] Modules linked in: [...] Pid: 14743, comm: iw Tainted: G C O 3.7.9+ #11 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81087ef8>] warn_slowpath_common+0x80/0x98 [<ffffffff81087fa4>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x41/0x43 [<ffffffff812a2608>] debug_print_object+0x7c/0x8d [<ffffffff812a2bca>] debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x95/0x1c3 [<ffffffff8114cc69>] slab_free_hook+0x70/0x79 [<ffffffff8114ea3e>] kfree+0x62/0xb7 [<ffffffff8149f465>] netdev_release+0x39/0x3e [<ffffffff8136ad67>] device_release+0x52/0x8a [<ffffffff812937db>] kobject_release+0x121/0x158 [<ffffffff81293612>] kobject_put+0x4c/0x50 [<ffffffff8148f0d7>] netdev_run_todo+0x25c/0x27e Signed-off-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 9cb6cb7 ] The following script will produce a kernel oops: sudo ip netns add v sudo ip netns exec v ip ad add 127.0.0.1/8 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip link set lo up sudo ip netns exec v ip ro add 224.0.0.0/4 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip li add vxlan0 type vxlan id 42 group 239.1.1.1 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip link set vxlan0 up sudo ip netns del v where inspect by gdb: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. [Switching to Thread 107] 0xffffffffa0289e33 in ?? () (gdb) bt #0 vxlan_leave_group (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:533 #1 vxlan_stop (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:1087 #2 0xffffffff812cc498 in __dev_close_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:1299 #3 0xffffffff812cd920 in dev_close_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:1335 #4 0xffffffff812cef31 in rollback_registered_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:4851 #5 0xffffffff812cf040 in unregister_netdevice_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:5752 #6 0xffffffff812cf1ba in default_device_exit_batch (net_list=0xffff88001f2e7e18) at net/core/dev.c:6170 #7 0xffffffff812cab27 in cleanup_net (work=<optimized out>) at net/core/net_namespace.c:302 #8 0xffffffff810540ef in process_one_work (worker=0xffff88001ba9ed40, work=0xffffffff8167d020) at kernel/workqueue.c:2157 #9 0xffffffff810549d0 in worker_thread (__worker=__worker@entry=0xffff88001ba9ed40) at kernel/workqueue.c:2276 #10 0xffffffff8105870c in kthread (_create=0xffff88001f2e5d68) at kernel/kthread.c:168 #11 <signal handler called> #12 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () #13 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () (gdb) fr 0 #0 vxlan_leave_group (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:533 533 struct sock *sk = vn->sock->sk; (gdb) l 528 static int vxlan_leave_group(struct net_device *dev) 529 { 530 struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev); 531 struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(dev_net(dev), vxlan_net_id); 532 int err = 0; 533 struct sock *sk = vn->sock->sk; 534 struct ip_mreqn mreq = { 535 .imr_multiaddr.s_addr = vxlan->gaddr, 536 .imr_ifindex = vxlan->link, 537 }; (gdb) p vn->sock $4 = (struct socket *) 0x0 The kernel calls `vxlan_exit_net` when deleting the netns before shutting down vxlan interfaces. Later the removal of all vxlan interfaces, where `vn->sock` is already gone causes the oops. so we should manually shutdown all interfaces before deleting `vn->sock` as the patch does. Signed-off-by: Zang MingJie <zealot0630@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Daniel Petre reported crashes in icmp_dst_unreach() with following call graph: #3 [ffff88003fc03938] __stack_chk_fail at ffffffff81037f77 #4 [ffff88003fc03948] icmp_send at ffffffff814d5fec #5 [ffff88003fc03ae8] ipv4_link_failure at ffffffff814a1795 #6 [ffff88003fc03af8] ipgre_tunnel_xmit at ffffffff814e7965 #7 [ffff88003fc03b78] dev_hard_start_xmit at ffffffff8146e032 #8 [ffff88003fc03bc8] sch_direct_xmit at ffffffff81487d66 #9 [ffff88003fc03c08] __qdisc_run at ffffffff81487efd #10 [ffff88003fc03c48] dev_queue_xmit at ffffffff8146e5a7 #11 [ffff88003fc03c88] ip_finish_output at ffffffff814ab596 Daniel found a similar problem mentioned in http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1007.0/00961.html And indeed this is the root cause : skb->cb[] contains data fooling IP stack. We must clear IPCB in ip_tunnel_xmit() sooner in case dst_link_failure() is called. Or else skb->cb[] might contain garbage from GSO segmentation layer. A similar fix was tested on linux-3.9, but gre code was refactored in linux-3.10. I'll send patches for stable kernels as well. Many thanks to Daniel for providing reports, patches and testing ! Reported-by: Daniel Petre <daniel.petre@rcs-rds.ro> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The stop machine logic can lock up if all but one of the migration threads make it through the disable-irq step and the one remaining thread gets stuck in __do_softirq. The reason __do_softirq can hang is that it has a bail-out based on jiffies timeout, but in the lockup case, jiffies itself is not incremented. To work around this, re-add the max_restart counter in __do_irq and stop processing irqs after 10 restarts. Thanks to Tejun Heo and Rusty Russell and others for helping me track this down. This was introduced in 3.9 by commit c10d736 ("softirq: reduce latencies"). It may be worth looking into ath9k to see if it has issues with its irq handler at a later date. The hang stack traces look something like this: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: at kernel/watchdog.c:245 watchdog_overflow_callback+0x9c/0xa7() Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 2 Modules linked in: ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw ath mac80211 cfg80211 nfsv4 auth_rpcgss nfs fscache nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat veth 8021q garp stp mrp llc pktgen lockd sunrpc] Pid: 23, comm: migration/2 Tainted: G C 3.9.4+ #11 Call Trace: <NMI> warn_slowpath_common+0x85/0x9f warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x48 watchdog_overflow_callback+0x9c/0xa7 __perf_event_overflow+0x137/0x1cb perf_event_overflow+0x14/0x16 intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x2dc/0x359 perf_event_nmi_handler+0x19/0x1b nmi_handle+0x7f/0xc2 do_nmi+0xbc/0x304 end_repeat_nmi+0x1e/0x2e <<EOE>> cpu_stopper_thread+0xae/0x162 smpboot_thread_fn+0x258/0x260 kthread+0xc7/0xcf ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 ---[ end trace 4947dfa9b0a4cec3 ]--- BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 22s! [migration/1:17] Modules linked in: ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw ath mac80211 cfg80211 nfsv4 auth_rpcgss nfs fscache nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat veth 8021q garp stp mrp llc pktgen lockd sunrpc] irq event stamp: 835637905 hardirqs last enabled at (835637904): __do_softirq+0x9f/0x257 hardirqs last disabled at (835637905): apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 softirqs last enabled at (5654720): __do_softirq+0x1ff/0x257 softirqs last disabled at (5654725): irq_exit+0x5f/0xbb CPU 1 Pid: 17, comm: migration/1 Tainted: G WC 3.9.4+ #11 To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./To be filled by O.E.M. RIP: tasklet_hi_action+0xf0/0xf0 Process migration/1 Call Trace: <IRQ> __do_softirq+0x117/0x257 irq_exit+0x5f/0xbb smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8a/0x98 apic_timer_interrupt+0x72/0x80 <EOI> printk+0x4d/0x4f stop_machine_cpu_stop+0x22c/0x274 cpu_stopper_thread+0xae/0x162 smpboot_thread_fn+0x258/0x260 kthread+0xc7/0xcf ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 Signed-off-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Pekka Riikonen <priikone@iki.fi> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

commit d9b8706 upstream. usbnet_disconnect() will set intfdata to NULL before calling the minidriver unbind function. The cdc_wdm subdriver cannot know that it is disconnecting until the qmi_wwan unbind function has called its disconnect function. This means that we must be able to support the cdc_wdm subdriver operating normally while usbnet_disconnect() is running, and in particular that intfdata may be NULL. The only place this matters is in qmi_wwan_cdc_wdm_manage_power which is called from cdc_wdm. Simply testing for NULL intfdata there is sufficient to allow it to continue working at all times. Fixes this Oops where a cdc-wdm device was closed while the USB device was disconnecting, causing wdm_release to call qmi_wwan_cdc_wdm_manage_power after intfdata was set to NULL by usbnet_disconnect: [41819.087460] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000080 [41819.087815] IP: [<f8640458>] qmi_wwan_manage_power+0x68/0x90 [qmi_wwan] [41819.088028] *pdpt = 000000000314f001 *pde = 0000000000000000 [41819.088028] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP [41819.088028] Modules linked in: qmi_wwan option usb_wwan usbserial usbnet cdc_wdm nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 vfat fat usb_storage bnep rfcomm bluetooth parport_pc ppdev binfmt_misc iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_mangle iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables dm_crypt uvcvideo snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_intel videobuf2_core snd_hda_codec joydev videodev videobuf2_vmalloc hid_multitouch snd_hwdep arc4 videobuf2_memops snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_rawmidi snd_seq_midi_event ath9k mac80211 snd_seq ath9k_common ath9k_hw ath snd_timer snd_seq_device sparse_keymap dm_multipath scsi_dh coretemp mac_hid snd soundcore cfg80211 snd_page_alloc psmouse serio_raw microcode lp parport dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log usbhid hid i915 drm_kms_helper drm r8169 i2c_algo_bit wmi video [last unloaded: qmi_wwan] [41819.088028] [41819.088028] Pid: 23292, comm: qmicli Not tainted 3.4.0-5-generic #11-Ubuntu GIGABYTE T1005/T1005 [41819.088028] EIP: 0060:[<f8640458>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 1 [41819.088028] EIP is at qmi_wwan_manage_power+0x68/0x90 [qmi_wwan] [41819.088028] EAX: 00000000 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 000000c3 EDX: 00000000 [41819.088028] ESI: c3b27658 EDI: 00000000 EBP: c298bea4 ESP: c298be98 [41819.088028] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 [41819.088028] CR0: 8005003b CR2: 00000080 CR3: 3605e00 CR4: 000007f0 [41819.088028] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 [41819.088028] DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 [41819.088028] Process qmicli (pid: 23292, ti=c298a000 task=f343b280 task.ti=c298a000) [41819.088028] Stack: [41819.088028] 00000000 c3b27658 e2a80d00 c298beb0 f864051a c3b27600 c298bec0 f9027099 [41819.088028] c2fd6000 00000008 c298bef0 c1147f96 00000001 00000000 00000000 f4e54790 [41819.088028] ecf43a00 ecf43a00 c2fd6008 c2fd6000 ebbd7600 ffffffb9 c298bf08 c1144474 [41819.088028] Call Trace: [41819.088028] [<f864051a>] qmi_wwan_cdc_wdm_manage_power+0x1a/0x20 [qmi_wwan] [41819.088028] [<f9027099>] wdm_release+0x69/0x70 [cdc_wdm] [41819.088028] [<c1147f96>] fput+0xe6/0x210 [41819.088028] [<c1144474>] filp_close+0x54/0x80 [41819.088028] [<c1046a65>] put_files_struct+0x75/0xc0 [41819.088028] [<c1046b56>] exit_files+0x46/0x60 [41819.088028] [<c1046f81>] do_exit+0x141/0x780 [41819.088028] [<c107248f>] ? wake_up_state+0xf/0x20 [41819.088028] [<c1053f48>] ? signal_wake_up+0x28/0x40 [41819.088028] [<c1054f3b>] ? zap_other_threads+0x6b/0x80 [41819.088028] [<c1047864>] do_group_exit+0x34/0xa0 [41819.088028] [<c10478e8>] sys_exit_group+0x18/0x20 [41819.088028] [<c15bb7df>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x28 [41819.088028] Code: 04 83 e7 01 c1 e7 03 0f b6 42 18 83 e0 f7 09 f8 88 42 18 8b 43 04 e8 48 9a dd c8 89 f0 8b 5d f4 8b 75 f8 8b 7d fc 89 ec 5d c3 90 <f0> ff 88 80 00 00 00 0f 94 c0 84 c0 75 b7 31 f6 8b 5d f4 89 f0 [41819.088028] EIP: [<f8640458>] qmi_wwan_manage_power+0x68/0x90 [qmi_wwan] SS:ESP 0068:c298be98 [41819.088028] CR2: 0000000000000080 [41819.149492] ---[ end trace 0944479ff8257f55 ]--- Reported-by: Marius Bjørnstad Kotsbak <marius.kotsbak@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 3cf003c upstream. [The async read code was broadened to include uncached reads in 3.5, so the mainline patch did not apply directly. This patch is just a backport to account for that change.] Jian found that when he ran fsx on a 32 bit arch with a large wsize the process and one of the bdi writeback kthreads would sometimes deadlock with a stack trace like this: crash> bt PID: 2789 TASK: f02edaa0 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "fsx" #0 [eed63cbc] schedule at c083c5b3 #1 [eed63d80] kmap_high at c0500ec8 #2 [eed63db] cifs_async_writev at f7fabcd7 [cifs] #3 [eed63df0] cifs_writepages at f7fb7f5c [cifs] #4 [eed63e50] do_writepages at c04f3e32 #5 [eed63e54] __filemap_fdatawrite_range at c04e152a #6 [eed63ea4] filemap_fdatawrite at c04e1b3e #7 [eed63eb4] cifs_file_aio_write at f7fa111a [cifs] #8 [eed63ecc] do_sync_write at c052d202 #9 [eed63f74] vfs_write at c052d4ee #10 [eed63f94] sys_write at c052df4c #11 [eed63fb0] ia32_sysenter_target at c0409a98 EAX: 00000004 EBX: 00000003 ECX: abd73b73 EDX: 012a65c6 DS: 007b ESI: 012a65c6 ES: 007b EDI: 00000000 SS: 007b ESP: bf8db17 EBP: bf8db1f8 GS: 0033 CS: 0073 EIP: 40000424 ERR: 00000004 EFLAGS: 00000246 Each task would kmap part of its address array before getting stuck, but not enough to actually issue the write. This patch fixes this by serializing the marshal_iov operations for async reads and writes. The idea here is to ensure that cifs aggressively tries to populate a request before attempting to fulfill another one. As soon as all of the pages are kmapped for a request, then we can unlock and allow another one to proceed. There's no need to do this serialization on non-CONFIG_HIGHMEM arches however, so optimize all of this out when CONFIG_HIGHMEM isn't set. Reported-by: Jian Li <jiali@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…d reasons commit 5cf02d0 upstream. We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack trace like this: PID: 2507 TASK: ffff88103691ab40 CPU: 14 COMMAND: "rpciod/14" #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9 #1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs] #2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f #3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8 #4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs] #5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs] #6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670 #7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271 #8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638 #9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f #10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e #11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f #12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad #13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942 #14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a #15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9 #16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b #17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808 #18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c #19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6 #20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7 #21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc] #22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc] #23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0 #24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96 #25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without a connected socket, so we deadlock. Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do allocations sometimes. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 1af36b2 upstream. Release the lock before mmc_signal_sdio_irq is called by mxs_mmc_irq_handler. Backtrace: [ 79.660000] ============================================= [ 79.660000] [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] [ 79.660000] 3.4.0-00009-g3e96082-dirty #11 Not tainted [ 79.660000] --------------------------------------------- [ 79.660000] swapper/0 is trying to acquire lock: [ 79.660000] (&(&host->lock)->rlock#2){-.....}, at: [<c026ea3c>] mxs_mmc_enable_sdio_irq+0x18/0xd4 [ 79.660000] [ 79.660000] but task is already holding lock: [ 79.660000] (&(&host->lock)->rlock#2){-.....}, at: [<c026f744>] mxs_mmc_irq_handler+0x1c/0xe8 [ 79.660000] [ 79.660000] other info that might help us debug this: [ 79.660000] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 79.660000] [ 79.660000] CPU0 [ 79.660000] ---- [ 79.660000] lock(&(&host->lock)->rlock#2); [ 79.660000] lock(&(&host->lock)->rlock#2); [ 79.660000] [ 79.660000] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 79.660000] [ 79.660000] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 79.660000] [ 79.660000] 1 lock held by swapper/0: [ 79.660000] #0: (&(&host->lock)->rlock#2){-.....}, at: [<c026f744>] mxs_mmc_irq_handler+0x1c/0xe8 [ 79.660000] [ 79.660000] stack backtrace: [ 79.660000] [<c0014bd0>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf4) from [<c005f9c0>] (__lock_acquire+0x1948/0x1d48) [ 79.660000] [<c005f9c0>] (__lock_acquire+0x1948/0x1d48) from [<c005fea0>] (lock_acquire+0xe0/0xf8) [ 79.660000] [<c005fea0>] (lock_acquire+0xe0/0xf8) from [<c03a8460>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x58) [ 79.660000] [<c03a8460>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x58) from [<c026ea3c>] (mxs_mmc_enable_sdio_irq+0x18/0xd4) [ 79.660000] [<c026ea3c>] (mxs_mmc_enable_sdio_irq+0x18/0xd4) from [<c026f7fc>] (mxs_mmc_irq_handler+0xd4/0xe8) [ 79.660000] [<c026f7fc>] (mxs_mmc_irq_handler+0xd4/0xe8) from [<c006bdd8>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x70/0x254) [ 79.660000] [<c006bdd8>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x70/0x254) from [<c006bff8>] (handle_irq_event+0x3c/0x5c) [ 79.660000] [<c006bff8>] (handle_irq_event+0x3c/0x5c) from [<c006e6d0>] (handle_level_irq+0x90/0x110) [ 79.660000] [<c006e6d0>] (handle_level_irq+0x90/0x110) from [<c006b930>] (generic_handle_irq+0x38/0x50) [ 79.660000] [<c006b930>] (generic_handle_irq+0x38/0x50) from [<c00102fc>] (handle_IRQ+0x30/0x84) [ 79.660000] [<c00102fc>] (handle_IRQ+0x30/0x84) from [<c000f058>] (__irq_svc+0x38/0x60) [ 79.660000] [<c000f058>] (__irq_svc+0x38/0x60) from [<c0010520>] (default_idle+0x2c/0x40) [ 79.660000] [<c0010520>] (default_idle+0x2c/0x40) from [<c0010a90>] (cpu_idle+0x64/0xcc) [ 79.660000] [<c0010a90>] (cpu_idle+0x64/0xcc) from [<c04ff858>] (start_kernel+0x244/0x2c8) [ 79.660000] BUG: spinlock lockup on CPU#0, swapper/0 [ 79.660000] lock: c398cb2c, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: swapper/0, .owner_cpu: 0 [ 79.660000] [<c0014bd0>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf4) from [<c01ddb1c>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0xf0/0x144) [ 79.660000] [<c01ddb1c>] (do_raw_spin_lock+0xf0/0x144) from [<c03a8468>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x58) [ 79.660000] [<c03a8468>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x58) from [<c026ea3c>] (mxs_mmc_enable_sdio_irq+0x18/0xd4) [ 79.660000] [<c026ea3c>] (mxs_mmc_enable_sdio_irq+0x18/0xd4) from [<c026f7fc>] (mxs_mmc_irq_handler+0xd4/0xe8) [ 79.660000] [<c026f7fc>] (mxs_mmc_irq_handler+0xd4/0xe8) from [<c006bdd8>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x70/0x254) [ 79.660000] [<c006bdd8>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x70/0x254) from [<c006bff8>] (handle_irq_event+0x3c/0x5c) [ 79.660000] [<c006bff8>] (handle_irq_event+0x3c/0x5c) from [<c006e6d0>] (handle_level_irq+0x90/0x110) [ 79.660000] [<c006e6d0>] (handle_level_irq+0x90/0x110) from [<c006b930>] (generic_handle_irq+0x38/0x50) [ 79.660000] [<c006b930>] (generic_handle_irq+0x38/0x50) from [<c00102fc>] (handle_IRQ+0x30/0x84) [ 79.660000] [<c00102fc>] (handle_IRQ+0x30/0x84) from [<c000f058>] (__irq_svc+0x38/0x60) [ 79.660000] [<c000f058>] (__irq_svc+0x38/0x60) from [<c0010520>] (default_idle+0x2c/0x40) [ 79.660000] [<c0010520>] (default_idle+0x2c/0x40) from [<c0010a90>] (cpu_idle+0x64/0xcc) [ 79.660000] [<c0010a90>] (cpu_idle+0x64/0xcc) from [<c04ff858>] (start_kernel+0x244/0x2c8) Signed-off-by: Lauri Hintsala <lauri.hintsala@bluegiga.com> Acked-by: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Chris Ball <cjb@laptop.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!" and the stack trace is: #7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905 #8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge] #9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge] #10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge] #11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge] #12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc #13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6 #14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad #15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17 #16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68 #17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101 #18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8 #19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun] #20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun] #21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1 #22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe #23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f #24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1 #25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292 this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by commit 9f00b2e (bridge: only expire the mdb entry when query is received). Same for __br_mdb_del(). Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com> Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com> Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

…s struct file The following call chain: ------------------------------------------------------------ nfs4_get_vfs_file - nfsd_open - dentry_open - do_dentry_open - __get_file_write_access - get_write_access - return atomic_inc_unless_negative(&inode->i_writecount) ? 0 : -ETXTBSY; ------------------------------------------------------------ can result in the following state: ------------------------------------------------------------ struct nfs4_file { ... fi_fds = {0xffff880c1fa65c80, 0xffffffffffffffe6, 0x0}, fi_access = {{ counter = 0x1 }, { counter = 0x0 }}, ... ------------------------------------------------------------ 1) First time around, in nfs4_get_vfs_file() fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] is NULL, hence nfsd_open() is called where we get status set to an error and fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] to -ETXTBSY. Thus we do not reach nfs4_file_get_access() and fi_access[O_WRONLY] is not incremented. 2) Second time around, in nfs4_get_vfs_file() fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] is NOT NULL (-ETXTBSY), so nfsd_open() is NOT called, but nfs4_file_get_access() IS called and fi_access[O_WRONLY] is incremented. Thus we leave a landmine in the form of the nfs4_file data structure in an incorrect state. 3) Eventually, when __nfs4_file_put_access() is called it finds fi_access[O_WRONLY] being non-zero, it decrements it and calls nfs4_file_put_fd() which tries to fput -ETXTBSY. ------------------------------------------------------------ ... [exception RIP: fput+0x9] RIP: ffffffff81177fa9 RSP: ffff88062e365c90 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: ffff880c2b3d99cc RBX: ffff880c2b3d9978 RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: dead000000100101 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffffffffe6 RBP: ffff88062e365c90 R8: ffff88041fe797d8 R9: ffff88062e365d58 R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #9 [ffff88062e365c98] __nfs4_file_put_access at ffffffffa0562334 [nfsd] #10 [ffff88062e365cc8] nfs4_file_put_access at ffffffffa05623ab [nfsd] #11 [ffff88062e365ce8] free_generic_stateid at ffffffffa056634d [nfsd] #12 [ffff88062e365d18] release_open_stateid at ffffffffa0566e4b [nfsd] #13 [ffff88062e365d38] nfsd4_close at ffffffffa0567401 [nfsd] #14 [ffff88062e365d88] nfsd4_proc_compound at ffffffffa0557f28 [nfsd] #15 [ffff88062e365dd8] nfsd_dispatch at ffffffffa054543e [nfsd] #16 [ffff88062e365e18] svc_process_common at ffffffffa04ba5a4 [sunrpc] #17 [ffff88062e365e98] svc_process at ffffffffa04babe0 [sunrpc] #18 [ffff88062e365eb8] nfsd at ffffffffa0545b62 [nfsd] #19 [ffff88062e365ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090886 #20 [ffff88062e365f48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c14a ------------------------------------------------------------ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Harshula Jayasuriya <harshula@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

…s struct file commit e4daf1f upstream. The following call chain: ------------------------------------------------------------ nfs4_get_vfs_file - nfsd_open - dentry_open - do_dentry_open - __get_file_write_access - get_write_access - return atomic_inc_unless_negative(&inode->i_writecount) ? 0 : -ETXTBSY; ------------------------------------------------------------ can result in the following state: ------------------------------------------------------------ struct nfs4_file { ... fi_fds = {0xffff880c1fa65c80, 0xffffffffffffffe6, 0x0}, fi_access = {{ counter = 0x1 }, { counter = 0x0 }}, ... ------------------------------------------------------------ 1) First time around, in nfs4_get_vfs_file() fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] is NULL, hence nfsd_open() is called where we get status set to an error and fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] to -ETXTBSY. Thus we do not reach nfs4_file_get_access() and fi_access[O_WRONLY] is not incremented. 2) Second time around, in nfs4_get_vfs_file() fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] is NOT NULL (-ETXTBSY), so nfsd_open() is NOT called, but nfs4_file_get_access() IS called and fi_access[O_WRONLY] is incremented. Thus we leave a landmine in the form of the nfs4_file data structure in an incorrect state. 3) Eventually, when __nfs4_file_put_access() is called it finds fi_access[O_WRONLY] being non-zero, it decrements it and calls nfs4_file_put_fd() which tries to fput -ETXTBSY. ------------------------------------------------------------ ... [exception RIP: fput+0x9] RIP: ffffffff81177fa9 RSP: ffff88062e365c90 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: ffff880c2b3d99cc RBX: ffff880c2b3d9978 RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: dead000000100101 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffffffffe6 RBP: ffff88062e365c90 R8: ffff88041fe797d8 R9: ffff88062e365d58 R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #9 [ffff88062e365c98] __nfs4_file_put_access at ffffffffa0562334 [nfsd] #10 [ffff88062e365cc8] nfs4_file_put_access at ffffffffa05623ab [nfsd] #11 [ffff88062e365ce8] free_generic_stateid at ffffffffa056634d [nfsd] #12 [ffff88062e365d18] release_open_stateid at ffffffffa0566e4b [nfsd] #13 [ffff88062e365d38] nfsd4_close at ffffffffa0567401 [nfsd] #14 [ffff88062e365d88] nfsd4_proc_compound at ffffffffa0557f28 [nfsd] #15 [ffff88062e365dd8] nfsd_dispatch at ffffffffa054543e [nfsd] #16 [ffff88062e365e18] svc_process_common at ffffffffa04ba5a4 [sunrpc] #17 [ffff88062e365e98] svc_process at ffffffffa04babe0 [sunrpc] #18 [ffff88062e365eb8] nfsd at ffffffffa0545b62 [nfsd] #19 [ffff88062e365ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090886 #20 [ffff88062e365f48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c14a ------------------------------------------------------------ Signed-off-by: Harshula Jayasuriya <harshula@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

Some mlme work structs are not cancelled on disassociation nor interface deletion, which leads to them running after the memory has been freed There is not a clean way to cancel these in the disassociation logic because they must be canceled outside of the ifmgd->mtx lock, so just cancel them in mgd_stop logic that tears down the station. This fixes the crashes we see in 3.7.9+. The crash stack trace itself isn't so helpful, but this warning gives more useful info: WARNING: at /home/greearb/git/linux-3.7.dev.y/lib/debugobjects.c:261 debug_print_object+0x7c/0x8d() ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: work_struct hint: ieee80211_sta_monitor_work+0x0/0x14 [mac80211] Modules linked in: [...] Pid: 14743, comm: iw Tainted: G C O 3.7.9+ hardkernel#11 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81087ef8>] warn_slowpath_common+0x80/0x98 [<ffffffff81087fa4>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x41/0x43 [<ffffffff812a2608>] debug_print_object+0x7c/0x8d [<ffffffff812a2bca>] debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x95/0x1c3 [<ffffffff8114cc69>] slab_free_hook+0x70/0x79 [<ffffffff8114ea3e>] kfree+0x62/0xb7 [<ffffffff8149f465>] netdev_release+0x39/0x3e [<ffffffff8136ad67>] device_release+0x52/0x8a [<ffffffff812937db>] kobject_release+0x121/0x158 [<ffffffff81293612>] kobject_put+0x4c/0x50 [<ffffffff8148f0d7>] netdev_run_todo+0x25c/0x27e Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

The following script will produce a kernel oops: sudo ip netns add v sudo ip netns exec v ip ad add 127.0.0.1/8 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip link set lo up sudo ip netns exec v ip ro add 224.0.0.0/4 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip li add vxlan0 type vxlan id 42 group 239.1.1.1 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip link set vxlan0 up sudo ip netns del v where inspect by gdb: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. [Switching to Thread 107] 0xffffffffa0289e33 in ?? () (gdb) bt #0 vxlan_leave_group (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:533 hardkernel#1 vxlan_stop (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:1087 hardkernel#2 0xffffffff812cc498 in __dev_close_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:1299 hardkernel#3 0xffffffff812cd920 in dev_close_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:1335 hardkernel#4 0xffffffff812cef31 in rollback_registered_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:4851 hardkernel#5 0xffffffff812cf040 in unregister_netdevice_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:5752 hardkernel#6 0xffffffff812cf1ba in default_device_exit_batch (net_list=0xffff88001f2e7e18) at net/core/dev.c:6170 hardkernel#7 0xffffffff812cab27 in cleanup_net (work=<optimized out>) at net/core/net_namespace.c:302 hardkernel#8 0xffffffff810540ef in process_one_work (worker=0xffff88001ba9ed40, work=0xffffffff8167d020) at kernel/workqueue.c:2157 hardkernel#9 0xffffffff810549d0 in worker_thread (__worker=__worker@entry=0xffff88001ba9ed40) at kernel/workqueue.c:2276 hardkernel#10 0xffffffff8105870c in kthread (_create=0xffff88001f2e5d68) at kernel/kthread.c:168 hardkernel#11 <signal handler called> hardkernel#12 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () hardkernel#13 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () (gdb) fr 0 #0 vxlan_leave_group (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:533 533 struct sock *sk = vn->sock->sk; (gdb) l 528 static int vxlan_leave_group(struct net_device *dev) 529 { 530 struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev); 531 struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(dev_net(dev), vxlan_net_id); 532 int err = 0; 533 struct sock *sk = vn->sock->sk; 534 struct ip_mreqn mreq = { 535 .imr_multiaddr.s_addr = vxlan->gaddr, 536 .imr_ifindex = vxlan->link, 537 }; (gdb) p vn->sock $4 = (struct socket *) 0x0 The kernel calls `vxlan_exit_net` when deleting the netns before shutting down vxlan interfaces. Later the removal of all vxlan interfaces, where `vn->sock` is already gone causes the oops. so we should manually shutdown all interfaces before deleting `vn->sock` as the patch does. Signed-off-by: Zang MingJie <zealot0630@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

…s struct file commit e4daf1f upstream. The following call chain: ------------------------------------------------------------ nfs4_get_vfs_file - nfsd_open - dentry_open - do_dentry_open - __get_file_write_access - get_write_access - return atomic_inc_unless_negative(&inode->i_writecount) ? 0 : -ETXTBSY; ------------------------------------------------------------ can result in the following state: ------------------------------------------------------------ struct nfs4_file { ... fi_fds = {0xffff880c1fa65c80, 0xffffffffffffffe6, 0x0}, fi_access = {{ counter = 0x1 }, { counter = 0x0 }}, ... ------------------------------------------------------------ 1) First time around, in nfs4_get_vfs_file() fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] is NULL, hence nfsd_open() is called where we get status set to an error and fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] to -ETXTBSY. Thus we do not reach nfs4_file_get_access() and fi_access[O_WRONLY] is not incremented. 2) Second time around, in nfs4_get_vfs_file() fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] is NOT NULL (-ETXTBSY), so nfsd_open() is NOT called, but nfs4_file_get_access() IS called and fi_access[O_WRONLY] is incremented. Thus we leave a landmine in the form of the nfs4_file data structure in an incorrect state. 3) Eventually, when __nfs4_file_put_access() is called it finds fi_access[O_WRONLY] being non-zero, it decrements it and calls nfs4_file_put_fd() which tries to fput -ETXTBSY. ------------------------------------------------------------ ... [exception RIP: fput+0x9] RIP: ffffffff81177fa9 RSP: ffff88062e365c90 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: ffff880c2b3d99cc RBX: ffff880c2b3d9978 RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: dead000000100101 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffffffffe6 RBP: ffff88062e365c90 R8: ffff88041fe797d8 R9: ffff88062e365d58 R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 hardkernel#9 [ffff88062e365c98] __nfs4_file_put_access at ffffffffa0562334 [nfsd] hardkernel#10 [ffff88062e365cc8] nfs4_file_put_access at ffffffffa05623ab [nfsd] hardkernel#11 [ffff88062e365ce8] free_generic_stateid at ffffffffa056634d [nfsd] hardkernel#12 [ffff88062e365d18] release_open_stateid at ffffffffa0566e4b [nfsd] hardkernel#13 [ffff88062e365d38] nfsd4_close at ffffffffa0567401 [nfsd] hardkernel#14 [ffff88062e365d88] nfsd4_proc_compound at ffffffffa0557f28 [nfsd] hardkernel#15 [ffff88062e365dd8] nfsd_dispatch at ffffffffa054543e [nfsd] hardkernel#16 [ffff88062e365e18] svc_process_common at ffffffffa04ba5a4 [sunrpc] hardkernel#17 [ffff88062e365e98] svc_process at ffffffffa04babe0 [sunrpc] hardkernel#18 [ffff88062e365eb8] nfsd at ffffffffa0545b62 [nfsd] hardkernel#19 [ffff88062e365ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090886 hardkernel#20 [ffff88062e365f48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c14a ------------------------------------------------------------ Signed-off-by: Harshula Jayasuriya <harshula@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

In several places, this snippet is used when removing neigh entries: list_del(&neigh->list); ipoib_neigh_free(neigh); The list_del() removes neigh from the associated struct ipoib_path, while ipoib_neigh_free() removes neigh from the device's neigh entry lookup table. Both of these operations are protected by the priv->lock spinlock. The table however is also protected via RCU, and so naturally the lock is not held when doing reads. This leads to a race condition, in which a thread may successfully look up a neigh entry that has already been deleted from neigh->list. Since the previous deletion will have marked the entry with poison, a second list_del() on the object will cause a panic: #5 [ffff8802338c3c70] general_protection at ffffffff815108c5 [exception RIP: list_del+16] RIP: ffffffff81289020 RSP: ffff8802338c3d20 RFLAGS: 00010082 RAX: dead000000200200 RBX: ffff880433e60c88 RCX: 0000000000009e6c RDX: 0000000000000246 RSI: ffff8806012ca298 RDI: ffff880433e60c88 RBP: ffff8802338c3d30 R8: ffff8806012ca2e8 R9: 00000000ffffffff R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8804346b2020 R13: ffff88032a3e7540 R14: ffff8804346b26e0 R15: 0000000000000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0000 #6 [ffff8802338c3d38] ipoib_cm_tx_handler at ffffffffa066fe0a [ib_ipoib] #7 [ffff8802338c3d98] cm_process_work at ffffffffa05149a7 [ib_cm] #8 [ffff8802338c3de8] cm_work_handler at ffffffffa05161aa [ib_cm] #9 [ffff8802338c3e38] worker_thread at ffffffff81090e10 #10 [ffff8802338c3ee8] kthread at ffffffff81096c66 #11 [ffff8802338c3f48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c0ca We move the list_del() into ipoib_neigh_free(), so that deletion happens only once, after the entry has been successfully removed from the lookup table. This same behavior is already used in ipoib_del_neighs_by_gid() and __ipoib_reap_neigh(). Signed-off-by: Jim Foraker <foraker1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com> Reviewed-by: Shlomo Pongratz <shlomop@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>

When booting secondary CPUs, announce_cpu() is called to show which cpu has been brought up. For example: [ 0.402751] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 OK [ 0.525667] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 OK [ 0.755592] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 OK [ 0.890495] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 But the last "OK" is lost, because 'nr_cpu_ids-1' represents the maximum possible cpu id. It should use the maximum present cpu id in case not all CPUs booted up. Signed-off-by: Libin <huawei.libin@huawei.com> Cc: <guohanjun@huawei.com> Cc: <wangyijing@huawei.com> Cc: <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1378378676-18276-1-git-send-email-huawei.libin@huawei.com [ tweaked the changelog, removed unnecessary line break, tweaked the format to align the fields vertically. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

When parsing lines from objdump a line containing source code starting with a numeric label is mistaken for a line of disassembly starting with a memory address. Current validation fails to recognise that the "memory address" is out of range and calculates an invalid offset which later causes this segfault: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000457315 in disasm__calc_percent (notes=0xc98970, evidx=0, offset=143705, end=2127526177, path=0x7fffffffbf50) at util/annotate.c:631 631 hits += h->addr[offset++]; (gdb) bt #0 0x0000000000457315 in disasm__calc_percent (notes=0xc98970, evidx=0, offset=143705, end=2127526177, path=0x7fffffffbf50) at util/annotate.c:631 #1 0x00000000004d65e3 in annotate_browser__calc_percent (browser=0x7fffffffd130, evsel=0xa01da0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:364 #2 0x00000000004d7433 in annotate_browser__run (browser=0x7fffffffd130, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:672 #3 0x00000000004d80c9 in symbol__tui_annotate (sym=0xc989a0, map=0xa02660, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:962 #4 0x00000000004d7aa0 in hist_entry__tui_annotate (he=0xdf73f0, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:823 #5 0x00000000004dd648 in perf_evsel__hists_browse (evsel=0xa01da0, nr_events=1, helpline= 0x58b768 "For a higher level overview, try: perf report --sort comm,dso", ev_name=0xa02cd0 "cycles", left_exits=false, hbt= 0x0, min_pcnt=0, env=0xa011e0) at ui/browsers/hists.c:1659 #6 0x00000000004de372 in perf_evlist__tui_browse_hists (evlist=0xa01520, help= 0x58b768 "For a higher level overview, try: perf report --sort comm,dso", hbt=0x0, min_pcnt=0, env=0xa011e0) at ui/browsers/hists.c:1950 #7 0x000000000042cf6b in __cmd_report (rep=0x7fffffffd6c0) at builtin-report.c:581 #8 0x000000000042e25d in cmd_report (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0, prefix=0x0) at builtin-report.c:965 #9 0x000000000041a0e1 in run_builtin (p=0x801548, argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:319 #10 0x000000000041a319 in handle_internal_command (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:376 #11 0x000000000041a465 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe38c, argv=0x7fffffffe380) at perf.c:420 #12 0x000000000041a707 in main (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:521 After the fix is applied the symbol can be annotated showing the problematic line "1: rep" copy_user_generic_string /usr/lib/debug/lib/modules/3.9.10-100.fc17.x86_64/vmlinux */ ENTRY(copy_user_generic_string) CFI_STARTPROC ASM_STAC andl %edx,%edx and %edx,%edx jz 4f je 37 cmpl $8,%edx cmp $0x8,%edx jb 2f /* less than 8 bytes, go to byte copy loop */ jb 33 ALIGN_DESTINATION mov %edi,%ecx and $0x7,%ecx je 28 sub $0x8,%ecx neg %ecx sub %ecx,%edx 1a: mov (%rsi),%al mov %al,(%rdi) inc %rsi inc %rdi dec %ecx jne 1a movl %edx,%ecx 28: mov %edx,%ecx shrl $3,%ecx shr $0x3,%ecx andl $7,%edx and $0x7,%edx 1: rep 100.00 rep movsq %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi) movsq 2: movl %edx,%ecx 33: mov %edx,%ecx 3: rep rep movsb %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi) movsb 4: xorl %eax,%eax 37: xor %eax,%eax data32 xchg %ax,%ax ASM_CLAC ret retq Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1379009721-27667-1-git-send-email-adrian.hunter@intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

As the new x86 CPU bootup printout format code maintainer, I am taking immediate action to improve and clean (and thus indulge my OCD) the reporting of the cores when coming up online. Fix padding to a right-hand alignment, cleanup code and bind reporting width to the max number of supported CPUs on the system, like this: [ 0.074509] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 OK [ 0.644008] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors: #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 OK [ 1.245006] smpboot: Booting Node 2, Processors: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 OK [ 1.864005] smpboot: Booting Node 3, Processors: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 OK [ 2.489005] smpboot: Booting Node 4, Processors: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 OK [ 3.093005] smpboot: Booting Node 5, Processors: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 OK [ 3.698005] smpboot: Booting Node 6, Processors: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 OK [ 4.304005] smpboot: Booting Node 7, Processors: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 OK [ 4.961413] Brought up 64 CPUs and this: [ 0.072367] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 OK [ 0.686329] Brought up 8 CPUs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Libin <huawei.libin@huawei.com> Cc: wangyijing@huawei.com Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130927143554.GF4422@pd.tnic Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Turn it into (for example): [ 0.073380] x86: Booting SMP configuration: [ 0.074005] .... node #0, CPUs: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 [ 0.603005] .... node #1, CPUs: #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 [ 1.200005] .... node #2, CPUs: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 [ 1.796005] .... node #3, CPUs: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 [ 2.393005] .... node #4, CPUs: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 [ 2.996005] .... node #5, CPUs: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 [ 3.600005] .... node #6, CPUs: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 [ 4.202005] .... node #7, CPUs: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 [ 4.811005] .... node #8, CPUs: #64 #65 #66 #67 #68 #69 #70 #71 [ 5.421006] .... node #9, CPUs: #72 #73 #74 #75 #76 #77 #78 #79 [ 6.032005] .... node #10, CPUs: #80 #81 #82 #83 #84 #85 #86 #87 [ 6.648006] .... node #11, CPUs: #88 #89 #90 #91 #92 #93 #94 #95 [ 7.262005] .... node #12, CPUs: #96 #97 #98 #99 #100 #101 #102 #103 [ 7.865005] .... node #13, CPUs: #104 #105 #106 #107 #108 #109 #110 #111 [ 8.466005] .... node #14, CPUs: #112 #113 #114 #115 #116 #117 #118 #119 [ 9.073006] .... node #15, CPUs: #120 #121 #122 #123 #124 #125 #126 #127 [ 9.679901] x86: Booted up 16 nodes, 128 CPUs and drop useless elements. Change num_digits() to hpa's division-avoiding, cell-phone-typed version which he went at great lengths and pains to submit on a Saturday evening. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: huawei.libin@huawei.com Cc: wangyijing@huawei.com Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130930095624.GB16383@pd.tnic Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Andrey reported the following report: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ffff8800359c99f3 ffff8800359c99f3 is located 0 bytes to the right of 243-byte region [ffff8800359c9900, ffff8800359c99f3) Accessed by thread T13003: #0 ffffffff810dd2da (asan_report_error+0x32a/0x440) #1 ffffffff810dc6b0 (asan_check_region+0x30/0x40) #2 ffffffff810dd4d3 (__tsan_write1+0x13/0x20) #3 ffffffff811cd19e (ftrace_regex_release+0x1be/0x260) #4 ffffffff812a1065 (__fput+0x155/0x360) #5 ffffffff812a12de (____fput+0x1e/0x30) #6 ffffffff8111708d (task_work_run+0x10d/0x140) #7 ffffffff810ea043 (do_exit+0x433/0x11f0) #8 ffffffff810eaee4 (do_group_exit+0x84/0x130) #9 ffffffff810eafb1 (SyS_exit_group+0x21/0x30) #10 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Allocated by thread T5167: #0 ffffffff810dc778 (asan_slab_alloc+0x48/0xc0) #1 ffffffff8128337c (__kmalloc+0xbc/0x500) #2 ffffffff811d9d54 (trace_parser_get_init+0x34/0x90) #3 ffffffff811cd7b3 (ftrace_regex_open+0x83/0x2e0) #4 ffffffff811cda7d (ftrace_filter_open+0x2d/0x40) #5 ffffffff8129b4ff (do_dentry_open+0x32f/0x430) #6 ffffffff8129b668 (finish_open+0x68/0xa0) #7 ffffffff812b66ac (do_last+0xb8c/0x1710) #8 ffffffff812b7350 (path_openat+0x120/0xb50) #9 ffffffff812b8884 (do_filp_open+0x54/0xb0) #10 ffffffff8129d36c (do_sys_open+0x1ac/0x2c0) #11 ffffffff8129d4b7 (SyS_open+0x37/0x50) #12 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: ffff8800359c9700: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd ffff8800359c9780: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9800: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9880: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>ffff8800359c9980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[03]fb ffff8800359c9a00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9a80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9b00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap redzone: fa Heap kmalloc redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Shadow gap: fe The out-of-bounds access happens on 'parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;' Although the crash happened in ftrace_regex_open() the real bug occurred in trace_get_user() where there's an incrementation to parser->idx without a check against the size. The way it is triggered is if userspace sends in 128 characters (EVENT_BUF_SIZE + 1), the loop that reads the last character stores it and then breaks out because there is no more characters. Then the last character is read to determine what to do next, and the index is incremented without checking size. Then the caller of trace_get_user() usually nulls out the last character with a zero, but since the index is equal to the size, it writes a nul character after the allocated space, which can corrupt memory. Luckily, only root user has write access to this file. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131009222323.04fd1a0d@gandalf.local.home Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>

…ux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 boot changes from Ingo Molnar: "Two changes that prettify and compactify the SMP bootup output from: smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors #1 #2 #3 OK smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors #4 #5 #6 #7 OK smpboot: Booting Node 2, Processors #8 #9 #10 #11 OK smpboot: Booting Node 3, Processors #12 #13 #14 #15 OK Brought up 16 CPUs to something like: x86: Booting SMP configuration: .... node #0, CPUs: #1 #2 #3 .... node #1, CPUs: #4 #5 #6 #7 .... node #2, CPUs: #8 #9 #10 #11 .... node #3, CPUs: #12 #13 #14 #15 x86: Booted up 4 nodes, 16 CPUs" * 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/boot: Further compress CPUs bootup message x86: Improve the printout of the SMP bootup CPU table

commit 057db84 upstream. Andrey reported the following report: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ffff8800359c99f3 ffff8800359c99f3 is located 0 bytes to the right of 243-byte region [ffff8800359c9900, ffff8800359c99f3) Accessed by thread T13003: #0 ffffffff810dd2da (asan_report_error+0x32a/0x440) #1 ffffffff810dc6b0 (asan_check_region+0x30/0x40) #2 ffffffff810dd4d3 (__tsan_write1+0x13/0x20) #3 ffffffff811cd19e (ftrace_regex_release+0x1be/0x260) #4 ffffffff812a1065 (__fput+0x155/0x360) #5 ffffffff812a12de (____fput+0x1e/0x30) #6 ffffffff8111708d (task_work_run+0x10d/0x140) #7 ffffffff810ea043 (do_exit+0x433/0x11f0) #8 ffffffff810eaee4 (do_group_exit+0x84/0x130) #9 ffffffff810eafb1 (SyS_exit_group+0x21/0x30) #10 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Allocated by thread T5167: #0 ffffffff810dc778 (asan_slab_alloc+0x48/0xc0) #1 ffffffff8128337c (__kmalloc+0xbc/0x500) #2 ffffffff811d9d54 (trace_parser_get_init+0x34/0x90) #3 ffffffff811cd7b3 (ftrace_regex_open+0x83/0x2e0) #4 ffffffff811cda7d (ftrace_filter_open+0x2d/0x40) #5 ffffffff8129b4ff (do_dentry_open+0x32f/0x430) #6 ffffffff8129b668 (finish_open+0x68/0xa0) #7 ffffffff812b66ac (do_last+0xb8c/0x1710) #8 ffffffff812b7350 (path_openat+0x120/0xb50) #9 ffffffff812b8884 (do_filp_open+0x54/0xb0) #10 ffffffff8129d36c (do_sys_open+0x1ac/0x2c0) #11 ffffffff8129d4b7 (SyS_open+0x37/0x50) #12 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: ffff8800359c9700: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd ffff8800359c9780: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9800: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9880: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>ffff8800359c9980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[03]fb ffff8800359c9a00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9a80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9b00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap redzone: fa Heap kmalloc redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Shadow gap: fe The out-of-bounds access happens on 'parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;' Although the crash happened in ftrace_regex_open() the real bug occurred in trace_get_user() where there's an incrementation to parser->idx without a check against the size. The way it is triggered is if userspace sends in 128 characters (EVENT_BUF_SIZE + 1), the loop that reads the last character stores it and then breaks out because there is no more characters. Then the last character is read to determine what to do next, and the index is incremented without checking size. Then the caller of trace_get_user() usually nulls out the last character with a zero, but since the index is equal to the size, it writes a nul character after the allocated space, which can corrupt memory. Luckily, only root user has write access to this file. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131009222323.04fd1a0d@gandalf.local.home Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 057db84 upstream. Andrey reported the following report: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ffff8800359c99f3 ffff8800359c99f3 is located 0 bytes to the right of 243-byte region [ffff8800359c9900, ffff8800359c99f3) Accessed by thread T13003: #0 ffffffff810dd2da (asan_report_error+0x32a/0x440) hardkernel#1 ffffffff810dc6b0 (asan_check_region+0x30/0x40) hardkernel#2 ffffffff810dd4d3 (__tsan_write1+0x13/0x20) hardkernel#3 ffffffff811cd19e (ftrace_regex_release+0x1be/0x260) hardkernel#4 ffffffff812a1065 (__fput+0x155/0x360) hardkernel#5 ffffffff812a12de (____fput+0x1e/0x30) hardkernel#6 ffffffff8111708d (task_work_run+0x10d/0x140) hardkernel#7 ffffffff810ea043 (do_exit+0x433/0x11f0) hardkernel#8 ffffffff810eaee4 (do_group_exit+0x84/0x130) hardkernel#9 ffffffff810eafb1 (SyS_exit_group+0x21/0x30) hardkernel#10 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Allocated by thread T5167: #0 ffffffff810dc778 (asan_slab_alloc+0x48/0xc0) hardkernel#1 ffffffff8128337c (__kmalloc+0xbc/0x500) hardkernel#2 ffffffff811d9d54 (trace_parser_get_init+0x34/0x90) hardkernel#3 ffffffff811cd7b3 (ftrace_regex_open+0x83/0x2e0) hardkernel#4 ffffffff811cda7d (ftrace_filter_open+0x2d/0x40) hardkernel#5 ffffffff8129b4ff (do_dentry_open+0x32f/0x430) hardkernel#6 ffffffff8129b668 (finish_open+0x68/0xa0) hardkernel#7 ffffffff812b66ac (do_last+0xb8c/0x1710) hardkernel#8 ffffffff812b7350 (path_openat+0x120/0xb50) hardkernel#9 ffffffff812b8884 (do_filp_open+0x54/0xb0) hardkernel#10 ffffffff8129d36c (do_sys_open+0x1ac/0x2c0) hardkernel#11 ffffffff8129d4b7 (SyS_open+0x37/0x50) hardkernel#12 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: ffff8800359c9700: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd ffff8800359c9780: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9800: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9880: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>ffff8800359c9980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[03]fb ffff8800359c9a00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9a80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9b00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap redzone: fa Heap kmalloc redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Shadow gap: fe The out-of-bounds access happens on 'parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;' Although the crash happened in ftrace_regex_open() the real bug occurred in trace_get_user() where there's an incrementation to parser->idx without a check against the size. The way it is triggered is if userspace sends in 128 characters (EVENT_BUF_SIZE + 1), the loop that reads the last character stores it and then breaks out because there is no more characters. Then the last character is read to determine what to do next, and the index is incremented without checking size. Then the caller of trace_get_user() usually nulls out the last character with a zero, but since the index is equal to the size, it writes a nul character after the allocated space, which can corrupt memory. Luckily, only root user has write access to this file. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131009222323.04fd1a0d@gandalf.local.home Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…ot QMI This interface is unusable, as the cdc-wdm character device doesn't reply to any QMI command. Also, the out-of-tree Sierra Wireless GobiNet driver fully skips it. Signed-off-by: Aleksander Morgado <aleksander@aleksander.es> Acked-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Pull networking fixes from David Miller: 1) Unbreak zebra and other netlink apps, from Eric W Biederman. 2) Some new qmi_wwan device IDs, from Aleksander Morgado. 3) Fix info leak in DCB netlink handler of qlcnic driver, from Dan Carpenter. 4) inet_getid() and ipv6_select_ident() do not generate monotonically increasing ID numbers, fix from Eric Dumazet. 5) Fix memory leak in __sk_prepare_filter(), from Leon Yu. 6) Netlink leftover bytes warning message is user triggerable, rate limit it. From Michal Schmidt. 7) Fix non-linear SKB panic in ipvs, from Peter Christensen. 8) Congestion window undo needs to be performed even if only never retransmitted data is SACK'd, fix from Yuching Cheng. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (24 commits) net: filter: fix possible memory leak in __sk_prepare_filter() net: ec_bhf: Add runtime dependencies tcp: fix cwnd undo on DSACK in F-RTO netlink: Only check file credentials for implicit destinations ipheth: Add support for iPad 2 and iPad 3 team: fix mtu setting net: fix inet_getid() and ipv6_select_ident() bugs net: qmi_wwan: interface hardkernel#11 in Sierra Wireless MC73xx is not QMI net: qmi_wwan: add additional Sierra Wireless QMI devices bridge: Prevent insertion of FDB entry with disallowed vlan netlink: rate-limit leftover bytes warning and print process name bridge: notify user space after fdb update net: qmi_wwan: add Netgear AirCard 341U net: fix wrong mac_len calculation for vlans batman-adv: fix NULL pointer dereferences net/mlx4_core: Reset RoCE VF gids when guest driver goes down emac: aggregation of v1-2 PLB errors for IER register emac: add missing support of 10mbit in emac/rgmii can: only rename enabled led triggers when changing the netdev name ipvs: Fix panic due to non-linear skb ...

This patch tries to fix this crash: hardkernel#5 [ffff88003c1cd690] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810166d5 hardkernel#6 [ffff88003c1cd730] invalid_op at ffffffff8159b2de [exception RIP: ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks+359] RIP: ffffffffa05dfa27 RSP: ffff88003c1cd7e8 RFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88003c1cdaa8 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: ffff880027a95000 RDI: ffff88003c79b540 RBP: ffff88003c1cd858 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffffffff815f6ba0 R10: 00000000000001c9 R11: 00000000000001c9 R12: ffff88002d271500 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000001000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 hardkernel#7 [ffff88003c1cd860] do_direct_IO at ffffffff811cd31b hardkernel#8 [ffff88003c1cd950] direct_IO_iovec at ffffffff811cde9c hardkernel#9 [ffff88003c1cd9b0] do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff811ce764 hardkernel#10 [ffff88003c1cdb80] __blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff811ce7cc hardkernel#11 [ffff88003c1cdbb0] ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffa05df756 [ocfs2] hardkernel#12 [ffff88003c1cdbe0] generic_file_direct_write_iter at ffffffff8112f935 hardkernel#13 [ffff88003c1cdc40] ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffa0600ccc [ocfs2] hardkernel#14 [ffff88003c1cdd50] do_aio_write at ffffffff8119126c hardkernel#15 [ffff88003c1cddc0] aio_rw_vect_retry at ffffffff811d9bb4 hardkernel#16 [ffff88003c1cddf0] aio_run_iocb at ffffffff811db880 hardkernel#17 [ffff88003c1cde30] io_submit_one at ffffffff811dc238 hardkernel#18 [ffff88003c1cde80] do_io_submit at ffffffff811dc437 hardkernel#19 [ffff88003c1cdf70] sys_io_submit at ffffffff811dc530 hardkernel#20 [ffff88003c1cdf80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8159a159 It crashes at BUG_ON(create && (ext_flags & OCFS2_EXT_REFCOUNTED)); in ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks. ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks is expecting the OCFS2_EXT_REFCOUNTED be removed in ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write() if it was there. But no cluster lock is taken during the time before (or inside) ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write() and after ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks(). It can happen in this case: Node A(which crashes) Node B ------------------------ --------------------------- ocfs2_file_aio_write ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write ocfs2_inode_lock ... ocfs2_inode_unlock #no refcount found .... ocfs2_reflink ocfs2_inode_lock ... ocfs2_inode_unlock #now, refcount flag set on extent ... flush change to disk ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks ocfs2_get_clusters #extent map miss #buffer_head miss read extents from disk found refcount flag on extent crash.. Fix: Take rw_lock in ocfs2_reflink path Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

…s struct file commit e4daf1f upstream. The following call chain: ------------------------------------------------------------ nfs4_get_vfs_file - nfsd_open - dentry_open - do_dentry_open - __get_file_write_access - get_write_access - return atomic_inc_unless_negative(&inode->i_writecount) ? 0 : -ETXTBSY; ------------------------------------------------------------ can result in the following state: ------------------------------------------------------------ struct nfs4_file { ... fi_fds = {0xffff880c1fa65c80, 0xffffffffffffffe6, 0x0}, fi_access = {{ counter = 0x1 }, { counter = 0x0 }}, ... ------------------------------------------------------------ 1) First time around, in nfs4_get_vfs_file() fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] is NULL, hence nfsd_open() is called where we get status set to an error and fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] to -ETXTBSY. Thus we do not reach nfs4_file_get_access() and fi_access[O_WRONLY] is not incremented. 2) Second time around, in nfs4_get_vfs_file() fp->fi_fds[O_WRONLY] is NOT NULL (-ETXTBSY), so nfsd_open() is NOT called, but nfs4_file_get_access() IS called and fi_access[O_WRONLY] is incremented. Thus we leave a landmine in the form of the nfs4_file data structure in an incorrect state. 3) Eventually, when __nfs4_file_put_access() is called it finds fi_access[O_WRONLY] being non-zero, it decrements it and calls nfs4_file_put_fd() which tries to fput -ETXTBSY. ------------------------------------------------------------ ... [exception RIP: fput+0x9] RIP: ffffffff81177fa9 RSP: ffff88062e365c90 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: ffff880c2b3d99cc RBX: ffff880c2b3d9978 RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: dead000000100101 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffffffffe6 RBP: ffff88062e365c90 R8: ffff88041fe797d8 R9: ffff88062e365d58 R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #9 [ffff88062e365c98] __nfs4_file_put_access at ffffffffa0562334 [nfsd] #10 [ffff88062e365cc8] nfs4_file_put_access at ffffffffa05623ab [nfsd] #11 [ffff88062e365ce8] free_generic_stateid at ffffffffa056634d [nfsd] #12 [ffff88062e365d18] release_open_stateid at ffffffffa0566e4b [nfsd] #13 [ffff88062e365d38] nfsd4_close at ffffffffa0567401 [nfsd] #14 [ffff88062e365d88] nfsd4_proc_compound at ffffffffa0557f28 [nfsd] #15 [ffff88062e365dd8] nfsd_dispatch at ffffffffa054543e [nfsd] #16 [ffff88062e365e18] svc_process_common at ffffffffa04ba5a4 [sunrpc] #17 [ffff88062e365e98] svc_process at ffffffffa04babe0 [sunrpc] #18 [ffff88062e365eb8] nfsd at ffffffffa0545b62 [nfsd] #19 [ffff88062e365ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090886 #20 [ffff88062e365f48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c14a ------------------------------------------------------------ Signed-off-by: Harshula Jayasuriya <harshula@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> [xr: Backported to 3.4: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Rui Xiang <rui.xiang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

An Intel i7 system regularly detected rcu_preempt stalls after the kernel was upgraded from 3.6-rt to 3.8-rt. When the stall happened, disk I/O was no longer possible, unless the system was restarted. The kernel message was: INFO: rcu_preempt self-detected stall on CPU { 6} [..] NMI backtrace for cpu 6 CPU 6 Pid: 119, comm: irq/19-ata_piix Not tainted 3.8.13-rt13 hardkernel#11 Shuttle Inc. SX58/SX58 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8124ca60>] [<ffffffff8124ca60>] ip_compute_csum+0x30/0x30 RSP: 0018:ffff880333303cb0 EFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: 0000000000000006 RBX: 00000000000003e9 RCX: 0000000000000034 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff81aa16d0 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffff880333303ce8 R08: ffffffff81aa16d0 R09: ffffffff81c1b8cc R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000005161f R13: 0000000000000006 R14: ffffffff81aa16d0 R15: 0000000000000002 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880333300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 0000003c1b2bb420 CR3: 0000000001a0f000 CR4: 00000000000007e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process irq/19-ata_piix (pid: 119, threadinfo ffff88032d88a000, task ffff88032df80000) Stack: ffffffff8124cb32 000000000005161e 00000000000003e9 0000000000001000 0000000000009022 ffffffff81aa16d0 0000000000000002 ffff880333303cf8 ffffffff8124caa9 ffff880333303d08 ffffffff8124cad2 ffff880333303d28 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8124cb32>] ? delay_tsc+0x33/0xe3 [<ffffffff8124caa9>] __delay+0xf/0x11 [<ffffffff8124cad2>] __const_udelay+0x27/0x29 [<ffffffff8102d1fa>] native_safe_apic_wait_icr_idle+0x39/0x45 [<ffffffff8102dc9b>] __default_send_IPI_dest_field.constprop.0+0x1e/0x58 [<ffffffff8102dd1e>] default_send_IPI_mask_sequence_phys+0x49/0x7d [<ffffffff81030326>] physflat_send_IPI_all+0x17/0x19 [<ffffffff8102de53>] arch_trigger_all_cpu_backtrace+0x50/0x79 [<ffffffff810b21d0>] rcu_check_callbacks+0x1cb/0x568 [<ffffffff81048c9c>] ? raise_softirq+0x2e/0x35 [<ffffffff81086be0>] ? tick_sched_do_timer+0x38/0x38 [<ffffffff8104f653>] update_process_times+0x44/0x55 [<ffffffff81086866>] tick_sched_handle+0x4a/0x59 [<ffffffff81086c1c>] tick_sched_timer+0x3c/0x5b [<ffffffff81062845>] __run_hrtimer+0x9b/0x158 [<ffffffff810631d8>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x172/0x2aa [<ffffffff8102d498>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0x89 [<ffffffff814d881d>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 <EOI> [<ffffffff81057cd2>] ? __local_lock_irqsave+0x17/0x4a [<ffffffff81059336>] try_to_grab_pending+0x42/0x17e [<ffffffff8105a699>] mod_delayed_work_on+0x32/0x88 [<ffffffff8105a70b>] mod_delayed_work+0x1c/0x1e [<ffffffff8122ae84>] blk_run_queue_async+0x37/0x39 [<ffffffff81230985>] flush_end_io+0xf1/0x107 [<ffffffff8122e0da>] blk_finish_request+0x21e/0x264 [<ffffffff8122e162>] blk_end_bidi_request+0x42/0x60 [<ffffffff8122e1ba>] blk_end_request+0x10/0x12 [<ffffffff8132de46>] scsi_io_completion+0x1bf/0x492 [<ffffffff81335cec>] ? sd_done+0x298/0x2ef [<ffffffff81325a02>] scsi_finish_command+0xe9/0xf2 [<ffffffff8132dbcb>] scsi_softirq_done+0x106/0x10f [<ffffffff812333d3>] blk_done_softirq+0x77/0x87 [<ffffffff8104826f>] do_current_softirqs+0x172/0x2e1 [<ffffffff810aa820>] ? irq_thread_fn+0x3a/0x3a [<ffffffff81048466>] local_bh_enable+0x43/0x72 [<ffffffff810aa866>] irq_forced_thread_fn+0x46/0x52 [<ffffffff810ab089>] irq_thread+0x8c/0x17c [<ffffffff810ab179>] ? irq_thread+0x17c/0x17c [<ffffffff810aaffd>] ? wake_threads_waitq+0x44/0x44 [<ffffffff8105eb18>] kthread+0x8d/0x95 [<ffffffff8105ea8b>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x65/0x65 [<ffffffff814d7b7c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [<ffffffff8105ea8b>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x65/0x65 The state of softirqd of this CPU at the time of the crash was: ksoftirqd/6 R running task 0 53 2 0x00000000 ffff88032fc39d18 0000000000000046 ffff88033330c4c0 ffff8803303f4710 ffff88032fc39fd8 ffff88032fc39fd8 0000000000000000 0000000000062500 ffff88032df88000 ffff8803303f4710 0000000000000000 ffff88032fc38000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8105a3ae>] ? __queue_work+0x27c/0x27c [<ffffffff814d178c>] preempt_schedule+0x61/0x76 [<ffffffff8106cccf>] migrate_enable+0xe5/0x1df [<ffffffff8105a3ae>] ? __queue_work+0x27c/0x27c [<ffffffff8104ef52>] run_timer_softirq+0x161/0x1d6 [<ffffffff8104826f>] do_current_softirqs+0x172/0x2e1 [<ffffffff8104840b>] run_ksoftirqd+0x2d/0x45 [<ffffffff8106658a>] smpboot_thread_fn+0x2ea/0x308 [<ffffffff810662a0>] ? test_ti_thread_flag+0xc/0xc [<ffffffff810662a0>] ? test_ti_thread_flag+0xc/0xc [<ffffffff8105eb18>] kthread+0x8d/0x95 [<ffffffff8105ea8b>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x65/0x65 [<ffffffff814d7afc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [<ffffffff8105ea8b>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x65/0x65 Apparently, the softirq demon and the ata_piix IRQ handler were waiting for each other to finish ending up in a livelock. After the below patch was applied, the system no longer crashes. Reported-by: Carsten Emde <C.Emde@osadl.org> Proposed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested by: Carsten Emde <C.Emde@osadl.org> Signed-off-by: Carsten Emde <C.Emde@osadl.org> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>

Mike Galbraith captered the following: | >hardkernel#11 [ffff88017b243e90] _raw_spin_lock at ffffffff815d2596 | >hardkernel#12 [ffff88017b243e90] rt_mutex_trylock at ffffffff815d15be | >hardkernel#13 [ffff88017b243eb0] get_next_timer_interrupt at ffffffff81063b42 | >hardkernel#14 [ffff88017b243f00] tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick at ffffffff810bd1fd | >hardkernel#15 [ffff88017b243f70] tick_nohz_irq_exit at ffffffff810bd7d2 | >hardkernel#16 [ffff88017b243f90] irq_exit at ffffffff8105b02d | >hardkernel#17 [ffff88017b243fb0] reschedule_interrupt at ffffffff815db3dd | >--- <IRQ stack> --- | >hardkernel#18 [ffff88017a2a9bc8] reschedule_interrupt at ffffffff815db3dd | > [exception RIP: task_blocks_on_rt_mutex+51] | >hardkernel#19 [ffff88017a2a9ce0] rt_spin_lock_slowlock at ffffffff815d183c | >hardkernel#20 [ffff88017a2a9da0] lock_timer_base.isra.35 at ffffffff81061cbf | >hardkernel#21 [ffff88017a2a9dd0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff815cf1ce | >hardkernel#22 [ffff88017a2a9e50] rcu_gp_kthread at ffffffff810f9bbb | >hardkernel#23 [ffff88017a2a9ed0] kthread at ffffffff810796d5 | >hardkernel#24 [ffff88017a2a9f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff815da04c lock_timer_base() does a try_lock() which deadlocks on the waiter lock not the lock itself. This patch takes the waiter_lock with trylock so it should work from interrupt context as well. If the fastpath doesn't work and the waiter_lock itself is taken then it seems that the lock itself taken. This patch also adds a "rt_spin_try_unlock" to keep lockdep happy. If we managed to take the wait_lock in the first place we should also be able to take it in the unlock path. Cc: stable-rt@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Mike Galbraith <bitbucket@online.de> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>

Nikolay has reported a hang when a memcg reclaim got stuck with the following backtrace: PID: 18308 TASK: ffff883d7c9b0a30 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "rsync" #0 __schedule at ffffffff815ab152 hardkernel#1 schedule at ffffffff815ab76e hardkernel#2 schedule_timeout at ffffffff815ae5e5 hardkernel#3 io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff815aad6a hardkernel#4 bit_wait_io at ffffffff815abfc6 hardkernel#5 __wait_on_bit at ffffffff815abda5 hardkernel#6 wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff8111fd4f hardkernel#7 shrink_page_list at ffffffff81135445 hardkernel#8 shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81135845 hardkernel#9 shrink_lruvec at ffffffff81135ead hardkernel#10 shrink_zone at ffffffff811360c3 hardkernel#11 shrink_zones at ffffffff81136eff hardkernel#12 do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8113712f hardkernel#13 try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages at ffffffff811372be hardkernel#14 try_charge at ffffffff81189423 hardkernel#15 mem_cgroup_try_charge at ffffffff8118c6f5 hardkernel#16 __add_to_page_cache_locked at ffffffff8112137d hardkernel#17 add_to_page_cache_lru at ffffffff81121618 hardkernel#18 pagecache_get_page at ffffffff8112170b hardkernel#19 grow_dev_page at ffffffff811c8297 hardkernel#20 __getblk_slow at ffffffff811c91d6 hardkernel#21 __getblk_gfp at ffffffff811c92c1 hardkernel#22 ext4_ext_grow_indepth at ffffffff8124565c hardkernel#23 ext4_ext_create_new_leaf at ffffffff81246ca8 hardkernel#24 ext4_ext_insert_extent at ffffffff81246f09 hardkernel#25 ext4_ext_map_blocks at ffffffff8124a848 hardkernel#26 ext4_map_blocks at ffffffff8121a5b7 hardkernel#27 mpage_map_one_extent at ffffffff8121b1fa hardkernel#28 mpage_map_and_submit_extent at ffffffff8121f07b hardkernel#29 ext4_writepages at ffffffff8121f6d5 hardkernel#30 do_writepages at ffffffff8112c490 hardkernel#31 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffff81120199 hardkernel#32 filemap_flush at ffffffff8112041c hardkernel#33 ext4_alloc_da_blocks at ffffffff81219da1 hardkernel#34 ext4_rename at ffffffff81229b91 hardkernel#35 ext4_rename2 at ffffffff81229e32 hardkernel#36 vfs_rename at ffffffff811a08a5 hardkernel#37 SYSC_renameat2 at ffffffff811a3ffc hardkernel#38 sys_renameat2 at ffffffff811a408e hardkernel#39 sys_rename at ffffffff8119e51e hardkernel#40 system_call_fastpath at ffffffff815afa89 Dave Chinner has properly pointed out that this is a deadlock in the reclaim code because ext4 doesn't submit pages which are marked by PG_writeback right away. The heuristic was introduced by commit e62e384 ("memcg: prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") and it was applied only when may_enter_fs was specified. The code has been changed by c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") which has removed the __GFP_FS restriction with a reasoning that we do not get into the fs code. But this is not sufficient apparently because the fs doesn't necessarily submit pages marked PG_writeback for IO right away. ext4_bio_write_page calls io_submit_add_bh but that doesn't necessarily submit the bio. Instead it tries to map more pages into the bio and mpage_map_one_extent might trigger memcg charge which might end up waiting on a page which is marked PG_writeback but hasn't been submitted yet so we would end up waiting for something that never finishes. Fix this issue by replacing __GFP_IO by may_enter_fs check (for case 2) before we go to wait on the writeback. The page fault path, which is the only path that triggers memcg oom killer since 3.12, shouldn't require GFP_NOFS and so we shouldn't reintroduce the premature OOM killer issue which was originally addressed by the heuristic. As per David Chinner the xfs is doing similar thing since 2.6.15 already so ext4 is not the only affected filesystem. Moreover he notes: : For example: IO completion might require unwritten extent conversion : which executes filesystem transactions and GFP_NOFS allocations. The : writeback flag on the pages can not be cleared until unwritten : extent conversion completes. Hence memory reclaim cannot wait on : page writeback to complete in GFP_NOFS context because it is not : safe to do so, memcg reclaim or otherwise. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9+ [tytso@mit.edu: corrected the control flow] Fixes: c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

…fier Whilst testing cpu hotplug events on kernel configured with DEBUG_PREEMPT and DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP we get following BUG message, caused by calling request_irq() and free_irq() in the context of hotplug notification (which is in this case atomic context). [ 0.091617] [c0] CPU0: thread -1, cpu 0, socket 1, mpidr 80000100 [ 0.091828] [c0] Running under secure firmware. [ 0.091901] [c0] Setting up static identity map for 0xc0618b98 - 0xc0618bf0 [ 0.091962] [c0] Exynos-SnapShot: exynos_ss_init failed [ 0.112330] [c0] ftrace: Allocated trace_printk buffers [ 0.134323] [c1] CPU1: Booted secondary processor [ 0.134354] [c1] CPU1: thread -1, cpu 1, socket 1, mpidr 80000101 [ 0.134402] [c1] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/page_alloc.c:2638 [ 0.134518] [c1] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/1 [ 0.134560] [c1] no locks held by swapper/1/0. [ 0.134598] [c1] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 3.10.82-xu43hk #11 [ 0.134640] [c1] Backtrace: [ 0.134694] [c1] [<c00132e4>] (dump_backtrace+0x0/0x114) from [<c0013554>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [ 0.134744] [c1] r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:df2da000 r4:c098c9c0 [ 0.134826] [c1] [<c0013534>] (show_stack+0x0/0x24) from [<c06124d8>] (dump_stack+0x24/0x28) [ 0.134887] [c1] [<c06124b4>] (dump_stack+0x0/0x28) from [<c00617f8>] (__might_sleep+0x144/0x148) [ 0.134952] [c1] [<c00616b4>] (__might_sleep+0x0/0x148) from [<c00f5590>] (__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x2a0/0xaac) [ 0.135006] [c1] r5:00080008 r4:002012d0 [ 0.135065] [c1] [<c00f52f0>] (__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x0/0xaac) from [<c012875c>] (new_slab+0x7c/0x22c) [ 0.135132] [c1] [<c01286e0>] (new_slab+0x0/0x22c) from [<c012a92c>] (__slab_alloc.isra.14.constprop.18+0x558/0x61c) [ 0.135187] [c1] r9:00000000 r8:df001f00 r7:014f7000 r6:00000000 r5:c1dee9e0 [ 0.135187] r4:c08f79e0 [ 0.135295] [c1] [<c012a3d4>] (__slab_alloc.isra.14.constprop.18+0x0/0x61c) from [<c012af3c>] (kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x194/0x1c8) [ 0.135367] [c1] [<c012ada8>] (kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x0/0x1c8) from [<c00b04e0>] (request_threaded_irq+0x78/0x138) [ 0.135433] [c1] [<c00b0468>] (request_threaded_irq+0x0/0x138) from [<c0610f7c>] (exynos4_local_timer_setup+0x100/0x160) [ 0.135507] [c1] [<c0610e7c>] (exynos4_local_timer_setup+0x0/0x160) from [<c060de3c>] (percpu_timer_setup+0xa4/0xb0) [ 0.135562] [c1] r8:4000406a r7:c0968c84 r6:10c0387d r5:c09148c0 r4:c1de9280 [ 0.135655] [c1] [<c060dd98>] (percpu_timer_setup+0x0/0xb0) from [<c060e1e4>] (secondary_start_kernel+0x118/0x134) [ 0.135710] [c1] r5:c09148c0 r4:00000001 [ 0.135765] [c1] [<c060e0cc>] (secondary_start_kernel+0x0/0x134) from [<4060d784>] (0x4060d784) [ 0.135815] [c1] r5:00000015 r4:5f13006a [ 0.144239] [c2] CPU2: Booted secondary processor [ 0.144267] [c2] CPU2: thread -1, cpu 2, socket 1, mpidr 80000102 [ 0.154295] [c3] CPU3: Booted secondary processor Change-Id: I78ee2d3997b2137e3c19432e17b3e3672523cf43

When a seq-virmidi driver is initialized, it registers a rawmidi instance with its callback to create an associated seq kernel client. Currently it's done throughly in rawmidi's register_mutex context. Recently it was found that this may lead to a deadlock another rawmidi device that is being attached with the sequencer is accessed, as both open with the same register_mutex. This was actually triggered by syzkaller, as Dmitry Vyukov reported: ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 4.8.0-rc1+ hardkernel#11 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- syz-executor/7154 is trying to acquire lock: (register_mutex#5){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff84fd6d4b>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_open+0x4b/0x260 sound/core/rawmidi.c:341 but task is already holding lock: (&grp->list_mutex){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffff850138bb>] check_and_subscribe_port+0x5b/0x5c0 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:495 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> hardkernel#1 (&grp->list_mutex){++++.+}: [<ffffffff8147a3a8>] lock_acquire+0x208/0x430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3746 [<ffffffff863f6199>] down_read+0x49/0xc0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:22 [< inline >] deliver_to_subscribers sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:681 [<ffffffff85005c5e>] snd_seq_deliver_event+0x35e/0x890 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:822 [<ffffffff85006e96>] > snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch+0x126/0x170 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2418 [<ffffffff85012c52>] snd_seq_system_broadcast+0xb2/0xf0 sound/core/seq/seq_system.c:101 [<ffffffff84fff70a>] snd_seq_create_kernel_client+0x24a/0x330 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2297 [< inline >] snd_virmidi_dev_attach_seq sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:383 [<ffffffff8502d29f>] snd_virmidi_dev_register+0x29f/0x750 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:450 [<ffffffff84fd208c>] snd_rawmidi_dev_register+0x30c/0xd40 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1645 [<ffffffff84f816d3>] __snd_device_register.part.0+0x63/0xc0 sound/core/device.c:164 [< inline >] __snd_device_register sound/core/device.c:162 [<ffffffff84f8235d>] snd_device_register_all+0xad/0x110 sound/core/device.c:212 [<ffffffff84f7546f>] snd_card_register+0xef/0x6c0 sound/core/init.c:749 [<ffffffff85040b7f>] snd_virmidi_probe+0x3ef/0x590 sound/drivers/virmidi.c:123 [<ffffffff833ebf7b>] platform_drv_probe+0x8b/0x170 drivers/base/platform.c:564 ...... -> #0 (register_mutex#5){+.+.+.}: [< inline >] check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1829 [< inline >] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1939 [< inline >] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2266 [<ffffffff814791f4>] __lock_acquire+0x4d44/0x4d80 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3335 [<ffffffff8147a3a8>] lock_acquire+0x208/0x430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3746 [< inline >] __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:521 [<ffffffff863f0ef1>] mutex_lock_nested+0xb1/0xa20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:621 [<ffffffff84fd6d4b>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_open+0x4b/0x260 sound/core/rawmidi.c:341 [<ffffffff8502e7c7>] midisynth_subscribe+0xf7/0x350 sound/core/seq/seq_midi.c:188 [< inline >] subscribe_port sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:427 [<ffffffff85013cc7>] check_and_subscribe_port+0x467/0x5c0 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:510 [<ffffffff85015da9>] snd_seq_port_connect+0x2c9/0x500 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:579 [<ffffffff850079b8>] snd_seq_ioctl_subscribe_port+0x1d8/0x2b0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:1480 [<ffffffff84ffe9e4>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x184/0x1e0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2225 [<ffffffff84ffeae8>] snd_seq_kernel_client_ctl+0xa8/0x110 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2440 [<ffffffff85027664>] snd_seq_oss_midi_open+0x3b4/0x610 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_midi.c:375 [<ffffffff85023d67>] snd_seq_oss_synth_setup_midi+0x107/0x4c0 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:281 [<ffffffff8501b0a8>] snd_seq_oss_open+0x748/0x8d0 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_init.c:274 [<ffffffff85019d8a>] odev_open+0x6a/0x90 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss.c:138 [<ffffffff84f7040f>] soundcore_open+0x30f/0x640 sound/sound_core.c:639 ...... other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&grp->list_mutex); lock(register_mutex#5); lock(&grp->list_mutex); lock(register_mutex#5); *** DEADLOCK *** ====================================================== The fix is to simply move the registration parts in snd_rawmidi_dev_register() to the outside of the register_mutex lock. The lock is needed only to manage the linked list, and it's not necessarily to cover the whole initialization process. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit b6bc1c7 upstream. Function ib_create_qp() was failing to return an error when rdma_rw_init_mrs() fails, causing a crash further down in ib_create_qp() when trying to dereferece the qp pointer which was actually a negative errno. The crash: crash> log|grep BUG [ 136.458121] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000098 crash> bt PID: 3736 TASK: ffff8808543215c0 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "kworker/u64:2" #0 [ffff88084d323340] machine_kexec at ffffffff8105fbb0 hardkernel#1 [ffff88084d3233b0] __crash_kexec at ffffffff81116758 hardkernel#2 [ffff88084d323480] crash_kexec at ffffffff8111682d hardkernel#3 [ffff88084d3234b0] oops_end at ffffffff81032bd6 hardkernel#4 [ffff88084d3234e0] no_context at ffffffff8106e431 hardkernel#5 [ffff88084d323530] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8106e610 hardkernel#6 [ffff88084d323590] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8106e6f4 hardkernel#7 [ffff88084d3235a0] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8106ebdc hardkernel#8 [ffff88084d323620] do_page_fault at ffffffff8106f057 hardkernel#9 [ffff88084d323660] page_fault at ffffffff816e3148 [exception RIP: ib_create_qp+427] RIP: ffffffffa02554fb RSP: ffff88084d323718 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: fffffffffffffff4 RCX: 000000018020001f RDX: ffff880830997fc0 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88085f407200 RBP: ffff88084d323778 R8: 0000000000000001 R9: ffffea0020bae210 R10: ffffea0020bae218 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88084d3237c8 R13: 00000000fffffff4 R14: ffff880859fa5000 R15: ffff88082eb89800 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 hardkernel#10 [ffff88084d323780] rdma_create_qp at ffffffffa0782681 [rdma_cm] hardkernel#11 [ffff88084d3237b0] nvmet_rdma_create_queue_ib at ffffffffa07c43f3 [nvmet_rdma] hardkernel#12 [ffff88084d323860] nvmet_rdma_alloc_queue at ffffffffa07c5ba9 [nvmet_rdma] hardkernel#13 [ffff88084d323900] nvmet_rdma_queue_connect at ffffffffa07c5c96 [nvmet_rdma] hardkernel#14 [ffff88084d323980] nvmet_rdma_cm_handler at ffffffffa07c6450 [nvmet_rdma] hardkernel#15 [ffff88084d3239b0] iw_conn_req_handler at ffffffffa0787480 [rdma_cm] hardkernel#16 [ffff88084d323a60] cm_conn_req_handler at ffffffffa0775f06 [iw_cm] hardkernel#17 [ffff88084d323ab0] process_event at ffffffffa0776019 [iw_cm] hardkernel#18 [ffff88084d323af0] cm_work_handler at ffffffffa0776170 [iw_cm] hardkernel#19 [ffff88084d323cb0] process_one_work at ffffffff810a1483 hardkernel#20 [ffff88084d323d90] worker_thread at ffffffff810a211d hardkernel#21 [ffff88084d323ec0] kthread at ffffffff810a6c5c hardkernel#22 [ffff88084d323f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff816e1ebf Fixes: 632bc3f ("IB/core, RDMA RW API: Do not exceed QP SGE send limit") Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 4dfce57 upstream. There have been several reports over the years of NULL pointer dereferences in xfs_trans_log_inode during xfs_fsr processes, when the process is doing an fput and tearing down extents on the temporary inode, something like: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 PID: 29439 TASK: ffff880550584fa0 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "xfs_fsr" [exception RIP: xfs_trans_log_inode+0x10] hardkernel#9 [ffff8800a57bbbe0] xfs_bunmapi at ffffffffa037398e [xfs] hardkernel#10 [ffff8800a57bbce8] xfs_itruncate_extents at ffffffffa0391b29 [xfs] hardkernel#11 [ffff8800a57bbd88] xfs_inactive_truncate at ffffffffa0391d0c [xfs] hardkernel#12 [ffff8800a57bbdb8] xfs_inactive at ffffffffa0392508 [xfs] hardkernel#13 [ffff8800a57bbdd8] xfs_fs_evict_inode at ffffffffa035907e [xfs] hardkernel#14 [ffff8800a57bbe00] evict at ffffffff811e1b67 hardkernel#15 [ffff8800a57bbe28] iput at ffffffff811e23a5 hardkernel#16 [ffff8800a57bbe58] dentry_kill at ffffffff811dcfc8 hardkernel#17 [ffff8800a57bbe88] dput at ffffffff811dd06c hardkernel#18 [ffff8800a57bbea8] __fput at ffffffff811c823b hardkernel#19 [ffff8800a57bbef0] ____fput at ffffffff811c846e hardkernel#20 [ffff8800a57bbf00] task_work_run at ffffffff81093b27 hardkernel#21 [ffff8800a57bbf30] do_notify_resume at ffffffff81013b0c hardkernel#22 [ffff8800a57bbf50] int_signal at ffffffff8161405d As it turns out, this is because the i_itemp pointer, along with the d_ops pointer, has been overwritten with zeros when we tear down the extents during truncate. When the in-core inode fork on the temporary inode used by xfs_fsr was originally set up during the extent swap, we mistakenly looked at di_nextents to determine whether all extents fit inline, but this misses extents generated by speculative preallocation; we should be using if_bytes instead. This mistake corrupts the in-memory inode, and code in xfs_iext_remove_inline eventually gets bad inputs, causing it to memmove and memset incorrect ranges; this became apparent because the two values in ifp->if_u2.if_inline_ext[1] contained what should have been in d_ops and i_itemp; they were memmoved due to incorrect array indexing and then the original locations were zeroed with memset, again due to an array overrun. Fix this by properly using i_df.if_bytes to determine the number of extents, not di_nextents. Thanks to dchinner for looking at this with me and spotting the root cause. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d1f1c0e upstream. Starting with commit d94a461 ("ath9k: use ieee80211_tx_status_noskb where possible") the driver uses rcu_read_lock() && rcu_read_unlock(), yet on returning early in ath_tx_edma_tasklet() the unlock is missing leading to stalls and suspicious RCU usage: =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.9.0-rc8 hardkernel#11 Not tainted ------------------------------- kernel/rcu/tree.c:705 Illegal idle entry in RCU read-side critical section.! other info that might help us debug this: RCU used illegally from idle CPU! rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 RCU used illegally from extended quiescent state! 1 lock held by swapper/7/0: #0: ( rcu_read_lock ){......} , at: [<ffffffffa06ed110>] ath_tx_edma_tasklet+0x0/0x450 [ath9k] stack backtrace: CPU: 7 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Not tainted 4.9.0-rc8 hardkernel#11 Hardware name: Acer Aspire V3-571G/VA50_HC_CR, BIOS V2.21 12/16/2013 ffff88025efc3f38 ffffffff8132b1e5 ffff88017ede4540 0000000000000001 ffff88025efc3f68 ffffffff810a25f7 ffff88025efcee60 ffff88017edebdd8 ffff88025eeb5400 0000000000000091 ffff88025efc3f88 ffffffff810c3cd4 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8132b1e5>] dump_stack+0x68/0x93 [<ffffffff810a25f7>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xd7/0x110 [<ffffffff810c3cd4>] rcu_eqs_enter_common.constprop.85+0x154/0x200 [<ffffffff810c5a54>] rcu_irq_exit+0x44/0xa0 [<ffffffff81058631>] irq_exit+0x61/0xd0 [<ffffffff81018d25>] do_IRQ+0x65/0x110 [<ffffffff81672189>] common_interrupt+0x89/0x89 <EOI> [<ffffffff814ffe11>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x151/0x200 [<ffffffff814ffee2>] cpuidle_enter+0x12/0x20 [<ffffffff8109a6ae>] call_cpuidle+0x1e/0x40 [<ffffffff8109a8f6>] cpu_startup_entry+0x146/0x220 [<ffffffff810336f8>] start_secondary+0x148/0x170 Signed-off-by: Tobias Klausmann <tobias.johannes.klausmann@mni.thm.de> Fixes: d94a461 ("ath9k: use ieee80211_tx_status_noskb where possible") Acked-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Gabriel Craciunescu <nix.or.die@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 816f318 upstream. When a seq-virmidi driver is initialized, it registers a rawmidi instance with its callback to create an associated seq kernel client. Currently it's done throughly in rawmidi's register_mutex context. Recently it was found that this may lead to a deadlock another rawmidi device that is being attached with the sequencer is accessed, as both open with the same register_mutex. This was actually triggered by syzkaller, as Dmitry Vyukov reported: ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 4.8.0-rc1+ hardkernel#11 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- syz-executor/7154 is trying to acquire lock: (register_mutex#5){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff84fd6d4b>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_open+0x4b/0x260 sound/core/rawmidi.c:341 but task is already holding lock: (&grp->list_mutex){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffff850138bb>] check_and_subscribe_port+0x5b/0x5c0 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:495 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> hardkernel#1 (&grp->list_mutex){++++.+}: [<ffffffff8147a3a8>] lock_acquire+0x208/0x430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3746 [<ffffffff863f6199>] down_read+0x49/0xc0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:22 [< inline >] deliver_to_subscribers sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:681 [<ffffffff85005c5e>] snd_seq_deliver_event+0x35e/0x890 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:822 [<ffffffff85006e96>] > snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch+0x126/0x170 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2418 [<ffffffff85012c52>] snd_seq_system_broadcast+0xb2/0xf0 sound/core/seq/seq_system.c:101 [<ffffffff84fff70a>] snd_seq_create_kernel_client+0x24a/0x330 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2297 [< inline >] snd_virmidi_dev_attach_seq sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:383 [<ffffffff8502d29f>] snd_virmidi_dev_register+0x29f/0x750 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:450 [<ffffffff84fd208c>] snd_rawmidi_dev_register+0x30c/0xd40 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1645 [<ffffffff84f816d3>] __snd_device_register.part.0+0x63/0xc0 sound/core/device.c:164 [< inline >] __snd_device_register sound/core/device.c:162 [<ffffffff84f8235d>] snd_device_register_all+0xad/0x110 sound/core/device.c:212 [<ffffffff84f7546f>] snd_card_register+0xef/0x6c0 sound/core/init.c:749 [<ffffffff85040b7f>] snd_virmidi_probe+0x3ef/0x590 sound/drivers/virmidi.c:123 [<ffffffff833ebf7b>] platform_drv_probe+0x8b/0x170 drivers/base/platform.c:564 ...... -> #0 (register_mutex#5){+.+.+.}: [< inline >] check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1829 [< inline >] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1939 [< inline >] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2266 [<ffffffff814791f4>] __lock_acquire+0x4d44/0x4d80 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3335 [<ffffffff8147a3a8>] lock_acquire+0x208/0x430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3746 [< inline >] __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:521 [<ffffffff863f0ef1>] mutex_lock_nested+0xb1/0xa20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:621 [<ffffffff84fd6d4b>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_open+0x4b/0x260 sound/core/rawmidi.c:341 [<ffffffff8502e7c7>] midisynth_subscribe+0xf7/0x350 sound/core/seq/seq_midi.c:188 [< inline >] subscribe_port sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:427 [<ffffffff85013cc7>] check_and_subscribe_port+0x467/0x5c0 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:510 [<ffffffff85015da9>] snd_seq_port_connect+0x2c9/0x500 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:579 [<ffffffff850079b8>] snd_seq_ioctl_subscribe_port+0x1d8/0x2b0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:1480 [<ffffffff84ffe9e4>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x184/0x1e0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2225 [<ffffffff84ffeae8>] snd_seq_kernel_client_ctl+0xa8/0x110 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2440 [<ffffffff85027664>] snd_seq_oss_midi_open+0x3b4/0x610 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_midi.c:375 [<ffffffff85023d67>] snd_seq_oss_synth_setup_midi+0x107/0x4c0 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:281 [<ffffffff8501b0a8>] snd_seq_oss_open+0x748/0x8d0 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_init.c:274 [<ffffffff85019d8a>] odev_open+0x6a/0x90 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss.c:138 [<ffffffff84f7040f>] soundcore_open+0x30f/0x640 sound/sound_core.c:639 ...... other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&grp->list_mutex); lock(register_mutex#5); lock(&grp->list_mutex); lock(register_mutex#5); *** DEADLOCK *** ====================================================== The fix is to simply move the registration parts in snd_rawmidi_dev_register() to the outside of the register_mutex lock. The lock is needed only to manage the linked list, and it's not necessarily to cover the whole initialization process. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>

[ Upstream commit 45caeaa ] As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6. v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well. We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk->sk_dst_cache) pointing to that dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is: hardkernel#8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648 [exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74] . . hardkernel#9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64 hardkernel#10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a hardkernel#11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02 hardkernel#12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4 hardkernel#13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9 hardkernel#14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d hardkernel#15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06 hardkernel#16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2 hardkernel#17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608 hardkernel#18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690 hardkernel#19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3] hardkernel#20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3] hardkernel#21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2 hardkernel#22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f hardkernel#23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c hardkernel#24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5 hardkernel#25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5 hardkernel#26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8 Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well. It's found the freed dst_entry here: 224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)↩ 225 {↩ 226 ▹ const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);↩ 227 ▹ const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);↩ 228 ↩ 229 ▹ return (dst && dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||↩ 230 ▹ ▹ (icsk->icsk_ack.quick && !icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong);↩ 231 }↩ But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in netfilter code as well. All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues: - Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable. - All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g: LockDroppedIcmps 267 A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk->sk_dst_entry can be decremented twice for the same socket via: do_redirect()->__sk_dst_check()-> dst_release(). Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket pointing to it via sk->sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash. To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket locked. The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too. As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which can set the dst->obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and triggers the dst_release(). Fixes: ceb3320 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.") Cc: Eric Garver <egarver@redhat.com> Cc: Hannes Sowa <hsowa@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <jmaxwell37@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 4dfce57 upstream. There have been several reports over the years of NULL pointer dereferences in xfs_trans_log_inode during xfs_fsr processes, when the process is doing an fput and tearing down extents on the temporary inode, something like: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 PID: 29439 TASK: ffff880550584fa0 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "xfs_fsr" [exception RIP: xfs_trans_log_inode+0x10] hardkernel#9 [ffff8800a57bbbe0] xfs_bunmapi at ffffffffa037398e [xfs] hardkernel#10 [ffff8800a57bbce8] xfs_itruncate_extents at ffffffffa0391b29 [xfs] hardkernel#11 [ffff8800a57bbd88] xfs_inactive_truncate at ffffffffa0391d0c [xfs] hardkernel#12 [ffff8800a57bbdb8] xfs_inactive at ffffffffa0392508 [xfs] hardkernel#13 [ffff8800a57bbdd8] xfs_fs_evict_inode at ffffffffa035907e [xfs] hardkernel#14 [ffff8800a57bbe00] evict at ffffffff811e1b67 hardkernel#15 [ffff8800a57bbe28] iput at ffffffff811e23a5 hardkernel#16 [ffff8800a57bbe58] dentry_kill at ffffffff811dcfc8 hardkernel#17 [ffff8800a57bbe88] dput at ffffffff811dd06c hardkernel#18 [ffff8800a57bbea8] __fput at ffffffff811c823b hardkernel#19 [ffff8800a57bbef0] ____fput at ffffffff811c846e hardkernel#20 [ffff8800a57bbf00] task_work_run at ffffffff81093b27 hardkernel#21 [ffff8800a57bbf30] do_notify_resume at ffffffff81013b0c hardkernel#22 [ffff8800a57bbf50] int_signal at ffffffff8161405d As it turns out, this is because the i_itemp pointer, along with the d_ops pointer, has been overwritten with zeros when we tear down the extents during truncate. When the in-core inode fork on the temporary inode used by xfs_fsr was originally set up during the extent swap, we mistakenly looked at di_nextents to determine whether all extents fit inline, but this misses extents generated by speculative preallocation; we should be using if_bytes instead. This mistake corrupts the in-memory inode, and code in xfs_iext_remove_inline eventually gets bad inputs, causing it to memmove and memset incorrect ranges; this became apparent because the two values in ifp->if_u2.if_inline_ext[1] contained what should have been in d_ops and i_itemp; they were memmoved due to incorrect array indexing and then the original locations were zeroed with memset, again due to an array overrun. Fix this by properly using i_df.if_bytes to determine the number of extents, not di_nextents. Thanks to dchinner for looking at this with me and spotting the root cause. [nborisov: backported to 4.4] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> -- fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

commit 45caeaa upstream. As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6. v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well. We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk->sk_dst_cache) pointing to that dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is: #8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648 [exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74] . . #9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64 #10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a #11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02 #12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4 #13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9 #14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d #15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06 #16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2 #17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608 #18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690 #19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3] #20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3] #21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2 #22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f #23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c #24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5 #25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5 #26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8 Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well. It's found the freed dst_entry here: 224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)â�© 225 {â�© 226 â�¹ const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);â�© 227 â�¹ const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);â�© 228 â�© 229 â�¹ return (dst && dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||â�© 230 â�¹ â�¹ (icsk->icsk_ack.quick && !icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong);â�© 231 }â�© But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in netfilter code as well. All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues: - Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable. - All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g: LockDroppedIcmps 267 A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk->sk_dst_entry can be decremented twice for the same socket via: do_redirect()->__sk_dst_check()-> dst_release(). Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket pointing to it via sk->sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash. To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket locked. The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too. As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which can set the dst->obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and triggers the dst_release(). Fixes: ceb3320 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.") Cc: Eric Garver <egarver@redhat.com> Cc: Hannes Sowa <hsowa@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <jmaxwell37@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>

Thomas reported that 'perf buildid-list' gets a SEGFAULT due to NULL pointer deref when he ran it on a data with namespace events. It was because the buildid_id__mark_dso_hit_ops lacks the namespace event handler and perf_too__fill_default() didn't set it. Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () Missing separate debuginfos, use: dnf debuginfo-install audit-libs-2.7.7-1.fc25.s390x bzip2-libs-1.0.6-21.fc25.s390x elfutils-libelf-0.169-1.fc25.s390x +elfutils-libs-0.169-1.fc25.s390x libcap-ng-0.7.8-1.fc25.s390x numactl-libs-2.0.11-2.ibm.fc25.s390x openssl-libs-1.1.0e-1.1.ibm.fc25.s390x perl-libs-5.24.1-386.fc25.s390x +python-libs-2.7.13-2.fc25.s390x slang-2.3.0-7.fc25.s390x xz-libs-5.2.3-2.fc25.s390x zlib-1.2.8-10.fc25.s390x (gdb) where #0 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () #1 0x00000000010fad6a in machines__deliver_event (machines=<optimized out>, machines@entry=0x2c6fd18, evlist=<optimized out>, event=event@entry=0x3fffdf00470, sample=0x3ffffffe880, sample@entry=0x3ffffffe888, tool=tool@entry=0x1312968 <build_id.mark_dso_hit_ops>, file_offset=1136) at util/session.c:1287 #2 0x00000000010fbf4e in perf_session__deliver_event (file_offset=1136, tool=0x1312968 <build_id.mark_dso_hit_ops>, sample=0x3ffffffe888, event=0x3fffdf00470, session=0x2c6fc30) at util/session.c:1340 #3 perf_session__process_event (session=0x2c6fc30, session@entry=0x0, event=event@entry=0x3fffdf00470, file_offset=file_offset@entry=1136) at util/session.c:1522 #4 0x00000000010fddde in __perf_session__process_events (file_size=11880, data_size=<optimized out>, data_offset=<optimized out>, session=0x0) at util/session.c:1899 #5 perf_session__process_events (session=0x0, session@entry=0x2c6fc30) at util/session.c:1953 #6 0x000000000103b2ac in perf_session__list_build_ids (with_hits=<optimized out>, force=<optimized out>) at builtin-buildid-list.c:83 #7 cmd_buildid_list (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at builtin-buildid-list.c:115 #8 0x00000000010a026c in run_builtin (p=0x1311f78 <commands+24>, argc=argc@entry=2, argv=argv@entry=0x3fffffff3c0) at perf.c:296 #9 0x000000000102bc00 in handle_internal_command (argv=<optimized out>, argc=2) at perf.c:348 hardkernel#10 run_argv (argcp=<synthetic pointer>, argv=<synthetic pointer>) at perf.c:392 hardkernel#11 main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x3fffffff3c0) at perf.c:536 (gdb) Fix it by adding a stub event handler for namespace event. Committer testing: Further clarifying, plain using 'perf buildid-list' will not end up in a SEGFAULT when processing a perf.data file with namespace info: # perf record -a --namespaces sleep 1 [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 2.024 MB perf.data (1058 samples) ] # perf buildid-list | wc -l 38 # perf buildid-list | head -5 e2a171c7b905826fc8494f0711ba76ab6abbd604 /lib/modules/4.14.0-rc3+/build/vmlinux 874840a02d8f8a31cedd605d0b8653145472ced3 /lib/modules/4.14.0-rc3+/kernel/arch/x86/kvm/kvm-intel.ko ea7223776730cd8a22f320040aae4d54312984bc /lib/modules/4.14.0-rc3+/kernel/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915.ko 5961535e6732a8edb7f22b3f148bb2fa2e0be4b9 /lib/modules/4.14.0-rc3+/kernel/drivers/gpu/drm/drm.ko f045f54aa78cf1931cc893f78b6cbc52c72a8cb1 /usr/lib64/libc-2.25.so # It is only when one asks for checking what of those entries actually had samples, i.e. when we use either -H or --with-hits, that we will process all the PERF_RECORD_ events, and since tools/perf/builtin-buildid-list.c neither explicitely set a perf_tool.namespaces() callback nor the default stub was set that we end up, when processing a PERF_RECORD_NAMESPACE record, causing a SEGFAULT: # perf buildid-list -H Segmentation fault (core dumped) ^C # Reported-and-Tested-by: Thomas-Mich Richter <tmricht@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas-Mich Richter <tmricht@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Fixes: f3b3614 ("perf tools: Add PERF_RECORD_NAMESPACES to include namespaces related info") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171017132900.11043-1-namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

commit 7ba7166 upstream. It was reported by Sergey Senozhatsky that if THP (Transparent Huge Page) and frontswap (via zswap) are both enabled, when memory goes low so that swap is triggered, segfault and memory corruption will occur in random user space applications as follow, kernel: urxvt[338]: segfault at 20 ip 00007fc08889ae0d sp 00007ffc73a7fc40 error 6 in libc-2.26.so[7fc08881a000+1ae000] #0 0x00007fc08889ae0d _int_malloc (libc.so.6) #1 0x00007fc08889c2f3 malloc (libc.so.6) #2 0x0000560e6004bff7 _Z14rxvt_wcstoutf8PKwi (urxvt) #3 0x0000560e6005e75c n/a (urxvt) #4 0x0000560e6007d9f1 _ZN16rxvt_perl_interp6invokeEP9rxvt_term9hook_typez (urxvt) #5 0x0000560e6003d988 _ZN9rxvt_term9cmd_parseEv (urxvt) #6 0x0000560e60042804 _ZN9rxvt_term6pty_cbERN2ev2ioEi (urxvt) #7 0x0000560e6005c10f _Z17ev_invoke_pendingv (urxvt) #8 0x0000560e6005cb55 ev_run (urxvt) #9 0x0000560e6003b9b9 main (urxvt) #10 0x00007fc08883af4a __libc_start_main (libc.so.6) #11 0x0000560e6003f9da _start (urxvt) After bisection, it was found the first bad commit is bd4c82c ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out"). The root cause is as follows: When the pages are written to swap device during swapping out in swap_writepage(), zswap (fontswap) is tried to compress the pages to improve performance. But zswap (frontswap) will treat THP as a normal page, so only the head page is saved. After swapping in, tail pages will not be restored to their original contents, causing memory corruption in the applications. This is fixed by refusing to save page in the frontswap store functions if the page is a THP. So that the THP will be swapped out to swap device. Another choice is to split THP if frontswap is enabled. But it is found that the frontswap enabling isn't flexible. For example, if CONFIG_ZSWAP=y (cannot be module), frontswap will be enabled even if zswap itself isn't enabled. Frontswap has multiple backends, to make it easy for one backend to enable THP support, the THP checking is put in backend frontswap store functions instead of the general interfaces. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180209084947.22749-1-ying.huang@intel.com Fixes: bd4c82c ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out") Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com> Reported-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> [put THP checking in backend] Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@kernel.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.14] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 3d942ee upstream. If System V shmget/shmat operations are used to create a hugetlbfs backed mapping, it is possible to munmap part of the mapping and split the underlying vma such that it is not huge page aligned. This will untimately result in the following BUG: kernel BUG at /build/linux-jWa1Fv/linux-4.15.0/mm/hugetlb.c:3310! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [hardkernel#1] LE SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV Modules linked in: kcm nfc af_alg caif_socket caif phonet fcrypt CPU: 18 PID: 43243 Comm: trinity-subchil Tainted: G C E 4.15.0-10-generic hardkernel#11-Ubuntu NIP: c00000000036e764 LR: c00000000036ee48 CTR: 0000000000000009 REGS: c000003fbcdcf810 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G C E (4.15.0-10-generic) MSR: 9000000000029033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24002222 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c00000000036ee44 SOFTE: 1 NIP __unmap_hugepage_range+0xa4/0x760 LR __unmap_hugepage_range_final+0x28/0x50 Call Trace: 0x7115e4e00000 (unreliable) __unmap_hugepage_range_final+0x28/0x50 unmap_single_vma+0x11c/0x190 unmap_vmas+0x94/0x140 exit_mmap+0x9c/0x1d0 mmput+0xa8/0x1d0 do_exit+0x360/0xc80 do_group_exit+0x60/0x100 SyS_exit_group+0x24/0x30 system_call+0x58/0x6c ---[ end trace ee88f958a1c62605 ]--- This bug was introduced by commit 31383c6 ("mm, hugetlbfs: introduce ->split() to vm_operations_struct"). A split function was added to vm_operations_struct to determine if a mapping can be split. This was mostly for device-dax and hugetlbfs mappings which have specific alignment constraints. Mappings initiated via shmget/shmat have their original vm_ops overwritten with shm_vm_ops. shm_vm_ops functions will call back to the original vm_ops if needed. Add such a split function to shm_vm_ops. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321161314.7711-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com Fixes: 31383c6 ("mm, hugetlbfs: introduce ->split() to vm_operations_struct") Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reported-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 5f16a04 ] FUTEX_OP_OPARG_SHIFT instructs the futex code to treat the 12-bit oparg field as a shift value, potentially leading to a left shift value that is negative or with an absolute value that is significantly larger then the size of the type. UBSAN chokes with: ================================================================================ UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in ./arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h:60:13 shift exponent -1 is negative CPU: 1 PID: 1449 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc4-00005-g977eb52-dirty hardkernel#11 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: [<ffff200008094778>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x538 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:73 [<ffff200008094cd0>] show_stack+0x20/0x30 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:228 [<ffff200008c194a8>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline] [<ffff200008c194a8>] dump_stack+0x120/0x188 lib/dump_stack.c:52 [<ffff200008cc24b8>] ubsan_epilogue+0x18/0x98 lib/ubsan.c:164 [<ffff200008cc3098>] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x250/0x294 lib/ubsan.c:421 [<ffff20000832002c>] futex_atomic_op_inuser arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h:60 [inline] [<ffff20000832002c>] futex_wake_op kernel/futex.c:1489 [inline] [<ffff20000832002c>] do_futex+0x137c/0x1740 kernel/futex.c:3231 [<ffff200008320504>] SYSC_futex kernel/futex.c:3281 [inline] [<ffff200008320504>] SyS_futex+0x114/0x268 kernel/futex.c:3249 [<ffff200008084770>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 ================================================================================ syz-executor1 uses obsolete (PF_INET,SOCK_PACKET) sock: process `syz-executor0' is using obsolete setsockopt SO_BSDCOMPAT This patch attempts to fix some of this by: * Making encoded_op an unsigned type, so we can shift it left even if the top bit is set. * Casting to signed prior to shifting right when extracting oparg and cmparg * Consider only the bottom 5 bits of oparg when using it as a left-shift value. Whilst I think this catches all of the issues, I'd much prefer to remove this stuff, as I think it's unused and the bugs are copy-pasted between a bunch of architectures. Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit a9d572c ] When io_bits is set, GCing encrypted block may hit the following hungtask. Since io_bits requires aligned block address, f2fs_submit_page_write may return -EAGAIN if new_blkaddr does not satisify io_bits alignment. As a result, the encrypted page will never be writtenback. This patch makes move_data_block aware the EAGAIN error and cancel the writeback. [ 246.751371] INFO: task kworker/u4:4:797 blocked for more than 90 seconds. [ 246.752423] Not tainted 4.15.0-rc4+ #11 [ 246.754176] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 246.755336] kworker/u4:4 D25448 797 2 0x80000000 [ 246.755597] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0) [ 246.755616] Call Trace: [ 246.755695] ? __schedule+0x322/0xa90 [ 246.755761] ? blk_init_request_from_bio+0x120/0x120 [ 246.755773] ? pci_mmcfg_check_reserved+0xb0/0xb0 [ 246.755801] ? __radix_tree_create+0x19e/0x200 [ 246.755813] ? delete_node+0x136/0x370 [ 246.755838] schedule+0x43/0xc0 [ 246.755904] io_schedule+0x17/0x40 [ 246.755939] wait_on_page_bit_common+0x17b/0x240 [ 246.755950] ? wake_page_function+0xa0/0xa0 [ 246.755961] ? add_to_page_cache_lru+0x160/0x160 [ 246.755972] ? page_cache_tree_insert+0x170/0x170 [ 246.755983] ? __lru_cache_add+0x96/0xb0 [ 246.756086] __filemap_fdatawait_range+0x14f/0x1c0 [ 246.756097] ? wait_on_page_bit_common+0x240/0x240 [ 246.756120] ? __wake_up_locked_key_bookmark+0x20/0x20 [ 246.756167] ? wait_on_all_pages_writeback+0xc9/0x100 [ 246.756179] ? __remove_ino_entry+0x120/0x120 [ 246.756192] ? wait_woken+0x100/0x100 [ 246.756204] filemap_fdatawait_range+0x9/0x20 [ 246.756216] write_checkpoint+0x18a1/0x1f00 [ 246.756254] ? blk_get_request+0x10/0x10 [ 246.756265] ? cpumask_next_and+0x43/0x60 [ 246.756279] ? f2fs_sync_inode_meta+0x160/0x160 [ 246.756289] ? remove_element.isra.4+0xa0/0xa0 [ 246.756300] ? __put_compound_page+0x40/0x40 [ 246.756310] ? f2fs_sync_fs+0xec/0x1c0 [ 246.756320] ? f2fs_sync_fs+0x120/0x1c0 [ 246.756329] f2fs_sync_fs+0x120/0x1c0 [ 246.756357] ? trace_event_raw_event_f2fs__page+0x260/0x260 [ 246.756393] ? ata_build_rw_tf+0x173/0x410 [ 246.756397] f2fs_balance_fs_bg+0x198/0x390 [ 246.756405] ? drop_inmem_page+0x230/0x230 [ 246.756415] ? ahci_qc_prep+0x1bb/0x2e0 [ 246.756418] ? ahci_qc_issue+0x1df/0x290 [ 246.756422] ? __accumulate_pelt_segments+0x42/0xd0 [ 246.756426] ? f2fs_write_node_pages+0xd1/0x380 [ 246.756429] f2fs_write_node_pages+0xd1/0x380 [ 246.756437] ? sync_node_pages+0x8f0/0x8f0 [ 246.756440] ? update_curr+0x53/0x220 [ 246.756444] ? __accumulate_pelt_segments+0xa2/0xd0 [ 246.756448] ? __update_load_avg_se.isra.39+0x349/0x360 [ 246.756452] ? do_writepages+0x2a/0xa0 [ 246.756456] do_writepages+0x2a/0xa0 [ 246.756460] __writeback_single_inode+0x70/0x490 [ 246.756463] ? check_preempt_wakeup+0x199/0x310 [ 246.756467] writeback_sb_inodes+0x2a2/0x660 [ 246.756471] ? is_empty_dir_inode+0x40/0x40 [ 246.756474] ? __writeback_single_inode+0x490/0x490 [ 246.756477] ? string+0xbf/0xf0 [ 246.756480] ? down_read_trylock+0x35/0x60 [ 246.756484] __writeback_inodes_wb+0x9f/0xf0 [ 246.756488] wb_writeback+0x41d/0x4b0 [ 246.756492] ? writeback_inodes_wb.constprop.55+0x150/0x150 [ 246.756498] ? set_worker_desc+0xf7/0x130 [ 246.756502] ? current_is_workqueue_rescuer+0x60/0x60 [ 246.756511] ? _find_next_bit+0x2c/0xa0 [ 246.756514] ? wb_workfn+0x400/0x5d0 [ 246.756518] wb_workfn+0x400/0x5d0 [ 246.756521] ? finish_task_switch+0xdf/0x2a0 [ 246.756525] ? inode_wait_for_writeback+0x30/0x30 [ 246.756529] process_one_work+0x3a7/0x6f0 [ 246.756533] worker_thread+0x82/0x750 [ 246.756537] kthread+0x16f/0x1c0 [ 246.756541] ? trace_event_raw_event_workqueue_work+0x110/0x110 [ 246.756544] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xb0/0xb0 [ 246.756548] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <shengyong1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 2c0aa08 ] Scenario: 1. Port down and do fail over 2. Ap do rds_bind syscall PID: 47039 TASK: ffff89887e2fe640 CPU: 47 COMMAND: "kworker/u:6" #0 [ffff898e35f159f0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103abf9 #1 [ffff898e35f15a60] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b96e3 #2 [ffff898e35f15b30] oops_end at ffffffff8150f518 #3 [ffff898e35f15b60] no_context at ffffffff8104854c #4 [ffff898e35f15ba0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81048675 #5 [ffff898e35f15bf0] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff810487d3 #6 [ffff898e35f15c00] do_page_fault at ffffffff815120b8 #7 [ffff898e35f15d10] page_fault at ffffffff8150ea95 [exception RIP: unknown or invalid address] RIP: 0000000000000000 RSP: ffff898e35f15dc8 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff889b77f6fc00 RCX:ffffffff81c99d88 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff896019ee08e8 RDI:ffff889b77f6fc00 RBP: ffff898e35f15df0 R8: ffff896019ee08c8 R9:0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:ffff896019ee08c0 R13: ffff889b77f6fe68 R14: ffffffff81c99d80 R15: ffffffffa022a1e0 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ffff898e35f15dc8] cma_ndev_work_handler at ffffffffa022a228 [rdma_cm] #9 [ffff898e35f15df8] process_one_work at ffffffff8108a7c6 #10 [ffff898e35f15e58] worker_thread at ffffffff8108bda0 #11 [ffff898e35f15ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090fe6 PID: 45659 TASK: ffff880d313d2500 CPU: 31 COMMAND: "oracle_45659_ap" #0 [ffff881024ccfc98] __schedule at ffffffff8150bac4 #1 [ffff881024ccfd40] schedule at ffffffff8150c2cf #2 [ffff881024ccfd50] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8150cee7 #3 [ffff881024ccfdc0] mutex_lock at ffffffff8150cdeb #4 [ffff881024ccfde0] rdma_destroy_id at ffffffffa022a027 [rdma_cm] #5 [ffff881024ccfe10] rds_ib_laddr_check at ffffffffa0357857 [rds_rdma] #6 [ffff881024ccfe50] rds_trans_get_preferred at ffffffffa0324c2a [rds] #7 [ffff881024ccfe80] rds_bind at ffffffffa031d690 [rds] #8 [ffff881024ccfeb0] sys_bind at ffffffff8142a670 PID: 45659 PID: 47039 rds_ib_laddr_check /* create id_priv with a null event_handler */ rdma_create_id rdma_bind_addr cma_acquire_dev /* add id_priv to cma_dev->id_list */ cma_attach_to_dev cma_ndev_work_handler /* event_hanlder is null */ id_priv->id.event_handler Signed-off-by: Guanglei Li <guanglei.li@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Honglei Wang <honglei.wang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Yanjun Zhu <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…s found [ Upstream commit 72f17ba ] If an OVS_ATTR_NESTED attribute type is found while walking through netlink attributes, we call nlattr_set() recursively passing the length table for the following nested attributes, if different from the current one. However, once we're done with those sub-nested attributes, we should continue walking through attributes using the current table, instead of using the one related to the sub-nested attributes. For example, given this sequence: 1 OVS_KEY_ATTR_PRIORITY 2 OVS_KEY_ATTR_TUNNEL 3 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_ID 4 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_SRC 5 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_DST 6 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TTL 7 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_SRC 8 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_DST 9 OVS_KEY_ATTR_IN_PORT 10 OVS_KEY_ATTR_SKB_MARK 11 OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS we switch to the 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' table on attribute #3, and we don't switch back to 'ovs_key_lens' while setting attributes #9 to #11 in the sequence. As OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS evaluates to 21, and the array size of 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' is 15, we also get this kind of KASan splat while accessing the wrong table: [ 7654.586496] ================================================================== [ 7654.594573] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.603214] Read of size 4 at addr ffffffffc169ecf0 by task handler29/87430 [ 7654.610983] [ 7654.612644] CPU: 21 PID: 87430 Comm: handler29 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 3.10.0-866.el7.test.x86_64 #1 [ 7654.623030] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016 [ 7654.631379] Call Trace: [ 7654.634108] [<ffffffffb65a7c50>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [ 7654.639843] [<ffffffffb53ff373>] print_address_description+0x33/0x290 [ 7654.647129] [<ffffffffc169b37b>] ? nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.654607] [<ffffffffb53ff812>] kasan_report.part.3+0x242/0x330 [ 7654.661406] [<ffffffffb53ff9b4>] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x34/0x40 [ 7654.668789] [<ffffffffc169b37b>] nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.676076] [<ffffffffc167ef68>] ovs_nla_get_match+0x10c8/0x1900 [openvswitch] [ 7654.684234] [<ffffffffb61e9cc8>] ? genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 [ 7654.689968] [<ffffffffb61e7733>] ? netlink_unicast+0x3f3/0x590 [ 7654.696574] [<ffffffffc167dea0>] ? ovs_nla_put_tunnel_info+0xb0/0xb0 [openvswitch] [ 7654.705122] [<ffffffffb4f41b50>] ? unwind_get_return_address+0xb0/0xb0 [ 7654.712503] [<ffffffffb65d9355>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21 [ 7654.719401] [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370 [ 7654.726298] [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370 [ 7654.733195] [<ffffffffb53fe4b5>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50 [ 7654.740187] [<ffffffffb53fe62a>] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xe0 [ 7654.746406] [<ffffffffb53fec32>] ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 7654.752914] [<ffffffffb53fe711>] ? memset+0x31/0x40 [ 7654.758456] [<ffffffffc165bf92>] ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x2b2/0xf00 [openvswitch] [snip] [ 7655.132484] The buggy address belongs to the variable: [ 7655.138226] ovs_tunnel_key_lens+0xf0/0xffffffffffffd400 [openvswitch] [ 7655.145507] [ 7655.147166] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 7655.152514] ffffffffc169eb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa [ 7655.160585] ffffffffc169ec00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 7655.168644] >ffffffffc169ec80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa [ 7655.176701] ^ [ 7655.184372] ffffffffc169ed00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 05 [ 7655.192431] ffffffffc169ed80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 7655.200490] ================================================================== Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Fixes: 982b527 ("openvswitch: Fix mask generation for nested attributes.") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…s found [ Upstream commit 72f17ba ] If an OVS_ATTR_NESTED attribute type is found while walking through netlink attributes, we call nlattr_set() recursively passing the length table for the following nested attributes, if different from the current one. However, once we're done with those sub-nested attributes, we should continue walking through attributes using the current table, instead of using the one related to the sub-nested attributes. For example, given this sequence: 1 OVS_KEY_ATTR_PRIORITY 2 OVS_KEY_ATTR_TUNNEL 3 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_ID 4 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_SRC 5 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_DST 6 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TTL 7 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_SRC 8 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_DST 9 OVS_KEY_ATTR_IN_PORT 10 OVS_KEY_ATTR_SKB_MARK 11 OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS we switch to the 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' table on attribute hardkernel#3, and we don't switch back to 'ovs_key_lens' while setting attributes hardkernel#9 to hardkernel#11 in the sequence. As OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS evaluates to 21, and the array size of 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' is 15, we also get this kind of KASan splat while accessing the wrong table: [ 7654.586496] ================================================================== [ 7654.594573] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.603214] Read of size 4 at addr ffffffffc169ecf0 by task handler29/87430 [ 7654.610983] [ 7654.612644] CPU: 21 PID: 87430 Comm: handler29 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 3.10.0-866.el7.test.x86_64 hardkernel#1 [ 7654.623030] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016 [ 7654.631379] Call Trace: [ 7654.634108] [<ffffffffb65a7c50>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [ 7654.639843] [<ffffffffb53ff373>] print_address_description+0x33/0x290 [ 7654.647129] [<ffffffffc169b37b>] ? nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.654607] [<ffffffffb53ff812>] kasan_report.part.3+0x242/0x330 [ 7654.661406] [<ffffffffb53ff9b4>] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x34/0x40 [ 7654.668789] [<ffffffffc169b37b>] nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.676076] [<ffffffffc167ef68>] ovs_nla_get_match+0x10c8/0x1900 [openvswitch] [ 7654.684234] [<ffffffffb61e9cc8>] ? genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 [ 7654.689968] [<ffffffffb61e7733>] ? netlink_unicast+0x3f3/0x590 [ 7654.696574] [<ffffffffc167dea0>] ? ovs_nla_put_tunnel_info+0xb0/0xb0 [openvswitch] [ 7654.705122] [<ffffffffb4f41b50>] ? unwind_get_return_address+0xb0/0xb0 [ 7654.712503] [<ffffffffb65d9355>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21 [ 7654.719401] [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370 [ 7654.726298] [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370 [ 7654.733195] [<ffffffffb53fe4b5>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50 [ 7654.740187] [<ffffffffb53fe62a>] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xe0 [ 7654.746406] [<ffffffffb53fec32>] ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 7654.752914] [<ffffffffb53fe711>] ? memset+0x31/0x40 [ 7654.758456] [<ffffffffc165bf92>] ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x2b2/0xf00 [openvswitch] [snip] [ 7655.132484] The buggy address belongs to the variable: [ 7655.138226] ovs_tunnel_key_lens+0xf0/0xffffffffffffd400 [openvswitch] [ 7655.145507] [ 7655.147166] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 7655.152514] ffffffffc169eb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa [ 7655.160585] ffffffffc169ec00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 7655.168644] >ffffffffc169ec80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa [ 7655.176701] ^ [ 7655.184372] ffffffffc169ed00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 05 [ 7655.192431] ffffffffc169ed80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 7655.200490] ================================================================== Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Fixes: 982b527 ("openvswitch: Fix mask generation for nested attributes.") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 2c0aa08 ] Scenario: 1. Port down and do fail over 2. Ap do rds_bind syscall PID: 47039 TASK: ffff89887e2fe640 CPU: 47 COMMAND: "kworker/u:6" #0 [ffff898e35f159f0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103abf9 hardkernel#1 [ffff898e35f15a60] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b96e3 hardkernel#2 [ffff898e35f15b30] oops_end at ffffffff8150f518 hardkernel#3 [ffff898e35f15b60] no_context at ffffffff8104854c hardkernel#4 [ffff898e35f15ba0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81048675 hardkernel#5 [ffff898e35f15bf0] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff810487d3 hardkernel#6 [ffff898e35f15c00] do_page_fault at ffffffff815120b8 hardkernel#7 [ffff898e35f15d10] page_fault at ffffffff8150ea95 [exception RIP: unknown or invalid address] RIP: 0000000000000000 RSP: ffff898e35f15dc8 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff889b77f6fc00 RCX:ffffffff81c99d88 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff896019ee08e8 RDI:ffff889b77f6fc00 RBP: ffff898e35f15df0 R8: ffff896019ee08c8 R9:0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:ffff896019ee08c0 R13: ffff889b77f6fe68 R14: ffffffff81c99d80 R15: ffffffffa022a1e0 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 hardkernel#8 [ffff898e35f15dc8] cma_ndev_work_handler at ffffffffa022a228 [rdma_cm] hardkernel#9 [ffff898e35f15df8] process_one_work at ffffffff8108a7c6 hardkernel#10 [ffff898e35f15e58] worker_thread at ffffffff8108bda0 hardkernel#11 [ffff898e35f15ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090fe6 PID: 45659 TASK: ffff880d313d2500 CPU: 31 COMMAND: "oracle_45659_ap" #0 [ffff881024ccfc98] __schedule at ffffffff8150bac4 hardkernel#1 [ffff881024ccfd40] schedule at ffffffff8150c2cf hardkernel#2 [ffff881024ccfd50] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8150cee7 hardkernel#3 [ffff881024ccfdc0] mutex_lock at ffffffff8150cdeb hardkernel#4 [ffff881024ccfde0] rdma_destroy_id at ffffffffa022a027 [rdma_cm] hardkernel#5 [ffff881024ccfe10] rds_ib_laddr_check at ffffffffa0357857 [rds_rdma] hardkernel#6 [ffff881024ccfe50] rds_trans_get_preferred at ffffffffa0324c2a [rds] hardkernel#7 [ffff881024ccfe80] rds_bind at ffffffffa031d690 [rds] hardkernel#8 [ffff881024ccfeb0] sys_bind at ffffffff8142a670 PID: 45659 PID: 47039 rds_ib_laddr_check /* create id_priv with a null event_handler */ rdma_create_id rdma_bind_addr cma_acquire_dev /* add id_priv to cma_dev->id_list */ cma_attach_to_dev cma_ndev_work_handler /* event_hanlder is null */ id_priv->id.event_handler Signed-off-by: Guanglei Li <guanglei.li@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Honglei Wang <honglei.wang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Yanjun Zhu <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 2bbea6e ] when mounting an ISO filesystem sometimes (very rarely) the system hangs because of a race condition between two tasks. PID: 6766 TASK: ffff88007b2a6dd0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "mount" #0 [ffff880078447ae0] __schedule at ffffffff8168d605 hardkernel#1 [ffff880078447b48] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffff8168ed49 hardkernel#2 [ffff880078447b58] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8168c995 hardkernel#3 [ffff880078447bb8] mutex_lock at ffffffff8168bdef hardkernel#4 [ffff880078447bd0] sr_block_ioctl at ffffffffa00b6818 [sr_mod] hardkernel#5 [ffff880078447c10] blkdev_ioctl at ffffffff812fea50 hardkernel#6 [ffff880078447c70] ioctl_by_bdev at ffffffff8123a8b3 hardkernel#7 [ffff880078447c90] isofs_fill_super at ffffffffa04fb1e1 [isofs] hardkernel#8 [ffff880078447da8] mount_bdev at ffffffff81202570 hardkernel#9 [ffff880078447e18] isofs_mount at ffffffffa04f9828 [isofs] hardkernel#10 [ffff880078447e28] mount_fs at ffffffff81202d09 hardkernel#11 [ffff880078447e70] vfs_kern_mount at ffffffff8121ea8f hardkernel#12 [ffff880078447ea8] do_mount at ffffffff81220fee hardkernel#13 [ffff880078447f28] sys_mount at ffffffff812218d6 hardkernel#14 [ffff880078447f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff81698c49 RIP: 00007fd9ea914e9a RSP: 00007ffd5d9bf648 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000000000a5 RBX: ffffffff81698c49 RCX: 0000000000000010 RDX: 00007fd9ec2bc210 RSI: 00007fd9ec2bc290 RDI: 00007fd9ec2bcf30 RBP: 0000000000000000 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 0000000000000010 R10: 00000000c0ed0001 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007fd9ec2bc040 R13: 00007fd9eb6b2380 R14: 00007fd9ec2bc210 R15: 00007fd9ec2bcf30 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This task was trying to mount the cdrom. It allocated and configured a super_block struct and owned the write-lock for the super_block->s_umount rwsem. While exclusively owning the s_umount lock, it called sr_block_ioctl and waited to acquire the global sr_mutex lock. PID: 6785 TASK: ffff880078720fb0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "systemd-udevd" #0 [ffff880078417898] __schedule at ffffffff8168d605 hardkernel#1 [ffff880078417900] schedule at ffffffff8168dc59 hardkernel#2 [ffff880078417910] rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffffff8168f605 hardkernel#3 [ffff880078417980] call_rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffffff81328838 hardkernel#4 [ffff8800784179d0] down_read at ffffffff8168cde0 hardkernel#5 [ffff8800784179e8] get_super at ffffffff81201cc7 hardkernel#6 [ffff880078417a10] __invalidate_device at ffffffff8123a8de hardkernel#7 [ffff880078417a40] flush_disk at ffffffff8123a94b hardkernel#8 [ffff880078417a88] check_disk_change at ffffffff8123ab50 hardkernel#9 [ffff880078417ab0] cdrom_open at ffffffffa00a29e1 [cdrom] hardkernel#10 [ffff880078417b68] sr_block_open at ffffffffa00b6f9b [sr_mod] hardkernel#11 [ffff880078417b98] __blkdev_get at ffffffff8123ba86 hardkernel#12 [ffff880078417bf0] blkdev_get at ffffffff8123bd65 hardkernel#13 [ffff880078417c78] blkdev_open at ffffffff8123bf9b hardkernel#14 [ffff880078417c90] do_dentry_open at ffffffff811fc7f7 hardkernel#15 [ffff880078417cd8] vfs_open at ffffffff811fc9cf hardkernel#16 [ffff880078417d00] do_last at ffffffff8120d53d hardkernel#17 [ffff880078417db0] path_openat at ffffffff8120e6b2 hardkernel#18 [ffff880078417e48] do_filp_open at ffffffff8121082b hardkernel#19 [ffff880078417f18] do_sys_open at ffffffff811fdd33 hardkernel#20 [ffff880078417f70] sys_open at ffffffff811fde4e hardkernel#21 [ffff880078417f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff81698c49 RIP: 00007f29438b0c20 RSP: 00007ffc76624b78 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffffffff81698c49 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00007f2944a5fa70 RSI: 00000000000a0800 RDI: 00007f2944a5fa70 RBP: 00007f2944a5f540 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 0000000000000020 R10: 00007f2943614c40 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffff811fde4e R13: ffff880078417f78 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 00007f2944a4b010 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This task tried to open the cdrom device, the sr_block_open function acquired the global sr_mutex lock. The call to check_disk_change() then saw an event flag indicating a possible media change and tried to flush any cached data for the device. As part of the flush, it tried to acquire the super_block->s_umount lock associated with the cdrom device. This was the same super_block as created and locked by the previous task. The first task acquires the s_umount lock and then the sr_mutex_lock; the second task acquires the sr_mutex_lock and then the s_umount lock. This patch fixes the issue by moving check_disk_change() out of cdrom_open() and let the caller take care of it. Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit fca3234 ] Executing command 'perf stat -T -- ls' dumps core on x86 and s390. Here is the call back chain (done on x86): # gdb ./perf .... (gdb) r stat -T -- ls ... Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00007ffff56d1963 in vasprintf () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) where #0 0x00007ffff56d1963 in vasprintf () from /lib64/libc.so.6 hardkernel#1 0x00007ffff56ae484 in asprintf () from /lib64/libc.so.6 hardkernel#2 0x00000000004f1982 in __parse_events_add_pmu (parse_state=0x7fffffffd580, list=0xbfb970, name=0xbf3ef0 "cpu", head_config=0xbfb930, auto_merge_stats=false) at util/parse-events.c:1233 hardkernel#3 0x00000000004f1c8e in parse_events_add_pmu (parse_state=0x7fffffffd580, list=0xbfb970, name=0xbf3ef0 "cpu", head_config=0xbfb930) at util/parse-events.c:1288 hardkernel#4 0x0000000000537ce3 in parse_events_parse (_parse_state=0x7fffffffd580, scanner=0xbf4210) at util/parse-events.y:234 hardkernel#5 0x00000000004f2c7a in parse_events__scanner (str=0x6b66c0 "task-clock,{instructions,cycles,cpu/cycles-t/,cpu/tx-start/}", parse_state=0x7fffffffd580, start_token=258) at util/parse-events.c:1673 hardkernel#6 0x00000000004f2e23 in parse_events (evlist=0xbe9990, str=0x6b66c0 "task-clock,{instructions,cycles,cpu/cycles-t/,cpu/tx-start/}", err=0x0) at util/parse-events.c:1713 hardkernel#7 0x000000000044e137 in add_default_attributes () at builtin-stat.c:2281 hardkernel#8 0x000000000044f7b5 in cmd_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe3b0) at builtin-stat.c:2828 hardkernel#9 0x00000000004c8b0f in run_builtin (p=0xab01a0 <commands+288>, argc=4, argv=0x7fffffffe3b0) at perf.c:297 hardkernel#10 0x00000000004c8d7c in handle_internal_command (argc=4, argv=0x7fffffffe3b0) at perf.c:349 hardkernel#11 0x00000000004c8ece in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe20c, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:393 hardkernel#12 0x00000000004c929c in main (argc=4, argv=0x7fffffffe3b0) at perf.c:537 (gdb) It turns out that a NULL pointer is referenced. Here are the function calls: ... cmd_stat() +---> add_default_attributes() +---> parse_events(evsel_list, transaction_attrs, NULL); 3rd parameter set to NULL Function parse_events(xx, xx, struct parse_events_error *err) dives into a bison generated scanner and creates parser state information for it first: struct parse_events_state parse_state = { .list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(parse_state.list), .idx = evlist->nr_entries, .error = err, <--- NULL POINTER !!! .evlist = evlist, }; Now various functions inside the bison scanner are called to end up in __parse_events_add_pmu(struct parse_events_state *parse_state, ..) with first parameter being a pointer to above structure definition. Now the PMU event name is not found (because being executed in a VM) and this function tries to create an error message with asprintf(&parse_state->error.str, ....) which references a NULL pointer and dumps core. Fix this by providing a pointer to the necessary error information instead of NULL. Technically only the else part is needed to avoid the core dump, just lets be safe... Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180308145735.64717-1-tmricht@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

odroid: Disable the exynos-mem block device on all ubuntu defconfigs
5337ab7
Also, fix permission on all odroid defconfigs (755 -> 644)

ghost assigned mdrjr Jan 16, 2013

hardkernel added a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 16, 2013
Merge pull request#11from Gu1-/odroid-3.0.y
958ea68
odroid: Disable the exynos-mem block device on all ubuntu defconfigs

hardkernel merged commit 958ea68 into hardkernel:odroid-3.0.yJan 16, 2013

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odroid: Disable the exynos-mem block device on all ubuntu defconfigs - #11

odroid: Disable the exynos-mem block device on all ubuntu defconfigs#11
hardkernel merged 1 commit into
hardkernel:odroid-3.0.yfrom
Gu1:odroid-3.0.y

Gu1 commented Jan 15, 2013

Uh oh!

mdrjr commented Jan 16, 2013

Uh oh!

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Gu1 commented Jan 15, 2013

Uh oh!

mdrjr commented Jan 16, 2013

Uh oh!

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